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Abstract 
Abstract 
This study mainly focuses on the compatibility of the international human rights with 
the diverse cultural and religious values of our world, in particular, the Islamic Shari'ah, 
consisting of values that not only extend across different regions but even form an 
important factor of legitimacy for most Islamic states. 
The study will extensively discuss the international conception of human rights and 
whether such rights are universal in character and hence applicable to all societies 
irrespective of their local values, or whether their local values are to a certain degree 
inevitable to establish real universal human rights with full realization of their essence. 
It will raise some religious and cultural matters that could form obstacles to the full 
realization of human rights, such as the complexity of the implementation of human 
rights under Islamic Shari'ah. It will also refer to traditional values and principles of the 
British common law, in which Parliament is the sovereign body accorded unrestrained 
power, which seems to pose the same difficulty that Islam could cause in human rights 
implementation. The study will demonstrate that the cultural tension with human rights 
is not exclusive to a certain culture but it is a result of the variety of diverse traditions of 
different nations that fonn our relativistic world. The study will suggest that although 
some of the local values of certain societies may raise tension with the principles and 
values of the current international trend of human rights, this does not mean that these 
local principles and values must be changed to comply. Rather, it may more 
appropriately be suggested that this developing notion of human rights should be 
reconsidered to make universal rights more universal and not relative to a certain 
regional part of the world. 
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Chapter One 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Identifying the Research Question 
The emergence of human rights law in the international sphere has unprecedentedly 
challenged the traditional international principle of state sovereignty. ' As will be seen 
later, international law doctrine, in matters related to human rights protection, goes 
beyond the principle of non-interference articulated in Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter, 
to hold states accountable for not acting positively to ensure rights. 2 However, this does 
not affect states' sovereign right to apply the law they choose within their jurisdiction 
according to their cultural, social and religious values. 3 The problem arises accordingly, 
of what happens if the state's national law, like the Islamic Shari'ah, contains principles 
raising serious tension with the international principles of human rights? Will the 
international human rights principles be applied irrespective of the national law of the 
state? Many authors stress that human rights are owed to every human being, simply 
because he is human, irrespective of the culture of the society he lives in and hence tend 
to press for the enforcement of international rights, even if they-are inconsistent with the 
cultural, religious and moral values of the state. 4 However, human rights are considered 
to be best secured by democracy, which is based on representation of the common 
beliefs of the members of the society concerned 5 and, hence, cultural legitimacy seems 
to be required for proper human rights implementation. As stated in the expert seminar 
1 Rehman, J., International Huntan Rights Lmv. a practical approach, London: Pearson Education, 2003, 
P. 1 
Michael J. Perry, The Idea ofHzinian Rights: Four Inquiries, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, 
r. 44 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, Report 
of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, December 2001, Available 
Online at http: //wwýv. iciss. ca/pdf/Commission-Reno!!. Pdf 
4 Howard, R. E., Human Rights and the Searchfor Community, Oxford: Westview Press, 1995, p. 57 
5 See Resolution 2003/36, see also The High Commissioner for Human Rights, Continuing dialogue on 
measures to promote and consolidate democracy, report submitted in accordance with Commission 
resolution 2001/4 1, E/CN. 4/2003/59,27 January 2003 
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held in accordance with human rights resolution 2001/41, people are only convinced by 
their own rich cultures, drawn from the deep roots of their own civilizations. 6 Hence, 
the"interdependence between democracy and human rights creates a pressing need for 
constructing dialogue between the international human rights principles and the state's 
local values to promote the realization of human rights world wide. This study, 
therefore, will mainly focus on the compatibility of the international human rights with 
the diverse cultural and religious values of our world, in particular, the Islamic Shari'ah, 
which seems to represent the most poiverful ideological force across the Muslim ivorld 
7 today. It will examine the question of whether states are allowed to exercise discretion 
in international rights implementation and whether the Islamic Shari'ah has the potential 
to accommodate human rights values. As democracy is always associated with human 
rights as an end in itself, 8 the study will raise the question whether the Islamic Shari'ah 
recognises democracy, which includes essential elements of limited government, like 
judicial independence and the rule of law. 
1.2. Literature Review 
The studies conducted in this area are divided into two themes: universalism which 
tends to uphold international human rights law without giving as much regard to the 
6 Ibid., paragraph 5 
7 Fuller, G. E., The Future of Political Islam, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 67. When the 
former president of Iran, the Shah, endeavoured to westernize the political life of Iran in a very radical 
way that rejected the very basic of Islamic Shari'ah, the result was the collapse of the regime through a 
Shiite revolution that brought about the current theocratic state. Price, D. E., Islamic Political Culture, 
Democracy, and Human Rights: a comparative study, Westport, Connectiut: Praeger, 1999, pp. 113-114. 
Algeria has suffered from political disorder, which was caused by its crucial decision to ban the Islamic 
party that had won the election in 1991. For more information about democracy in Algeria see Volpi, F., 
Islam and Democracy. The Failure qfDialogue in. 41geria, London: Pluto, 2003. 
8 The High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the second expert seminar "Democracy and the 
rule of law", report submitted in accordance with Commission resolution 2003/36, E/CN. 4/2005/58,18 
March 2005 
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cultural differences, and relativism which seems to stress the cultural legitimacy of - 
human rights standards as the only way for a proper application of human rights. From 
close examination of the universalist writings, a researcher may notice that although the 
universalist authors recognize the cultural differences which may conflict with 
international nonns, they do not seem to be as much inclined to resolve the areas of 
conflict by way of reconciliation, in appreciating cultural differences that are of 
fundamental importance in a given society, as they are by the way of elimination. 
Donnelly, for example, although he recognizes some variation in human rights 
implementation, is rather unclear on the extent of such variation. For example, he 
completely refuses to accept the Islamic punishment of amputation, no matter how 
humanely carried out, while he contends that execution is a subject of debate. Moreover, 
he seems to imply that although the Islamic ban on pictures which show women 
unveiled is permissible to preserve public morals, he considers it as discrimination 
against women's freedom of expression. 9 Mayer also asserted that Islamic law, as 
articulated by traditional Islamic fiqh, violates many of the international rights of 
women and hence must be changed in accordance with international standards. 10 
Bassarn Tibi, although he claimed to be aware of the need for a cultural basis for the 
implementation of human rights, seems in his writings to be more inclined to deny any 
aspect of Islain that has any connection with human rights. His main concern seems to 
be to assert that the modem human rights are a European tradition and that Islam must 
be compatible with such Western human rights. " 
9 See Donnelly, J., International Hunian Rights, Oxford: Westview Press, 1998, p. 133. See also Howard, 
R. E., op. cit., p. 56 
10 See Mayer, A. E. *, Islain and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics, Third Edition, Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1999, pp. 83- 96 
11 See Tibi, B., "The European Tradition of Human Rights and the Culture of Islam", In: An-Na'im, A. 
A., and Deng, F. M., (eds. ), Hunian Rights in Africa: Cross-Cullitral Perspectives, Washington, DC: The 
Brooking Institution, 1990, pp. 104-132 
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This language does not seem to be helpful to resolve the problem of implementation and 
non-compliance with international human rights law. It is not a question of what are the 
origins of rights, but whether the rights that exist are applicable. The real problem that 
appears to face states is how to implement such a universal concept, whatever its origin, 
in their constitutional settings, which are necessarily based on particular political, 
constitutional and cultural norms. This question seems to have been rarely tackled by 
the universalist authors. Rhoda Howard has argued, however, that the relativists confuse 
the principle with the practice in claiming that human rights are unattainable because in 
practice they are not protected worldwide. 12 Howard might be right in saying this; 
however, this does not really tackle the main difficulty in the implementation of 
international rights in constitutional settings where particular cultural values are 
fundamental, and a more receptive approach from the universalists would be required, if 
their values, as they call them, are to be successfully implemented. The question here is 
not whether human rights are attainable if they are not practised worldwide, but whether 
they are attainable if they do not have legitimacy when applied to particular societies 
and cultures. 
Some authors who have written about Islam and human rights, and who support the 
relativist approach to human rights implementation, have exerted notable efforts in this 
regard; yet, they differ in their methods of reform. ' 3 An-Naim, for example, although he 
12 See Howard, R. E., op. cit., 1995, p. 53 
13 Baderin, M., International Hunian Rights and Islamic Lmv, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
An-Na'im, A. A ...... Area Expressions" and the Universality of Human Rights: mediating a contingent 
relationship", In: Forsythe, D. and McMahon, P., (eds. ), Human Rights and Diversity: area studies 
revisited, London: University of Nebraska Press, 2003. An-Naim, A. A., "Toward a Cross-Cultural 
Approach to Defining International Standards of Human Rights: the meaning of cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment", in: An-Na'im, (ed. ), A., Human Rights it? Cross-Cultural 
Perspectives: a questionfor consensus, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995. Ali, S., 
Gender and Human Rights in Islam and International Lmv: equal before Allah unequal before man, 
London: Kluwer Law International, 2000. Haider, S. M., (ed. ), Islamic Concept offfitman Rights, Lahore: 
The Book House, 1978. Said, A., and Nasser, J., "The Use and Abuse of Democracy in Islam", In: 
Nelson, J. L., and Green, V. M., (eds. ), International Human Rights: contemporary issues, New York: 
4 
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is a primary supporter of cultural legitimacy, seems to be following the same - 
universalist approach in resolving the conflict between Islam and human rights. He has 
proposed a new approach of reinterpretation of the Quran and Sunna to fit the modem 
social, economic, and political circumstances, in which he would abolish some Islamic 
principles like qcnvanza and dhininia. 14 It seems to me that this position itself needs 
cultural legitimacy in the Muslim world; as he, himself, suggests, An-Naim's version of 
Islamic law would be "appreciated by only a tiny minority ofcontemporary Muslim. " 15 
Baderin, in contrast, has focused his work on the Islamicfiqh, Islamic jurisprudence, of 
different Islamic schools, pointing out that Islam might differ from the international 
standards but this does not mean it is incompatible with them. He has drawn attention to 
significant techniques such as Siyasah shariyyah (legitimate governmental policy), 6 
inaqasid al-Shariah (the ultimate objective of the Shari'ah) 17 and takhayyur (eclectic 
choice)18 that can be used to reach a convergence with international norms, but rightly 
pointed out that a reconciliation cannot be done without a receptive approach on the part 
of the international human rights scholars as well. 19 However, in discussing the relation 
of Islamic political ideology to the liberal theory of human rights that is based on the 
principle of limited government, it may be necessary to raise a different dimension that 
is of a more complex nature. Does Islam recognize the doctrine of constitutionalism and 
democracy, which has been internationally recognized aý the basis for human rights 
protection? Baderin's book, International Human Rights and Islamic Lmv, did not 
Human Rights Publishing Group, 1980. Malik, M. I., "The Concept of Human Rights in Islamic 
Jurisprudence", Hinnan Rights Quarterly, 1981. Karnali, H. M., Freedom of Expression in Islani, 
Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1997. 
14 Cited in Steiner, H., and Alston, P., ( eds. ), International Human Rights in Context, Second Edition, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 396 
15 Ibid., p. 392 
16 Baderin, M., op. cit., p. 53 
17 See the footnote in Ibid., pp. 50-51 
18 Ibid., 46 
19See Baderin's conclusion in Ibid., p. 219 
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provide a detailed examination of the concept of democracy and constitutionalism in - 
Islam. 
Many international advocates of human rights who consider the Islamic values 
incompatible with the modem values of democratic and constitutional states usually 
assert their points with reference to the unhealthy practice of the current Islamic states. 20 
However, most of the Islamic states that are usually referred to in this regard seem to be 
either states that are experiencing political disorder and economic problems, like Sudan 
and Pakistan, or those which hold an extreme understanding of Islam, like Saudi Arabia 
and Iran. 21 Moreover, many studies do not seem to take into account the fact that most 
governments of those Islamic states like Iran, Syria, Sudan, Iraq and Libya, which are 
referred to as places where the situation of human rights is grave, came to power 
through military upheaval. It is important to take this into account, since a government 
which came to power through military revolution is likely to take, especially if it is not 
based on democratic values, the form of a police state that is always concerned with its 
security rather- than respect for individual rights, as it is always in fear of another 
revolution. So Islam is not necessarily the factor for the totalitarian attitude of 
governance in many Islamic states. 
20 See Mayer, A. E., op. cit., 1999, pp. 149-173. Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat also cites the Islamic states' 
practices and reservations on the Women's convention to illustrate the cultural obstacle to full realization 
of women's rights. Arat, Z. F. K., "Promoting Women's Rights against Patriarchal Cultural Claims: the 
women's convention and reservations by Muslim states", In: Forsythe, D. and McMahon, P., op. cit., pp. 
242,243. Moreover, Emile Sahliyeh in her study refers to Islamic states' practices and concludes that the 
Islamic conservative understanding is the reason for incompatibility with human rights. See Sahliyeh, E., 
"The State of Human Rights in the Middle East: prospect and challenges", In: Forsythe, D. and 
McMahon, P., op. cit., pp. 252-275. 
21 See Sardar, A. S., A Comparative Study of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all 
Fornis of Discrimination against Women, Islamic Lmv and the Lenvs of Pakistan, [s. l. : s. n. ], 1995. See 
Sardar, A. S, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Islamic Itnv and Pakistan 
legislation: a comparative study, [s. l. : s. n. ], 1994. See Uichol, K., Henriette, S., and Shirin, E., 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Islain in Modern frail. psychological social, and cultural perspectives, 
Bergen: Fagbok for Laget, 2003. See Lefebvre, A., Islanz, Human Rights and Child Labour in Pakistan, 
Copenhagen: NIAS Books, 1995. See Simons, G. L., SaudiArabia: the shape of a clientfeudalisnil Geoff 
Shnons, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998. 
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Another feature of many human rights studies concerned with human rights - 
implementation in Islamic states is that they seem to be concerned solely with the 
comparison among the Islamic states themselves, without referring to other nations 
which have made notable efforts in resolving their traditional obstacles to the full 
realization of human rights. Mayer referred in her study to the Iranian constitution and 
the practices of Sudan and Saudi Arabia to show the denial of human rights in Islamic 
law, but she did not propose any reformative approach, other than elimination of the 
values of Islam recognised by the traditional Islamicji'qh to promote certain views about 
Islam, articulated by a handful of modem human rights authors. 22 Zehra F. Kabasakal 
Arat also cites the Islamic states' practices and reservations on the Women's convention 
to illustrate the cultural obstacle to full realization of women's rights. However, she 
mixes the states, whether Islamic or secular, Arab or non-Arab, in the same group, 
claiming that Islamic Shari'ah still represents a barrier to the implementation of women 
rights, even in Islamic states that have undergone some sort of secularization, since 
family law has never been changed. 23 However, she does not refer to Tunisia, where 
family law has to a large extent been altered and where women are still being 
aggressively oppressed and their rights of expression and to free choice, particularly of 
warring hyab, are being grossly violated. 24 She admits, though, that religion is not the 
main obstacle and she suggests that international economic and political inequalities, 
militarism, lack of development, authoritarian politics, and inadequate legal structures, 
play a key role in the subjection and secondary status of women. 25 Among these 
elements, Zehra does not seem to be clear to what extent Islam affects the 
22 See Mayer, A. E., op. cit., 1999, pp. 98-130 
23 Arat, Z. F. K., "Promoting Women's Rights against Patriarchal Cultural Claims: the women's 
convention and reservations by Muslim states", In: Forsythe, D. and McMahon, P., op. cit., pp. 242-243 
24 Al-Hamroni, M., Tunisian Activist to Internationalize Hyab Ban, 19-Jan-2006, Available Online at 
htti2: Hislanionline. net/English/News/2006-01/19/,, irticleO3. shtml. For more discussion about democracy 
and human rights in Tunisia see Price, E. D., op. cit., pp., 75-84 
25 Arat, Z. F. K., op. cit., pp. 231-251 see in particular p. 243. 
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implementation of human rights. Emile Sahliyeh has also mixed states, secular and - 
Islamic, Arab and non-Arab, together and concluded that the Islamic conservative 
26 
understanding is the reason for incompatibility with human rights. If it is claimed that 
Islam is responsible for the non-compliance with human rights in states where Islam is 
the dominant law, it cannot be claimed that Islam is also the deciding factor in states 
where it is considered as secondary law. So, a reference to states without taking into 
account their political and constitutional nature could be confusing. 
On the other hand, Daniel E. Price has intensively examined eight countries- Egypt, 
Jordan, Syria, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Algeria, and Iran as case studies that 
represent different relationships between Islam and politics and concluded that Islam is 
not a factor for the current political crisis in the Islamic states or predominantly Muslim 
countries. Rather, he asserted that the greater the influence of Islam in political life, the 
higher the level of democracy becomes, and the less the influence of Islam on 
government, the higher the level of oppression. 27 However, the study was merely 
concerned with the relationship between democracy and Islam. It did not tackle the 
potential tension that might arise from the application of democracy and human rights in 
the Islamic states where the Islamic Shari'ah is the dominant law. The term "Islamic 
state" is used in this study not just to describe states that are mostly occupied by 
Muslims, but to describe those states which constitutionally recognize Islamic Shari'ah 
as a principal source of legislation; a point which may raise not only cultural but also 
constitutional tension with the current international trend of human rights. 28 
26 See Sahliyeh, E., "The State of Human Rights in the Middle East: prospect and challenges", In: 
Forsythe, D. and McMahon, P., op. cit., pp. 252-275. 
27 See Price, E. D., op. cit., p., 137-156 
28Examples of these states are UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Iran. See Article 7 of the UAE Constitution 
which states "Islam is the official religion ofthe Federation. The Islamic Shari'ah shall be a main source 
of legislation in the Federation... " See Article I of Qatar constitution which states that "Qatar is an 
independent Arab state. Islam is the State's religion and the Islamic Shariah is the main source of its 
legislations... " See Article 7 of the basic law of Saudi Arabia which states that "The regime derives. its 
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1.3. Research Methodology 
In the light of the above- noted shortcomings of previous writings, there is a need for an 
Islamic reformative approach that preserves the fundamentals of Islam with a receptive 
position toward international norms, seeking assistance from other nations that have 
undergone such a process of reconciliation of their traditions with the international 
principles. In this study I will focus on the United Arab Emirates as a primary case 
study representing a moderate Islamic state. 
The United Arab Emirates is a federal state established on 2 "d December, 1971. As a 
federal state, the UAE by nature embraces a clear political identity with clear 
distribution of powers between its federal and local authorities. The UAE's constitution 
contains many rights and freedoms similar to those contained in the UN human rights 
instruments, like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two UN Covenants 
on Human Rights, 29 and yet the Islamic Shari'ah is considered the supreme source of 
legislation. 30 The constitutional recognition of the rights and freedoms in the text of the 
poiverftoni the Holy Quran and the Prophet's Sunna which rule over this and all other State La-ivs. " See 
Article 4 of Iran constitution which states that ", 411 civil, penal financial economic, administrative, 
cultural, military, political, and other laws and regulations inust be based on Islamic criteria. This 
principle applies absolutely and generally to all articles of the Constitution as ivell as to all other lmvs 
and regulations, and thefiiqahaofthe Guardian Council arejudges it? this matter. " 
29 Rights and freedoms have been stated in Parts Two and Three of the UAE Constitution. Although the 
UN Report 2002 has shown the failure of the Arab countries in securing the rights and freedoms of their 
own people, it indicated the advanced level that the UAE occupied within the Arab countries, in respect 
of the freedoms enjoyed and in relation to women's role in society. See UN Arab Human Development 
Report 2002, p. 25,26. In addition, the UAE, according to the UN Human Development report 2005, has 
achieved a high level of human development, coming in 41 st place world wide, and being the second top 
state in the Arab region. See UN Human Development Report 2005, p. 219. In November 2004, the 
United Arab Emirates named its first ever woman minister. In the recent cabinet two women ministers 
have been appointed to serve two ministries; the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Economy. 
See. Khaleej Times Online, New UAE Cabinet hailed, II February 2006, Available Online at 
bttp: //www. khaleejtimes. com/Displayarticle. asp? section=theuae&xfile=data/theuae/2006/february/thcuae 
_february3l3. 
xml This is a sign of the state's realization of the importance of women's involvement in 
the public domain. 
30 See Article 7 of the constitution which states that "Islam is the official religion of the Federation. The 
Islamic Shariah shall be a main source of legislation in the Federation. The official language of the 
Federation is 4rabic. " This Article will be discussed in chapter four where it will be shown that 
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UAE constitution was a significant step in keeping the basic law of the state in line with - 
the international movement towards stronger protection for human rights. 31 However, 
the application of the Shari'ah law as the supreme law in the land seems to raise tension, 
in the implementation, with some of the rights and freedoms recognised in the 
constitution if they were to be applied in accordance with international supervision. For 
example, Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights implies that everyone 
is entitled to all rights and freedoms set forth in the declaration, without any kind of 
distinction on such grounds as sex or religion. However, the rules of Islamic Shari'ah 
recognised in the UAE constitution do in fact distinguish between people on the 
grounds of religion. That is, the principles and rules of Islamic law are entirely based on 
a religious criterion and, as a result, are designed to govern the conduct of relations 
between Muslims and non-Muslims, regardless of all other criteria which are taken into 
account by the relevant principles of the international doctrine of human rights. 32 
However, according to the literature in this area, it appears that it is not only Islamic 
principles that have tension with international rights, but also some Western traditions 
have formed strong obstacles to the full implementation of the international human 
rights. The UK constitutional system, for example, has no separation of powers between 
according to the Federal UAE Constitutional Court interpretation of the Article the Islamic Shari'ah is the 
V 
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rincipal source of legislation. 
Although the UAE has not signed the two UN Covenants on Human Rights, it has ratified some 
important human rights treaties, like conventions concerning labour rights, such as the Convention 
Concerning Forced Labour 1930, the Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration 1951, the Convention 
Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour 1957, and the Convention Concerning Minimum Age 1973. It 
has also ratified the International 'Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
1966, and the Unite Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989. It has very recently ratified the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Fofms of Discrimination against Women 1979. See the UN High 
Commission of Human Rights website, Available Online at 
http: //www. unhchr. ch/tbs/doc. nsf/newhvstatusbycoiintrv? OpenView&Start=l &Count=250&Expand=I 83 
#183 
32 Therefore, the UAE has been found by the Amnesty International to have Islamic principles in a clear 
tension with the international rights, in particular, flogging and the discrimination in marriage between 
Muslim and non-Muslim. See, for example, Imprisonment and Flogging for Marriage Across Faiths: 
The Case of Elie Dib Ghaleb, Amensty International, MDE 25/003/1997, Available Online at 
http: //iveb. amnesty. org/library/index/ENGMDE250031997 
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the legislature and the executive organ 33 and both powers ar .e conferred on Parliament, 
whose Act is absolutely sovereign and the courts have no power but to apply it in a way 
that does not conflict with Parliament's intention in issuing the Act. 34 This British 
conception of majoritarian democracy, based on parliament legislative monopoly, 35 
seems to contradict the international human rights requirement of holistic democracy 
which is based on the rights of majority and minority alike, as well as the abhorrence of 
concentraflon of powers. 36 Nothing, under the British constitution, can stop Parliament 
from issuing legislation contrary to the basic individual rights. 37 The British doctrine of 
the supremacy of Parliament has been described by some authors as "elected 
dictatorship',. 38 Although the special legal status of the European Convention on Human 
Rights has pushed the British to a constitutional reform and compromise, as will be seen 
throughout the study, such a compromise was not at the expense of the British 
Parliamentary Sovereignty. The UK tried to balance between the two principles which 
are of fundamental importance, the sovereignty of Parliament and the protection of 
human rights, and the Human Rights Act 1998 was the fruit of such effort. However, 
the UK, as will be seen in this study, does not depart from its great traditions in tackling 
international principles, even those that require some sort of modification of the 
constitutional system. Rather, British politicians and lawyers always apply the 
international standards and requirements in a way that complies with the British 
traditions. 
33 Parpworth, N., Constitutional and Administrative Lmv, Second Edition, London: Butterworths, 2002, p. 
21 
34 Dicey, A., Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, Eighth Edition, London: Macmillan, 
193 1, p. 60 
35 For more information about Parliament's legislative monopoly see Lord Lester, "Human Rights and 
the British Constitution", In: Jowell, J., Oliver, D., The Changing Constitution, Fourth Edition, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 89-110 
36 Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/47, Promoting and consolidating democracy, 
AIRES12000147 
37 Dicey, op. cit., pp. 46-47 
38 Lord Lester, op. cit., 2000, p. 90 
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There is a clear linkage between the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty and the , 
supremacy of the Shari'ah law in the United Arab Emirates, in that they both form an 
obstacle to the full realization of human rights. Dicey, himself, long ago made such a 
comparison between the two when he endeavoured to justify the sovereignty of the 
British Parliament of Westminster. In his illustration of the internal limitation, Dicey 
stated, "The Sultan could not if he would change the religion of the Mahommedan 
world, but ffhe could do so it is in the very highest degree improbable that the head of 
Mahommedanisin should ivish to overthrow the religion of Mahoinet. 09 Similarly, if 
the British legislature, Dicey argued, "... decided that all blue-eyed babies should be 
murdered, the preservation of blue-eyed babies would be illegal; but legislatures must 
go mad before they could pass such a 1mv, and subjects be idiotic before they could 
submit to it. 114O 
The study, therefore, will use the UK as an example of a state that endeavours to secure 
its political stability through recognizing the importance of traditions and, at the same 
time, accommodates the very well recognized international norms of human rights, 
without affecting the fundamentals of both. This mutual treatment of the state's 
traditional fundamentals and the international law requirements, exercised by one of the 
most developed countries, politically and economically, among Western nations, and 
one which has participated strongly in forming most parts of international law, indicates 
that the possibility of reconciling human rights norms and the UAE's constitutional 
principles, which are rooted in the teaching of Islam, is wide open. 
It is worth noting that the main point of referring to the UK constitutional system, here, 
is not to make a comparison between the supremacy of Islamic legal rules of the 
39 Dicey, A., op. cit., p, 80 
4D Ibid., p, 81 
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Shari'ah and the supremacy of Acts of Parliament, since Acts of Parliament inconsistent - 
with human rights in the UK can easily be amended by Parliament, while the Islamic 
legislature cannot change the fixed legal rules of Islamic Shari'ah. Rather, the reference, 
here, is mainly to the ideological and constitutional aspects of the UK constitutional 
principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty, with all this may imply of legal rules 
inconsistent with human rights, which Parliament itself cannot change. This may assist 
in tackling the constitutional principle of the supremacy of Islamic Shari'ah that God is 
the supreme lawgiver, with all this may imply of rules inconsistent with human rights, 
which the Islamic legislature cannot change. Hence, it is not a straight comparative 
work but one that derives lessons and demonstrates the wider application of the issue of 
values when it comes to the domestic implementation of human rights. 
The different writings of international lawyers and jurists on international public law in 
general and on international human rights in particular will be utilised in this study. The 
opinions of the International Court of Justice, alongside UN resolutions and the 
decisions of the Human Rights Committee, will also be used as primary sources of the 
research. The study will also analyse other regional and national cases to help in 
assessing the matter from different perspectives. It will extensively use English books 
and journals, especially in the area of constitutional democracy. 
As regards the Islamic conception of human rights, reference will be made to the 
principal primary sources of the Shariah (Islamic Law), the Quran and Sunna, and to 
the work of Muslim jurists. This study will rely extensively on the interpretations of 
prominent traditional Muslim scholars such as 41shafi, Abu Hanefah, al-Mmvardi, Ibn 
Tayndyah, and others whose opinions are most respected in the Muslim world. It will 
also discuss the interpretations of some well known modem scholars like al-Qaradcnvi. 
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However, the Islamic Shari'ah may need to be examined in a broad perspective, taking 
into account the contribution of international law, favouring democracy and stronger 
protection of human rights within constitutional settings. By addressing such matters, it 
may be possible to identify elements which could create a constitutional environment 
conducive to better human rights implementation in the Islamic states. 
1.4. Outline of the Research 
Chapter Two: Human Rights, Constitutional Democracy and the Tension with 
Constitutional and Religious Principles 
This chapter will consider the legal status of human rights in public international law. 
The chapter will also tackle the international conception of human rights and whether 
such rights are universal in character or culturally relative. The constitutional basis of 
human rights implementation in the realm of constitutional democracy will also be 
examined. In this chapter, a number of questions will be raised; questions as to what a 
constitution should do to enhance democracy, how it should protect and promote human 
rights and how international law contributes to improve human rights in constitutional 
settings. It will discuss the idea of constitutionalism in which the two most important 
elements of limited government will be analysed: the principle of separation of powers 
and the rule of law. The chapter will also discuss the developments in international law 
in favour of democracy and human rights protection within constitutional settings. It 
will raise some religious and cultural matters that could form obstacles to the full 
realization of human rights, such as the complexity of the implementation of human 
rights under Islamic Shari'ah. It will also refer to traditional values and principles of the 
British common law, in which Parliament is the sovereign body accorded unrestrained 
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power, which seems to pose the same difficulty that Islam could cause in human rights - 
implementation. 
Chapter Three: Islam, Human Rights, and Democracy 
This chapter will first examine the meaning of Islam within the political context. It will 
also discuss the Islamic recognition of democracy and consider to what extent the 
doctrine of constitutionalism is recognised in Islamic teaching. This chapter will point 
out a legal technique recognised in the Islamic fiqh, called Siyasah Shariyyah, which 
affirms the timeless nature of Islam and which can be used to accommodate some 
international norms of human rights. The areas of conflict between Islam and the current 
conception of human rights will be analysed. An attempt will be made to clarify the 
position of the individual within the Islamic state's system, which, I hope, will give a 
clear understanding about why some rights and freedoms in Islam are dealt with in a 
manner often considered unsatisfactory by non-Muslims. 
Chapter Four: The UAE Islamic Constitution and the International Requirements 
of Human Rights Protection 
Having discussed the theory of human rights from two perspectives, the international 
law perspective and the Islamic perspective, this chapter will focus on the United Arab 
Emirates as a primary case study of an Islamic state. The constitutional structure of the 
UAE will be discussed to check whether or not the basic structure of human rights 
protection is recognised. The UAE's strong constitutional recognition of the Shari'ah 
law as the supreme law in the land will also be examined and it will be shown that such 
recognition was not an obstacle to the UAE's embracing the modem constitutional 
values of a modem state. The chapter will highlight where the Islamic Shari'ah could 
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pose difficulty to the full realization of human rights, which do not seem to go beyond 
the legal perspective. 
Chapter Five: Implementing International Human Rights Standards in our 
Relativistic World 
In this chapter we will try to learn from the United Kingdom, which has greatly 
contributed to the formation of the current international law of human rights, even 
though it happens to have a constitutional tradition that raises great difficulty for the 
implementation of human rights. The chapter will discuss the British judicial efforts to 
reconcile the traditional common law values with the changing international norms. It 
will also give consideration to the legislative step undertaken by the British government 
to bring the British constitutional system into line with the requirements of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. This chapter will give a detailed analysis of 
how the British experience can be of benefit for the reconciliation between Islamic 
Shari'ah and the international human rights requirements. The European doctrine of 
margin of appreciation will be examined, along with the question of whether the 
doctrine can be of use to accommodate Islamic values on the world level. 
Chapter Six: Conclusion: findings of the research 
This chapter is the conclusion of the research, which provides a final discussion and a 
summary of the findings, together with some critical remarks and recommendations. 
The study will show that although human rights have internationally been recognized in 
various declarations and treaties, there is no international fixed model of right 
implementation. The UK experience on the implementation of European Convention 
rights shows that disagreement over such a contestable matter is difficult to 
accommodate even on the regional level, where societies are supposed to have shared 
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common values. So it is unsurprising to see such a controversy on human rights matter - 
in international level. The Islamic variation in the implementation of human rights is 
just another difference of many that may exist in our modem world, which contains 
diverse social, cultural and religious principles. Islam is not necessarily an obstacle to 
the full realization of human rights. The basic views of the importance of human life 
and dignity embodied in the international human rights instruments are recognised in 
the Islamic Shari'ah. The study appeals, therefore, for reconsideration of the 
international human rights discourse, suggesting that the use of domestic values to a 
certain degree is inevitable to establish real universal human rights with full realization 
of their essence. The study also calls upon the Islamic authors to reconsider their 
discourse and be more receptive to the internationally recognised values of human 
rights. Both international human rights bodies and Islamic states, along with the Islamic 
scholars, should embrace a complementary approach for the promotion of human rights 
in the Islamic states. Such a complementary approach can be achieved internationally 
through making use of the doctrine of margin of appreciation and Islarnically through 
making use of the Islamic doctrine of Siyasah Sharijyah, the legitimate governmental 
policy. A common Islamic approach on clear standards of human rights implementation 
through regional arrangement would also help to eliminate the complexity that may be 
raised from the conflicting Islamic views on democracy and human rights, which 
ultimately would enhance human rights in the Islamic states. 
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Chapter Two 
11. Human Rights, Constitutional Democracy and the Tension with 
Constitutional and Religious Principles 
11.1. Introduction 
Human rights as embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are a very 
broad and-contestable concept. As some argue, the current functioning of international 
human rights has not been given official definitive theoretical foundations, justifying 
their existence, but rather they have been simply declared in international documents as 
a set of values. 41 What exactly does right really mean? Does it mean natural right that is 
based on the law of nature and hence applicable irrespective of culture or social 
context? Or is it rooted in the positive law and hence a creation of the state sovereign 
body? The theoretical basis of rights is still a matter of debate among international 
human rights authors. 42 The dominant theme in the UN human rights objective has been 
whether the human rights in the modem conception are group based, in the sense that 
41 It has been argued that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the founding document of modem 
human rights, has not provided a theoretical basis, like other earlier declarations of rights. It does not, like 
the American Declaration of Independence, hold that people are "endowed by their Creator" with certain 
rights, or, like the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, describe human rights as "natural" and 
"sacred. " After a prefatory reference to the "inherent dignity" of all human beings, the Universal 
Declaration simply declares certain values to be human rights. See Beitz, C., "What Human Rights 
Mean", Vol. 132.1 Daedalus, 2003, p. 36 
42 Some support the argument that human rights have their origin in the philosophy of natural law. The 
doctrine of natural law holds that there are laws of nature beyond positive law implying certain natural 
and inalienable rights of men. See Robertson, A., and Merrills, J., Human Rights in the World- an 
introduction to the study of the international protection of human rights, Fourth Edition, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1996 p. 3. However, others argue that this notion of natural right is not 
actually the current function of the theory of human rights. Human rights is not serving as a theory of 
legitimacy- the divine right of a king is not legitimate if he does not satisfy the natural rights of his 
citizens- but they have become part of an effort to develop standards of achievement with respect to 
citizens'rights within an international community. See Sidorsky, D., "Contemporary Reinterpretations of 
the Concept of Human Rights", In: Sidorsky (ed. ), Essay on Human Rights: contemporary issues and 
Jewish perspectives, Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1979, p. 89. As Bentham 
noted, "Rights is the child oflaw; from real law come real rights; butfrom imaginary laws, from "laws of 
nature ", come imaginary rights... " Cited in Steiner, H., and Alston, P., op. cit., p. 326 
1 
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community is the basic social unit, or individualistic in nature, regardless of cultural or - 
social context. 43 
This generality of the human rights concept sets forth different aspirations, which 
subsequently confers on them different dimensions. It is a combination of rights that are 
associated with individuals, like rights to life, liberty, and security of the person; rights 
that are associated with the rule of law, like the right to a fair trial; rights that are 
associated with politics, like the right to take part in the government of the country and 
to periodic and genuine elections; rights that are associated with economic rights, 
including free choice of employment, and health care; and rights that are associated with 
the communities, like self-determination. 44 It is worth noting that while the international 
community has already recognised the binding nature of these rights through the 
international human rights instruments, states, as will be seen below, have not yet 
reached consensus on their substantive scope and, hence, their implementation in states' 
constitutional and legal systems is still uncertain. 
Thus, as human rights is a broad and complex concept with different dimensions, this 
chapter will be extensive and will tackle human rights from different perspectives. The 
chapter will be divided into three sections. The first section will discuss human rights 
from an international law perspective. The legal status of human rights in international 
law will be examined, and the philosophical debate about the nature of human rights- 
whether it is universal or culturally relative- will be presented. The relative nature of 
human rights will be emphasized, as this might be the only way for their proper 
implementation in state constitutional settings, and may well be the prerequisite of the 
43 See Pollis, A., "A New Universalism", In: Pollis, A., Schwab, P., and Rienner, L., (eds. ), Himian 
Rights: newperspeclives, neiv realities, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000, pp. 9-27 
44 Beitz, C., op. cit., pp. 37-39 
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doctrine of holistic democracy that is being emphasized by the international - 
instruments. 45 
In the second section, the tension between societies' cultural values and international 
principles of human rights will be examined. The discussion will focus on two systems 
that could create great difficulty to the full implementation of international human rights 
which are the Islamic Shari'ah system and the UK constitutional tradition of common 
law. As the Islamic Shari'ah will be discussed in more detail in chapter three, at this 
point the main focus will be on the British constitutional system and its traditional 
principle which forms an obstacle to the full realization of human rights, specifically 
those contained in the European Convention on Human Rights. It will be shown that the 
cultural tension with human rights, as the British experience of human rights 
implementation seems to suggest, is not exclusive to the non-Western nations but is a 
result of the variety of diverse traditions of different nations that form our modem 
world. 
The third section of the chapter will discuss human rights from a constitutional 
perspective. In this part we will examine whether constitutions really matter for the 
enhancement of human rights. The idea of constitutionalism will be discussed and the 
two most important elements of limited government will be analysed: the principle of 
separation of powers and the rule of law. Consideration will also be given to the role of 
culture in the constitution and how can that affect the implementation of international 
human rights. 
45 Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/41, Continuing dialogue on measures to promote and 
consolidate democracy, AIRES12001141 
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The chapter will demonstrate the need to accommodate people's local beliefs and 
traditions for proper implementation of the international human rights. A relativist 
approach to human rights might be necessary, either because of the nature of political 
rights as claims curbing the state's authority which necessarily require, as will be seen, 
social recognition, or due to international standards which emphasise holistic 
democracy based on self-determination and rooted in cultural values and spiritual 
traditions from all parts of the world. 
11.2. International Conception of Human Rights 
11.2.1. International Human Rights Law 
One of the most significant changes in the era of human rights is actually the very 
mention of the term in the United Nations' Charter, which reaffirms faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person. 46 Although the Charter has 
not provided a clear definition of what "human rights" constitute, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) has carried out the process of defining human 
rights, emphasising their universal character. 47 Although the UDHR was not a binding 
treaty, it has been acknowledged by a great number of scholars that it has become the 
source of inspiration and 'the basis for the United Nations in making advances in 
standard setting as contained in the existing international human rights instruments' 
such as the two covenants of human rights, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
46 The preamble of the United Nations Charter reads: "We the peoples of the United Nations 
determined .. to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and ... to promote social progress 
and better standards of life in larger freedom" 
47 For more information on the binding nature of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as part of 
customary law see Humphrey, J., P., "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: its history, impact and 
juridical character", In: Ramcharan, B., G., (ed. ), Human Rights: thirty years after the universal 
declaration, London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979. 
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48 Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The two international covenants, the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR, elucidate the principles of UDHR and have transformed many of the human 
rights principles into binding treaties, lying down legally binding rights on the state 
parties. 49 Some scholars have gone even further and suggested that, in spite of the fact 
that the two covenants on human rights are recognized as treaties which are supposed to 
be binding only on the state parties, because of the nature of their content which relates 
to all human beings, they may be regarded as codifying pre-existing customary rules 
50 
and, hence, might be seen as binding treaties to states not parties to the covenants. 
However, it has been suggested that the most transformative aspect of the human rights 
regime for the international system is not found in the growth of its legal instruments 
but in its impact on a fundamental principle of international relations, which is based on 
the concept of state sovereignty articulated in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. 51 Many 
scholars agree that the individual by virtue of being human is entitled to certain 
unalienable rights and freedoms, irrespective of the law of the state to which he 
belongs. " The state is no longer sovereign in the domain of human rights and cannot 
claim exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. 53 As Thomas Jefferson asserted, his 
countrymen were a 'firee people claitning their rights as derivedfrom the laivs ofnature 
and not as the gift of their Chief Magistrate". 54 Many experts seem to suggest that the 
48 Hegarty, A., and Leonardo, S., Hunian Rights: an agenda for the 21st century, London: Cavendish 
Publishing Limited, 1999. p. 6 
49 Coicaud, J., Doyle, M., and Gardner, A., The Globalization of Hunlan Rights, New York: United 
Nations University Press, 2003, p. 2 
50 For more discussion about extending the obligation of a treaty beyond the contracting states see 
Meron, T., Human Rights and Humanitarian Nornis as Customary Lenv, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, 
V ý. 89-93 
52 
Coicaud, J., Doyle, M., and Gardner, A., op. cit., p. 3 
53 
Robertson, A., and Merrills, J., op. cit., p. I 
Daes, E., Status of the Individual and contemporary International Lcnv: promotion, protection and 
restoration of human rights at national, regional and international level, New York: United Nations, 
Centre for Human Rights, 1992, p. 21 
54 Quoted in Steiner, H., and Alston, P., op. cit., p. 325. However, this notion of natural right, as we will 
see below, is not actually the current function of the theory of human rights. Human rights are now part of 
an effort to develop standards of achievement within an international community. 
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modem conception of human rights challenges the traditional concept of state 
sovereignty, exposing domestic human rights abuses, even those perpetrated by a 
government against its own people, to international scrutiny. 55 UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan declared in his comment on international interventions in Kosovo and East 
Timor that "State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined... States are 
now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice 
versa... [while] individual sovereignty - by which I mean the findamental fteedom of 
each individual, enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and subsequent 
international treaties - has been enhanced by a reneived and spreading consciousness 
of individual rights. 1156 
This revolutionary step of making individuals subjects of international law, and 
conferring on them some direct rights, has unbalanced the traditional relationship 
between international. law and domestic law and seems to have weakened the dualistic 
theory of dealing with the international norms. It is now difficult to accept, in the 
domain of human rights protection, the dualist argument that the state law is distinct 
from the international law, in that they are derived from different sources and deal with 
different subjeCtS. 57 'It is now the individual who really lies at the root of the unity ofall 
55 Coicaud, J., Doyle, M., Gardner, A., op. cit., p. 3 
56 Kofi Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty, " The Economist, 18 September 1999, cited in Coicaud, J., 
Doyle, M., and Gardner, A., op. cit., p. 1 
57 Starke QC, Introduction to International Lenp, Tenth Edition, London: Butterworths, 1989, p. 72. Starke 
has reported that the two legal systems have two fundamental differences: a. the subjects of state law are 
individuals, while the subjects of intemational law are states solely and exclusively. b. the source of state 
law is the will of the state itself, while the source of international law is the common will (Gemeinivill) of 
states. It has been argued, however, that the monist-dualist controversy is unreal, artificial and strictly 
beside the point. See Malanczuk, P., op. cit., p. 64 In reality the monist-dualist theory does not seem to 
reflect the actual state practice and therefore fails to produce a conclusive answer on the true relationship 
between international law and municipal law. For example, Article 6 of the United States constitution 
seems to reflect the monistic approach, in that it regards treaties signed by the government as the highest 
law in the land; however the judicial practice gives a different impression as the US Supreme Court has 
classified treaties into two categories; self-executing treaties, which are regarded as part of national law 
and the courts must apply them without any need for further procedures of incorporation, and non self- 
executing treaties, which need to be incorporated by legislation to be judicially applicable. See Lillich, R. 
B., "The Constitution and International Human Rights", 83 The American Journal oftiternational Lcnv, 
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1(nV, 58 and the protected sovereignty has become 'the people's sovereignty rather than 
the sovereign's sovereigmy. 59 It has been argued that the reference in Article 2 of 
chapter I of the UN Charter to the principle of sovereign equality of states has been 
defined by UDHR Article 21 (3) to mean the will of the people, expressed in periodic 
and genuine elections, and not the defacto control of the seizer of power. 60 
However, in the absence of clear standards, able to specify where the international law 
must end and where the national law starts, 61 this transfer of sovereignty from states as 
nominal persons of international law to the inhabitants, who exist within the boundary 
of the states, could lead to unexpected result. Reisman, for example, used the concept of 
human rights protection to justify military invasion. He argued that if the removal of the 
external invasion of the state's sovereignty by an outside force is justified under 
traditional international law, then the removal of the internal invasion of the popular 
sovereignty by unilateral force can be justified under the modem constitutive, human 
1989, p. 855. The British legal system, on the other hand, may be regarded as radical dualistic. However, 
the courts have decided in various cases that international customary law forms part of British common 
law. See Hunt, M., Using Human Rights Lenv in English Lmv, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998, p. 11 
58 Starke, Q. C, op. cit., p. 74 
59 Reisman, M. W., "Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law", 84 American 
Journal of International Lenv, p. 866-876 In: Alston, P., (ed. ), Human Rights Lmv, Aldershot: Dartmouth,, 
1996, p. 548 
60 Ibid., pp. 546-547 
61 While it seems on the surface that state sovereignty is internationally recognized and upheld by giving 
states the freedom to decide the method they see best to perforrn the international obligations, the general 
principle of international la%v seems to limit this freedom by suggesting that the state cannot invoke 
provisions of its internal law as a justification for non-compliance with international obligations. This was 
clearly stated in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which states "A party may not invoke 
the provisions of its internal lmv asjustificationfor itsfallure to perforin a treaty... " Consistent with this, 
the Permanent Court of International Justice said in the Free Zones case that "It is certain that France 
cannot rely on her own legislation to limit the scope of her international obligations". It continued to 
indicate, in the advisory opinion, February 4,1932 concerning the treatment of Polish nationals in 
Danzig, that the principle is not limited to the mere legislation of the state in the narrow sense but it 
extends to include the provisions of the constitution itself. It stated that "While on the one hand, according 
to generally accepted principles, a State cannot rely, as against another State, on the provisions of the 
latter's Constitution, but only on international lmv and international obligations duly accepted, on the 
other hand conversely, a State cannot adduce as against another State its own Constitution ivith a view to 
evading obligations incumbent upon it under international 1mv or treaties in force. " Cited in 
Drzemczewski, A., European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1983, p., 21. See the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gev (France v. Switzerland) In: 
Hudson, M., Morld Court Reports: a collection of thejudgments, orders and opinions of the Permanent 
Court ofInternationalJustice, Vol. 11 1927-1932, New York: Oceana, 1969, p., 490. 
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rights-based conception of popular sovereignty. 62 The problem with Reisman's- 
argument is that it does not provide a clear measurement by which to assess the size of 
the majority whose wishes must be respected and protected. How can we be assured that 
a certain number represents the majority wishes? Moreover, the concept of human rights 
is very broad, contestable and raises many cultural and religious issues that lie at the 
heart of state ideology. Reisman's argument does not provide an answer if some of the 
majority's Nvishes, according to their religious and cultural values, run against the 
current understanding of international human rights. Will there be any dialogue to give 
effect to the democratically expressed wishes of the people, or will the wishes of the 
people be ignored and certain understanding of human rights be enforced? 63 Of course, 
it is not appropriate to say in this context that people should have the right to violate 
human rights as a result of their exercise of the international right of self determination, 
simply because first, human rights, as shown above, are an international matter and do 
not lie exclusively within their state's jurisdiction; second, it is illogical that people 
would choose to oppress themselves. But what is meant within this context is whether 
the international system would tolerate differences in the interpretation of some 
international human rights and allow for different implementation, even if these 
differences run against some of the so-called internationally recognized values of 
62 Reisman, M. W., "Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law", 84 American 
Journal of International Lmv, In: Alston, P., (ed. ), op. cit., pp. 549-55 1. See also Falk, R., "Theoretical 
Foundations of Human Rights", In: Claude, R., and Weston, B., (eds. ), Human Rights in the World 
Community. issue and action, Second Edition, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992, pp., 
31-42. However, the International Court of Justice in 1986 declared that 'the use of force could not be the 
appropriate method to monitor or ensure such respect' for human rights. the Court had said that 'where 
hunian rights are protected by international conventions, that protection takes the form of such 
arrangenientsfor monitoring or ensuring respectfor human rights as are providedfor in the conventions 
themselves'. Cited in Kritsiotis, D., "Arguments Of Mass Confusion", 15, European Journal of 
International Linv, April 2004, p. 273 
63 An interesting case that was brought before the Canadian Supreme Court regarding secession might be 
of relevance to the current discussion. The court suggested that if the majority of people in any province 
sought to secede from the federation, then as a democratic nation, the expression of the will of the people 
could not be ignored, and both Canada and the province would have to enter into negotiations to give 
effect to the democratically expressed wishes of the people. Cited in Friel, R. J., "Providing A 
Constitutional Framework for Withdrawal from the EU: Article 59 Of The Draft European Constitution", 
53.2, International and Comparative Laiv Quarterly, April 2004, p. 418 
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human rights? Does democracy justify differences in human rights implementation 
according to cultural and religious values? 
H. 2.2. Democracy and International Human Rights 
Although the word democracy has not been mentioned in the UN Charter, the 
international instruments have emphasised its fundamental principles, such as 
participation, accountability and self-determination, as important mechanisms for the 
realization of international human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Secretary- 
General in his report to the General Assembly at its fifty-first session noted that "the 
ivord 'deniocracy' does not appear in the Charter. Holvever, with the opening 1vords of 
that document 'We the Peoples of the United Nations, the founders invoked the most 
fitndaniental principle of democracy, rooting the sovereign authority of the Member 
States, and thus the legitimacy of the Organization which they were to compose, in the 
will of their peoples. "' The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by 
the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights also asserted in paragraph 8 of Section 1, 
"Democracy, development and respectfor human rights andfiindainentalfreedoms are 
interdependent and mutually reinforcing. ... The international community should 
support the strengthening and promoting of democracy, development and respect for 
human rights andjundamentalfteedoms in the entire world. " Moreover, the UDHR has 
affirmed this original commitment to democracy and suggested that "the will of the 
people shall be the basis of the authority of government", guaranteeing the right of the 
individual to be part of the processes that affect his life. 65 In Article 29 (2) the UDHR 
64 Cited in the website of the United Nations high Commissioner for Human Rights, Available online at 
htti2: H%v%vw. obchr. org/english/issues/democracy/index. htm 
65 Article 21 of UDHR states that " 1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives. 2. Everyone has the right to equal access to public 
service in his country. 3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of govenu-nent; this will 
shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and 
shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. " 
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stresses that the limitation on human rights and freedoms are permitted only by law that 
is acceptable in democratic society. 66 The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights has confirmed the binding nature of the individual right to take part in the 
conduct of public affairs, enhancing the principles of democracy across states party. 67 
The United Nations support for democratization as the way for proper implementation 
of international human rights and fundamental freedoms has been manifested through 
many UN resolutions. For example Resolution 2000/47 has reaffirmed the commitment 
to the process democratization of states, and recognized that democracy and human 
rights are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. States are called upon to consolidate 
democracy through the promotion of pluralism and the respect of human rights. 68 
Resolution 2001/36 has also stressed the interdependence of democracy and human 
rights, and also added development, as meeting the basic human needs is essential for 
effective democracy. 69 Moreover, the Commission has adopted resolution 2001/41 on 
"Continuing dialogue on measures to promote and consolidate democrac. )P and called 
upon all governments, relevant intergovermnental organizations and interested non- 
governmental organizations to continue and deepen debates aimed at identifying ways 
and means to promote and consolidate democracy. 70 
Furthermore, the most effective regional courts of human rights, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, have recognized 
66 Article 29 (2) of the UDHR states "In the exercise oftis rights andfreedoms, everyone shall be subject 
only to such limitations as are determined by law solelyfor the purpose ofsecuring due recognition and 
respect for the rights andfreedoins of others and of ineeting the just requirements of morality, public 
order and the general ivetrare in a democratic society. " 
67 See Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
61COMMiSSion 
on Human Rights resolution 2000/47, Promoting and consolidating democracy, 
AIRES12000147 
69 Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/36, Strengthening of popular participation, equity, 
social justice and non-discrimination as essential foundations of democracy, NRES12001136 
"Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/41, Continuing dialogue on measures to promote and 
consolidate democracy, AIRES12001141 
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democracy as the basic foundation for the promotion and protection of human rights and - 
fundamental freedoms. 71 
It is worth adding that in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 
2001/41 mentioned above, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights held 
an expert seminar to explore the conceptual linkages between democracy and human 
rights and to engage in a dialogue on practical ways and means of promoting and 
consolidating democracy. The seminar attempted to clarify the meaning of the concept 
of democracy, which has continuously been emphasized in the international 
instruments. It called states to move beyond narrow notions of democracy to promoting 
and securing what they termed as "holistic democracy". " The concept of "holistic 
democracy" has been defined as a conception grounded on universal human rights 
standards that gives respect to all people on an equal footing, no matter how numerous 
they are, whether majority or minority, and which encompasses procedural and 
substantive processes of justice and fairness based on the rights of self detennination 
and the abhorrence of discrimination and the concentration of power. 73 The seminar 
concluded that international democracy is rooted in cultural values and spiritual 
traditions from all parts of the world and hence, while no single institution can claim 
democratic perfection, the combination of doinestic democratic structures with 
universal democratic norms is aformidable tool in strengthening both the roots and the 
reach of democracy, and in advancing a universal understanding of democracy. 7' It has 
been suggested that people are only convinced by their own rich cultures, and hence 
71 For more details about the role of democracy in promoting and protecting human rights in the European 
Convention on Human Rights system and the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights system see 
Burchili, R., "The Role of Democracy in the Protection of Human Rights: lessons from the European and 
Inter-American human rights systeme', In: Forsythe, D. P., and McMahon, P. C., op. cit., pp. 137-152 
72 The High Commissioner for Human Rights, Civil and Political Rights: Continuing dialogue on 
measures to promote and consolidate democracy, E/CN. 4/2003/59,27 January 2003, p. 4 73 Ibid., p. 4 74 Ibid., p. 17 
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they should be encouraged to achieve human rights on the wings of their own cultures, , 
inspirations and teachings. " In the report of the second expert seminar on democracy 
and the rule of law, Dr. Ginwala asserts that the challenge to holistic democracy "was 
not to take one model of democracy, but to stress the universal elements in concept and 
practice in a way that built upon and strengthened existing cultures and inslitutions. "76 
Thus, such recognition of the significance of democracy, "holistic democracy", as a 
basis for proper implementation of international human rights, seems to put more 
emphasis on the need for cultural legitimacy and hence work on a horizontal level 
through cross cultural and international dialogue than on the vertical level, which seems 
to be more inclined towards enforcement procedures. This correlative relationship 
between international human rights and democracy seems to affirm the point that 
whatever the world's differences in the understanding of what could constitute rights for 
human beings, the use of these differing traditions is, to a certain degree, inevitable to 
establish real universal human rights with full realization of their essence. 
11.2.3. Differences in the Understanding of the Human Rights Concept 
To say that there is an international recognition of the principle of human rights is not to 
say that there is complete agreement about the nature of such rights or their substantive 
scope. 77 The international recognition is, indeed, demonstrated through various 
international human rights instruments, however, an agreement on precise standards of 
the implementation of the content of these rights has not yet been reached. The 
differences in the definition or interpretation of rights arose fairly early on in the 
75 See Dr. Surin Pitsuwan's view, Ibid., p. 5 
76 Commission on Human Rights, Sixty-first session, Interdependence between Democracy and Human 
rights: report of the second expert seminar "Democracy and the rule of law", E/CN. 4/2005/58,18 March 
2005 
77 Steiner, H., and Alston, P., op. cit., p. 326 
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foundation of the UN and indeed in the preparation of the UDHR. 78 There were 
differences between Western countries and the former Soviet bloc over the prioritisation. 
of rights which reflected their different economic and political ideologies. 79 For 
example, Western liberal states may apply the economic, social and cultural rights; 
however the acceptance of their legal validity is subject to the individual's liberty. On 
the other hand, communist states might recognize the legality of the civil and political 
rights but 'as subject to the integrity of the society. 80 This is due to the conflicting 
ideologies from which both sets of rights spring. Whereas the civil and political rights 
spring from the philosophy of individualism, favouring maximum individual freedom of 
action and a minimal role to be played by the state, the economic, social and cultural 
rights stem from the philosophy of socialism, which gives a stronger role to state 
intervention. 81 
There was also disagreement over the matter of freedom of religion, which was opposed 
by many Muslim states on the basis that Islam prohibits a Muslim to change his or her 
religion. 82 The justification for that might be that "the basis of Muslini polity being 
religious and not ethnological or linguistic", for a Muslim to change his or her religion 
might amount to a "politico-religious rebellion". 83 
These differences in the understanding of human rights have been a subject of debate in 
the UN international human rights objective and for the greater part of the last two 
78 Banda, F., "Global Standards: local values", 17, International Journal of Lmv Policy and Fandly, 
2003., p. 3 
79 Ibid., p. 3 
so lbhawoh, B., "Cultural Relativism and Human Rights: rcconsidering the Africanist Discourse", 
Netherlands Quarterly ofHuman Rights, Vol. 19/1,200 1, pp. 46A5 
81 Eide, A., "Realisation of Social and Economic Rights and the Minimum Threshold Approach" 10 
Hianan Rights Law Journal, 1989, p. 43. 
92 Baderin, M., op. cit., p. 119 
83 Hamidullah, Muslim Conduct of State, Revised 7h Ed., 1977, p. 174, para. 330 cited in Baderin, M., 
op. cit., p., 124 
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decades, the dominant theme has been whether human rights in the modem conception -" 
are of universal character and applicability or whether they are culturally relative. 84 
11.2.3.1. Universalism and Cultural Relativism 
Universalists argue that human rights are a supreme universal value in the sense that 
most people, deprived of these protections, want to have them regardless of the culture 
85 in which they live. Individuals everywhere want the same essential things: to have 
sufficient food and shelter; to be able to speak freely without being threatened with 
torture or detention without charge, which are in no way dependent upon culture. 86 
Relativists, on the other hand, argue that the individual realizes his personality through 
his culture and, hence, what are held to be human rights in one society may be regarded 
as anti-social by another people, or by the same people in a different period of their 
history. 87 Therefore, human rights can be improved through the enhancement of the 
88 
cultural legitimacy of their standards. 
To understand properly the relationship between culture and the universality of human 
rights it is important to understand the meaning of the term human rights and whether 
the meaning attached to it is flexible enough to accommodate differences in its 
imPlementation. 
84 lbhawoh, B., op. cit., p. 43 
85 Howard, R. E., op. cit., 1995, p. 57 
86Higgins, R., Problems and Process: international 1mv and how to use it, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, 
97 
Renteln, A, International Human Rights: universalism versus relalivism, London: Sage, 1990, p. 83 
An-Na'im, A. A., "Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards of Human 
Rights: the meaning of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment", in: An-Na! im, A., (ed. ), 
op. cit., 1995, p. 22 
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11.2.3.1.1. The Meaning of Human Rights 
A human right is defined as "a universal moral right, something which all men, 
evenywhere, at all times ought to have, something of which no one may be deprived 
without a grave affront to justice, something which is owing to every human being 
simply because he is human. "89 The terin "universal" or "universality" can be defined as 
"'of, belonging to, done by, all; affecting all', and a universal rule as one with no 
exception. "90 The geographical reference, accordingly, is irrelevant, "as the applicability 
ofhuman rights to all persons without exception automatically means that they apply to 
all persons regardless ofplace. "91 Rhoda Howard stressed that human rights are private 
as they inhere in individuals, unmediated by social relations, individual as an isolated 
human being can, in principle, exercise them, and aitiononzous as, in principle, no 
authority other than the individual is required to make human rights claims. 92 Two main 
distinctions have been made by the universali. sts to assert the universality of human 
rights that human rights versus human dignity and human rights versus human duty. 
11.2.3.1.1.1 Human Rights and Human Dignity 
Universalists authors, mostly Western, differentiate, in defining human rights, between 
moral standards of human dignity that might be shared by all cultures and human rights 
versus the state authority. Bassam Tibi noted that the notion of human dignity exists in 
all cultures, western and non-western; in Islamic and African cultures, as well as in 
Buddhist and other non-monotheistic cultures. However, the modem concept of human 
89 Renteln, A., op. cit., p. 47 
90 Lindholt, L., Questioning the Universality of Human Rights: the African charter on hunjan and 
peoples'rights in Bostsivana, Malenvi and Mozambique, Sydney: Ashgate Dartmouth, 1997, p. 33 
91 Brems, E., Hunian Rights: universality and diversity, London: Martinus Nijhoff, 200 1, p. 4 
92 Howard, R. E., "Dignity, Community, and Human Rights", In: An-Na'im, A., (ed. ), op. cit., 1995, p. 82 
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rights that are enforceable against the state is a modem European creation. 93 Consistent 
with this view, Rhoda Howard asserted that dignity is not a claim but "the parlicular 
cultural understandings of the inner moral worth of the h1anan person and his or her 
proper political relations with society" and hence human dignity is not private, 
individual, or autonomous, but public, collective, and prescribed by social norms. 94 so, 
any reference to cultural values and moral codes is actually a reference to the notion of 
human dignity, not to the modem concept of human rights. 
The distinction between human rights and human dignity has been criticized by Bonny 
Ibhawoh as it fails to recognize the idea and the meaning of rights in a social and 
historical context. In most traditional African societies, he argued, there were no clear 
cut distinctions between religious values, moral precepts and laws; such traditional 
societies had their own legal institutions and law enforcement procedures which were, 
nonetheless, effective within their social and political context. 95 Thus, he concluded, 
"the rights and obligations that derivedftoin such religious, moral and cultural values 
associated with human dignity in traditional society, (which ivere enforced for the 
benefit of both the community and the individual), can validly be considered the 
06 
contextual equivalent ofthe modern concept of legal rights. 
It seems that the distinction between human rights and human dignity is put to assert the 
point that the current concept of human rights is, as Tibi put it, "a modem cultural 
achievement of Western Europe. ', 97 Any cultural recognition of the importance of 
93 Tibi, B., "The European Tradition of Human Rights and the Culture of Islam", in: An-Na'im, A. A., and 
Deng, F. M., (eds. ), op. cit., 1990, p. 109 
94 Howard, R. E., "Dignity, Community, and Human Rights", in: An-Na'im, A., (ed. ), op. cit., 1995, p. 84 
95 lbhawoh, B., op. cit., p. 46 
96 Ibid., p. 46 
97 An-Na'im's comment on Bassam Tibi's argument presented in the introduction in: An-Na'im, A. and 
Deng, F. M, op. cit., 1990, p. 4 
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human life and dignity not of Western culture is considered moral worth of human 
being not human rights. 98 This assertion, however, does not seem to be helpful to the 
discourse of human rights implementation because the implementation process, rather 
than distance itself from the society concerned, always tries to find a way to assert itself 
in that society's culture, albeit in moral form. So human rights being recognized in 
moral or religious form do not seem to discredit the society; rather it forms a primary 
force for the overall human rights achievement. 
H. 2.3.1.1.2. Human Rights and Human Duty 
Some universalists authors, in the process of defining human rights, have set another 
distinction: the concept of right versus the concept of duty. This distinction has long 
been debated and has now been cited to assert a Western conception of the international 
human rights, as a right is not dependent on a duty on the part of the person toward 
whom the right is held. Western authors usually cite Gray's argument which asserts that 
the theory of a correlative relationship between rights and duty fails to recognize that 
there are duties independent of rights. There may be a duty to perform an action towards 
a person where we cannot say that he has a right to have the action performed. 99 As. 
Gray put it, "It may be the duty of Jack Ketch (as a public servant) to hang Jonathan 
Wild, but ive do not say that Wild has a right to be hanged. "100 This argument might 
stem from the opinion that the public institution cannot be the owner of rights- that 
Ketch as a public servant has the right to hang Jonathan Wild- as a right is always 
private and vested in some determinate individual. However, it seems to forget that 
there are certain rights which an individual possesses in virtue of his membership of a 
98 Howard's assertion that dignity is not private, individual, or autonomous, but public, collective, and 
prescribed by social norms is a clear adherence to the Western cultural understanding of the concept of 
human rights that largely stems of Western philosophy of individualism. 
99 Gray, J. C., The Nature and Sources ofthe Lcnv, New York: Macmillan, 1924, p. 9 
100 Ibid., p. 9 
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group which are tenned as "public rights" or "group rights", like rights of way, rights of 
navigation and fishing, and rights of protection against nuisances. 101 
Moreover, it has been argued that there are claims of rights that do not entail any duties. 
The right to education, for example, is a legitimate claim that is held by a person, but 
against no particular individuals. 102 Lyons also contends that freedom of speech does 
not correspond to any duty. 103 
Consistent with this, Donnelly argues that although the political precepts of Islam do 
reflect a strong concern for human good and human dignity, the bases for these 
injunctions are divine commands that establish only duties, not human rights. 104 The 
right of protection of life, he illustrated, is in fact a divine injunction not to kill and to 
consider life as inviolable. 105 The right to justice, as he put it, proves to be instead a 
duty of rulers to establish justice. 106 Mayer has pointed out that women's rights in 
Islam, as recognised by traditional Islamic fiqh, are nothing more than duties to stay 
segregated, secluded, and veiled, that have no connection with international principles 
of human rights. 107 These human rights authors seem to assert that human rights is a 
synonym for total, unrestrained freedoms and entitlements and the term duty is 
irrelevant to the international notion of right, being "relegated to the confines of 
'zinderdeveloped'non-ivestern societies such as Islamic ones. "108 
101 Lamont, W. D., The Principles ofMoral Judgment, Clarendon Press, 1946, p. 81 
102 Cited in Rowan, J., Conflicts of Rights: Moral Theory and Social Policy Implications, Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1999, p. 21 
103 Cited in Renteln, A, op. cit., p. 4 1. 
104 Donnelly, J., Universal Huntan Rights in Theory and Practice, London: Cornell University Press, 
1989, pp. 50-52 
105 Ibid., p. 51 
106 Ibid., p. 51 
107 Mayer, A. E., op. cit., 1999, pp. 60,103 
103 Ali, S., op. cit., p. IS 
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However, this distinction between right and duty, by close examination, is misleading. - 
In respect of Lyons' example of freedom of speech, it can be argued, there is a duty 
imposed upon the judiciary to protect the right concerned. 109 If we submit that a right 
cannot be vested in the public institutions, then the public institutions are under a duty 
to protect the individual right, and only such a duty would give rise to the right as a 
legal claim. 110 The same can be said regarding the right to education, in that the party 
against whom the claim is held might be the government or even society at large, which 
bears the duty to ensure proper education for individuals. "' 
It seems that the correlative relationship between right and duty is the core element that 
gives rise to the legal claim. Although the functioning human rights instruments may 
seem, on the surface, more inclined to assert the idea of the individual's right than the 
individual's duty, the idea of duty still forms a substantive basis of the concept of 
human rights. Duty might not even be a result of an existent claim, but a basis, along 
with right, for its existence. That is to say, a legal claim cannot be imagined held by an 
isolated individual living on an isolated island, because of the absence of anyone who 
would respect his rights, like the other party to a certain legal contract, or who would 
dispute the existence or the extent of them. In this case, a right as a claim would not 
109 Renteln, A, op. cit., p. 42 
110 Rowan gives a sophisticated analysis in this regard, asserting that the claim, if it is to be regarded as 
such, has to be held against some determinate person or persons. A claim that is held against no one is 
actually not a claim but a "privilege". Rowan argues, a privilege differs from a claim because of the 
absence of a correlative duty. For Rowan, it is the duty that plays the crucial role in differentiating 
between the right as a privilege and the right as a claim. He illustrates that the refusal of service at the 
ticket window because of the skin colour of a person cannot violate his privilege of going, say, to the ball 
game, because his privilege entails no duty on the part of others; there can be violations of his rights only 
if those rights are claims that entail a duty on the part of others not to differentiate according to colour. 
Rowan continues to argue that while a duty is essential for the claim to be held against someone, it need 
not necessarily be accompanied with the power to waive the claim. For example, in the United States, it is 
against the law for anyone to sell himself into slavery; the legal claim not to be enslaved is not 
accompanied by a legal power to waive this claim. This may also explain why some rights are seen as 
inalienable. Rowan, J., op. cit., pp. 21-27 
111 Ibid., p. 21 
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exist and the individual right would be no more than an interest. 112 This correlative duty ' 
with right is manifested in the international right to a fair trial and the right concerning 
periodic elections, which clearly impose obligations upon the states to set up of an 
adequate judiciary and legal aid system and to hold free and secret elections. 113 
However, duty, here, is a conceptual one which only exists to give rise to the right of 
individual as a legal claim, in the sense that it does not give any right to be exercised by 
whoever person against the individual, say, by the state in the name of the rights of 
people. 114 The international instruments clearly give priority to the individual's right 
over people's right and this is evidenced by the wide range of rights, the international 
human rights treaties cover, which mainly serve individuals, not society or the people 
and which accorded precedence over national sovereignty. ' 15 
Although the correlative relationship between right and duty as the meaning of the 
concept of the individual right is recognised in international instruments, this is not 
necessarily the only notion of human rights. The international human rights instruments 
112 See the discussion of the theory of the Belgian scholar, Dabin, in Nijaidah, A. H., . 411ndkhal le 
Derasat 41qanoon fVefqan Lquaneen Dmvlat 41-Emarat . 41-. 4rabyyah 41-Mittlahedah: Alketab Athani 
Nadaryyat Alhaq, (in Arabic), Dubai: Albayan Press, 1994, p. 38 
113 Van Hoof, G. "The Legal Nature of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Rebuttal of Some 
Traditional Views" In: Alston, P& Tomasevski, K, (eds. ), The Right to Food, Netherlands: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1984, p. 103 
114 It is said that people's rights have an aspect of state sovereignty and its field of application is 
determined by state, while traditional human rights are addressed to individuals and have the function of 
limiting the free exercise of state sovereignty in the interest of justice. See Partsch, K. J., "The 
Enforcement of Human Rights and People's Rights: observations on their reciprocal relationsP, In: 
Bernhardt, R., Jolowicz, A, J., (eds. ), International Enforcement of Human Rights, Report Submitted to 
the Colloquiurn of International Association of Legal Science, Heideberg, 28-30 August, 1985, p., 26 
115 Rights like the right to life, right to freedom from torture and degrading treatment, freedom of religion, 
freedom of speech, etc. As a result of the international focus on individual rights, giving them precedence 
over the society at large, the African states, most newly independent, have tended to regard the 
international concern for human rights as a pretext for undermining their sovereignty. See Naldi, G. J., 
"Future Trends in Human Rights in Africa- the increased role of the OAU?, " In: Evans, M. D., Murray, 
R., (eds. ), The African Charier on Human and Peoples' Rights: The System in Practice, 1986-2000, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 2 The African regional effort, therefore, resulted in an 
African Charter on Human and People's Rights adopted in June 27,1981 in which the African states 
clearly specify in chapter two the duties of the individual, by which state members could claim the power 
to intervene in individual basic rights in the name of the individual's duties towards the society at large. 
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sometimes, although very rarely, impose a duty upon individuals towards the state for 
the benefit of individuals. Article 20 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is a 
case in point, where it requires states to prohibit any propaganda of war, and in turn puts 
individuals under an obligation towards the state not to commit such an act. 
Accordingly, individuals' duty towards the government or society at large, such as 
Muslim women's duty towards the society to be veiled, if the society concerned 
perceived it to be for the benefit of women, in particular, and the society, in general, 
might be acceptable. 116 
These distinctions between human right and human dignity on the one hand, and 
between right and duty on the other, may have been intended to undermine any 
justification for gross violation of human basic rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
name of culture and religion. 117 However, the fact of cultural differences is both 
inescapable and difficult to accommodate philosophically' 18 as human nature itself is, in 
some measure, culturally relative. 119 Donnelly himself admits that the cultural 
variability of human nature not only permits but requires significant allolvance for 
cross-cultural variations in human rights. 120 The American Anthropological 
Association has stressed the need for sensitivity to cultural diversity in the drafting of 
international human rights instruments 121 and warned of the danger that the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights would be "a statement ofrights conceived only in terms of 
116 In the Saudi society, for example, the black veil is embraced by many women as a form of protection 
and an integral part of their religion. See Faiza Saleh Ambab, Saudi Women Rise in Defense of the Veil: 
Some Conservatives Fear U. S. -Led Erosion of Traditional Islamic Values, Thursday, June 1,2006, 
Washington post Website, Available On line at http: //Nvww. washingtonpost. com/Nvp- 
dyn/contentlarticle/2006/05/3 I/AR2006053101994. html 
117 See Higgins, R., op. cit., p. 96 
i's Nickel, J. W., "Cultural Diversity and Human Rights", in: Nelson, J. L., and Green, V. M., (eds. ), 
International Human Rights: contemporary issues, New York: Human Rights Publishing Group, 1980, p. 
44 
119 Donnelly, J., op. cit., 1989, p. I 11 
120 ]bid., p. 112 
121 An-Na'im, A. A., Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards of Human 
Rights: the meaning of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, in: An-Na1m, A., op. cit., 
1995, p. 22 
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the values prevalent in the countries of Western Europe and America. " 122 The , 
organization is still insisting on equal opportunity of all cultures, societies, and persons 
to realize their cultural identities and social lives. 123 We must be cautious not to replace 
tyranny that governs in the name of culture or religion with a new colonialism or 
imPerialism in the name of human rights. 124 
11.2.3.2. Western Universalism as a Type of Relativism 
An-Nalrn has pointed out that the assumptions that non-Western countries are 
commonly conceived as relativist and Western European countries are commonly 
assumed to be fully committed to the universality of human rights are both misleading 
and difficult to maintain in practice. 125 Human rights in Western ideology and the 
cultural position of individualism are individualistic, negative in nature, and can only be 
secured by non-interference on the part of states. Hence, Western European states, 
generally speaking, resist accepting the economic, social and cultural rights as human 
rights because they are, by nature, collective rights, giving state authority a wider role 
and intervention in their implementation. 126 Western authors, in general, regard these 
rights of an economic, social and cultural nature as second class rights, incompatible 
with the civilized world and free market. 127 On this basis, Dworkin has made another 
122 Nickel, J. W., "Cultural Diversity and Human Rights", in: Nelson, J. L., and Green, V. M., (eds. ), 
op. cit., p. 46 
'2' See the Declaration on Anthropology and Human Rights, available on line at 
http: //www. aaanet. org/stmts/humanrts. htm 
124 It has been argued that the concept of human rights come out of the West as the 'black ships' of 
imperialism. See Freeman, M., "Universal Rights and Particular 
Cultures", In: Jacobsen, M., and Bruun, 0., (eds. ), Hinnan Rights and Asian Valites: Contesting National 
Identities and Cultural Representations in Asia, Richmond: Curzon, 2000, p. 52 
123 An-Na'im, A. A., "Area Expressions" and the Universality of Human Rights: mediating a contingent 
relationship", In: Forsythe, D. and McMahon, P., op. cit., p. 3 
126 Van Hoof, G. "The Legal Nature of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Rebuttal of Some 
Traditional Views" In: Alston, P& Tomasevski, K, (eds. ), op. cit., p. 103 
127 For more details about the nature of the economic, social and culture rights see Alston, P. "Out of the 
Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New U. N Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" 
(1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly, p. 332-381. Alston, P& Quinn, G. "The Nature and Scope of Parties' 
Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (1987) 9 Hunian 
Rights Quarterly, p. 156-229. Chapman, A. "A "Violations Approach" for Monitoring the International 
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distinction between human rights, in that he regards rights that are concerned with 
contribution to the collective welfare as goals, not rights, while the rights that are 
concerned with political moralities such as freedom of speech are human rights. 128 This 
demonstrates that when the matter of human rights raises ideological issues, Western 
authors tend to uphold their own ideology and cultural position. This western stance 
towards international human rights causes An-NaIm to assert that "if the ideology or 
culture can exempt Western countriesfrOm accepting these rights (economic social and 
cultural rights) as human rights, non-Western countries can clahn the same regarding 
such human rights norms as equality for women or protecting freedom of 
expression. "129 Human rights authors who view the current universal human rights 
corpus as a modem cultural achievement of Europe tend to argue that Western culture 
should always be the universal normative model for human rights implementation 
worldwide. 130 However, such a stress to the exclusivity of the concept of universalism 
to Western culture is in itself a denial of the concept of universality of human rights. 131 
Baderin noted that the concept of universality of human rights, which refers to the 
universal acceptance of the human rights idea through various international human 
rights instruments, must not be confused with the concept of universalism in human 
rights, which relates to the interpretation and application of human rights on which a 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", 1996,18 Human Rights Quarlerly, p. 23-66. Darrow, 
M& Alston, P. "Bill of Rights in Comparative Perspective" In: Alston, P. Promoting Human Rights 
through Bills of Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Eide, A. "Realisation of Social and 
Economic Rights and the Minimum Threshold Approach", 1989,10 Human Rights Lcnv Journal, p. 35-5 1. 
Robertson, R. "Measuring State Compliance with the Obligation to Devote the "Maximum Available 
Resources" to Realizing Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", 1994,16 Human Rights Quarterly, 
p. 693-714. Symposium, "Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic , Social and Cultural Rights" (Limburg Principles), 1987,9 Human Rights Quarterly, p. 121-135. 
128 Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously, London: Duckworth, 1987, p. 90 
129 An-Naim, A. A., ""Area Expressions" and the Universality of Human Rights: mediating a contingent 
relationship", In: Forsythe, D. P., and McMahon, P. C., op. cit., 2003, p. 7 
130 Tibi, B., "The European Tradition of Human Rights and the Culture of Islam", In: An-Na1m, A. A., 
and Deng, F. M., (eds. ), op. cit., 1990, pp. 104-132. See also Mayer, E., "Current Muslim Thinking on 
Human Rights", An-Na'im, A. A., and Deng, F. M., (eds. ), op. cit., 1990, pp. 133-158 
131 Mutua, M., "The Ideology of Human Rights", 36 Virginia Journal ofInternational Lmv, Spring, 1996, 
pp. 593-594 
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complete international agreement has not yet been achieved. 132 The current functioning ' 
of human rights is more one of internationalism, which considers rights as a product of 
international action, such as treaty negotiations and conference deliberations, rather 
than of Western universalism, which often stems from the philosophical theory of 
natural right that is largely of Western culture. 133 This is evidenced by Article 31 (2) of 
the ICCPR. which provides that in electing members of the Human Rights Committee, 
which is responsible to monitor the implementation of the ICCPR Covenant and its 
Protocols, "consideration shall be given to equitable geographical distribution of 
membership and to the representation of the different forms of civilization and of the 
principal legal systeme'. 134 Giving consideration to different form of cultures and legal 
systems that form our modem world in the membership of the UN human rights 
machinery, would undoubtedly contribute to the universality of human rights. This is 
clearly a UN readiness towards multi-cultural approach in the interpretations of 
universal human rights articulated in the UN human rights instruments rather than being 
culturally relative to Westem values. 135 
11.3. Domestic Values and International Human Rights: tension and 
paradox 
The significance of cultural legitimacy, underpinned by cultural and spiritual values, for 
the implementation of international human tights, as discussed earlier, highlights the 
need for more research for international legal standards to draw the line between 
permissible variation and abhorrent violation of human rights. Many states would find 
132 Baderin, M., op. cit., p. 23 
133 Friedman, J. R., "Human rights Internationalism: a tentative critique", In: Nelson, J. L., and Green, V. 
M., (eds. ), op. cit., p. 31 
134 See also Article 8 (1) of International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination which states that "There shall be established a Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) consisting of eighteen experts of high moral 
standing and acknowledged impartiality elected by States Partiesfrom anzong their nationals, who shall 
serve in their personal capacity, consideration being given to equitable geographical distribution and to 
the representation ofthe differentforms oftivilization as ivell as ofthe principal legal systems. " 
133 See Baderin, M., op. cit., p. 27 
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in the elaboration of cultural relevance to the implementation of human rights a 
convincing reason to justify their violation and non-compliance with international 
rights. 136 Universalists' main objection to the relativists seems to be that the relativist 
view is very state-centred and usually seeks to justify non-compliance with international 
human rights obligations. 137 This criticism seems also to be a main reason for the 
relativists to engage in cross-cultural dialogue, within each culture as well as between 
cultures, to explore proper international standards able to differentiate between the 
permissible variation, necessarily for the implementation, and the prohibited 
violation. 138 It seems that tackling the theory of cultural relativity to reach common 
legal standards to govem the implementation of human rights might be more 
appropriate than leaving it for the state to justify gross violation of them. Elaborating on 
the theory of cultural relativity would pave the way to an objective approach, favouring 
human dignity, to scrutinise and critically evaluate justifications on cultural differences. 
11.3.1. Islam and International Human Rights 
The reconciliation of the states' local values with human rights has often been difficult 
since it clashes with ideological and constitutional fundamental principles. One of the 
most important questions that has always been debated in international instruments is 
how to apply secular law, the international law of human rights, in an Islamic state 
where the religion is the fundamental and dominant law in the land. The strong 
relevance of Islam to the discourse of international human rights is clear in its position 
as the most powerful ideological force across the Muslim world, operating in parallel to 
136 For example the representative of Islamic Republic of Iran states in defence of alleged violation of 
human rights by his country that the Iranian government is "in filll accordance and harmony 1vith the 
deepest moral and religious convections of the people and therefore most representative of the 
traditional, cultural, moral and religious beliefs of Iranian society ...... See UN General Assembly, 39th, Sess., Third Committee, 65th Mtg, 7 December 1984, A/C. 3/39/SR. 65. Cited in Baderin, M., op. cit., p. 30 
137 Higgins, R., op. cit., p. 96 
138 See An-Na'im, A. A., "Toward a Cross Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards of 
Human Rights", In: An-Na'im, A. A., op. cit., 1995, p. 21 
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other globalizing forces. 139 Islam is a living religion and the faith of nearly one-fifth of 
the world's population. 140 In fact, Islam represents itself as a universal belief with values 
and norms sent down for the benefit of human beings and which create a common 
cultural continuum across Asia, Eurasia and Africa. 141 It has even been recognized as a 
prominent feature of the religious landscape of some Western countries. 142 Thus, giving 
no regard to the Islamic fundamental values in the international human rights discourse, 
might result in severe impacts on the constitutional systems and political orders of the 
Islamic states or predominantly Muslim countries and hence on the international order 
and stability. The upheavals in many parts of the world that followed the publication of 
Salman Rushdie's Satanic Verses could be an example of the strong impact of Islam. 143 
The recent event of publication of cartoons depicting Prophet Muhammad in a 
degrading way in some newspapers in Denmark and some other European states is 
another clear demonstration of the need to explore areas of conflict and of unification 
between Islamic law and international human rights law. 144 
It is worth noting that Muslims' condemnation of Salman Rushdie's Satanic Verses and 
of the publication of cartoons depicting Prophet Muhammad is seen by many in the 
West as putting Western freedom of speech and consequently Western democracy on 
139 Fuller, G. E., The Future ofPolitical Islain, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 67 
140 Monshipouri, M., Islandsin, Secularism and Human Rights in the Middle East, London: L. Rienner, 
1998, p. 1 
14 1 Fuller, G. E., op. cit., p. 67 
142 Winter, T. J., British Muslim Identity: past, problems, prospects, Cambridge: Muslim Academic Trust, 
2003, p. 1 
143 Baderin, M. A., op. cit., p. 128 
14' The images offended the sentiments of billions of Muslims in the name of freedom of the press. Saudi 
Arabia has recalled its ambassador from Denmark and Libya has closed its embassy in Copenhagen, the 
capital of Denmark. The images triggered outrage among Muslims across the Middle East, sparking 
protests, economic boycotts and warnings of possible retaliation against the people, companies and 
countries involved. See John Ward Anderson, Cartoons of Prophet Met With Outrage, Depictions of 
Muhammad in Scandinavian Papers Provoke Anger, Protest Across Muslim World, Washington Post, 
Tuesday, January 31, Available Online at, http: //www. washingtonpost. con-dNvp- 
dyn/content/article/2006/01/30/AR2006013001316. htmI 
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trial. 145 Freedom of speech is considered valued and essential in Western Europe, even , 
in the realm of religion, and as this study considers the necessity to take a relativistic 
approach to human rights to be applicable to all peoples with different cultures and 
traditions, it indeed appreciates the Western differences in the implementation of the 
right to freedom of speech in much the same way as it encourages the international 
human rights bodies to appreciate, to a certain extent, the variation of others, like 
Muslims, in their application of human rights. However, this does not mean that both 
Western and Islamic states should also have the right to implement human rights in a 
way that greatly offends what might constitute fundamentals in both beliefs. If the 
Western states, for example, claim the right to vary in rights implementation 
irrespective of Islamic fundamentals, even if their way of implementation constitutes a 
violation which is extremely provocative in nature to Muslims, and Muslims claim the 
same right to vary in rights implementation irrespective of what the Western states 
would consider it, then we might fall into a trap of the so called "clash of civilizations", 
which is definitely not in the interest of the promotion of human rights worldwide. 146 
The relativistic approach to human rights should not be perceived as a claim to differ, 
but rather, as mentioned earlier, as an engagement in cross-cultural dialogue between 
different cultures, to explore proper international standards for drawing the line between 
permissible variation, necessarily for implementation, and prohibited violation. Human 
rights, after all, are a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, 
1'5John Ward Anderson, Cartoons of Prophet Met With Outrage, Depictions of Muhammad in 
Scandinavian Papers Provoke Anger, Protest Across Muslim World, Washington Post, Tuesday, January 
31, Available Online at, http: //ivww. washingtonpost. com/wp- 
dynkontent/article/2006/01/30/AR2006013001316. htmI 
116 Huntington in his work, tilled "The clash of civilizations" argued that clashes between conflicting 
value and belief systems, particularly the incompatibility of Islam and the West, might form a potential 
cause of great wares. See Huntington, S., "The Clash of Civilizations? ", 72 Foreign Affairs, Summer, pp. 
2249. The publication of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad has triggered the anger of Muslims 
in Muslim communities across Europe and the wider world, raising a fear in Europe that the clash of 
civilizations could explode at any minute if some Muslim extremists, for example, decided, in retaliation 
against the publication of the cartoons, to blow up a church. See David Rennie, Day of Anger Threatened Zý 
over Cartoons of Prophet, Telegraph Newspaper Website, 04/02/2006, Available Online at 
, raph. co. uk/news/main. 
ihtml? xml=/news/2006/02/03/wcartO3. xml http: //www. telep 
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for the promotion of freedom, justice and peace in the world. 147 However, this may not - 
be possible without international cooperation, acting in a spirit of brotherhood that 
respects others' cultural and religious differences. Hence, with regard to the Western 
exercise of freedom of speech, although it is valued, it carries with it an inherent 
responsibility, and should not be used to degrade, humiliate or insult any group or 
individual. 148 Moreover, Muslims should also clearly identify and show the extent to 
which freedom of speech and human rights in general are respected in Islamic Shari'ah. 
Islamic Shari'ah has, indeed, as will be seen in the next chapter, many aspects of human 
rights values and Muslims, therefore, are encouraged to explore areas where Islamic law 
and human rights can work together for the enhancement of human rights values 
worldwide. 
However, it has been argued that the conflict between Islamic Shariah and international 
law of human rights can never be fully resolved because Islamic Shari'ah addresses the 
individual's relation to his ruler within the context of his relation to God. Hence, there is 
a fear that the state may well interpret the individual's duties to God as duties to the state 
and as a result, the state intervention will be justified as applying God's commands. 149 it 
has also been suggested that the Caliph in an Islamic state enjoys universal and final 
judicial and legislative powers in addition to his executive authority, and with such an 
authoritarian regime, no right can be implemented. 150 
147 See the introduction of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
141 See Kofi Arman's statement over the cartoons at the opening session of the second meeting of the 
high-level group for the alliance of civilization, Doha, 26-Fabruary-2006, in Islamic Culture Foundation 
Website, Available on line at http: //%vww. funci. orp, /en/2006/issuesik-of-i-annans-statement-doha-2006/ 
149 Brems, E., op. cit., p. 207-208 
150 An-Na! im, A. A., "A Modem Approach to Human Rights in Islam: Foundations and Implications for 
AfricaP, In: Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Ronald 1. Meltzer, (eds. ), Hunian Rights and Development in Africa, 
Albany : State University of New York Press, 1984,81 
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Although these views might be true to some degree in the traditional schools of Islamic 
thought, they do not seem to represent, as will be seen in the next chapter, the common 
view in modem Islamic jurisprudence. Indeed, Islam has to some extent some tension 
with the international human rights norms, but this does not necessarily mean that they 
can never be compatible. 
151 
In fact, not only Islam contains principles that may raise tension with the current 
conception of human rights but also some Western traditional understandings of 
democracy and human rights create complexity in the international human rights 
discourse. The UK political and constitutional tradition, for example, has been an 
obstacle to the full realization of the European convention rights. The UK human rights 
experience shows how domestic values inevitably influence to a large degree the 
process of implementation. Since the tension between the Islamic Shari'ah and human 
rights will be discussed in more detail in chapter three, the following section will be 
devoted to discussion of the tension between British constitutional traditions and human 
rights principles. 
11.3.2. British Constitution and Human Rights 
Lord Scarman has reported that UK's violation of the European Convention of Human 
Rights accounted for approximately one fifth of the total making UK the most likely to 
violate the convention rights within the contracting states. 152 Lord Lester has also 
151A deeper discussion and analysis about the substance of Islamic Shari'ah and human rights will be 
made in the next chapter. 
152 Lord Scarman, Human Rights: can they be protected without a written constitution?, Swansea: 
University College of Swansea, 1986, p. 7 
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admitted in his recent work that some sixty judgments of the European Court have 
found breaches by the UK in wide areas of state regulations. 153 
The reason for so many findings of British violations could be traced to the absence of 
effective domestic remedies in the British legal system. 154 Human rights are not 
enshrined in any basic law in Britain. 155 In the UK there is no written constitution 
specifying the power of the state authorities and the rights of individuals. The principles 
of the British constitution can be found in some specific Westminster statutes and 
judge-made common law. 156 This British legal tradition led the UN Human Rights 
Committee in 1995 to criticize the legal system of the United Kingdom. It suggested 
that the British constitutional system "does not ensurefidly that an effective remedy is 
providedfor all victims of violations of the rights contained in the Covenant" and called 
on Britain to examine the need for human rights incorporation into the British legal 
system or the introduction of a Bill of Rights. 157 
The UK's objection to introducing a constitutional Bill of Rights was founded on its 
social political belief and perception of the concept of the constitution, which is 
different from that recognized in the civil law realm. The provisions of the constitution 
have no special status in the British political and constitutional belief and hence 
parliament can change whatever rules and whenever it likes. 158 There is no separation of 
153 Lord Lester, "Human Rights and the British Constitution", In: Jowell, J., and Oliver, D., (eds. ), The 
Changing Constitution, Fourth Edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 95-96. See also 
Lord Lester, "A Human Rights Bill", Vol. 145 No 668 1, New Law Journal, 3 February 1995, p. 141 
154 Lord Lester, "Human Rights and the British Constitution", In: Jowell, J., and Oliver, D., op. cit., p., 96 
155 There were no justiciable rights entrenched in the British constitution until the Human Rights Act 
1998 was adopted in 2 Oct. 2000. However, the Act does not entrust to the courts the power to strike 
down an Act of Parliament. Parliament's sovereignty is still in full operation. For more details see 
Bradley. A. W., "The Sovereignty of Parliament - Form or Substance? ", In: Jowell, J., and Oliver, D., 
op. cit., p. 56. In chapter six we will discuss in more detail the effect of the UK Human Rights Act 1998 in 
the UK legal system. 
156 Barendt, E., An Introduction to Constitutional Lmv, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 26- 
27 
137 Zander, M., A Bill ofRights?, Forth Edition, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997, p., 51 
158 Barendt, E., op. cit., p. 27 
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powers between the legislature and the executive organ. 159 Both powers are conferred 
on Parliament, whose Act is absolutely sovereign, and the courts have no power but to 
apply it in a way that does not conflict with Parliament's intention in issuing such an 
Act. 160 This is recognized as the principle of the sovereign parliament, the most 
fundamental principle in the United Kingdom. Thus, the entrenchment of the Bill of 
Rights in such a constitutional system is seen as an attack on their fundamental 
constitutional principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty, since such bills always seek to 
impose restraints on the power of the government as well as the legislature. The 
common British view is that Parliament (elected officials) is the institution which must 
have the unrestrained power to legislate and repeal whatever it likes by simple majority 
and that constitutional principle is fundamental in a way that Parliament itself cannot 
change. 161 One of the arguments put against the introduction of a Bill of Rights is that 
the entrenchment of the international rights would necessarily empower the judges, the 
guarders of law, to decide issues traditionally conceived to fall within the capacity of 
elected officials. 162 This codification, as British politicians believe, would undennine 
democracy on the ground that it would shift the power to decide very broad and 
contestable matters such as human rights to the appointed judges. 163 
Whatever the basis of the argument that is made against the entrenchment of the 
international rights in the British legal system, this British constitutional principle of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty is seen as a principle of majoritarian tyranny, since 
Parliament can change whatever it likes even against basic human rights by simple 
159 Parpworth, N., op. cit., p. 21 
160 Dicey, A., op. cit., p. 60 
161 Ibid., p., 38. Dicey asserted that parliament can even interfere with far more important rights of 
individuals to the benefit of the community. see pp. 46-47 
162 Darrow, M., and Alston, P., "Bills of Rights in Comparative Perspective", In: Alston, P., op. cit., 1999, 
%498 
Campbell. T., "Democratizing Human Rights", In: Leiser. B& Campbell, (eds. ), Human Rights ill 
Philosophy and Practice, Aldershot : Ashgate, 200 1, p. 183 
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majority. 164 The most frightening element of the principle does not lie in its procedural . 
aspect but it actually lies in its substantive constitutional feature of unrestrained 
legislature. It is the British political belief in the supreme Parliament that can change 
whatever it likes without any legal accountability. The constitutional principle of the 
supremacy of the Islamic Shari'ah, which implies that God is the supreme lawgiver in 
many Islamic states, 165 and which cannot be changed by the legislature seems to equate 
to the supremacy of the constitutional principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty in the UK, 
which even Parliament itself, as will be seen below, cannot change. So, Islamic religion 
and British tradition seem to come to a point of convergence, particularly in its 
constitutional aspects, in respect of the foreign values represented by the international 
norms of human rights. 
It is worth adding, here, that the main point of comparing the UK constitutional 
principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty with the Islamic states' constitutional principle 
of the supremacy of the Islamic Shari'ah is not to make a comparison between the 
supremacy of the legal rules of the Shari'ah and the supremacy of Acts of Parliament, 
since Acts of Parliament inconsistent with human rights in the UK can easily be 
amended by Parliament, while the Islamic legislature cannot change the fixed rules of 
Islamic Shari'ah. Rather, the reference, here, is mainly to the ideological and 
constitutional aspects of the UK constitutional principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty, 
with all this may imply of legal rules inconsistent with human rights, which Parliament 
16' Lord Lester of Herne Hill QC, "Human Rights and the British Constitution", in: Jowell, J., and Oliver, 
D., op. cit., p. 90-91 
165 See Article 7 of the basic law of Saudi Arabia which states that "The reginze derives its powerfrom the 
Holy Qziran and the Prophet's Sunna which rule over this and all other State Lmvs. " Article 4 of Iran 
constitution also states that "All civil, penal financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, 
political, and other 1mvs and regulations inust be based on Islamic criteria. This principle applies 
absolutely and generally to all articles of the Constitution as ivell as to all other Icnvs and regulations, 
and thefitqaha'of the Guardian Council arejudges in this inatter. " See also the UAE court interpretation 
of Article 7 of the UAE Constitution, discussed in Chapter Four, which asserts the supremacy of the 
Islamic Shari'ah in the UAE constitutional system. See also Article I of Qatar constitution which states 
that "... Islain is the State's religion and the Islantic Shari'ah is the main source of its legislations... " 
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itself cannot change. This may assist in tackling the constitutional principle of - the 
supremacy of Islamic Shari'ah that God is the supreme lawgiver, with all this may 
imply of rules inconsistent with human rights, which the Islamic legislature cannot 
change. Indeed, in certain areas, where the legal principles of Islamic Shari'ah are fixed, 
Muslims also cannot make changes, except as required by the Shari'ah law; the Islamic 
hudud and some aspects involving relations between Muslims and non-Muslims are 
examples. However, they can react to potential inconsistency in other wider areas, such 
as freedom of speech, equality between men and women, freedom of religion, and the 
rights of minorities. Muslim scholars and jurists can use, in their interpretations of what 
is revealed by God, techniques that exist in the Islamic teaching, confirming the 
flexibility of Islamic Shari'ah in the implementation, and its timeless nature that is 
adaptable to the present-day conditions and circumstances, as we will see later, to 
incorporate international human rights and reconcile, to a certain extent, the potential 
inconsistency between them. In this respect, the example of the UK reaction to 
inconsistency between its sacred constitutional principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty 
and the requirement of human rights, as we will see in Chapter Five, could be of benefit. 
In fact, the potential inconsistency of Islamic rules can be clearly defined, in the sense 
that such rules cannot be more than already exist, as the revelation of God ended with 
the death of His last Prophet. The UK legal system, however, as a result of the 
continuing nature of the UK constitutional principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty, is 
evolving and hence the inconsistency is unpredictable. The UK constitutional principle 
of Parliamentary Sovereignty implies, as will be seen below, that Parliament can, at any 
time, if it chooses, violate the basic human rights and fundamental freedoms without 
any legal accountability whatsoever. 166 However, the main point, here, is not how the 
inconsistency arises but how a lesson can be drawn from the UK reaction to the 
166 See Rv Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simins and another, House of Lords, . [2000]2AC 115, [1999]3 All ER400, [1999]3 WLR328, [1999] EMLR689. 
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potential inconsistency between its constitutional system and the requirements of human 
rights. Thus, it is not a legal issue of implementation but the idea of values that 
determines how the legal system operates. 
It is also worth noting that the reference to the UK, here, should not be taken as pointing 
a finger at the UK constitutional system as having constitutional principles inconsistent 
with the requirements of international human rights in order to justify violations of 
human rights elsewhere in the world. Rather it should be taken as first, a demonstration 
that cultural and traditional tension with human rights is not necessarily exclusive to a 
certain culture or certain nation but it is actually a result of the variety of diverse 
traditions of different nations that form this modem world. Second, it is a 
demonstration, as mentioned above, of how the UK constitutional system reacts to 
resolve the constitutional inconsistency between human rights and its principle of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty; an experience from which Muslims can benefit to strike the 
balance between the constitutional principle of the Islamic Shari'ah that God is the 
supreme lawgiver and the requirements of international human rights instruments. Thus, 
it is not a straight comparative work but one that derives lessons and demonstrates the 
wider application of the issue of values when it comes to the domestic implementation 
of human rights. In the following section, therefore, we will examine the fundamental 
constitutional principle of the British Parliamentary Sovereignty, which raises 
complexity in human rights implementation in the UK constitutional system. 
111.3.2.1. The Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty 
Parliamentary Sovereignty is the main fundamental constitutional principle in the UK 
legal and political system. Dicey, one of the most celebrated constitutional scholars in the 
UK, defined the principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty as the "right to make or unniake 
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any knv whatever; and, fiirther, that no person or body is recognized by the lmv of - 
England as having the right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament". 167 
Dicey further explained his definition by saying that the principle of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty may then have two sides. The positive side is that: "any Act ofParlianient, or 
an part of an Act of Parliament, which makes a new Iaw, or repeals or modifies an y 
existing lmv, will be obeyed by the Courts. " The negative side is that: "there is no person 
or hody ofpersons who can, under the English constitution, make rules which override or 
derogateftom anAct ofParliament, or which (to express the same thing in other words) 
will be enforced by the Court in contravention ofan Act ofParlianzent. " 1 68 
For Dicey, the unrestrained legislative power of Parliament is a legal fact, in the sense 
that no institution whatsoever can challenge the validity of its enactments, even if it was 
to override the rule of law. 169 There is no sacred area that Parliament cannot touch. It can 
easily intervene in public or even private rights of individuals. The Septennial Act of 
1716 was a striking example of Parliament's interference with public rights. The 
Septennial Act was introduced to extend the legal duration of Parliament from three to 
seven years, prolonging the powers of the existing House of Commons for four years 
beyond the time for which the House was elected. 170 This Act was a surprise for many 
lawyers, who regarded such an enactment as a violation of the trust of the people. 
Although Parliament in the Septennial Act of 1716 made unprecedented use of its power, 
the Act proves that Parliament, from a legal point of view, is neither the agent of the 
electors nor a trustee for its constituents. 171 It is legally the sovereign legislative power in 
167 Dicey, A., opcit., p., 38 
168 Ibid., p., 38 
169 jowell, J., "The Rule of Law Today", In: Jowell, J., and Oliver, D., op. cit., p. 17 
170 Jenkins, D., "From Unwritten to Written: Transformation in the British Common-Law Constitution", 
Vol. 36, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Lmv, 2003, p. 870 
171 Dicey, A., op. cit., p., 45 
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the state. Dicey asserted that parliament can even interfere with far more important rights , 
of individuals to the benefit of the community. 172 
Undoubtedly, for Dicey, the arrangements of the constitution are to assure that the will of 
electors is, by the means of constitution, enforced in the political and constitutional life. 
But this is a political, not a legal fact, in the sense that the Courts will take no notice of 
the will of electors. 173 The electors can always enforce their will in the long run only 
through their representatives in Parliament. They cannot, for example, invalidate an Act 
of Parliament on the ground that it is against their wish. That is simply because such an 
Act is an expression of the wish of their representatives. As Dicey suggests, the common 
view of the British constitutional authors is that the members of the House of Commons 
are not merely trustees and their acts are not subject to electors. 174 It is worthwhile 
mentioning that in Dicey's time, the independence of judiciary was seen as "the sole 
securityfor the maintenance of the common 1mv ivhich ivas nothing else but the rille of 
established customs modified only by, 4cts of Parliament. " 175 
Almost all of the well known British authors, like Austin 176 , Hart 
177 
, Heuston 
178 and 
Wade 179 , seem to agree with the Dicean theory of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty in that the 
Parliament of Westminster is the sovereign body in the United Kingdom, holding 
unrestrained legislative power. Although there are some disagreements over the nature of 
172 Ibid., pp., 46-47 
173 Ibid., p., 71 
174 Ibid., p., 73 Austin agrees with Dicey that Parliament is the sovereign body in the United Kingdom 
which has the ultimate legislative power, but Austin differs from Dicey in that he considers members of 
the House of Commons as merely trustees, implying that sovereignty lies in the monarch, peers and 
electors, instead of the members of the House of Common. See Austin, J., The Province ofJurisprudence 
Determined, London: Low & Brydone (Printers)Ltd, 1965, pp. 230-231 
175 Harden, I., and lewis, N., The Noble Lie: The British Constitution and the Rule of Lenv, London: 
Hutchinson, 1986, p. 38 
176 Austin, J., opcit., Lecture vi, 1954, pp. 191-361 
177 Hart, H. L. A., The Concept ofLmv, Oxford University Press, 1965, pp. 50-78 
"' Heuston, R., Essays in Constitutional Lmv, Second Edition, London: Stevens & Sons, 1964, pp. 1-31 
179 Wade, W., The Basis ofLegal Sovereignty, 1955, pp. 171-197 
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sovereignty and over whether Parliament has the power to bind its successor, the British , 
common view is that Parliament cannot be bound even by its own enactments, in the 
sense that the current Parliament cannot withdraw a topic from the legislative scope of 
future Parliament, despite the disagreement on whether Parliament can bind its successor 
as to the form and manner in which a statute can be passed. 180 
Recent cases show that the courts are hampered by the principle of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty and not willing to compromise. In Raymond v. Honey 1983, Lord 
Wilberforce admitted that access to a court was a right protected by Article 6 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
However, he asserted that under English law, constitutional rights such as access to 
court can be taken away from a convicted person expressly or by necessary 
implication. 181 Lord Bridge added that even a citizen's right to unimpeded access to the 
courts can also be taken away by express enactment. 182 In a recent judgment, Laws J 
has noted that the English common law provides no lesser protection of the right of 
access to the Queen's courts than might be vindicated in Strasbourg. However, he 
180 Hart in justifying the continuity of the legislator differentiates between two schools: the continuing and 
the sey-embracing school and admits that the rule is one of continuing theory, so that Parliament cannot 
protect its statutes from repeal, but Parliament, he added, can extend its enactments to bind its successor 
as to the manner and form in which legislation can be passed. Hart, H. L. A, op. cit., p., 147. Parliament 
could determine the manner and form by which the statutes can be identified and how its will was to be 
ascertained. Barber, N., "Sovereignty Re-examined: The Courts, Parliament, and Statutes", Vol. 20, No. I., 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2000, P. 133. However, Heuston re-emphasised that the courts have 
jurisdiction to question the validity of an Act only on the grounds that it does not satisfy the conditions 
and procedures set out in the introduction to such kind of statute, but when it comes to the area of what 
may be done by a law, the courts have no jurisdiction. Heuston believes that the rule identifying statutes 
is not a matter of limitation but identification. Heuston, R., Essays in Constitutional Lmv, Second Edition, 
London: Stevens & Sons, 1964, p. 15. On the other hand, Wade, although he seems to be in line with 
Heuston's argument which suggests that sovereignty is rule-based, differs in approaching the question of t, 
statute identification. Wade argues that the rule identifying statutes is beyond the reach of parliament. It is 
the common law, which is the source for such a rule and it is above Parliament, logically prior to it, and 
Parliament cannot alter it. Barber, N., op. cit., p. 133. Wade suggests that the relationship between the 
courts and Parliament stands on a political fact and therefore he concludes that Parliament cannot bind its 
successor in any way and the courts must give effect to Parliament's most recently expressed intention. 
Wade, W., The Basis ofLegal Sovereignty, 1955 
181 Rayniondv. Honey [1983] IACI 
182 See Lord Bridge's opinion, Judgment-5, in Rayniondv. Honey [1983] IACI 
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refused to accept the counsel's argument that citizens' right to access to the courts is a 
fundamental right that Parliament cannot override. 183 
Simon Brown in R v. Ministry of Defence 1995 declined to grant relief for applicants, 
discharged from the military service under a decision of 18 March 1994 because they 
had committed homosexual acts whilst serving in the armed forces. Although it was 
admitted that such a ministerial decision was in breach of Article 8 and 14 of the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Simon 
Brown found himself not in a position to declare the decision unlawful. He clearly 
expressed his sympathy for the applicants; however, he suggested that their claims must 
fail, since the decision had been affirmed by Parliament. 184 Lord Irvin of Lairg L. C has 
made it clear that any suggestion of the limitation of Parliament's legislative power is 
"contrary to established 1mvs and conslitution of the United Kingdom. "'" Lord 
Bingham has also suggested that judges should not embark on an "exercise of dis- 
applying Acts ofParlianient" because this is "notpart of our constitutional tradition"186 
This sacred recognition of Parliamentary Sovereignty, therefore, leads to a question as 
to how such unlimited authority can guarantee that Parliament would not act as a 
despotic or tyrannical government in which the rights of individuals would be at stake. 
Some opinions have recently emerged suggesting that Parliament is not at liberty to 
infringe some basic rights of individuals. 187 Lord Woolf affirmed that both institutions, 
Parliament and the courts, were ultimately subject to the rule of law and therefore if 
Parliament were to embark on the unthinkable by legislating law that undermined in a 
193 p 
184 _ 
v. Lord Chancellor, exparle Wtham[1998] QB 575, [1997] 2 All ER779, [1998]2 WLR849 
Rv Ministry of Defence, ex p Smith [1996] QB 517 
"5 Elliott, M., "The Demise of Parliamentary Sovereignty? The Implications for Justifying Judicial 
Review", 115 Human Rights Lmv Review, 1999, p. 125 
196 Bingham rejects new privacy law, The Daily Telegraph, Thursday 9 October 1997, Issue 868 
187 Taylor v. New ZealandPoultry Board, 1984 1 NZLR 394,398 (Sir Robin Cooke) 
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fundamental way the rule of law, the courts would not be obliged to give effect to such , 
arbitrary legislation. 188 However, judicial applications in this respect have not gone that 
far. Lord Hoffmann in the case of R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex 
parte Sininis has expressed the view embraced by the House of Lords that "Parliamentary 
sovereignty means that Parliament can, if it chooses, legislate contrary to findamental 
principles of hunian rights" and the constraints on the power of Parliament, he added, are 
'zillimately political, not legal', which means that such constraints are beyond the power 
of the court. 189 Thus, the fundamental principle of the British constitution is that 
Parliament has an unrestrained legislative power, such that no institution can override its 
enactments, even if they are, by clear expression, in breach of the individual's 
fundamental rights. 
190 
188 Lord Woolf, "Droit Public-English Style", Pub. L., 1995, pp. 67-69 
189 But, Lord Hoffmann also underlined that 'Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or 
ambiguous words' and suggested "In the absence of express language or necessary implication to the 
contrary, the courts therefore presume that even the most general words were intended to be subject to the 
basic rights of the individual. " See Rv Secretary of Statefor the Home Department, ex parte Shnnis and 
another, House of Lords, [2000] 2 AC 115, [1999] 3 All ER 400, [1999] 3 WLR 328, [1999] EMLR 689. 
190 The doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty indeed caused great internal constitutional difficulties when 
the British government decided to join the European Community. That is because membership of the 
European Community requires a state to surrender some of its sovereignty for the benefit of establishing a 
new European legal order. In doing so the state members must give certain provisions of Community law a 
direct effect in the state domestic legal system, whereby individuals can rely on them before national courts 
without further implementation. See Hunt, M., op. cit., p., 47. National courts have no power, whatsoever, 
to invalidate Community acts. See Andens, M., and Jacobs, F., (eds. ), European Community Laiv in the 
English Courts, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 13. The European Court of Justice held in Costa 
v. ENEL that 'itfollowedfrom the very nature of the new legal order that national courts are bound to give 
prinjacy to Community laiv over any inconsistent national laiv, including subsequent legislationý See Hunt, 
M., op. cit., p., 47. Giving supremacy to the provisions of Community law over the Act of Parliament would 
indeed raise a constitutional difficulty in the British legal system. It is inconsistent with, at least, the 
continuing theory of Parliamentary Sovereignty which suggests that Parliament cannot bind its successor. 
However, by legislating the European Community Act 1972, the British Parliament has accepted the direct 
effect of the European Community law in the British legal system without further enactment. Accordingly, 
it might be true to say that by this Act Parliament, in certain areas, has transferred its sovereignty to the 
European Community law, meaning that future statutes of Parliament must be consistent with the 
Community law requirements. In accepting directly effective community law, Parliament seems to be 
abandoning the continuing theory of Parliamentary Sovereignty and moving more towards the self 
embracing view which indicates that Parliament could bind its successor. In the Factortaine case, Lord 
Bridge gave an earlier statute, 1972 Act, precedence over a later one, Merchant Shipping Act 1988, 
undermining the common view, supported by the case law, that suggests that an earlier parliament could 
not bind a later parliament. Barber. N., op. cit., p. 145 see the opinion of Lord Bridge in the case of 
Factortanze Lid and others v Secretary ofStatefor Transport, House of Lords, [ 1991 ]I All ER 70, [1990] 
3 WLR 818, [1990] Lloyd's Rep 10. However, many lawyers have emphasized that Parliamentary 
Sovereignty in effect has remained intact, in that it can always retain its sovereignty by repealing the Act of 
1972. For more discussion about the supremacy of the European Community law see Hunt, M., op. cit., 
chapter 2, pp., 44-86 
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Accordingly, British experience of human rights implementation suggests that the tension , 
resulted from domestic values with human rights is not exclusive to the non-Western 
states but Western states also have some traditions that are not in full compliance with the 
current notion of human rights. The tension with human rights, in practice, seems to be a 
result of the variety of diverse traditions of different nations that form our modem world, 
seeking to preserve their cultural and political identities before foreign values even if they 
were in the name of human rights. The potential threat that could result from the British 
traditional principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty is that it Nvould damage, in addition to 
the rights and freedoms, in general, the core element of the international human rights 
movement, which is minority rights. 191 The international standard of human rights is that 
every single person must be secured fundamental and political rights, no matter what the 
origin of that person or the religion in which he or she believes and no matter the size of 
that community. 192 The British parliament, however, is accorded such an ultimate power 
that it could even result in the deprivation of important rights of a minority by a simple 
majority. The High Commissioner of Human Rights has warned the international 
community of the danger of majoritarian tyranny and suggests a conception of democracy 
that encompasses majorities and minorities alike, participating on an equal footing in 
decision making. 
193 
Dicey, in his attempt to defend the unlimited sovereignty of the UK's parliament, has 
argued that the ruler, by nature, and without any formal procedures, will not embark on 
something which he regards as highly improbable and also the governed obviously will 
191 Minority rights are perceived to be the original source of the growth of the current human rights 
movements. See Henrard, K., Minority Protection in Post-Apartheid SouthAfrica: Human Rights, Minority 
Rights, and Set(-Determination, Westport, Connecticut : Praeger, 2002, p. 2. See Steiner, H., and Alston, 
P., (eds. ), op. cit., p. 93 
192 Darrow, M and Alston, P., "Bills of Rights in Comparative Perspective", In. Alston, P, op. cit., 1999, p. 
500 
193 Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/41, Continuing dialogue on measures to promote and 
consolidate democracy, AIRES12001141, p. 4 
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not submit to such arbitrary rules. However, Dicey failed to explain how this limitation - 
can really happen on the ground, since he denied the power of any kind of legal 
machinery. Instead, he left the issue to be resolved by the sovereign members of that 
sovereign parliament. 194 Dicey shows that the parliamentary power is not even subject to 
the people that elected the House of Commons, as he asserts, the House of Commons is 
not an agent of its electors. 
This British understanding of democracy has brought a new dimension to human rights 
and attracts attention to a more complex aspect in the domain of right implementation in 
the state constitutional system. The British constitutional dilemma, which seems to hold 
the UK back from full realization of human rights, is of significance, and it illustrates 
the need to take constitutional principles seriously in tackling the implementation of 
human rights. Therefore, in the following part of this chapter I will discuss the concept 
of constitution and whether or not it really matters for the application of human rights. 
11.4. Constitutional Conception of Human Rights 
11.4.1. Human Rights in the Constitutional Settings 
Most legal systems have always identified the concept of constitution as a special 
document with an extraordinarily high legal status, which contains fundamental rules 
that characterize the identity of the state. Besides this, the constitution, in most 
countries, tends to be the source of powers of the state's institutions. Every institution 
must function within its capacity, which is clearly designated in such a special 
document. The rules of the constitution have always been given precedence over the 
ordinary rules and legislations must be issued in the light of the constitutional orders, 
194 Loveland, I., "The War Against the Judges", 68 Political Quarterly, 1997, p. 163 
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otherwise, they would be regarded as unconstitutional. 195 The amendment of the 
constitutional rules is usually more difficult than those at the ordinary level. For 
example, if the majority vote to approve the amendment of ordinary legislation is a third 
of the members of the legislature, the majority vote to approve the amendment of the 
rules of constitution would be two thirds of the members. 196 Moreover, some 
fundamental rules may not even be subject to any kind of modification. Such inviolable 
nature of the fundamental rules may be expressly stated in the constitution, such as Art. 
79, paragraph. 3 of the Federal Republic of Germany's Fundamental Law, which 
prohibits any modification of any rules that might touch the federal structure of the 
state. 197 In other cases, it may be identified by means of interpretation, as is the case in 
Switzerland. 198 
The machinery applying such a hierarchy of the constitutional rules takes two forms of 
control; the first one, which is widespread in Europe, is called a posteriori review, in 
which the power of deciding the constitutional validity of legislation is conferred on the 
judiciary. The second one, which is recognized in France, is called a priori review, 
which requires a special council to be established to look at the constitutional 
compatibility of the Bill before it is passed as a valid law. The first form of control is 
the common one and takes different forms in its implementation. Some countries, such 
195 Allan, R., Brewer, Carias, Judicial Review in Comparative Lmv, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989, p. 137 
196 In the USA, amendments require a special majority in Congress followed by ratification by three- 
quarters of the states. See Finer, S. E., Bogdanor, V., and Rudden, B., Comparing Constitutions, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995,13. See also Article 144,2, (C) of the UAE Constitution. 
197 Haefliger. A., "The Hierarchy of Constitutional Norms and its function in protecting human rights", 
Human Rights Lcav Journal, Vol. 13, No. 3,1992, p. 84 
... In Swiss constitutional law, there is no norm corresponding to Art. 79, para. 3 of Germany's 
fundamental law, no is there any indication suggesting that certain norms take precedence over others. 
However, the constitutional right to launch an initiative to show the people's will for such a constitutional 
amendment is said to be limited. The recent doctrine suggests that even though the amendment of the 
constitution is purely democratic, there are certain baff iers preventing any radical change that could touch 
the structure of the state. The Federal Assembly (Parliament) would have to invalidate any constitutional 
initiative threatening the foundations of the federalism or the essential core of the democratic order or 
personal freedoms. See Haefliger, A., op. cit., p. 84 
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as Germany, Italy and Spain, set up a specialized constitutional court to review the 
constitutionality of legislation as a means of protecting the constitution from any 
potential danger of infringement by the legislature. 199 This system is known as a 
centralized system, and it is very common in Europe. 200 The matter of constitutional 
validity of legislation may be brought either directly by an individual before the 
constitutional court or indirectly through the ordinary courts, where the litigant pleads 
that a piece of legislation is unconstitutional. 201 Others adopt a decentralized system of 
judicial review that lets the ordinary court decide the constitutionality of legislation, as 
is the case in America. The character of this codified constitution is always seen as 
rigid, since its amendment is through unusual procedures. 
States tend to differ in securing human rights within their constitutional settings. Some 
states prefer to specify the rights in the preamble of the constitution than to state them in 
the constitutional body. 202 Others protect human rights through a bill of rights, either as 
a separate document used as an aid to guide the judges to apply and interpret the law in 
accordance with the bill as well as the legislature in passing the national laws, or as a 
legislated bill of rights which takes the fonn of a piece of legislation or a package of 
different statutes which when brought together, may be treated as a bill of rights. 203 But 
all these different approaches are subject to serious criticisms. The main criticism of 
such approaches is that in respect to the bill of rights, whether as a separate document or 
even entrenched in the preamble of the constitution, it does not seem to bind the courts 
199 Robert, J., "Constitutional and International Protection of Human Rights: Competing of 
Complementary Systems? ", General Report to the IXth Conference of European Constitutional Courts, 15 
Hunian Rights Law Journal, No. 1-2,1994, p. 4. 
200 See Al-Ghufli, S. M., A Reconsideration of Constitutional Review in the United Arab Endrates: M 
Posteriori" or "A Priori" Review?, PhD, University of Wales, Aberystivyth, 2000, p. 76-90 
201 Robert, J., op. cit., pp. 4-5 
202 France, for example, entrenched the rights contained in the French Declaration of the Right of Man 
1789 in the preamble of the French constitution of 1946. 
203 Darrow. M and Alston. P, "Bills of Rights in Comparative Perspective", In: Alston. P, op. cit., 1999, 
p. 482 
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in using its nonns in their interpretation, nor does it bind the legislature in passing laws 
in accordance with its inspiration. 204 With regard to the legislated bill of rights, it cannot 
override inconsistent legislation, and it is subject to being repealed by ordinary 
legislation. 205 It can easily be repealed whenever the legislature likes, which is believed 
to be a very crucial point. Therefore, it is traditionally believed that in order to have a 
high statutes of protection for human rights, they should be stipulated in the text of the 
constitution with such a high status of legality, so the rights of individuals will be 
secured from any intervention by the legislature or other governmental institutions. 
Although this latter solution might be a reasonable conclusion in terms of the above 
description, it is not always as simple as it first seems. If we look at the issue from a 
practical point of view, the conclusion may become different. In practice, there are 
countries, such as the UK, which have better human rights situations without having 
entrenched rights and freedoms or even without having a written constitution, than 
others who do not seem to pay attention to the respect of human rights and dignity, 
although their constitutions do contain individual rights and freedoms and have such a 
character of rigidity. 206 The question, then, may not be whether a state has a written 
constitution. Rather, does the state believe in such constitutional norms as the principle 
of limited government, the fundamental rights and freedoms of individual and the rule 
of law? So, the idea is not the constitution itself, the idea is actually the principle of 
204 French inclusion of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in the preamble of French 
constitution raised a question of whether such inclusion in the preamble and not in the main body of the 
constitution is enough for them to be regarded as constitutionally binding rights. The French 
Constitutional Council resolved this question in 1971 by giving the Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
of the Citizen the constitutional value, whereby the council was able to rule unconstitutional some 
provisions of law on the basis they infringed principles given in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
of the Citizen stated in the preamble. See Constitutional Council Decision 7144DC 1971 Available 
Online in French language at http: //,. vww. conseil-constitutionnel. fr/decision/I 971/7144dc. htm. See also 
Sroor, A., Alhiniayyah Addustoorjyah lel Hziqooq iva Alhuryyat, (in Arabic) Cairo: Dar Ash'orooq, 1999, 
Fý565 
Darrow, M., and Alston, "Bills of Rights in Comparative Perspective", In: Alston. P, op. cit., 1999, p. 
482 
206 The UN Arab Human Development Report 2002 has shown that the Arab states, although they all 
have written constitutions and most of them state individual rights in the text of their constitutions, were 
proven to be the world's lowest scoring region, in both Average value of freedom scores, 1998-99 and ZD Average value of "voice and accountability" indicators, 1998. 
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constitutionalism, which is more concerned with constitutional norms and values than a 
written document. The adoption of a constitution does not necessarily indicate that the 
state concerned is committed to the principle of constitutionalism. 207 
11.4.2. The Idea of Constitutionalism 
Constitutionalism is the doctrine of restricted government. It requires imposition of 
limits on the powers of government, adherence to the rule of law, and the protection of 
fundamental rights and it is not dependent on the existence of a written constitution. 208 
It is more than 'a power map' or merely formal procedures; it is working arrangements 
which take control over the political authority, so it cannot be used oppressively or 
arbitrarily. 209 Its main function is not to create the state's powers (legislative, executive 
and judicial powers) or to spell out a set of laws, but to limit those powers in a 
principled way. 
210 
The limitations could take a variety of forms. A federal system, for example, could limit 
the state's powers in their scope of authority; the federal government could have the 
authority over matters pertaining to the security of the nation, while the provincial 
governments would be concerned with matters pertaining to health services and 
education. The legislative power of the federal government could also be limited to 
certain elements by exclusively specifying them, while allowing provincial 
207 Darrow, M., and Alston, P., "Bills of Rights in Comparative Perspective", In: Alston. P, op. cit., 1999, 
P684 65 
Rosenfeld, M., "Modem Constitutionalism as Interplay between Identity and Diversity", In: 
Rosenfeld, M., Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference, and Legitimacy: Theoretical Perspectives, 
London: Duke University Press, 1994, p. 3 
20913arendt, E., op. cit., p. 14. See also Baun, M. J., and Franklin, D. P., (eds. ), Political Culture and 
Constitutionalism: A Comparative Approach, London: M. E. Sharpe, 1995, p. 5 
2 10 Baun, M. J., and Franklin, D. P., op. cit., p. 2 
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211 
governments wider legislative authority in all matters not assigned to the Federation. 
This kind of limitation can also be defined as vertical separation of powers. 212 
Another form of limitation is the separation of the powers of the state's three authorities, 
the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. This separation of powers could take 
different fonns; the Montesquieuan form is a strict separation of persons and powers, in 
the sense that all organs of government must be separate and act exclusively, so there is 
no overlap whatsoever (pure separation of powers). 213 The American version takes the 
form of rigid separation of persons but with some degree of power overlap to secure the 
functionality of check and balance; it has been defined as a check and balance 
principle. 214 The third form might be the British check and balance principle which 
seems to be more flexible than the American one. The British check and balance version 
seems to leave broad overlap of authorities between the legislative organ and the 
executive one. However, it assigns great independence to the judiciary. 215 
The aim of constitutionalists has been to arrange political institutions and influence the 
conduct of both citizens and governors by just legal rules providing for the common 
interest and civil liberty. 216 Their main concern is to establish the government of law 
211 See the constitution of the United Arab Emirates 
212 Baun, M. J., and Franklin, D. P., op. cit., p. 43 
213 Parpworth, N., op. cit., p. 20-21 
214 Barendt, E., op. cit., p. 15 
2 15 Although the British principle of separation of judicial power is rather vague, British authors maintain 
that the principle has been constitutionally guaranteed in several places of British constitutional 
practices; first, a full time judge cannot sit in the House of Commons; second, MPs are significantly 
limited in ability to criticize the judiciary or to discuss cases pending before the courts, to save the 
judiciary from any political pressure; third, senior judges hold their position 'during good behaviour, 
subject to a power of removal by the Crown on an address ... presented by both Houses of Parliament', 
which makes the removal of judges significantly difficult. See Barendt, E., op. cit., p. 129-130. However, 
it has been argued that this independence of the judiciary in British constitution is primarily political 
rather than legal and recognized in the light of the independence of individual judges rather than 
collective the judiciary. See Stevens, R., "A Loss of Innocence?: judicial independence and the separation 
of powers", 19 OxfordJournal oftegal Studies, 1999. p., 375 
216 Gwyn, W. B., "The Separation of powers and Modem Forms of Democratic Governmerif', In: 
Goldwin, R. A., Separation of Powers-Does it Still JYork?, Washington, D. C: Enterprise Institute, 1986, 
p. 67 
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and not of men, where the governors and the governed are ruled by one fundamental 
law. 
The individual rights have often been considered as a fundamental element of the notion 
of constitutionalism. 217 It has even been argued that "constitutionalism has come to 
mean nothing more than a system of legally entrenched rights that can override, where 
necessary, the ordinaty political process. , 218 Micheal Reisman has also pointed out that 
the international human rights contained in UDHR and the two international Covenants 
necessarily imply a right to an appropriate constitution. 219 Sir John Laws has 
distinguished between good constitutions and bad constitutions and referred to the good 
constitutions as recognising equal rights. 220 He perceives the rule of law as the 
substantive one, not fonnal. 
221 
This distinction between the rule of law in the formal sense and the rule of law in the 
substantive sense has further stressed the significance of adhering to individual rights in 
the constitutional system. Rosenfeld has argued that the rule of law in the fon-nal sense 
is insufficient to satisfy the minimum requirements of legitimate constitutional 
democracy. 222 The rule of law in this sense, he argues, could regard unjust laws such as 
slavery, apartheid and even inhuman practice as legitimate, as long as they satisfy the 
procedural requirements of the formal version of the rule of law. 223 It is commonly 
217 Darrow, M and Alston, P., op. cit., p. 465 
218 Cited in ibid., p. 467 
2 19 Reisman, M., "Introductory Remarks", 19 Yale Journal ofInternational Lmv, 1994, pp. 189-190 
220 Laws, J., "The Constitution: Moral and Rights", Public Lmv, 1996, p. 622-623 
221 Ibid., p. 631 
222 Rosenfeld, M., "The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy", 74: 1307, South 
California Lenv Review, 200 1, p. 1314 
223 Ibid., p. 1314. The minimum requirements of the rule of law in the formal sense are that law be general, 
adequately publicized, clear, prospective, and relatively stable. Goldsworthy argues that nothing can Z, 
guarantee that the procedural requirements of the rule of law in the formal sense will be satisfied. He 
states that 'legislator cannot be required to ensure that every detail of every new lmv is brought to the 
attention of every citizen'. He maintains that 'the rule of Icnv would suffer if citizens were ininnineftom 
any lmv not specifically brought to their attention'. See Goldsworthy, J., "Legislative Sovereignty and the 
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suggested, therefore, that the legitimacy of the rule of law needs more than the rule of 
law in the formal sense. 224 It may need to be based, in addition to the formal procedures, 
on justice and fairness, in the sense that the rule of law will be better served if it is 
grounded on procedural and substantive norms of fairness. Dworkin argues that a 
substantive conception of the rule of law is the conception of rights, in the sense that 
individuals have moral rights and duties in relation to one another, and political rights 
against the state as a whole and these rights are recognized in positive law and enforced 
through courts. 225 Dworkin maintains that 
"The rule of law in this conception is the ideal of rule by an accurate public 
conception of individual rights. It does not distinguish, as the rule book conception 
(the fonnal conception) does, between the rule of law and substantive justice; on the 
contrary it requires, as part ofthe ideal oflaiv, that the rules in the book capture and 
enforce moral rights. t1226 
Allan has also based his conception of the content of the rule of law on certain 
substantive rights of individuals, such as speech, conscience and association. 227 Allan 
argues that judges must, in the application of the rule of law, give appropriate weight in 
their decisions to personal liberty. 228 
It is worth noting, here, that individual rights within this context are not only recognised 
as a set of rights that must be protected from the infringement of the state's authorities, 
but also as another form of limitation that curbs the authority of government through 
Rule of Law", In: Campbell, T., Ewing, K., and Tomkins, (eds. ) Sceptical Essays on Human Rights, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2001, P. 66-67 
224 Rosenfeld, M., op. cit., p., 1314 
225 Dworkin, R., A Matter ofPrinciple, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985, pp., 11-12 
226 Ibid., pp., I 1- 12 
227 Craig, P., "Constitutional Foundation, the Rule of Law and Supremacy", Public Lmv, 2003, p., 97 
228 Allan, T. R. S., Lmv, Liberty, and Justice the Legal Foundation of British Constitutionalism, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993, p., 39 
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justiciable rights to things like free expression, association, equality and due process of 
iaW. 229 
11.4.3. The Cultural Legitimacy of Constitutional Rights 
Human rights as a form of limitation, according to the constitutional conception 
discussed above, may fail to function if they were formulated in isolation from the 
culture and belief of the society they were supposed to serve. Human rights without 
cultural legitimacy, instead of being designed for curbing the state authority, may 
legitimize more state authority and intervention. 230 Indeed, human rights 
implementation requires enforcement procedures against the government, but the 
exercise of these procedures mainly depends on the holders of these rights. As Donnelly 
asserts, human rights is in fact a set of social practices. 23 1 As a result, human rights 
should be seen as a product of process rather than an established, predetermined 
normative proclaimed through international instruments. 232 As An-Na'irn noted, the 
proper implementation of human rights requires mobilization of the political will at the 
local, national, and international levels and that political will can in no way be 
229 Mayer, A. E., op. cit., 1999, p. 40 
230 For example, women's rights are widely perceived, especially in the West, as a means of liberating 
women from the oppression that they might encounter in their society, liberating women from their 
subordination to men, making them equal to men, giving them sey-'esteein and esteem in the eyes of their 
society. See Cherie Blair's statement in: Catherine Bennett, JVhy should ive defend the veil?, See The 
Guardian, Thursday January 22,2004, Available online at 
http: //xvww. guardian. co. uk/gender/story/0, I 1812,1128472,00. htmi. This kind of right, the right of women 
to uncover, it may be called, was aggressively enforced in some Islamic countries like Iran at the time of 
Shah who saw in the wearing of the veil a symbol of political resistance against his secular system of 
governance. See Arkoun, M., Rethinking Islam: common questions, uncommon ansivers, translated and 
edited by Lee, R. D, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, p. 26. The Tunisian government took a similar step 
in 1981 when the Tunisian government ratified law no. 108 banning Tunisian women from wearing hyab 
in state offices. See Al-Hamroni, M., Tunisian, 4clivist to Internationalize Hyab Ban, Available Online at 
http: //islamonline. net/English/News/2006-01/19/articleO3. shtmi. Those governments found it convenient 
to eliminate any behaviour that could help the return of political Islam, and to dominate the political scene 
through their totalitarian attitude of governance. See Price, D., op. cit., p., 76,130. So, the real holder of 
this kind of right, which is not socially and culturally accepted, is not the individual but actually the 
government, which seems inclined to use it to legitimize its oppression. 
23 1 Donnelly, J., op. cit., 1989, p. 17 
232 An-Na'im, A. A., ""Area Expressions" and the Universality of Human Rights: mediating a contingent 
relationship", In: Forsythe, D. P., and McMahon, P. C., op. cit., 2003, p. 2 
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guaranteed if human rights lack cultural legitimacy. 233 The High Commissioner for 
Human Rights has affirmed the importance of the common political values of society at 
large that is heavily affected by culture, and suggested that the state institutions need to 
be strengthened through broad outreach to and access by people to counter the threat 
ofpolitical elitisin. 234 For some authors, the state institutions with little societal support 
would end up operating in a social and cultural vacuum that is opposed to the true 
liberal democratic system. 235 As Apter has observed, "Modernity ivas not the property 
of thefeiv, or a scientific elite, but rather afact of culture". 236 On this basis, the human 
rights Commissioner's report looks beyond the formal institutions of democracy, i. e. the 
executive, the judiciary and the legislature, and draws the attention to the principle of 
representativeness underpinned by civil society where electoral systems deliver results 
close to what the people aspire. 
237 
As far as international human rights law is concerned states are, indeed, legally required 
to refrain from violation of the international rights and to adopt measures of reform in 
their constitutional systems in order to comply with the international human rights 
requirements. 238 Also states, especially parties to the human rights treaties, are 
233 Ibid., p. 6. See also Solesbee v. Balkcoin, 339 U. S. 9,16 (1950). See also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 
101 (1958). The US Supreme Court asserted in this case that the application of the constitutional principle 
of the due process of law heavily depends on social values and beliefs of American people. It states that 
"Due Process Clause embodies a system of rights based on inoral principles so deeply embedded in the 
traditions andjeelings of our people as to be deemedfindainental to a civilized society as conceived by 
our whole history. " Also it pointed out that in the enforcement of such a broad technical concept as due 
process, the court would ensure that the court does not translate personal views into constitutional 
limitations. It stated "the Court enforces those permanent and pervasive feelings of our society as to 
which there is compelling evidence ofthe kind relevant tojudgments oil social institutions". 
234 The High Commissioner for Human Rights, Civil and Political Rights: Continuing dialogue on 
measures to promote and consolidate democracy, submitted in accordance with Commission resolution 
2001/41,27 January 2003, p. 11 
235 Kamrava, M., Democracy in the Balance: Culture and Society in the Middle East, New York: 
Chatham House Publishers, 1998, p. 3. See also Verba, S., "Comparative Political Culture", In: Pye, W., 
and Virba, S., (eds. ), Political Culture and Political Development, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1965., p, 525 
236 Apter, D., The Politics of Modernization, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 
1965, p. 10 
237 The High Commissioner for Human Rights., 2001/41,27 January 2003, op. cit., p. 11 
238 See Article 2(l) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
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prohibited from invoking their constitutional principles, which are mainly social and 
cultural norms, to justify a failure to perform or give effect to obligations under the 
human rights treaties. 239 However, the international human rights principles do not have 
direct horizontal effect as a matter of international law and the Covenants on human 
rights cannot be viewed as a substitute for domestic criminal or civil law. 240 So the 
domestic legal principles that are heavily affected by the constitutional norms and 
structures of the states are in fact the principles that are always applied and hence the 
cultural legitimacy of the rights concerned will always be invoked. Restrictions on 
international rights are also permitted under international human rights standards, in so 
far as it is necessary in a democratic SoCietyl4l and does not impair the essence of the 
international rights. 242 Those state restrictions seem to be allowed mainly for the interest 
of public security and stability, which are themselves heavily dependent on the political 
culture and public norms of each society. 243 This also indicates that variations in the 
implementation of human rights are permissible as long as they are conducted according 
to the international human rights standards, which require the variation to be acceptable 
in a democratic society and not to impair the essence of international rights. 244 
It can be argued, however, that the determination of compatibility between rights and ý 
certain societal traditions and customs may be not so difficult to achieve, but if religion 
is involved which upholds imitation over logic and reason, the difficulty becomes much 
greater and may not even leave any glance of hope of reconciliation. The complexity 
239See Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See also Advisory opinion of the 
permanent court of international justice, February 4,1932 concerning the treatment of Polish nationals in 
Danzig. 
240 General Comment No. 31 [80] Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the 
Covenant: 26/05/2004., CCPR/C/2 I/Rev. I/Add. 13. Available online at 
httl2: //%v%v-. v. unhchr. ch/tbs/doc. nsf/(Symbol)/c92ce7lll79ccab] c 1256c48OO38394a? Opendocument 
24 1 Robertson, A. H., and Meffills, J. G., op. cit, p. 126. 
242 General Comment No. 31 [801, Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the 
Covenant: 26/05/2004., CCPR/C/21/Rev. I/Add. 13 
243 Robertson, A. H., and Merrills, J. G., op. cit., 1996, p. 126 
244 In Chapter Five we will discuss these human rights standards in more details. 
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that has arisen from the involvement of religion, particularly Islam, in rights discourse - 
might be the inner belief, not mere custom, that God and God alone is the ultimate right 
giver, from which necessarily follows the idea that freedom can only be achieved 
through submission to God and His divine law. 245 Within this context, it has been 
argued that in Islam God, not the individual, is always the focal point and the 
individual, rather than having rights against the state, has religious duties toward the 
state, which is, according to many authors, against the core substantive feature of 
human rights. 246 As a result, the divine law of the Shari'ah is found to be, in the Islamic 
states, the dominant law in the land consisting of principles, some of which are 
absolutely fixed and incompatible with the current understanding of human rights. 
Examples of these principles are the prevention of Muslim women from marrying 
unbelievers, which is said to amount to discrimination on the basis of religion, the 
differentiation between men and women in inheritance, which is said to be a 
discrimination on the basis of sex, and the Islamic hudud punishments which are 
according to the current trend of international human rights against the individual 
fundamental rights not to be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. 247 
It appears that the main difficulty that is facing the application of human rights in the 
Islamic context is the secular basis of the concept of human rights. 248 However, secular 
principles, by reflection, do not always enhance democracy and human rights but 
sometimes form a factor of repression and dictatorship, as in the case of Tunisia. 249 
245 Brems, E., op. cit., p. 207 
246 Tibi, B., "The European Tradition of Human Rights and the Culture of Islam", In: An-Na'im, A. A., 
and Deng, F. M., op. cit., 1990, p. 116 
24' Deeper discussion and analysis about the principles of Islam and human rights will be made in the 
next chapter. 
248AIi, S., op. cit., pp. 25-28 
249 Sieglinde Granzer in his comparative study concluded that in the more secular state, Tunisia, the 
human rights are less implemented than in the more traditional Islamic state of Morocco, He has called 
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Generally speaking, the defenders of human rights, instead of defending human rights 
and democracy, appear sometimes to be arguing to defend the principles of secularism, 
not human rights. Therefore, it is appropriate, here, to discuss the relations of secularism 
and Islam to democracy before we endeavour to examine, in greater details, the 
compatibility of Islamic Shari'ah with the requirements of international human rights in 
the next chapter. 
11.5. Secularism and Islam: their relations to democracy 
It has been argued, from a secularist perspective, that religion is in general an obstacle 
to modernization . 
250 If religion enters the public sphere, it inevitably leads to the kind of 
irresolvable clash that is the collapse of a democratic political order. 251 It has been 
argued that secularism is the only way to guarantee international rights protection, since 
it rejects discrimination on the basis of religion, race and colour. "' This rejection of the 
role of religion in public life might be due to the Western experience with religion, 
whereby the Pope and Emperor were able to claim to be the viceroys of God on earth 
with their authority and power coming directly from Him. 253 Popes and priests were the 
only people who could read what the will of God might be, to the extent that even if 
people were accorded free and equal access to the Bible, they tended to dominate 
foreign governments, Western NGOs, and researchers to reconsider the view that Tunisia, which 
endeavored to implement a strong secularization in all aspects of public life, is a model for the Arab states 
in how to organize their Islamic culture into a political form. See Granzer, S., "Changing discourse: 
transnational advocacy networks in Tunisia and Morocco", In: Risse, T., Ropp, S., and Sikkink, K., 
(eds. ), The Power of Human Rights : international nornis and domestic change, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999, pp., 109-133 
25ODonald Eugene Smith's statement cited in Saeed, J., Islam and Modernization: a comparative analysis 
ofPakistan, Egypt, and Turkey, London: Praeger Publishers, 1994, p. 25 
25 'Thiemann, R. F., Religion in Public Life: A Dilenunafor Democracy, Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 1996, p. 75 
252 Tabi. B., "The European Tradition of Human Rights and the Culture of Islam", In An-Na'im, A. A., 
Deng, F. M., op. cit., 1990, p. 104 
253 Kallen, H. M., Secularism is the lVill of God: an essay in the social philosophy of democracy and 
religion, New York: Twayne Publishers, 1954, p. 43 
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interpretations of the Bible to preserve their exclusive authority over the divine law. 254 
Thus, if democracy is to be properly established, religion must be confined in the 
private realm, without disturbing the public life. Citizens cannot be free and equal in the 
exercise of religion, if a particular faith or creed is the preferred religion of the state. 255 
With regard to Islam, it has been considered to have a weak democratic tradition, since 
it lacks legal recognition of corporate persons and legislative bodies. 256 
However, some secularists did not seem to realize the significant impact of personal 
beliefs and convictions in shaping individual understanding of the good and bad, which 
ultimately will affect the public life through his views and opinions on controversial 
moral and political matters like abortion or pornography. 257 Secularists' stance towards 
religion seems to be affected by the western conception of religion, which is perceived 
to cover only the relation of the individual to God. This does not necessarily represent 
the meaning of Islam. 
There are two points that must be made in discussing the relation of secularism and 
Islam to democracy: 
First, the failure to distinguish between the source and the method of Islamic law has 
resulted in a misconception about Islamic law being wholly divine and immutable. 258 it 
is very important to distinguish between the revelations, the Quran and the Sunna, from 
which the divine law is derived and the understanding of the divine law which can be 
254 ]bid., 44 
255 Thiernann, R. F., op. cit., p. 74 
256 Bernard Lewis's opinion cited in Monshipouri, M., op. cit., p. 216 
257 Ibid., p. 77 
258 Baderin., M., op. cit., p. 33 
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found in the books of medieval scholars and their successors. 259 The latter is calledfiqh, 
which refers to the method of understanding of the divine law and which was developed 
by Islamic intellectual effort called Ijtihad. Hence, while the divine law as a revelation 
from God is immutable, the fiqh, the understanding of the divine law is subject to 
human errors and may change according to time and circumstances. 260 
Accordingly, Islam does not seem to give people like priests or other religious people 
chance to claim special access to the will of God, since every judicial-political decision 
takes its justification and finality from the written book, the Quran, and the clear 
practices of the Prophet Muhammad, Peace be upon him, which are intensively debated 
in the books offiqh . 
261 Accordingly, it might be right to say that the so called religious 
authorities in Islam, are the specialists who can elaborate on matters that might not have 
been properly discussed before or might not have come into being, and in accordance 
with certain techniques, known by those concerned with this discipline, give their 
opinion on them, in much the same way that lawyers perform their work. The 
involvement of Islam does not seem to give any authority to anyone in the name of 
religion, by virtue of being a scholar. As far asfiqh is concerned, the politicians may be 
able by themselves to derive the rules that govern the political situation from the Islamic 
fzqh, without resorting to any Muslim scholars. Where an unprecedented situation 
comes into existence that has no direct verdict in the Islamicfiqh, the scholars then may 
be consulted in the same way that other experts in other fields may be cited if the issue 
concerned the field of their specialization. 
259 Vogel, F. E., "The Rule of Law in Saudi Arabia: exploring contradictions and traditionsý', In: Cotran, 
E., and Yamani, M., The Ride of Lmv in the Middle East and the Islamic World. Human Rights and 
Judicial Process, London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2000, p. 128 
260 Ramadan, S., Islantic Lmv. its scope and equity, Geneva: [s. n. ], 1970, p. 36 
26'Arkoun, M., op. cit., p. 22 
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Second, a distinction must be made between the meaning of Islam and religion. That is, 
the meaning of Islam is not only confined to the spiritual sense, although this is 
ftindamental, but it extends to cover all aspects of life. The Islamic scholars have made 
religion, the field that tackles the relationship with God, only one necessity of five that 
Islam is based on, which are:, religion, soul, mind, offspring and money. 262 Therefore, 
Islam cannot be reduced to a mere field of ethics, tackling the rituals of worship and the 
relation of the individual to God, but is a living religion that strongly interacts with 
other social, political and economic aspects of life. The Islamic imperative is both 
personal and societal, individual and corporate and the Muslim community, "the state", 
is seen as the essential factor for the realization of God's Will. 263 MUSliMSi perceptions, 
as a result, are shaped by Islamic codes, ethics and values concerning the individual, 
whether in terms of his individuality or his position in the community. Hence, it is 
difficult for Muslim politicians to act in isolation from the Islamic ethics and values. 
Drawing upon these distinctions, Islam may better serve in the formulation of 
democracy and the rule of law in a predominantly Islamic society than secularism. That 
is to say, the worldview, secularism emphasizes separation between the religious and 
political spheres and since, in Islam, the religious and other aspects of people's lives are 
not distinct, 264 this partition between religion and politics in Islamic society would 
become arbitrary. The decline of Islam in Muslims' public life would result in a decline 
of popularity and representativeness, since the people's religious values would not be 
present in the political sphere. The Turkish experience, for example, has shown that 
secularization imposed from above by the ruling elites cannot create a mass secular 
262 AI-Qaradawi, Y., Min Fiqh Addmvlahfi Alislam, (in Arabic), Cairo: Dar Ash'rooq, 1997, p., 58 
263 Espositoj. L., Islam and Politics, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1987, p. 2 
264 Monshipouri, M., op. cit., p. II 
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culture. 265 Secularization that ignores the Islamic values has not been successful in the' 
Islamic states and has resulted in reversed effects. John Esposito has observed that "the 
secularization of processes and institutions did not easily translate into the 
secularization of minds and culture. While a minority accepted and implemented a 
Western secular worldview, the majority ofmost Muslim populations did not internalize 
a secular outlook and values. , 266 
Moreover, the view that religion is an obstacle to modernization and inevitably leads to 
the collapse of democratic order is not necessarily applicable to Islam. 267 Islam has 
never been an obstacle to the process of reform based on democratic values in Islamic 
268 
world. All modernizers who raised their voices in the nineteenth century against 
despotic govemments were actually Islamic scholars. Rifa'ah al-Tahtawi (1801-1873), 
Khairuddin AI-Tunisi (1810-1899), Jamal Al-Din AI-Afghani (1838-1897), Abdel 
Rahman Al-Kawakibi (1854-1902), and Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) all called for 
an end to absolutist rule and an establishment of the rule of law and popular 
participation through Islamic Shura, consultation, and election. 269 
Furthermore, the presumption that secularism eliminates every religious aspect in 
politics, on reflection, seems to be mistaken. That is to say, from a constitutional 
perspective, secularism stresses that the government is a creation of men and not of 
265 Ibid., p. 13 
266 Esposito, J. L., The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? New York: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 9 
267 Donald Eugene Smith's statement cited in Said, J., op. cit., p. 25, see also Thiemann, R. F., op. cit., p. 75 
26" Daniel E. Price conducted a study in which he intensively examined eight countries- Egypt, Jordan, 
Syria, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Algeria, and Iran, and concluded that the greater the influence of 
Islam in political life of Islamic countries, the higher the level of democracy becomes, and the less the 
influence of Islam on government, the higher the level of oppression. See Price, E. D., Islamic Political 
Culture, Democracy, and Human Rights: a comparative study, London: Praeger, 1999. 
269 But in the later years of nineteenth century different people with Christian background had taken the 
position to elaborate on the matter on the basis of a completely westerniýed conception of reform. People 
like Shibli Shumayyil (1850-1917), Farah Antun (1874-1922), Georgie Zaidan (1861-1914), Ya7qub 
Suruf (1852-1917), Salama Musa (1887-1958), and Nicola Haddad (1878-1954) who claimed that the real 
problem with the Arab world was its culture--and, specifically, its dominant religion. See Tamimi, A., 
"The Renaissance of Islam, " 132 Daedalus, 2003. 
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God, which most Muslims would agree with. But it also stresses that, in order to limit 
human greed and tendency to control, the government recognized in a secular state is 
the government of law and not of men. The difficulty, here, is that law is still affected 
by men's desires and perceptions of the good and bad. Although laws, in Western 
society, are known through reason, natural law will always be a source of that reason 
and the context within which laws are to be shaped. It is not clear so far where natural 
law leaves off and positive law begins. 270 However, in both cases the last say on what 
constitutes natural law or positive law is actually held by human beings themselves, 
which seems to indicate that some people, who claim to have exclusive understanding 
of what is natural and what is not, or who claim the authority to produce law that they 
consider appropriate for the community, will rule, and not law by itself, since it is a 
product of men. Therefore, it is not a departure from the government of men but it is a 
government of men in accordance with law. Good law may be shaped by spiritual 
elements which are mostly shaped in their turn by religious ethics. 271 In the Western 
system, for example, civil society ruled by law was initially reinforced by Christianity, 
in the sense that the right conduct is guided by Christian ethics and individual freedom 
is tempered by representative government. 272 These complementary reinforcing 
elements have resulted in a high degree of self-restraint in behaviour which is now the 
essence of the liberal democratic polity. 273 Accordingly, religion is a source of faith that 
shapes men's perception of what is right and wrong, while representative government is 
270Apter, D., Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization, Englewood Cliffs (N. J. ): 
Prentice-Hall., 1968, p., 207 
271 It has been suggested that the substantive values enshrined in the Western basic laws are rooted in the 
three main currents one of which is the Christian 'natural law' tradition. See Finer, S. E., Bogdanor, V., 
and Rudden, B., op. cit., p. 37 
272 Apter, D., op. cit., 1968, p., 209. 
273 Ibid., 209. Consistently, US Supreme Justice William 0. Douglas stated in 1952 "We are a religious 
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. " This means that religious beliefs always 
influence decisions. Cited in Thiemann, R. F., op. cit, pp. 2-3 
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the machinery that enables men to implement their values. 274 So long as men who are 
the ultimate founders of secular states are heavily influenced by God in one way or 
another, the religious values will somehow affect the government, even if that 
government stems from secular grounds. 275 As a result, religion, whether Christianity or 
Islam, will always have role in deciding what is good for the community. 
11.6. Conclusion 
It might be right to conclude that the relativity of human rights is inevitable for their 
implementation, either by their nature, as claims curbing the state's authority and the 
implementation of the rule of law as discussed above, or by international standards 
which emphasise holistic democracy based on self-determination and rooted in cultural 
values and spiritual traditions from all parts of the world. Although the relation of Islam 
or other constitutional traditions to human rights must be tackled within the context of 
the international norms recognized by the international community, the international 
huinan rights instruments do not seem to suggest eliminating any cultural or religious 
274 Voll has argued that secularism might be an inherent part of the process of modernization but this does 
not mean that religion has no vital force in the political and social life of modernized people. See Voll, J. , 0., Islam, Continuity and Change in the Modern World, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1994, p. 
289 
275A case of Pledge of Allegiance, Elk Grove Independent School District v. Newdow, is being heard by 
the US Supreme Court, where an atheist, Michael Newdow, claims that his child is being led to say "one 
nation under God" on a daily basis in the school and this makes him feel disenfranchised. The Pledge, 
which touts "liberty for all, " is being used to inculcate in his daughter a religious world view that he, as an 
atheist, cannot accept. In other words, the state is displacing his role in educating his daughter on religion, 
and therefore "under God" is unconstitutional. Cited in Hamilton, M. A., The Supreme Court's Pledge of 
Allegiance case: Why the Department of Juslice is wrong to support 'Under God, CNN website, Law 
Center, Friday, March 26,2004, Available online at 
http: //%v%v%v. cnn. com/2004/LAW/03/26/hamitton. pled2e/index. htmi. Although the U. S. Court of Appeals 
for the 9th Circuit ruled that the phrase "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance that is recited by 
schoolchildren is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court dismissed, on a technicality, the court decision. A 
step was taken by Congress to protect affirmation of religion as part of the national heritage of the 
American nation and approved a bill which would prohibit federal courts, including the Supreme Court, 
from hearing cases involving the pledge and its recitation and would prevent federal courts from striking 
the words "under God" from the pledge. See House bill would block Supreme Court on Pledge: Measure 
stirs zip religion, separation ofpoivers, CNN website, Politics, Thursday, September 23,2004, Available 
online at http: //%vxv%v. cnn. com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/09/23/pled. ge. undergod. ap/index. litml. Thus, the 
religious impact on the secular state becomes much clearer when dealing with non-believers in matters 
concerning public affairs. 
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values that are seen in conflict with the international rights. Rather, they seem inclined 
to resolve the areas of conflict in a way of reconciliation. The differentiation between 
the notion of right and other concepts like the notion of duty, put forward by the 
universalists, might be useful to undermine any claim seeking an alternative concept 
based in a particular culture. However, the universality of human rights has already 
been recognized by the international community through many declarations, covenants 
and conventions, as mentioned at the very beginning of this chapter. The problem facing 
states appears to be more one of how to implement such a universal concept through 
their constitutional settings, which are necessarily based on political constitutional 
cultural norins, than the mcre definition of the concept. 
The experience of human rights implementation in the UK, as a Western state, has 
shown that the cultural tension with human rights is not exclusive to the non-Western 
nations but it is a result of the variety of diverse traditions of different nations that form 
this modem world, seeking to preserve their cultural and political identities in the face 
of foreign values, even if they were in the name of human rights. Although the 
discussion throughout this chapter has tried to demonstrate the need to accommodate 
people's local beliefs for proper implementation of the international human rights, it did 
not consider how this can be done in the era of international globalization. Islam, for 
example, is seen as the most powerful ideological force across the Muslim world, with 
values that not only extend across different regions but even form an important factor of 
legitimacy for most Islamic states. Thus, the question arises: can a state with an Islamic 
ideology cope with the requirements of the international human rights principles? There 
are serious tensions between Islamic law and some international rights of individuals, 
like the right to non-discrimination, the rights of women, and the right of religious 
freedom, which must not be underestimated. Also, the previous Taliban regime in 
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Afghanistan and perhaps the regime of Saudi Arabia and Iran gave a negative 
impression in this regard, although their commitment to embrace Islam in their legal 
systems was noticeable. Therefore, the attempt to reconcile Islamic values and 
international norms of human rights might raise many complex questions that are more 
relevant to Islam. How should we view Islam in the modem world? Should we view it 
in a very traditional way so any change must not affect the traditions of the past? Or in a 
receptive way that could accommodate changes in conditions and circumstances but 
without affecting the main fundamentals? Or should we view Islam as a purely religious 
phenomenon without political dimension or force? What appears at present, on the face 
of it, as will be seen in the next chapter, is either the first version, whose main concern 
is not to change but to uphold the traditions through changing circumstances, as in the 
cases of Iran and Saudi Arabia, or the third version, which does not seem to recognize 
the political aspect of Islam and hence does not allow it in the political sphere, as 
recognized, in various degrees, by most Islamic states. The second version seems to be 
the victim of these two extreme views, and I believe it must now be allowed to take its 
turn after the others have failed. Therefore, the next chapter will be devoted to 
discussing the concept of human rights in Islam. It will examine the Islamic recognition 
of democracy and raise the question, to what extent the doctrine of constitutionalism is 
recognized in the Islamic teaching. 
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Chapter Three 
111. Islam, Human Rights, and Democracy 
111.1. Introduction 
This chapter tackles the concept of human rights in Islam. It begins by defining Islam 
within the political context and examining the relation of religion to the realm of 
politics. It explores whether Islam is conceived to be purely a religion or whether it has 
a more comprehensive meaning of which religion may only form one part. It moves, 
then, to discuss the theory of human rights in Islam and whether the concept of right is 
understood in Islam to be a mere duty or a legal claim that an individual can hold 
against the state. The chapter also discusses the approach used in the application of 
Islamic Shari'ah, in particular the application of hudud, the Islamic punishments, which 
seems to affirm, as will be explained below, the flexible nature of Islam, which is able 
to respond to different times and places without violating its essence. The discussion 
shows that Islam, through the technique of Siyasah Shariyyah (legitimate governmental 
policy), can even disable some elements that are considered as fundamentals, for the 
sake of preservation of the most essential ones. In other words, if it was proved that the 
chief fundamentals of Islam could not function unless other less fundamental elements 
were disabled, then disabling the less fundamental ones would be obligatory. This 
doctrine of legitimate governmental policy seems to be based more on the knowledge of 
rulers about their realties and compelling necessities, than their knowledge of the 
technicalities of the Islamicfiqh. 
However, the doctrine of Siyasah Shar'iyyah, as will be seen below, gives the political 
will of the state wider discretion to apply Islamic principles in the way that seems, to the 
state itself, best to preserve the interest of Islam. Such a wide discretion without 
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accountability and without popular participation in the process that would affect people , 
lives and destiny is dangerous and may justify the governance of tyranny and 
dictatorship. Hence, Siyasah Shariyyah, can best be served if it is based on democratic 
values that ensure that the political decision is a reflection of what instilled in people's 
sentiment. Therefore, the chapter will discuss the idea of democracy in Islam. In this 
connection it will tackle the question of whether the three components of democracy, 
representativeness, accountability and the respect of individual rights are understood in 
Islam, or whether Islam has its own meaning and understanding of the word democracy 
and its functionality. Finally, some of the Islamic states' practices will also be 
examined. 
111.2. The Meaning of Islam within the Political Context 
In the West, religion is usually perceived as that which can only be experienced in a 
276 heavenly, rather than earthly mode of existence. Biblical thought considers the world 
to be "inan's sphere of action and pre-eniinence"277 , while religion is merely a matter 
that citizens may deal with in their personal affairs. 278 So, religion, generally speaking, 
is only one among many matters that the state is responsible for, and on which the 
government must be neutral. 279 Many Westerners seem unwilling to tackle the role of 
religion as the predominant element of man's action and this might be due to the 
Western historical experience with the concept of religion, whereby the Pope and 
Emperor in general were able to claim to be the viceroys of God on earth with their 
authority and power coming directly from Him. 280 Hence, it is unsurprising that 
276 Safi, L. M., "The Intellectual Challenge Facing Contemporary Islamic Scholarship", 19 American 
Journal of1slandc Social Sciences, Spring 2002 Number 2, p. iv 
277 Vahanian, G., The Death of God. ý the culture of our post-Christian era, New York: George Braziller, 
196 1, p. 61 
273 Thiemann, R. F., op. cit., p. 75 
279 Ibid., p. 76 
280 Kallen, H. M., op. cit., p. 43 
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Western authors and politicians seem uncomfortable with the involvement of Islam in 
political affairs of Muslim states, as they fear that it could form a strong obstacle to any 
progress and political development, since it would empower the religious leaders to 
impose a certain political vision that serves their own interests in the name of religion. 
The Western view is that such a thrust of religion in the political life is dangerous as it 
often leads to theocracy and unchecked fanaticism. 28 1A question arises, however, as to 
whether this Western conception of religion applies to Islam. In other words is Islam 
only a religion or does it imply a more comprehensive sense of which religion forms 
only one part? 
Islam, in fact, does not very much differ from the other monotheistic religions such as 
Judaism and Christianity in terms of the general idea that God alone is the ultimate 
Creator who has sent His messengers to show people the right path that leads to heaven. 
These two religions even share with Islam the direct spiritual lineage of the Prophet 
Abraham. 282 However, the meaning of Islam is not confined to this spiritual meaning, 
important though this is, but it extends to cover all different aspects of life. Life in Islam 
is the gate to heaven or, as AI-Ghazali put it, "Life is the jarm of the hereafter without 
which religion cannot be established'. 283 Therefore, the Islamic scholars have made 
281 Allen, D., Bowden, H. W., Religion and Political Conflict in South Asia: India, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1992, p. 3 
282 Al-Hageel, S., Human Rights in Islam and their Applications in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, First 
Edition, Riyadh: Matabi'a Alhamedi, 2001, p. 12. Islam not only respects these monotheistic religions but 
it also believes that they were the revelations of God, but in incomplete form, sent down to respond to 
certain groups in certain circumstances. See Al-Marzouqi, 1. A., Hunian Rights in Islamic Lmv, First 
Edition, Abu Dhabi: Cultural Foundation, 2000, p. 88. From this perspective, Islam is the religion which 
was given to Adam, the first man, and it was the religion of all the prophets sent by Allah to mankind, but 
Allah has selected this version of Islam to be the final, complete and only acceptable religion for mankind 
today. The word Islam was even chosen by God Himself and clearly mentioned in His final revelation to 
man, which did not happen in the other religions. God says in the Holy Quran "This day have I perfected 
your religion for you, completed My favour upon you, and have chosen for you Islam as your religion. " 
(Al-Maa'idah 5: 3 ) "If anyone desires a religion other than Islam never will It be accepted of Him. " 
(Aal'imraan 3: 58) "Abraham was not a Jew nor Christian; but an upright Muslim. " (Aal'imraan 3: 67) See 
Philips, B., The Trite Religion ofGod, Jeddah: Dar al-Khair, 1992, pp. 4-6 
283 Al-Ghazali, lhya Ulzini AdDeen, Ketab Alelm, (in Arabic), p., 71, cited in Al-Qaradawi, Y., op. cit., 
1997, p. 19 
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religion, the field that tackles the relationship with God, only one necessity of five on 
which Islam is based, which are: religion, soul, mind, offspring and money. 284 
Assanhoori asserted in his study that Islam even extends to the science of law, private 
and public law, the rules of conduct, moral codes and health instructions. 285 Islam, just 
as it provides rules of worship to achieve God's satisfaction, also provides rules to 
protect life, thoughts, family, and fortune. The concept of the state through which 
human life can be protected and promoted is conceived to be one of the most 
fundamental fields in Islamic science. 286 
Islam contains two important inseparable dimensions; a vertical dimension which deals 
with the relationship of individual to God and a horizontal dimension which deals with 
the community. 287 Any attempt to denounce either of these dimensions would 
undermine the essential religious nature of Islam. Some scholars have even condemned 
the use of the term, 'political Islam', as it gives the impression that politics was not 
originally part of Islam. 288 Thus, when we deal with Islam, we must understand that 
Islam is not a mere religion, but a system of life. 
The strong connection of Islam with politics and Muslims' political life may become 
clearer in the Quranic requirements for Muslims to submit to Allah's will and refer all 
of their disputes, whatever their nature, political, economic or even societal, to Allah's 
sayings and his Messenger. Allah says, "If any do fail to judge by (the light oj) what 
284 Al-Qaradawi, Y., op. cit, 1997, p., 58 
285 Assanhoori, A., Fiqh 41-Khilafah iva Tatinvorha, (in Arabic), Second Edition, Cairo: Alhaya'h 
Almasryya Al'aammah Lelketab, 1993, p., 45 
286 However, this important field, because of the corruption of governors in the later centuries, has not 
been elaborated enough to provide a firm political machinery. It was well known to jurists that any 
emphasis on the subject of state would encourage warfare and conflicts. See Yosry, A., Huqoq Alensan 
iVa, 4sbabA1'aunfJ71 Alnnýtania AI-Islanii, (in Arabic), Alexandria: Alm'aaref, 1993, p., 4748 287 See Vogel, F., "The Rule of Law in Saudi Arabia: exploring contradictions and traditions", in: Cotran, 
E., and Yamani, M., (eds. ), op. cit., p. 133. See also Al-Qaradawi, op., cit., p., 23 
288 Al-Qaradawi, op. cit., p., 23 
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Allah hath revealed, they are (no better than) Unbelievers". 289 It was well established 
by this verse and others 290 that whoever refers legislation to sources other than what 
Allah revealed to His Messenger is an unbeliever. 291 
The sayings and practices of the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, also indicate 
such a strong connection between Islam and politics. Muslims are even required by 
Islamic rules to participate in political issues through the concept of bayah (voting). It 
was reported that the Prophet said that anyone who died without having performed his 
duty to vote (bayah) for a president is a hypocrite. 292 
Ibn Taymiyah, one of the most celebrated Islamic scholars, asserted that anything 
without which a duty cannot be performed is itself a duty. 293 And it is very well 
understood by all Muslims that Islamic rules and principles cannot be applied without a 
government able to implement them on the ground and hence all Muslims seem to agree 
that the establishment of the Islamic state is a fundamental duty in Islam. 294 The 
establishment of the Prophetic state in Madinah immediately after the emigration from 
Makkah illustrates this point. 
289 Q5: 44 
290 Allah says in another verse, "0 ye who believe! obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those 
charged with authority among you. If ye differ in anything, among yourselves, refer it to Allah and His 
Messenger, if ye do believe in Allah and the Last Day: that is best, and most suitable for final 
determination. " (Q 4: 59) 
291 Al-'Asqalani, A., Fath 41bary Sharh Sahih . 41-Bukhary, (in Arabic), Part, 13, Beirut: Dar Alm'arefah, 1379 (Islamic calendar), p. 147, See also Abdulwahhab, S., Tyseer 41azeez 41hameedfi Sharh Kelab 
, 411mvheed, (in Arabic), Riyadh: Maktabat Arriyadh Al-Hadeethah, pp. 493-494 292 Ibn Taymiyah, A., AUafmva, Part 35, (in Arabic), Maktabat Ibn Taymiyah, 1403 (Islamic calendar), p. 
12 
293 Ibn Taymiyah, Al'asyan Ahnusalah mv Qetal AN Albaghifi Daiviat Al-Islanz iva MinvqefAlhakein 
Menha, (in Arabic), Beirut: Dar Al-Jeel Press, 1992, pp. 36-37 29' Assanhoori suggested in his study, Fiqh Al-Khilafah, that the main Islamic Madhabs, Sunni and 
Shiite, including the Mu'atazelah agree that the establishment of the Islamic state, the Caliphate, is a 
religious duty but they differ over the basis of this duty. While the Sunni Madhab establish their view on 
the basis of ljma, the consensus of the companions, the Shiites refer the duty to sacred text. The 
Mu'atazelah, on the other hand, assert their view on the basis of human logic. Assanhoori, A., op. cit., p., 
67 
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The Madinah Charter is considered the first written constitution followed by any state 
authorities. 295 The Charter presents itself as the source of power and law and has clearly 
affirmed that the Islamic state is one for all nations, even if they differ in religion. 296 it 
demonstrates the connection of Islam with politics, since it was put by the Prophet 
Muhammad, himself, peace be upon him. It is worth noting that the Charter of Madinah 
recognized rights and freedoms for Muslims and non-Muslims alike. For example, it 
recognized in Article 18 the right of non-Muslims to practice their religion and live at 
the same time with Muslims under one basic law, which is the Charter. 297 However, 
since the Charter was issued before the revelation of Quranic verses in Madinah which 
tackle many of these worldly matters and which accordingly replace them with Quranic 
provisions, Muslim scholars do not recognize it as a proper source for Islamic Fiqh and 
hence not strong enough to be used as a basis for interpreting Islamic Shari'ah. 298 Thus, 
the question arises, what is the concept of human rights and freedoms in the Islamic 
Shari'ah? 
111.3. The Concept of Right in Islam 
Rights and freedoms declared in the UDHR clearly aim at assuring freedom and dignity 
of the individual, and achieving justice and equality between all people. These basic 
views of the importance of human life and dignity are also shared by the Islamic 
Shari'ah. Human beings, according to a number of the Quranic provisions, are highly 
respected in Islam and accorded rights that have never been given to others of God's 
creatures. Allah says in chapter 17 verse 70, "We have honoured the sons of, 4dain; 
295 Khan, M., Hunian Rights in Muslim World: findanzentalisin, constitutionalism, and international 
politics, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 2003, p. 146 
296 Nuwayhid, W., "Qeraa'h fi Dstoor Almadanah", In: Al-Jeosi, S., (ed. ), Httqoq Alensanfi Atrikr Al- 
Arabi. derasatfi annusos, (in Arabic), Beirut: Derasat Alwehdah Alarabyyah, 2002, p. 144 see also p. 
164 
297 See the Madinah Charter attached to the study of Nuwayhid in Ibid., p. 168 
298 Ibid., p. 153 
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provided them with transport on land and sea; given them for sustenance things good , 
andpure; and conferred on them specialfavours, above a great part of Our Creation. " 
The meaning of human nature itself has even been given a different dimension, in that 
God has considered human beings as His deputies on earth. Allah says in chapter 2 
verse 30, "Behold, thy Lord said to the angels: I will create a vicegerent on earth. " 
Therefore, Muslim jurists have been in dispute, as a result of the verse 70 of chapter 17 
which says at the end "... and conferred on them specialfavours, above a great part of 
Our Creation", over who is superior, humans or the angels of God . 
299 The majority of 
Sunni jurists seem to- suggest that human beings are superior to the angels because God 
clearly stated in verse 34 of chapter 2, " And behold, We said to the angels: "Bow down 
to Adam: " and they bowed down: not so Iblis: he refused and was haughty he was of 
those who reject Faith. 000 
El-Berry noted that according the verse 107 of chapter 21 the objective of the Islamic 
mission is achieving mercy for all people that can be achieved through the inner belief 
of human brotherhood . 
301 El-Berry contends that this makes the feeling that human 
rights are addressed in the Quran as a common factor between all members of the 
human family based on their origin (as all are human beings), the unity of fatherhood 
(as all are sons of Adam) and the unity of motherhood (Eve) and therefore, their 
offspring should be regarded equal in all rights and privileges at all times and through 
299 Al-Jabery, M., "Mafaheern Alhuqoq %va Al-AdI fi Annusos Alarabyyah wa Al-Islamyyah", In: Al- 
Jeosi, S., op. cit., p. 59 
3DO See the debate of the traditional Muslim jurists over this subject in Al-Qurtubi, Aljainea LeAhkain Al- 
Quran, (in Arabic), Part 1, Second Edition, Cairo: Dar Ash'ab, 1372 (Islamic calendar), p. 289, See Ibn 
Taymiyah, A., op. cit., Part 4,1403 (Islamic calendar), p. 350 
300 Ibn Katheer, Tafseer AI-Quran. 41-Azeeni, (in Arabic), Part 1, Beirut: Dar Al-Fikr, 1401(lslamic 
calendar), p. 80 
30 1 EL-Berry, Z., Man's Rights in Islam, Heliopolis, 1981. Available Online at http: //ivivxv. witness- 
pioncer. org/vil/Books/ZB_MRI/human - 
rights. htm. The verse 107 of chapter 21 reads "And we have sent 
you (0 Muhammad) not but as a inercyfor the worlds. " 
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all generations. 302 This is evidenced by the fact that the Quran frequently addresses 
mankind by the phrase, "0 You children ofAdain". 303 Human beings are all equal before 
Allah no matter what racial or colour or linguistic differences might exist. Nothing 
counts except the noble deeds and honourable achievements. Allah says, " Verily, the 
most honourable of you with Allah is that (believer) who is most pious. , 304 This has 
also been illustrated by the Prophet in one of his sayings which reads: "No Arab has any 
superiority over a non-Arab, nor does a non-Arab have any superiority over an Arab. 
Nor does a white man have any superiority over a black man, or the black man any 
superiority over the white man. You are all the children of Adam, and Adam was 
createdfrom clay. 11 305 
Al-Mawdudi also noted that Islam lays down some rights for man simply because he is 
a human being regardless of race, colour, sex, or religion. 306 The Holy Quran refers to 
this fact in asserting some basic rights like the rights to life. Allah says, ""Ifanyone sleiv 
a person - unless it befor murder orfor spreading mischief in the land- it ivould be as if 
he sleiv the ivhole people: and if any one saved a life, it 1vould be as if he saved the life 
of the ivhole people... 007 In another verse Allah says, ""Whether open or secret; take 
not life, which, 411ah hath inade sacred, except by ivay offitstice and lmv: thus doth He 
connnand you, they ye inay learn ivisdom. "308 Another clear example is the right to 
justice. According to this right Muslims have to be just not only with ordinary human 
beings but even with their enemies. Allah says, "0 ye who believe! stand outfirmlyfor 
Allah, as witnesses to fair dealing, and let not the hatred of others to you make you 
302 Ibid., Available Online athttp: //www. witness-pioneer. org/vil/Books/ZB_MRI/human_rights. htm 
303 Q7: 26 
304 Q49: 13 
305 Cited in AI-Mawdudi, A., Human Rights in Islam, Chapter Two, Islamic Foundation, 1981. Available 
Online at http: //Nvww. witness-pioneer. org/viUBooks/M-hri/index. htm#The Islamic-Approach 
306 Ibid.,, Available Online at http: //www. witness- 
er. org/viUBooks/M hri/index. htmgThe Islamic Approach 070 ý5 
. 
32 
308 Q6: 151 
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siverve to wrong and depart ftom justice. Be just: that is next to Piely andftar Allah. 
For Allah is ivell-acquainted with all that ye do. 009 
Al-Mawdudi added that the rights in Islam have been sanctioned by God not by 
legislative assembly and hence are permanent, perpetual and eternal. As a result, they 
are not subject to any alterations or modifications, and there is no scope for any change 
or abrogation. 3 10 Thus, as human beings in Islam are so sacred, having permanent and 
non-abrogative rights, then it is necessary to see how human rights are defined and 
treated by the Islamicfiqh, to which we will now turn. 
IIIAL Definition of Right in Islam 
The definition of right as human rights has been discussed in chapter two of this study 
where it has been shown that the meaning of right recognized in the international 
instruments is not a mere duty or dignity but also a legal claim of an individual against 
the state and not vice versa. Here we will discuss the concept of right in Islam, as to 
whether it is perceived as a claim of an individual against a person or persons or a mere 
duty of an individual toward the community. It is important to note here, as it has been 
discussed in the second chapter, that right as a claim is not a mere privilege but that 
311 
which has a correlative relationship with duty entailed on the part of others. In the 
abstract, the question under discussion is what concept of right does Islam recognize? 
Does it recognize right as a claini, a privilege or mere ditty? Some authors claim that 
there is no such term as 'right' in the Islamic tradition, only duty, and hence the 
309 Q5: 8 
3 10 AI-Mawdudi, A., op. cit., Chapter one 31 1 Althoug 
., 
h many authors differentiate between rights and duty, we are inclined to support Rowan's view 
as it is closer to the current function of human rights manifested in the current international instruments. 
See our discussion in chapter two, pp. 34-37, See Rowan, J., op. cit., pp. 21-22. For information about the 
difference between right and duty see Gray, J. C., op. cit., p. 9, see Ross, D., op. cit., p. 50, see Donnelly, 
J., op. cit., 1989, pp. 50-52 
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international conception of human rights has no root in Islam. 312 In the following 
section, therefore, we will explore the concept of right in Islam according to the Islamic 
fiqh to assess whether duty is the only notion of right in Islam or Islam understands 
right in more comprehensive meaning in which duty represents only one sense. 
Muslim jurists, in defining the notion of right, do not seem to differentiate between 
these three terms, claim, privilege and duty. They sometimes define right as every 
interest permitted and protected by Islamic law. 313 People are at liberty to choose from 
among permissible things their desired interests, according to their needs, and their 
exercise of this choice is consequently safeguarded by the law. 314 It has also been 
315 
recognized as Ibahah, meaning that people are at liberty to exercise it or not. This 
kind of right does not seem to be held against some determinate person or persons. An 
individual, for example, is permitted to go hunting or fishing, but no one has a 
correlative duty to ensure that he gets to go hunting or fishing. This definition of right 
seems to be more akin to a privilege. 
Sometimes rights are defined as those which are granted by God to all human beings on 
an equal footing. Human beings are obliged to respect these rights and not to disturb or 
violate them. 316 Individuals are under an obligation in Islamic law not to transgress 
others' right of freedom, life, and property. Such transgression is called Tahrini, which 
312 See Ali, S., op. cit., p. 15. See also Hodgson, D., Individual Duty within a Human Rights Discourse, 
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004, pp. 50-51. See also Nasser, S., "The Concept and Reality of Freedom in 
Islamic Civilisation", In: Rosenbaum, A., (ed. ), The Philosophy of Human Rights: international 
perspectives, Westport, Conn. : Greenwood Press, 1980, pp. 95-97 
313 Ashamsi, J. A., Nadaryyat Alhaq: derasah ininlaranah be ayiqh al-Island, (in Arabic), Al-Ain: The 
University of the United Arab Emirates Press, 2000, p. 18 
314 Al-Marzouqi, L A., op. cit., p. 138 
3 15 Attantawi, M. M., Osool Ayt'qh Al-Islaini, (in Arabic), First Edition, Dubai: Albayan, 1990, p. 87 
316 Ashamsi, J. A., op. cit., p. 18 
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includes all that Allah has forbidden. 317 This definition, accordingly, seems to fall 
within the notion of duty, rather than right. 
Muslim jurists also define right as that which has a correlative relationship with duty. If 
an individual has a freedom to do what he wishes,, others have a duty not to interfere 
and this duty also extends to the individual himself in respect of others' rights. 318 This 
definition of right seems to extend to most of the rights recognized in Islamic law. For 
example, the freedom of belief is recognized in Islam as one of the fundamental rights 
of individuals, derived from an explicit text of the Holy Quran, 319 and hence guaranteed 
by two methods; first, people are obliged to respect the right of the other to believe in 
what he wishes; second, the individual concerned is encouraged to protect his belief in 
accordance with the Islamic rules. 320 As a result, the individual here can use his right to 
freedom of belief as a claim against a transgressor who broke his obligation to respect 
his right. 
Thus, the Islamicfiqh seems to recognize the notion of right in a more comprehensive 
sense that includes privilege, duty, and claim. Islamic scholars have summarized these 
different meanings of the term right as everything that a human being is entitled to and 
which is not prohibited by Islamic law. 32 1 According to the Islamic fiqh, rights are 
divided into three categories: Allah's rights (public rights), the individual's rights, and 
317 Almansoor, M. A. S., Political Rights of JVomen in Islamic Law, International Lmv and United Arab 
Endrates Lmv, PhD, Glasgow: Glasgow Caledonian University, 2002, p. 25 
3 18 Alhaj, S. S., Ahnafaheem Alqanonyyah le Httqoq Alensan 'Abra Azzanian iva Almakan, (in Arabic), 
Alexandria: A1jame'ah Almaftohah, 1995, p. 124 
319 God says, " Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from Error ... " (Q2: 256) in 
another verse God says "If it had been thy Lord's Will, they would all have believed, all who are on earth! 
Wilt thou then compel mankind, against their will, to believe! " (Q 10: 99) 
320 Raslan, A. A., Alhuqoq iva Alhztr)yat Al'aammah ft 'Aalani Mittaghyyer , (in Arabic) Curio: Dar Annahdah Al-Arabyyah, 1997, p. 44-45 
321 See Ashamsi, J. A., op. cit., p. 17 
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rights shared between Allah and the individual. 322 This recognition of different types of , 
right may justify the difference in the meanings given to the term. Accordingly, Islamic 
fiqh seems to differentiate between these types of rights not according to the nature of 
right whether claim or duty but according to the subject of the right, whether an 
individual or Allah (the public). These different types of rights will be explained further 
below; however it must be pointed out that a transformation of pure Islamic ideas into 
an international law context is a rather complex task, since Islamic Shari'ah sometimes 
uses different technical language and terms. For example, in Islamic teaching the 
Islamic hadd, which is a state legal punishment, is considered as the right of Allah and 
termed by many authors as a public or people's right because it protects the public 
interest, while in international human rights law people's right does not seem to be 
recognized in such a manner in which a state could claim a right against an individual. 
Although the international instruments recognize the concept of duty as discussed in 
chapter two, they mainly focus on the right of the individual rather than the right of 
people and as far as the individual is the supreme, which seems to be true in the current 
trend of human rights, the state cannot in the name of people claim right against him. 323 
Hence, this Islamic difference in viewing human rights is not only a linguistic one but 
also a substantial, since Islam, as will be seen below, seems to pay noticeable attention 
to the concept of duty in the name of Allah's rights (public rights). 
322 See Almansoor, M. A. S., op. cit., p. 23, Al-Marzouqi, I. A., op. cit., p. 139, Attantawi, M. M., op. cit, p. 
112, Ashamsi, J. A., op. cit., p. 21-22, Alhaj, S. S., op. cit., pp. 125-126 
323 As a result of the international focus on the right of individual more than the right of people, the 
African regional effort has resulted in an African Charter on Human and People's Rights adopted in June 
27,1981. The African states clearly specify in chapter two of the Charter the duties of individual which 
the individual is obliged to fulfil if he or she is to enjoy certain rights and freedoms specified in the 
Charter. 
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111-3.2. The Types of Right in Islam 
U1.3.2.1. Allah's Right 
Allah's right is meant to be that which is related to the public interest without being 
peculiar to a particular individual. 324 It is not, in its actual sense, referred to Allah (God) 
but to individuals in the collective form. 325 The reference to Allah here is to emphasise 
the significance of this kind of right and its strong connection with the integrity of the 
community as a whole. 326 The forbidding of adultery, for example, serves the public 
interest in maintaining the integrity of lineage intact. This forbidding of adultery and the 
punishment resulting from breaking this sacred rule is deemed by Muslim scholars as a 
public or people's right since it serves the public interest in protecting people. An 
individual cannot relinquish this kind of right or exercise discretion in the process of its 
implementation. 327 People are under an obligation to fulfil the requirements of this 
public or people's right. It has been considered as an obligatory matter on individuals, 
for the public welfare. 328 Other examples of Allah's right are: all kinds of Ibadat 
(worship matters), Maonah (the tax that brings relief to the needy persons in the 
community like zakat and Sadaqa (charity)329 and hudud (Islamic punishments) except 
the punishments for slander and murder. 330 Ibn Taymiyah has asserted that hudud under 
no circumstances can be relinquished, either fully or partially, to the extent that people 
cannot make payment to the state in return for not having the hadd (the punishment) 
324 Almansoor, M. A. S., op. cit., p. 23 
325 Ashamsi, I A., op. cit., p. 24 
326 Ibid., p. 24 
327 Attantawi, M. M., op, cit, p. 112 
328 Al-Marzouqi, 1. A., op. cit., p. 140 
329 God says " Alms are for the poor and the needy, and those employed to administer the (funds); for 
those whose hearts have been (recently) reconciled (to the truth); for those in bondage and in debt; in the Cý 
cause of Allah; and for the wayfarer: (thus is it) ordained by Allah, and Allah is full of knowledge and 
wisdom" (Q9: 60). See Ashamsi, J. A., op. cit., p. 25 
330 Attantawi, M. M., op. cit, p. 112 
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applied in a particular case. 331 Moreover, one who attempts even to speak before those 
responsible for hadd's application, like the court, to save or liberate the accused from 
the punishment in the sense of relinquishing the hadd, if he does so despite indisputable 
proof that the person under punishment has committed the crime concerned, is deemed 
to be, by this act, challenging God. 332 
HI. 3.2.2. Individual's Right 
This kind of right is related to everything that presents a worldly interest for the 
individual alone, without relevance to the community. 333 It is a purely private right, 
unmediated by social relations. Therefore, it has been recognized in the Islamiefiqh as a 
pure right of the servant (individual) irrespective of the colour, sex or nationality of the 
individual. Examples of this right are: the owner's right to take back goods that have 
been stolen from him, the right of the purchaser to own the purchased goods and the 
right of the seller to own the money, the right of a wife to have a dower, and to receive 
good companionship and economic support from her husband, 334 and all other aspects 
of enjoyment in life that are not prohibited by Islamic law, such as eating, drinking, 
driving a car, owning property, travelling, etc. 
This kind of right is ftindamental in Islam and the breach of it is forbidden by Shari'ah 
law. This right is strongly emphasised in the Islamic fiqh, to the extent that scholars 
have asserted that repentance will not save the violator from punishment, unless the 
33 'In the sense that people cannot purchase the hadd, because it is a bribe. See Ibn Taymiyah,. 4ssiyasah 
, 4shar'iyyahf1 Islah, 4rraay iva Arraayyah, (in Arabic) Beirut: Dar Al-Jeel, 1993, p. 87 332 Ibid., p. 82 it must be noted here that the person who pledges himself to endeavour in a process of 
relinquishing the hadd is not meant to be the solicitor who discusses whether the hadd is applicable to a 
certain event, without asking for relinquishing it if it has been perceived as applicable, but one who asks 
for the relinquishing of the hadd, although the conditions of its application are perfectly satisfied. 
333 Attantawi, M. M., op. cit, pp. 117-118 
334 Ibid., p. 117-118 
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victim of the breach has forgiven him. 335 For example, the state cannot relinquish the 
owner's right to get back his belongings from the thief because this right is the 
individual's own right and the individual is autonomous in making his claim. 
1111.3.2.3. Shared Right 
This kind of right is shared between Allah (the public) and the individual, and 
accordingly consists of a mutual relationship between right and duty. This right is 
divided into two categories: first, the right which is common between Allah (the public) 
and the individual whereby Allah's right (public interest) prevails; second, the right 
which is also joint between Allah and the individual, but the individual right prevails. 
These two categories of the shared right will be further discussed. 
111.3.2.3.1. Shared Right where Allah's Right Prevails 
This right is termed as a right because it serves the interest of the victim as well as the 
community. An example of such a right is hadd alqadhf (the punishment for slander) 
which is eighty lashes. 336 So it is the right of the victim not to be defamed by others. 
The punishment of slander clearly presents an interest for the victim since it proves that 
the accusation is nothing but a false allegation, which is in itself a declaration of his or 
her innocence. Preventing people from slandering also constitutes an interest for the 
community as a whole, as it keeps society clean from defamation and untrustworthiness. 
It is clear that both public and individual interests are present in this right. However, 
some Islamic authors have asserted that the public interest prevails and hence the 
335 Ibid., p. 118 
336 Al-Mawardi, Alahkam Assullanyyah iva Alivelayal Adden", ah, (in Arabic) Beirut: Amaktabah 
Alasriyyah, 2000, p. 249 
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individual cannot implement this right by himself, nor can he surrender the right by 
forgiving the one who commits such an act. 337 
Consistent with this, some scholars went on to suggest that the human body is a subject 
of two rights: Allah's right since it is a creature of Allah almighty and individual right, 
since the individual is the beneficiary of the functions of his body. However, they have 
asserted that Allah's right in this case prevails, from which it follows that an individual 
cannot sell or surrender any organ of his body, as to do so would constitute a violation 
338 
of the stronger right that belongs to Allah. 
111.3.2.3.2. Shared Right where the Individual's Right Prevails 
An example of this right is the individual right to life. This right has been realized in 
Islamic Shari'ah through the punishment of premeditated homicide, which is the death 
penalty as a deterrent punishment to save other innocent lives. In this crime, there is a 
clear violation of the individual's right of life and also a violation of the right of the 
victim's relatives to have their loved one alive. It also constitutes an interest for the 
public security in deterring people from committing such a crime. 339 However, the 
individual right prevails here, because the subject of homicide crime is the individual 
alone, not the society. 340 Therefore the punishment of this crime constitutes an interest 
of the victim's relatives alone in claiming retaliation or compensation (blood money), or 
offering forgiveness. It is worth noting that once the relatives decided to claim blood 
money, the choice of retaliation would be inoperative, and once the relatives decided to 
337 Attantawi, M. M., op. cit, p. 118, Al-Marzouqi, 1. A., op. cit., p. 14 1, Almansoor, M. A. S., op. cit., p. 23 
338 Cited in Asbarnsi, J. A., op. cit., p. 24 
339 Almansoor, M. A. S., op. cit., p. 24 
340 Attantawi, M. M., op. cit, p. 119 
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forgive the criminal, the whole hadd (the punishment) would drop. 341 This is clearly 
different from the positive law, where the punishment of homicide is a public right and 
the victims (the relatives) have no chance to relinquish the penalty if they decide to 
forgive the killer. 342 
111.3.2.3.3. Tension between Allah's Right and Individual's Right 
It may be true to say that the concept of right in Islam, as discussed above, generally 
speaking, recognizes both individual rights and people's rights (termed as Allah's 
rights) and seems to pay noticeable attention to the concept of duty. However, the 
Islamic categories of right, discussed above, although they may explain the theory of 
right in Islamic teaching, do not tackle the possibility of tension between Allah's right, 
which is public, and the individual right, which is private. The shared type of right may 
give insight into the kind of right that has a double nature, public and private, but we 
have not discussed the question of conflict between rights. Arkoun suggests that Islamic 
thought has always been in favour of Allah's rights over individual's rights. He states 
that "Islamic thought has always included a discourse on the rights of God and the 
rights of man (httqoq Allah I huqoqadam), iviththeforiiierhavingprimacyandpriority, 
over the latter. "343 In asserting his view, that Allah's rights have primacy over 
individual rights, Arkoun refers to the five canonical obligations, as he calls them, that 
Muslims must submit to even if they are at the expense of their basic rights, which are 
"profession of faith (shahada), prayer, almsgiving, fasting at Ramadan, and the 
34 1 However, Imam Malik, the founder of Maliki School of Islamic jurisprudence, takes the opinion that 
even if the relatives decided to claim blood money, the state still has discretion of imposing lazeer 
punishment, which could reach one year imprisonment, to serve as deterrence to other offenders. Ibn 
Qudama, A., AI-Mughnifi Fiqh Alemain Ahmed bin Hanbal Ashibani, (in Arabic), Part 8, First Edition, 
Beirut: Dar Al-Fikr, 1405 (Islamic calendar), p. 280 
342 Ibid., p. 119 
343 Arkoun, M., Rethinking Islam: Connnon Questions, Uncommon Ansivers, Boulder Co: Westview 
Press, 1994, p. 108 
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pilgrimage to Mecca. 1344 However, Arkoun seems to forget that these five elements - 
represent not only rights of God, but the cornerstones of Islamic belief against which no 
right can be claimed. The subject of these elements is not actually right in its strict sense 
but a complete submission of the individual's will to the will of God; the core principle 
of Islamic faith. Therefore, Arkoun seems to be mistaken in referring to these elements 
to suggest that Allah's rights are prioritized in Islam over individual rights. It is not 
appropriate for a Muslim, for example, to question whether he has the right not to pray 
or not to fast during Ramadan, since denying any of these fundamentals would amount 
to apostasy. The question that is more relevant, in the discourse of right, is actually 
whether Allah's right as a public right related to the public interest and public order, has 
precedence over an individual right that is of a private nature. For example, what is the 
position of Islamic law if AllaWs right, say, the adultery hadd, which is 100 lashes for 
an unmarried man, conflicts with the individual's right not to be tortured? 
The traditional Islamic fzqh seems not to have dealt explicitly with this question; 
however, it has underlined some rules that might assist the discussion. It seems that 
although the right of Allah, in particular that concerning the Islamic punislunents, 
hudud, is so fundamental that Muslim people cannot withhold the hadd application if 
the conditions have been perfectly satisfied, Islamic teaching seems to be flexible 
regarding the process of collecting and interpreting evidence in hadd cases. One of the 
important conditions for the application of hadd is being free from any doubt. 345 It is 
universally agreed in Islamic teaching that if the evidence raises any shubhah (doubt), 
the Muslims responsible for the application of punishment should try their best to avoid 
applying it, even if the evidence is very strong, like a confession. 346 If a man, for 
344 Ibid., p., 10 8 
345 Albahoti, M., Kashaf Alqenaa 'an Main Aleqnaa, (in Arabic), part 6, Beirut: Dar Alfikr, 1402 
(Islamic calendar), p. 96 
346 Al-Mawardi, op. cit., p. 244 
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example, has had sexual intercourse with a women in the belief that she was his wife 
and for some reason she appeared not to be, this raises a legitimate doubt that prevents 
the application of hadd. 347 It has even been argued by some scholars that hadd cannot 
be applied on the basis of analogy, because the analogy process is more about guessing, 
not fact and this is enough to constitute the doubt that invalidates the hadd. 348 
According to some Muslim jurists, the evidence that denies the application of hadd 
should have precedence over the evidence that supports the hadd, because hadd is 
damage and the denial of damage is the nature of things. 349 They contend that if the 
denial evidence is not firmly established it would, at least, constitute doubt, which itself 
350 is a firm reason to deny the application of hadd. 
The Islamic rule in the application of hadd, whether for adultery or theft, is that even if 
there has been a confession, it is preferable to instruct the criminal to reconsider his or 
her confession and that it would be acceptable if he or she denies the crime . 
35 1 That is 
because if the right of Allah was put before the right of the individual, the application 
must be accommodative toward the preservation of the individual right, in the sense that 
the violation of the latter cannot be tolerated for the sake of the preservation of Allah's 
right. 
352 
347 Albahoti, M., op. cit, p. 96 
348 Cited in Alamdy, A., Alehkanj fi Osool A-Ahkam, (in Arabic), part 4, First Edition, Beirut: Dar Al- 
Ketab Al-Arabi Press, 1404 (Islamic calendar), p. 65 
349 Ar-Razi, M., AI-Mahsoolfi Elm AI-Osool, (in Arabic) Part 5, First Edition, Riyadh: Aleman 
Muhammad bin Saud University, 1400 (Islamic calendar), p. 590 
350 lbid, p. 590 
35 'An-Nawawy, A., Saheeh Muslim Sharh An-Nmvaivy, (in Arabic), part 11, Second Edition, Beirut: Dar 
lhya Atturath Al-Arabi, 1392 (Islamic calendar), p. 195 
352 Consistent with this, Alamdy has suggested that the right of the master over his servant has preference 
over the right of Allah because first, the master is able under the Islamic rules to prevent his servant from 
performing the Nivafel pray, which is supererogatory prayer, although it is Allahs right; second, Allalfs 
right is based on tolerance, because Allah does not lose if his right is not implemented or benefit if it is 
implemented, but the individual loses and benefits. See Alamdy, A., op. cit., Part 2, p. 290 
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Accordingly, it has been conceived, unlike the situation with respect to Allah's right 
(hadd), that a confession, once it has been made in matters concerning private right, 
cannot then be denied. 353 If evidence is found to indicate that a seller, for example, has 
not received the money from the buyer, the latter will be under an obligation to give the 
money to the seller, even if he or she denies the allegation, unless he or she brings 
strong evidence to the contrary, whereas with the application of hadd a denial may be 
enough for the accused to discharge himself, even if the evidence was very strong, like a 
confession. 
AshaPay, the founder of the Ashafay school, one of the four main schools in the Sunni 
Madhab, has asserted that if an unbeliever entered Islam and had not yet become aware 
of the rules of Islam and hence married a woman according to the rules of the 
unbelievers and entered accordingly into sexual intercourse with her without knowing 
that such an act is forbidden, the hadd of adultery would not be applicable. Hence 
Allah's right would be relinquished, because the perpetrator was unaware of the rules. 
However, the private rights that might have resulted from such an act would be 
maintained and the accused would be liable accordingly to give the woman the dower 
and any child bom of the union would be regarded as his and he would be responsible 
for it, although the marriage contract was invalid. 354 In this example, the individual's 
right seems to have prevailed twice. That is to say, first, the individual right not to be 
tortured has taken preference over Allah's right (the adultery hadd); second, the 
individual rights of those who were affected by the act are upheld, although the 
marriage contract was invalid and the hadd was relinquished. 
353 An-NawaNvy, A., op. cit., 1392 (Islamic calendar), p. 195 
354 Ashafay, M., Al-Uni, (in Arabic), Second Edition, Beirut: Dar Alm'arefah, 1393, (Islamic calendar), 
pp. 245-246 
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It is worth noting that hudud (Islamic punishments) are in fact designed to safeguard 
human beings, either as autonomous individuals, in particular the individual's right as a 
victim, represented in qisas (the right to retaliate) or diyyah (the right to demand blood 
money) or as a member of the community, represented in the punishments that save the 
integrity of the community from fragmentation and instability. By reflection, the 
individual, as a victim, seems to be able to dispense with hadd application by forgiving 
the violator, and he also seems to be able, as violator, according to many scholars, to 
avert the hadd application if he repents before being captured. 355 As a result, the 
application of hadd appears not to be in the hands of the state authorities but in the 
hands of the individual himself, either by being unforgiving, if he was a victim, which 
will support the hadd application or by being obdurate, if he was the violator, with no 
intention to repent. 356 
A question arises, however, if the individual's right in Islam is very powerful to the 
extent that is even prioritised over Allah's right, does it have the power to constrain the 
state authority? 
It seems that the individual's right in Islam is also a powerful instrument against the 
state authority. Ashafay asserted that if a ivali (one of the state authorities in the 
3551t has been argued that the one who turns from sin as if he has not committed a sin and who has no sin 
deserves no hadd (punishment). Ibn Qudama, A., op. cit., Part 9, p. 130 see also Ashafay, M., op. cit., 
P art 4, p. 291 ý'6 
In the UAE there are cases in which the accused tried to resort to the application of the Islamic hadd in 
order to avoid the punishment. In these cases the defendants tried to benefit from the rules of the Islamic 
Shari'ah that gives the ultimate say of the application of hadd, particularly the death penalty, qisas, to the 
victim's relatives. In the cassation number 43 of the year 1997 the defendant argued that the application 
of the death penalty in this case was wrong because the victim's relatives had forgiven the accused and 
hence, according to the Islamic Shari'ah, the qisas hadd is dropped. However, the court ruled that the 
Shari'ah hadd was not applicable to this case because the conditions of hadd application were not met and 
therefore the death penalty was not applied as Islamic hadd but as la'zir, allowed by the Islamic Shari'ah 
where the conditions of the application of hadd were not satisfied, according to the state law. See Dubai 
Supreme Court, Cassation number 43 of the year 1997. If the rules of the Shari'ah had been applied in 
this case the accused, according to many Islamic scholars, would have been set free even if he was the 
one who committed the homicide crime. See also Dubai Supreme Court, Cassation number 398 of the 
year 2004. 
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Islamic state) had forgiven the criminals who had committed an armed robbery and this 
forgiveness was intended to cover the stolen property of the victims, this forgiveness 
would be null and void in respect of the victims' right and the ivali would be 
responsible to implement the individual's right to restoration of the victims' money and 
property. 357 
Ashaf ay also went on to suggest that if the sultan had killed an apostate without 
following the Islamic rule in this respect, which is to invite the apostate back to Islam 
and make an effort to convince him through reasoning, the sultan would be under an 
obligation to pay the victim's relatives the diyyah (blood money). Moreover, it has been 
asserted by many Islamic authors that if the sultan applied hadd punishment to a person 
in matters that were not hadd, or if in a hadd matter but he applied a harsher punishment 
than stipulated, which resulted in the death of the punished person, the sultan would be 
under an obligation to pay compensation for the death of the person under 
punishment. 358 So, the Islamic government here seems to be constrained not to 
arbitrarily punish individuals and any penalty prescribed by the Islamic Shari'ah must 
be applied in accordance with the Islamic Shari'ah rules and procedures. 
Nevertheless, Islamic teaching is very broad and Islamic scholars seem to differ in 
interpreting the sacred Quranic texts and the prophetic sayings and practices. As a 
result, different conclusions are reached on the same matter. The views reported above 
are general ones that, with some development, might be consistent with human rights 
principles (as they are rights, not only mere duties, and of the individual not only of the 
357 Ashaf ay, M., op. cit., part 4, p. 291 
358 Ibid., part 6, pp. 175-176. The punishment for alcohol drinking is conceived to be 40 lashes and what 
exceeds that amount is not hadd. Hence, if the accused died as a result of a punishment that exceeded the 
hadd requirements, the sultan would be obliged to pay compensation. See Al-Mawardi, op. cit., p. 248. 
See also Ibn Hazem, Alehkanifi Osool Alahkam, Part 7, First Edition, Curio: Dar Alhadith, 1404 (Islamic 
calendar), pp. 456-457 
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community and imply the possibility of curbing the state authority). However, there are 
also contrary views which may raise difficulty in tackling the relationship between right 
in Islam and the right recognised in the international instruments. For example, some 
scholars take the view that hudud cannot be dispensed with, even if the accused has 
repented before being captured, or that the denial retraction of a confession cannot 
constitute doubt that leads to withholding the hadd. 359 Moreover, many Muslim jurists 
seem to suggest that analogy could form a legitimate factor to increase the punishment 
of hadd and may even contribute to establish a new hadd, even if it was not clearly 
stated in the Quranic texts and the prophetic traditions. 36017or example, there appears to 
be doubt whether drinking alcohol is a hadd or ta'zir offence. Some scholars have 
contended that the punishment of drunken persons at the time of the Prophet was a 
disciplinary punishment carried by the Prophet according to his own opinion and not a 
hadd conveyed by God. 361 They support their view by citing the statement of Ali bin 
Abitalib which indicates that the Prophet did not enact such punishment during his 
life 362 , but his companions, after the time of the Prophet, created it in its current form, 
which is 80 lashes, by analogy with the hadd of slander, on the basis that anyone who 
drinks alcohol gets drunk and one who gets drunk slanders. 363 According to this view, 
the state authority seems to be able to punish with the hadd punishment even in matters 
that do not constitute hadd crimes, by using the analogy process, without being held 
accountable if the punishment inflicts serious injury on the accused under punishment 
or he dies as a result of such a harsh punishment. 364 Although the use of analogy may 
give indication of such a dangerous conclusion, the majority of Muslim jurists seem to 
359 Cited in Ibn Qudama, op. cit., part 9, p. 130 
360 See more discussion about the use of analogy in the application of hadd in Alamdy, A., op. cit., part 4, 
66-65 
Cited in Al-'Asqalani, A., op. cit., Part, 12, p. 74 
362 See the statement of Ali bin Abitalib in: Muslim, Sahih Muslim, Part 3, (in Arabic) Beirut: Dar lhya 
Atturath Al-Arabi, p. 1332 
363 See Abu Dawod, Sunan Abi Dmvod, Part 4, (in: Arabic), Dar Alfikr, p. 166 
364 Ibn Qudama, op. cit., part 9, p. 149 
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reject this conclusion on the basis of the prophetic saying that anyone who inflicts the 
hadd punishment in matters that do not constitute hadd, is a transgressor. 365 However, 
they seem to have agreed that the ruler could increase the punishment of hadd on the 
basis that alcohol drinking was conceived unanimously by the companions as a hadd, 
but the original penalty was 40 lashes, and through the use of the technique of analogy, 
it was increased to 80 lashes. 366 Ali's statement was related to the added 40 lashes, and 
not to the hadd as a whole. 367 
In looking at the various views of Muslim traditional scholars particularly those relating 
to the application of hadd, we can easily conclude that the traditional Islamic fiqh 
considers the state as a discipliner and hence accords a significant role to enacting laws 
(ta'zir) that may establish a disciplined society that does not break the state orders and 
rules shaped in the name of preserving Islam. 368 This process might be directed against 
the basic rights of individuals, or towards promoting them, according to what concerns 
the Islamic state the most. If the main goal of the Islamic state is to create a disciplined 
society, regardless of any other disadvantages, the state would be more inclined to 
interfere in even basic individual rights and it would find in the traditional Islamicfiqh 
what would legitimise the interference. If the state, however, decided to uphold the 
individual's rights and freedoms in the belief that a disciplined society could not be 
established unless human rights and dignity were respected in the first place, the state 
would be more inclined to choose the opinions of the Islamic fiqh that could help to 
365 Cited in Ibid., p. 149. See also Alkasani, 'A., Badea AssaneafiTarteeb Asharea, (in: Arabic), Part 7, 
Second Edition, Beirut: Dar Al-Ketab AI-Arabi, 1982, p. 64 
366 Ibn Hazem, op. cit., part 7, p. 454 
367 Al-Mawardi, op. cit., p. 248 
368 A disciplined society according to Islamic principles seems to be a significant objective in the Islamic 
fiqh for the preservation of Islam. The traditional Islamicfiqh does not only give the Imam (Sultan ) the 
right to punish to establish a disciplined society but it also gives the husband the right to punish his 
disobedient wife to make her obedient according to the Islamic rules. Consistent with this, it has been 
asserted by some traditional jurists that if a husband beat his disobedient wife and, as a result of the 
punishment, she died, the husband cannot be held responsible, since it was done to discipline her 
according to legitimate Islamic principles. See Ibn Qudama, op. cit., part 9, p. 150 
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achieve its main goal of a disciplined society through the promotion of individual rights 
and freedoms. Thus, the preference between different opinions in the Islamicfiqh seems 
to depend on the political will of Islamic state, according to the objective it pledges 
itself to promote. 
A question arises, however, as to what technique could help the Islamic government to 
choose the right opinion. Does the Islamic flqh recognize standards that may help to 
balance between the two competing Islamic objectives; the promotion of individual 
rights and the establishment of a disciplined society? The Islamic ji'qh seems to have 
recognised very important technique in this regard, useful for the promotion of human 
welfare and the realization of state stability, called Siyasah Shar'iyyah (legitimate 
governmental policy) which needs to be discussed properly. 
111.4. Siyasah Shar'iyyah (The Legitimate Governmental Policy) 
The doctrine of Siyasah Shariyyah has no explicit mention in the Holy Quran or in the 
sayings of the prophet. It has been designed and developed solely by the Islamic 
scholars, according to maslahat al-'ibad (the interest of Muslims) in order to assist 
jurists and political leaders in managing Muslims' political and legal affairs, particularly 
in new matters that have not been explicitly tackled by the Quran or the traditions of the 
prophet. 369 Siyasah Shar'! yyah is defined by the Islamic fiqh as a doctrine allowing 
actions that are closer to the people's interest and further away from corruption, even if 
the actions instituted neither by the prophet nor by God . 
370 Ibn Al-Qayyem has 
suggested that Siyasah Shar'ijyah does not concern whether a particular action was in 
369 At-Qadi, A., AssiyasahAshariyyah MasdarAtlaqneen bqynAnnadarjyah ivaAltalbeeq, (MArabic), 
First Edition, Tanta: Matb'aat Dar Alkutob Aljam'ayyah Alhadeethah, 1989, pp. 35-36 
370 Al-Qaradawi, Y., Shariaal Al-Islam: khlzideha iva salahehaft kul zantan wa makan, (in Arabic), Third 
Edition, Beirut: AI-Maktab Al-Islami, 1983, p. 25 
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conformity with the Islamic Shariah in its strict sense, but rather, whether it was not in 
contradiction with the main fixed principles of Islam in its general sense. 371 It is based 
on the traditional Islamicfiqh's rule that the avoidance of harm is more important and 
prioritised than bringing benefit. 372 In other words, Siyasah Shar'iyyah implies the 
technique that balances competing Islamic interests and prioritises the most useful 
interests by sacrificing a less useful one, or avoids the most evil action by accepting a 
less evil one. 373 
Ibn Taymiyah has pointed out that the Islamic interest is that which prioritises the 
preservation of the Islamic religion over state interests. 374 For Ibn Taymiyah, for a state 
to be qualified to use the doctrine of Siyasah Shariyyah, it is not enough to be Islamic 
in name but it has to be at least founded on four factors; applying Islamic hudzid, 
securing the state's routes, confronting enemies through Mad, and distributing the state 
revenue. 375 Therefore, as long as these factors are recognised, it has been conceived that 
in the state of war, Muslims must prefer the strongest person as leader, even if he was 
dissolute, rather than a pious but weak one. That is because the strong dissolute one 
would serve Islam, in the state of war, more than the weak pious one, in the sense that 
his strength is for the strength of Islam and his sin is for himself, while piety would not, 
in a state of war, benefit Islam, while weakness would certainly undermine the 
continuity of the Islamic state. 376 Therefore, the less beneficial interests, represented by 
piety, which may be a factor in the establishment of justice, is scarified, in a state of 
war, to serve the greater interest, which is the existence of the Islamic state itself. 
371 Ibn At-Qayyem, Altziroq Alhitkniyyah fi Assiyasah Ashariyyah, (in Arabic), Beirut: Dar Alfikr 
Allubnani, 1991, p. 22. See also Vogel, F., "The Rule of Law in Saudi Arabia: exploring contradictions 
and traditions", in: Cotran, E., and Yamani, M., (eds. ), op. cit., p., 128 
372 It is also based on the Islamic rules, such as maqasid ashari'ah (the ultimate objective of the Shari'ah), 
dara' almadar (preventing harm), and Darora (necessity). See Al-Qadi, A., op. cit., pp. 135-189 
373 Ibn Taymiyah, op. cit., 1993, p. 67 
374 Ibid., p. 37 
375 See the statement of Ali bin Abitalib cited in Ibid., p. 81 
376 Ibid., p. 27 
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Siyasah Shariyyah does not seem to serve the partial or short-term Islamic interest, but - 
that which can be gained in the long tenn and which represents the genuine interest of 
Islam in its totality. It might be seen at times to conflict with the formal rules of the 
Islamic Shari'ah, but in reality it is what the Islamic Shari'ah is supposed to serve. For 
example, the prophetic practice of giving the leaders of the tribes whose Islam was still 
not properly established more money from the state revenue than other, poor, people 
may appear from the surface to be contrary to the Islamic principles of justice and 
equality, whereby the rich and the poor must be treated on an equal footing. However, it 
was perceived by the Prophet, at that time while the Islamic state was still weak, more 
beneficial for Islam, in that it would attract very important people with their followers to 
377 Islam, which would significantly contribute to the strength of the Islamic state. Jurists 
have suggested, therefore, that after Islam has been firmly established, there must be no 
differentiation in the distribution of wealth. 378 
The use of the doctrine of Siyasah Shar'iyyah according to the circumstances may 
intensify or relax the Islamic rule, as will be explained below. 
Umar, the second caliph, used the doctrine of Siyasah Shar'iyyah to intensify the 
Islamic rule on many occasions and in ways which sometimes contradicted clear 
prophetic judgments, without objection from the companions. For example, in the rule 
of divorce, the Prophet's practice was that the divorce happens when the husband 
pronounces it verbally once, such as saying, "I am divorcing my wife". 379 The Islamic 
377 Attabary, Jnie'a Albayan 'an Ta%veel Aiy AI-Qitran, (in Arabic), Part 10, Beirut: Dar Al-Fikr, 1405 
(Islamic calendar), p. 161. See also An-Nsaa'y, AI-Mzýlaba min Assunan, (in Arabic), Part 5, Second 
Edition, Halab: Maktabat Al-Matbu'aat Al-Islamyyah, 1986, p. 87 
378 Attabary, op. cit., Part 10, p. 163 
379 The Islamic divorce is even valid by the mere announcement of it even if the wife did not hear it. See 
Abdulrahim, A., Fatenva Sheik Mithanimad bin Saleh Al-Othaimeen, (in Arabic), Part two, Riyadh: Dar 
Aalarn Alkutob, 1994, p. 804 
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divorce has three stages. After the first two pronouncements of divorce, both the - 
spouses have the opportunity of reviewing what has happened and of being reunited. 
However, if the third pronouncement takes place it would constitute a clear sign that the 
relationship is beyond repair, and it cannot be revoked, until the wife married a different 
380 
person, had sexual relations with her new husband and subsequently got divorced. 
Although Islamic divorce has three stages, it is forbidden for the husband to pronounce 
the divorce three times at once, and if, despite this prohibition, it happened, at the time 
of the Prophet, it was counted as only one attempt, so the spouses still had the chance to 
be reunited, without a new marriage. 38 1 However, during Umar's caliphate, the sin of 
pronouncing the divorce three times in one attempt significantly increased, causing 
corruption in people's religious values. Umar, therefore, changed this rule and treated 
the three pronouncements made at once as if they were three separate divorces, in an 
attempt to deter people from playing with strict Islamic rules. 382 Since the rule in this 
case is that the divorced wife must have entered a new marriage with a different person 
and then must have been divorced, before being reunited with her previous husband, the 
Islamic society, according to the new rule established by Umar, entered into a new sin, 
which was false marriage carried out to enable the divorced wife to be returned to the 
original husband. This formed a reason for some scholars, at a later time, to return to the 
original rule established by the Prophet. 383 
Accordingly, it is clear that the Islamic rule of divorce was clearly changed by Umar to 
become stricter and it was universally accepted for the sake of the interest in deterring 
people from making light of Islamic rules. Later, and also according to the Islamic 
380 Attabary, op. cit., Part 2,458 
38 1 Assyoti, Addur Al-Manthoor, (in Arabic), Part 1, Beirut: Dar Al-Fikr, 1993, p. 668 
382 Ibid., p. 668. See also Alkurtubi,, 41jamea Le, 40am, 41-Quran, (in Arabic), Part 3, Second Edition, 
Cairo: Dar AsWab, 1372 (Islamic calendar), p. 130 
383 Ibn At-Qayyem, op. cit., p. 26 
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interest which was changed according to the new circumstances created by the new rule - 
of Umar, the rule was again returned to its original form. This clearly indicates that 
Islamic rules do change according to circumstances on the basis of one criterion, which 
is the preservation of the interest of Islam. 
Umar also used the doctrine of Siyasah Sharijyah to increase the hadd for alcohol 
drinking from 40 lashes to 80.384 Moreover, the Islamiefiqh has allowed the ruler of the 
Islamic state to kill someone guilty of religious heresy, if there is clear Islamic interest 
in the killing, even if the accused was not considered apostate. 385 
The use of the doctrine of Siyasah Sharijyah may further help to dispense with an 
Islamic rule to preserve a proper Islamic interest. For example, the Prophet, peace be 
upon him, did not kill hypocrites who reverted inwardly from faith to disbelief and who 
caused much damage to the Islamic community. 386 The reason for that, some scholars 
explain, is that the prophet feared that Arab tribes would say that Muhammad killed his 
companions and would therefore become reluctant to enter Islam. 387 Consistent with 
this, the Prophet also dispensed with the hadd for one who repented before being 
captured . 
388 The Prophet also dispensed with the hadd for people who committed hadd 
crimes on enemy territory during war, so as not to encourage the accused to join the 
enemy as an escape from the hadd. 389 Moreover, the fourth caliph, Ali bin Abitalib, 
suspended the application of qisas (the death penalty) of the killer of the third caliph 
384 Al-Qaradawi, Y., op. cit., 1983, p. 27 
385 Ibn Taymiyah, op. cit., 1993, p. 139 
396 Al-Qaradawi, Y., op. cit., 1983, pp. 35-36 
397 See details on why the prophet did not kill the hypocrite in Alkurtubi, op. cit., Part 1, pp. 198-200, and 
Ibn Katheer, op. ciL, 1401 (Islamic calendar), p. 49 See also At-Asqalani, A., op. cit., Part 10, p. 231 
389 Al-Qaradaivi, Y., op. cit., 1983, p. 36 
389 Ibid., p. 36-37 
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Othman bin Affan, in order to avoid rousing the tribes to claim retaliation, which could - 
have caused another war. 390 
Thus, the doctrine of Siyasah Shariyyah suggests that the governmental policy should 
not be applied exactly as pronounced by the Shariah, but rather it should be applied not 
inconsistence with the universal principles of Islam. 391 This gives the political will of 
the state wider discretion to apply Islamic principles in the way that seems, to the state 
itself, best to preserve the interest of Islam. This can change according to circumstances. 
Accordingly, the Islamic state accorded a wide discretion to choose the right opinion 
that may best fit the prevailing circumstances and which serve the Islamic interest. Al- 
Qaradawi has pointed out, however, that the ruler cannot make a judgement on the basis 
of his own wish, but must show proper justification that it would serve the interest of 
Islam. 392 Al-Qaradawi has demonstrated how the Islamic interest can be defined by 
citing the example of prisoners of war and suggested that the ruler may release prisoners 
if the Islamic state was strong and taking the lead in the war, in order to attract 
unbelievers to enter Islam. In contrast, if the Islamic state was weak and some of its 
soldiers had been captured by the enemy, the interest may rest in the exchange of the 
prisoners. Al-Qaradawi went further and suggested that the Islamic interest may even 
rest in the killing of the prisoners, if those prisoners were involved in mutilating and 
torturing Muslims, and may therefore be termed as war criminals. 393 
Nevertheless, the Islamic interest seems not to have been properly defined by the 
Islamic fiqh. Rather, it seems to be left for the rulees own understanding of what the 
Islamic interest may be in particular circumstances. Al-Qaradawi's illustration may help 
390 Alkurtubi, op. cit., Part 16, p. 318 
391 Ibn Al-Qayyem, op. cit., 199 1, p. 22. 
392 Al-Qamdaivi, Y., op. cit., 1983, p. 24 
393 Ibid., p. 43 
108 
Chapter Three: Islam, Human Rights, and Democracy 
to identify how the Islamic interest can vary according to the circumstances, but it does , 
not limit or constrain the ruler if he decides to the contrary, especially if the decision 
was against the popular will. The doctrine of Siyasah Shar'iyyah, although it may in 
some degree give relief for the state to free itself from rigid application of the Islamic 
Shari'ah, it seems to allow for more state intervention in individual rights through such a 
wide discretion. It has been shown above that, as although the doctrine of Siyasah 
Shar'iyyah may be seen as loosening the application of hadd, it has also played an 
important role to strengthen it, making it strict and difficult, at the same time. A wide 
discretion without accountability and without popular participation in the process that 
would affect people lives and destiny is dangerous and may justify the governance of 
tyranny and dictatorship. Thus, the doctrine of Siyasah Shariyyah can only be helpful if 
based on three elements: representativeness, accountability, and the respect of 
individual rights, which are the core concepts of the doctrine of constitutional 
democracy. 394 A question arises, however, as to whether Islam recognises, democracy 
that is based on these three elements. 
111.5. Democracy and Islam 
Democracy is a term that may be used to describe the state of representative assembly 
with the role of enacting rules for the general welfare and which itself is governed by 
these rules and accountable to the people who elected its members in the first place. 395 it 
also seems to be based on the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, in the 
sense that political participation cannot be guaranteed without being expressed in the 
394 See The High Commissioner for Human Rights, Civil and Political Rights: Continuing dialogue on 
measures to promote and consolidate democracy, submitted in accordance with Commission resolution 
2001/41,27 January 2003, p. 7-12 
395 Loughlin, M., "Rights, Democracy, and Law", In: Campbell, T., Ewing, K, and Tomkins, A., (eds. ), 
op. cit., p. 42 
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language of rights. 396 Some authors assert, therefore, that the Islamic concept of politics - 
contradicts the liberal theory of democracy, since the governmental legitimacy and 
policy appears to stem from religious doctrine and not from the people. 397 
However, the discussion over the source of the state sovereignty, whether the people or 
God, seem to fall more in the field of religious and philosophical debate than in the 
formation of the constitutional machinery for securing the three mentioned elements of 
democracy, namely, representativeness, accountability, and the respect of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. Indeed, in primitive society where there are no political 
principles or the principles are rather vague, the philosophical aspects can be of 
importance, but where the political principles are clear and present in the people's belief, 
investigation of the nature and the source of sovereignty would not be as important as 
the political machinery responsible for the application. In other words, if the political 
values of the three components of democracy, representativeness, accountability, and 
the respect of individual rights and liberties, are already present in the social belief of 
the community, then the question that should be tackled is not the origin of those values, 
whether they come from human logic or from God, but how to apply them. Therefore, 
the conception, concerning the assumptions and beliefs of democracy, which suggests 
that the people are the source of sovereignty, should not be the criterion for judging 
whether or not the Islamic state is democratic. The criterion should rather be, as the 
Human Rights Resolution 2005/68 seems to suggest, whether or not the Islamic state 
recognizes the three component elements of democracy, representativeness, 
accountability, and the respect of individual rights and freedoms. 398 
396 Ibid., p. 43 
397 Kamrava, M., op. cit., p. 11. See also Khan, M,, op, cit., 2003, pp. 12-13 
3981n. resolution 2005/68 it has been recognized that good governance practices vary according to 
circumstances and needs of different societies but that variation must be based on transparency and 
accountability along with maintaining environment conducive to the enjoyment of all human rights. See 
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The majority of Muslim jurists have differentiated, however, between the source of 
sovereignty on the one hand, and the source of power and legitimacy on the other. 399 
They have contended that in Islam, God is the sovereign who possesses the ultimate 
legislative power that designs the very broad and general political and legal structures of 
the state. However, God is not the ruler on earth, nor is He the source of political power 
and legitimacy for governance. The governor is one of the mass, elected by the Muslim 
people on'the understanding that he will run the community according to the Islamic 
values that shape the public political belief of the Islamic community. 400 Consistent with 
this, it has been suggested by the Islamic Fiqh that the death or removal of the Caliph 
(the governor) does not affect the position of the judges he chose. That is because the 
selection of those judges was not made on behalf of the ruler himself, but on behalf of 
the people, who are the continuing source of the legitimacy. 401 In the following 
paragraph, I will provide further discussion of the Islamic recognition of the principle of 
representative and accountable government, and the extent to which the individual 
rights and fundamental freedoms are respected in Islam. 
Human Rights Resolution 2005/68, paragraph 7. Moreover, human rights resolution 2005/32 does not say 
that God should have no relevance to democracy but rather declares elements that democracy must 
include which are "respect for all human rights and findainental freedoms, inter alia freedom of 
association and ofpeacefzil assembly, freedom of expression and opinion, and the right to take part in the 
conduct ofpublic affairs, directly or Mroughfreely chosen representatives, and to vote and to be elected 
at genuine periodicfree elections by universal and equal suffrage and by secret ballot guaranteeing the 
free expression of the ivill of the people, as ivell as a pluralistic system of political parties and 
organizations, respect for the rule of Imy, the separation ofpoivers, the independence of the judiciary, 
transparency and accountability in public administration, andfree, independent and pluralistic media. " 
See Human Rights Resolution 2005/32, Article 1. 
399 AlKhayyad, A., . 4nnedam Assiyasyfi, 41-lslani: annadaryyah assiyasyyah nedanz alhukin, (in Arabic), First Edition, Cairo: Dar Assalam, 1999, p. 72, See Assanhoori, A., op. cit., pp, 56-57. See Al-Qaradawi, 
Y., op. cit., 1997, p. 39. See Howaydi, F., Al-Islani iva Addenioqradyyah, (in Arabic), Cairo: Markaz Al- 
Ahram, 1993, pp. 185-186 
400 Assanhoori, A., op. cit., pp. 93-119 
401AIKhayyad, A., op. cit., p., 73, See also An-Nadi, F., Turuq Ikhtiyar At-Kalifah, (in Arabic), Sanaa: 
Jame'aat San'aa, 1980, pp. 285-286 
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111.5.1. The Principle of Representative Government 
A careful examination of the text of the Quran reveals that Allah clearly assigns the 
authority to enjoin good and forbid evil which is, basically the establishment of public 
order, not to any particular person of high social or religious status, but to all Muslims. 
Allah says: 
"Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining 
fe t 40 what is right, andforbidding what is wrong: they are the ones to attain lici Y. ,2 
The word "you" in Arabic is "ininkum" in plural form. Thus it directs to all Muslims the 
order to choose a band of people to establish the public order of the Islamic state. The 
Quran, intentionally, did not mention in this verse, nor did it mention in others, how to 
choose those people, but it clearly underlined the principle of representativeness and left 
the manner of application to be decided by the people according to the circumstances. 403 
The vast majority of Muslim jurists seem to have agreed that the Islamic government 
cannot be legitimate if it is not based on the choice of Muslims; however, they differ on 
the number of people whose votes are enough to establish a legitimate government. 404 
Some medieval jurists suggested that the proposed ruler must have gained the majority 
vote of IN Al-Hal iva Al-'Aqd (the electoral college) of each region of the Islamic state 
in order to ensure the mass acceptance of the new ruler. Others cited the practice of the 
Prophet's companions in the formation of the first Islamic state after the death of the 
Prophet. They asserted their acceptance of the establishment of the new government 
402 Al-Imran, 3: 104. There are many other verses emphasising the principle of representative government 
and giving to the Muslim community the power to choose their leader. See Al-Imran 3: 110, At-Touba, 9: 
71,112, Al-Hajj, 22: 41 
403 An-Nadi, F., op. cit., p. 153 
404 Al-Mawardi, op. cit., p. 15 
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even if it was elected by a very small number, for example four of the five members of 
lhl Al-Hal iva, 41-'Aqd. 
405 
This Islamic recognition of the establishment of the Islamic government on the basis of 
a very small number, represented by the members of IN AI-Hal iva Al-Aqd, could 
constitute a failure, rather than success, in implementation of the principle of 
representativeness. However, as was asserted by An-Nadi, the simplicity in the 
application of such an important principle might have been considered by the 
companions suitable for the circumstances prevailing in their time. This should not 
discredit the principle in any way and should not affect the underlying principle of 
representativeness, which emphasises the right of the Islamic nation to choose its 
leader. 406 If the application, which is merely a human effort, sometimes falls short of 
completeness, this failure in the application should not discredit the recognised values 
of the principle underlined by God. As Atturabi implies in his book, Asslyasah iva 
Alhulan (Politics and Governance) the Shari'ah rules and general principles of state 
derive from God and the Muslim community is under an obligation to set detailed rules 
for applying God's orders. 407 It is worth noting that this Quranic principle of enjoining 
good and forbidding evil is conceived to be the cornerstone of the Islamic state, which 
serves to preserve the main principles of Islam, even if it sometimes requires disabling 
some Islamic principles that are less fundamental in order to preserve the most 
fundamental ones. 408 So, Muslim scholars are encouraged to develop the concept of IN 
, 41-Hal iva 41-'Aqd to be compatible with the international recognition of universal 
suffrage. In the following paragraphs we will cite the traditions of the Prophet and his 
405 Ibid., p. 15 
406 An-Nadi, F., op. cit., p. 151 
407 Atturabi, H., Assiyasah iva Affittkni: annumm Assullaniyyah bayn alosol iva sunan ahvaqia, (in 
Arabic), First Edition, Beirut: Dar Assaqi, 2003, p. 121 
403 Ibn Taymiyah, op. cit., 1992, pp. 33-37 
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companions to illustrate the Islamic recognition of the principle of representativeness in 
practice. 
The first Islamic application of the principle of representativeness was conducted by the 
Prophet when he died without appointing any of his companions to take his role in 
governing the society. The Prophet seems to have left the leadership position empty to 
indicate the principle that no one can decide who should govern the Islamic community, 
except the governed. 409 It may be correct to say that the Prophet was conscious of the 
political vacuum that would arise out of his death, but he was also aware of God's order 
as indicated in the above Quranic verse and in his silence he confirmed the governance 
of representativeness. 
410 
The companions of the Prophet were aware of the intention of the Prophet to establish 
this political principle of representativeness and as a result of the new religious order 
deduced from the prophet's silence, they met immediately after the Prophets death in 
Saqeefat bani Saaedah to discuss who should lead the community after the Prophet. 
After keen debate on who should rule the society, they chose Abu Bakr, the first Caliph 
of the Islamic state. 411 
It is very important to note, here, that this process of electing the Caliph was new to the 
world of that time, which was governed by the principle of dictatorship of theocratic 
governance, underpinned by the two most powerful regimes in the world; the Caesar in 
409 Albyati, M., Addaiviah Alqanonyyah iva Annizant Assiyasy Al-Islami, (in Arabic), PhD, Cairo: The 
University of Cairo, 1978, p. 243 
4 '0 Allah clearly describes the prophet's knowledge as follows: "By the Star when it goes down, Your 
Companion (the prophet) is neither astray nor being misled, Nor does he say (aught) of (his own) Desire. 
It is no less than inspiration sent down to him: He was taught by one Mighty in Power, Endued with 
lVisdomfor he appeared (in statelyform)" See An-Najm, 53: 1,2,3,4,5,6 
41 1 Hassan, H., and Hassan, A., Annuzom AI-Islamyyah, (in Arabic) Cairo: Maktabat Annahzah 
Almasryya, 2001, pp. 36-38 
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Rome and Cyrus in Persia. Therefore, in the absence of experience and effective 
machinery to apply the principle, the Islamic state was about to collapse when, 41-Ansar, 
who were the inhabitants of Madinah, wanted to share the governance with Al- 
Muhajreen, who migrated with Prophet Mohammad; the tribes of Koriysh. It was only 
after strong debate that . 41-, 4nsar accepted Abu Bakr's suggestion, which implied that 
the prince was from Al-Mithajreen and the ministers were from them, and elected 
(Bay'ah) Abu Bakr as President 
Nevertheless, Abu Bakr, because of the absence of machinery that could secure the 
application of the principle of representativeness feared, towards the end of his rule, that 
if he died without choosing a successor, the same dispute over the leadership could 
again occur, which might lead to warfare. Hence, Abu Bakr chose Umar to take his 
position if he died. However, Abu Bakr did not select Umar according to his own will. 
Rather, it was done in a long consultation with the most influential people in the 
community and after assurances that the community would accept his decision. 
Moreover, Abu Bakr based his decision not only on the approval of those influential 
people, but also on the approval of Muslims after he declared his decision to the public 
and they accepted it. 412 
It is worth mentioning here that Umar was not related to Abu Bakr in any way, and 
hence the decision was merely based on Umar's powerful personality and popularity. 
Hereditary rule was not recognized in Islam according to Islam's original sources, the 
Quran and the tradition of the prophet and his companions. 413 Umar asserted this point 
when he rejected the people who proposed that his son, Abdullah, should rule after him, 
412 Assanhoori, A., op. cit., p. 122 
413 It has even been suggested by some scholars that hereditary rule is forbidden in Islam. See Al- 
Mawardi, op. cit., p. 19 
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and responded with harsh words. 414 Umar initially even refused to suggest anyone for 
the presidency, on the basis that the Prophet did not do so, but after the influential 
people insisted that it was necessary in order to avoid division and warfare, Umar 
suggested seven people who had been very close to the Prophet, but left the Muslim 
people to decide the most appropriate one among them. 415 
It is clear that it was only the lack of machinery that led Abu Bakr and Umar to suggest 
successors, to avoid instability, and perhaps the same reason was also behind the crisis 
between the fourth Caliph, Ali, and Mu'aawya, the fifth Caliph. We must not forget that 
the predominance in the world at that time of dictatorship, represented by Rome and 
Persia, affected the process of the application of the principle on the ground. Those two 
dominant nations were always in the minds of Muslims in managing the state 
affairs 416 and hence, the political values of those nations might have been a reason that 
urged Mudaivya to divert from the Islamic principle of representativeness to the 
principle of hereditary rule, which was internationally the common political principle. 417 
111.5.2. The Principle of Government Accountability 
111.5.2.1. Political Accountability 
Although the principle of representativeness, generally speaking, is recognized in its 
basic form in Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh), the principle of accountability has long been 
a controversial subject. The controversy, however, does not seem to be over the nature 
of the goverment, whether or not it is a deputy of God and hence above the law, but 
414 Hassan, H., and Hassan, A., Op. CiL, p. 41 
415 Ibid., p., 41 
4 16 For example, Umar, during his period in office, created, for the first time, a financial system in 
accordance with the financial system of Persia Empire to manage and control the state finance. See Falah, 
A., Addmvlahfi AI-Islani, Cairo: Dar Assalam, 2000, p. 56 
417 Atturabi, op., cit., pp. 129-130 
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over the way that the government should respond to the public and the way the public - 
should scrutinize the conduct of the government. Does Islam recognize the right for the 
people to oppose the government through means, like opposition party or the media? 
This is the kind of question we will endeavour to discuss in the following paragraphs. 
Government accountability is very closely associated with government transParency. In 
Human Rights Resolution 2005/32 the importance has been stressed of an effective, 
Iranspai-ent and accountable functioning of parliaments to the promotion and protection 
of democracy and the rule of law. 418 In Human Rights Resolution 2005/68 states have 
also been urged to "provide transparent, responsible, accountable and participatory 
government, responsive to the needs and aspirations of the people. A 19 The resolution 
has attracted the attention to deepening democracy beyond free and fair elections, to 
achieve truly transparent, responsible, accountable and participatory government 420 
Moreover, in the Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights submitted in 
accordance with Commission resolution 2001/41, the group arrived at some principles 
considered to be important to institutions of democracy; one of these principles was the 
accountability and transparency of institutions run by public officialS. 421 
While transparency is associated with accountability as an important component of 
good government, civil society has been recognized as essential agent to monitoring the 
actions of the, State and central to a successU democratization process. 422 It has been 
4 'a Democracy and the rule of law, Human Rights Resolution 2005/32, Article 15, available online at 
httli: //aD. ohchr. orgLdoctiinents/E/CHR/resolutions/E-CN 4-RES-2005-32. doe 
4 19 The role of good governance in the promotion and protection of human rights, Human Rights 
Resolution 2005/68, Article 1, available online at http: //ap. ohchr. org/documents/E/CHR/resolutions/E- 
CN 4-RES-2005-68. doc 
420 i-bid., paragraph 4, C 
421 Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-ninth session, Continuing dialogue on measures to promote and 
consolidate democracy, Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights submitted in accordance 
with Commission resolution 2001/41, E/CN. 4/2003/59 27 January 2003, Paragraph 19 
422 Ibid., paragraph 16 
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considered a crucial vehicle for ensuring that people participate in important debates - 
and decisions that shape their lives in which free media could play an important role. 423 
The significance of independent and pluralistic media in promoting democracy has been 
realized in Human Rights Resolution 2005/32 and considered to be one important 
component of democracy. 424 Some advocates stress on the importance of the role of the 
media in promoting human rights as human rights may only be promoted by disclosing 
the facts. 425 
Thus, while transparency is essential like accountability for democratic government and 
may even be a cause for the principle of accountability itself, since citizens cannot 
participate in self-rule without having, before all, access to government information, 426 
free media seem to be also essential since without free media underpinned by freedom 
of speech, the public may not be able to publicly scrutinize the government's conduct. 
So, in discussing the principle of accountability in Islam, it is necessary to discuss 
whether or not Islam recognizes the principle of transparent government and free media 
underpinned by freedom of speech. 
111.5.2.1.1. The Principle of Accountable and Transparent Government 
In looking at the text of the Quran, we find verse 159 of chapter 3 (Al-Imran) and verse 
38 of chapter 42 (Ashura) giving clear orders to the Prophet to consult Muslims in 
423 Ibid., paragraph 16, the report has pointed out that since the free media play an important role in 
promoting democracy, strict regulations should be adopted to counter misuse of the media. See paragraph 
20 
424 Democracy and the rule of laxv, Human Rights Resolution 2005/32, Article 1 
425 Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-ninth session, Continuing dialogue on measures to promote and 
consolidate democracy, op. cit., paragraph 15 
426 Hoefges, M., Halstuk, M., and Chamberlin, B., "Privacy Rights Versus FOIA Discloser Policy: The 
"uses and effects" Double Standard in Access to personally- identifiable information in government 
records", 12 William & Mary Bill ofRights Journal, December 2003. p. 3 
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matters concerning their worldly affairs. 427 Muslim jurists in the application of this 
verse seem to have agreed that it establishes a clear political principle of Shura 
(consultation) that Muslim leaders are obliged by the Islamic Shari'ah to implement. 
However, the jurists are in dispute over the kind of subject that requires consultation. 
Some jurists say that the leader is obliged to consult Muslims only on matters of war, 
since the verse was describing the battle of Uhud, which is of a military nature; 
however, the majority, especially modem jurists, take the view that except in matters 
that concern the fundamentals of the Shari'ah, the leader seems to be obliged 428 to 
consult Muslims in all matters that affect their life, regardless whether they are political, 
economic or social. 429 
Accordingly, the leader is under the Islamic Shari'ah obligation to make full 
information on government business accessible to all Muslims, especially those 
trustworthy representatives who are well recognised by the masses, since no 
consultation can be done without, first, providing information about the matter 
concerned. 
Consistent with this view, the Prophet, peace be upon him, not only consulted his 
companions on public matters but also consulted them about matters that concerned him 
427 Allah says: "... and ask for (Allah's) forgiveness for thein; and consult thein in affairs (of inolnent). 
Then, when thou hast taken a decision, put thy trust in Allah. For Allah loves those who put their trust (in 
Him)" See Q3: 159, Allah also says in chapter 42 verse 38 that "... who (conduct) their affairs by inutual 
Consultation... " 
429 Some traditional scholars, however, do not seem inclined to accept that the ruler is obliged to conduct 
a consultation and suggested that it is not binding in the strict sense but it is most preferable. Cited in Ibn 
Katheer, op. cit., Part 1, p. 421 However, Abdulkhaliq, a modem scholar, has suggested that those scholars 
who do not support the view that the ruler is under obligation to conduct a consultation seem to confuse 
the question of the obligatory nature of consultation, which is very clear in the holy text of the Quran as it 
comes in the form of command, with the question of whether the opinion that results from that 
consultation is binding, which has not yet been resolved. See Abdulkhaliq, F., Fi AI-Fiqh Assiyasy Al- 
Island. - inabadea' destoryyah, ashshura, aladl, alniusmvah, ( in Arabic) Cairo: Dar Ashuroq, 1998, pp. 
59-60. See Mutwalli, A., Mabadea' Nezam Alhukni J1 Al-Islam, (in Arabic), Alexandria: Munsha't 
Alm'aaref , 1978, p. 243, See also Ashawi, T., Fiqh Ashura iva Alestisharah, (in Arabic), Al Mansurah: Dar Alwafa, 1992, p. 108 
4'9AIkurtubi, op. cit., Part 4, pp. 250-25 1, See also Attabary, op. cit., Part 4, p. 152 
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personally, like the case of the people who slandered his wife 'Aa'eshah, may Allah be 
430 
pleased with her, in Hadith Alejk. It is reported that Ibu Hurayrah, one of the 
companions of the prophet, said, "I have not seen anyone inore than the prophet in 
consulting his companions". 43 1 The companions also followed the same path and 
consulted Muslims on all matters of public concern, like the war against the tribes who 
refused to pay Zakat at the time of Abu Bakr, the consultation of Umar in the matter of 
increasing the punishment for the crime of drinking alcohol (hadd Alkhanir), and the 
consultation of Othman, the third Caliph, on codifying the holy Quran in one particular 
reading. 432 Those are examples of matters that arose at the time of the Prophet and his 
companions, which were resolved through consultation. 
This obligation on the part of government to conduct a consultation before it embarks on 
taking a decision is an important sign, underlining the attitude of Islam towards the 
government and its functions. Islam, in obliging the govenunent to conduct a 
. consultation 
in decision making, requires, in the implementation of the principle, that all 
information it possesses be made accessible to the public. This, in turn, may indicate the 
Islamic recognition of the political principle of transparent government. 
It is worthwhile to mention, here, that the mandatory nature of the consultation, in the 
sense that the government is obliged to conduct a Shura (consultation), is different from 
the binding nature of the opinion that results from the consultation. It seems that the 
question whether the opinion reached after the consultation is binding or not is akin to 
430 Al-Bukhary, M., Aljamea Assahih Almukhtasar, Part 6, (in Arabic), Third Edition, Beirut: Dar Ibn 
Katheer, Alyarnamah, 1987, p. 2682 
43 1 Assyoti, op. cit., Part 2, p. 358 
432 Alkurtubi, op. cit., Part 1, p. 52 
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that of whether or not the government is limited by the public opinion, which although 
as significant as the principle of transparency, is a different question. 
There seem to be two arguments with regard to the binding nature of the opinion 
resulting from consultation. The first argument, backed by the traditional fiqh, rejects 
the binding nature of the opinion resulting from the consultation and holds the view that 
the ruler is at liberty to uphold or reject the opinion, even if the opinion was agreed on 
unanimously. One of the arguments on which the proponents of this argument depend is 
that Allah's command in verse 159 of chapter 3 orders the Prophet, after consulting his 
companions, " nen you have taken a decision, put your trust in Allah", which means 
carry out the decision you have chosen, not necessarily that which has risen from the 
consultation. 433 Consistent with this, they argue, the caliph Abu Bakr initiated a war 
against the Murtaddeen, the people who became apostates after the death of the prophet, 
although most of the companions opposed the war. 434 
The counter argument is that the ruler cannot escape the decision made by the majority 
of the consultants and hence the ruler must implement the decision, even if it is contrary 
to his own view. This argument seems to be based on the prophefs sayings and 
traditions, which form the main guide to the true meaning of the holy text of the Quran. 
The prophet reportedly said to his companions, Abu Bakr and Umar, "ffyozi reached a 
consensus on a decision I will not oppose yollit. 
435 It is also been reported that the 
Prophet, in response to the question put by the companions asking about the meaning of 
deteunination, said it means "consult the people of opinion and follow them". 436 
433 Cited in Alhulu, M. R., Addmvlahfi Mezan Asharia, Annuzom Assiyasyyah, (in Arabic), Alexandria: 
Dar Al-Matbu'aat Aijam'ayyah, 1996, p. 381 
434 Ibid., 383 
435 Ibn Katheer, op. cit., Part 1, p. 421 
436 Ibn Hazern, op. cit., Part 6, p. 200 
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Moreover, the Prophet consulted his people on the battle of Uhud and followed the , 
companions' advice to go to war, although he was inclined to avoid it. 437 
It might be suggested that if the government is universally recognized in Islamic 
jurisprudence to be under a Shari'ah obligation to conduct a consultation with wise 
representatives, on all political, economic and social matters that are closely connected 
with individuals' life and the continuity of the community, then it is unreasonable to 
think that the result of that consultation is different and hence might be, in certain or 
even all cases, non-binding. That is because the obligation to conduct a consultation 
would be meaningless, if the result of it is non-binding. This might be the time to 
reconsider the Islamic discourse, especially on this vital matter which has significant 
implications for the continuity of the Islamic community. The sacred text must be read 
within the context of the necessities of the reality, in a manner that ultimately serves the 
purposes of Islam. As Sheikh Al-Qaradawi suggests, if there are two opinions on this 
matter, one that the government is obliged to implement the outcome of consultation, 
the other that entitles the leader to disregard it, the injustice of our time strongly 
suggests the need to uphold the former view. Hence, the government must implement 
the result of the consultation, just as it is obliged to conduct the consultation. 438 
Whatever the differences of opinions in Islamic jurisprudence over this matter, if the 
people one day decide to form a goverment in accordance with the opinion that 
suggests that consultation is binding, then these differences must be resolved according 
to the people's will and the government must keep the promise. 439 
437 Asha%vi, T., op. ciL, p. 52, See also Alkurtubi, op. cit., Part 4, p. 253 
438 Al-Qaradaivi, Y., op. cit., 1997, p., 146 
439 Ibid., p. 146, See also Abdulkhaliq, F., op. cit., p. 69 
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111.5.2.1.2. Free Media and Freedom of Speech 
The principle of consultation in this latter meaning seems to approach the core element 
of the concept of democracy, which is based on limited and accountable government. 
The democratic system seems to require a transparency that allows the public to have 
access to information in order to regulate the governmenfs conduct. In the same way, 
Islamic Shura (consultation) scrutinizes the functions of the government through public 
opinion. So, the Islamic Shura (consultation) itself then may function as the basis of 
freedom of speech, since the consultation is all about public opinion. However, it is not 
necessarily as simple as it first seems. 
According to Muslim jurists, Islamic consultation seems to be confined to those who are 
chosen, whether by the government itself, the current practice ofthe current Islamic 
states, or by the people, as Muslims are currently calling for. 440 The principle of Shura 
seems to give only a group of people the right to debate government conduct and does 
not seem to consider the ordinary people. 44 1 The Prophet and his companions only 
consulted a group of people who were known for their knowledge and wisdom and who 
were recognized as IN 41-Hal iva 41-', 4qd. 442 The principle of consultation does not 
confer on all individuals any right whatsoever. Rather, it is a procedure of decision- 
making, specifying the way that the Islamic government must conduct its business. It is 
a part of the state's machinery that governs the people, not something to be used by the 
latter against the state. Although it may assert the principle of accountable and 
transparent government, it is not necessarily good enough to be the basis of the freedom 
440 See Al'alkeem, H., "Al-Islam wa Addemoqradyyah Mut'aadedan am Mutnaqidan", In: Tamimi, 
A., (ed. ), Musharakal Al-Islainyyeen ft Assullah, (in Arabic), London: Liberty for the Muslim World, 
1994, pp. 37-51, See also Al-Mutwakkel, M., "Al-Islam wa Huqoq Alensan", In: Markaz Derasat 
Alwehdah Alarabyyah, Hziqoq Alensan Al-Arabi, (in Arabic), Beirut: Mark-az Derasat Alwehdah 
Alarabyyah, 1999, pp. 123-125 
411 See Mutwalli, A., op. cit., p. 256 
442 See Ibn Katheer, op. cit., Part 1, p. 421, See Attabary, op. cit., Part 4, p. 152 
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of speech as some might suggest. 443 Freedom of speech concerns not only whether the 
people can convey their opinion to the state, which maybe satisfied through consultation 
with appointed officials or the people's representatives, but whether the ordinary people 
can, themselves, participate in the political debate. Can the media, for example, embark 
on public affairs and scrutinize the state decision? 
When Islamic authors try to assert the existence of freedom of speech*in Islam, they 
usually cite the Islamic principle of enjoining good and forbidding evil, in the sense that 
every Muslim, through the concept of Hisbah, 444 is not only permitted but required to 
put an end to evil by deed if he is able to do so, or by words if he has not the power to 
change it by deed. 
445 
However, close examination reveals that this principle cannot be relied, on to justify a 
freedom of speech that would enable citizens to debate and even object to government 
decisions. That is, if we agree that the government itself was established in accordance 
with this principle, as indicated above, and since that government is of an Islamic 
nature, then the evil that the citizens are able to denounce is what the government 
considers as evil, and the good is what the government considers as good. Citizens, in 
443 See Al-Hageel, S., op. cit., p., 137 Al-Hageel in his book discusses freedom of speech in the form of 
consultation and most of his justification seems to depend on the ability of Muslims to give advice, 
whether to the government or to the other Muslims. 
444 For more details about the Islamic concept of hisbah see Saeed, S., Sharqyyat, 4ssu1tah iva Annizanifi 
Hzikm, 41-Islam, (in Arabic), Cairo: Dar Annahzah Alarabyyah, 1999, pp. 163-165 
445The Prophet reportedly said that 'Whosoever sees an evil [in the Islamic society] must change it 
[correct it] by his own hand [by action]. If he could not do so, then let him use his tongue [deny the 
practice verbally]. [Finally] if he could not do so, then let him use heart [despise the practice by heart 
and declare that helshe hates to see such a wrong practice in the Islamic society]. That is the least [level 
oflfaith. " See Alkurtubi, op. cit., Part 4, p. 49, see also An-Namry, Y., Attanihees leinaft Ahninvattaa min 
Ahn'aani iva Alasaneed, Part 10, (in Arabic), Morocco: Wazarat 'Aumom Alawqaf wa Asha'on Al- 
Islamyyah, 1967, p. 259 
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exercising this principle, are in fact supporting the government and backing its decision, 
not scrutinizing it. 446 
Moreover, it must be bome in mind that the application of a principle is not always as 
successful as the principle is in theory. The reality is different, as it raises details in the 
process which are undoubtedly subject to human error. Such error must be corrected and 
the officials who caused it must accept the responsibility, no matter what is their nature, 
elected or appointed. So, the state's application of the principle of enjoining good and 
forbidding evil might itself be subject to public scrutiny. Hence, it is unclear how the 
public will judge the state's application of a principle that is itself the basis for the 
power of judgment. For example, is the public able to criticize the state's application of 
the principle of enjoying good and forbidding evil, which itself is deemed to be the 
basis for the legitimacy of public intervention in the state affairs? If the public can say 
the state's application of the principle is wrong, then this judgment itself is wrong, since 
it is founded on the same application of the same principle. Therefore, the principle of 
enjoining good and forbidding evil might support freedom of speech, but does not seem 
to be strong enough to found it. Freedom of speech is more than mere advice. It is about 
scrutiny and, sometimes, objection. 
446 The Saudi system, for example, has established an institution called the institution of ordering good 
and preventing evil, haya'I alanir belmaaroof iva annahy 'an aInninkar, which is considered by some 
commentators a religious police. Through this institution the Saudi government interferes fundamentally 
in matters that are mainly concerned with the individual's personal life in the name of the Islamic 
principle of ordering good and forbidding evil. In the name of this principle, they forbid different media 
forms and arts and impose restriction on women's work, especially in places where men work. See the 
electronic news E-laph, a Saudi journalist complaining about the way the Saudi institution of ordering 
good and forbidding evil conduct their work, available online at 
http: //www. elanh. com/ElaphWeb/Politics/2006/l/124140. litm For more information about this institution. 
See Al-'Autaibi, A., hayat alamr belma'aroof fi Assaudiyyah bayn Naqd Ahnabda' 1va Naqd 
Alnwa'ssasah, E-laphl electronic news, January 2006 Available online at 
http: //wNvw. elaph. com/ElaphWeb/NewsPapers/2006/i/117254. htni 
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In fact, some Islamic scholars reject the right of the public to scrutinize government 
decisions. In their view, Islam can never give the ordinary people the right to debate or 
even oppose the government's political decision in a public forum. 447 If anything 
happens to the community, touching the public interests, the ordinary people must not 
debate it in public, even if their aim in doing so is to understand the complexity of the 
matter. Rather, they must privately discuss it with those charged with authority among 
them. 448 'the proponents of this argument seem to fear that such a public debate on 
matters that concerned with public order would encourage division, which could 
ultimately lead to disorder and instability. Verse 83 of chapter 4 of the Holy Quran may, 
at first glance, serve in support of this view. It says that 
"When there comes to them some matter touching (public) safety orfear, they divulge 
it. If they had only referred it to the Messenger or to those charged with authority 
aniong them, the proper investigators would have tested itftom them (direct). Were it 
not for the Grace and Mercy of Allah unto you, all but a few of you would have 
followed Satan. 049 
Nevertheless, if we carefully examine this verse, we may find in it one of the important 
elements that establish freedom of speech in Islam rather than demolish it. One of the- 
most credible Islamic scholars, Ibn Katheer, has asserted that this verse is merely 
talking about the prohibition of disclosing sensitive information that might endanger the 
450 
community without proper investigation. Assyoti has further suggested that, 
according to this verse, all Muslims are required to investigate any unclear issue, 
especially ones of public concern, and discuss it with the responsible people who are 
able to tackle such matters. Those people, Assyoti argued, need not only be state 
447 See the opinion of Sheik Ibn Baz in: Al-Jeraisy, K., and AI-Buraik, S., (eds. ), Falmva Ulanla'Albail 
Alharam, (in Arabic), Riyadh: Al- Al-Jeraisy Lttawzee'a, 1999, p. 316 449 Ibid., p. 316 449 Q4: 83 
450 Ibn Katheer, op. cit., Part 1, pp. 390, and 530-531 
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officials, but could also include Islamic scholars and intellectuals. 45 1 This verse seems 
to be revealed to prevent the spread of lies and rumours by urging Muslims to scrutinize 
any matter that may arouse suspicion and discuss it with the people concerned, who are 
able to give clarification. 452 Accordingly, this verse refers to proper investigation or 
extraction of matters from their proper resources, it does not forbid investigation. In 
other words, this verse seems to urge people to investigate public matters in a free 
environment with the people concerned. This, in turn, requires channels like political 
forums where people can reach the relevant officials, for the purpose of inquiry. Only 
this will really implement the purpose of this verse, which is to close the door against 
those who spread lies and rumours to bring unrest to the community. 
Consistent with this view, Umar bin Alkhattab, when he was informed that the 
Messenger of Allah had divorced his wives, left his house, entered the Mosque and 
found the people talking about this news. He immediately went to the Prophet to ask 
him what had truly happened, asking him, "Have you divorced your ivives? " The 
Prophet said, "No. " Then he stood by the door of the Mosque and shouted with the 
loudest voice, "The Messenger ofAllah did not divorce his ivives"453 
Thus, this verse seems to urge both the people to express their concems and discuss 
them with the responsible persons, and the officials charged with authority to facilitate 
this by guaranteeing that no harm will be inflicted on anyone because of his words. 
Moreover, as the issues are of public nature, then the debate must be in public to inform 
the investigators, as Umar did when he shouted with his loudest voice to infonn the 
4s' Assyoti, op. cit., Part 2, p. 601 
452 Al-Asgalani, A., op. cit., Part 9,285 
453 Cited in Muslim, op. cit., part 2, p. 1107, See also Ibn Habban, Saheeh Ibn Habban Bilarfeeb Ibn 
Balban, Part 9, (in Arabic), Second Edition, Beirut: Mua'ssasat Arresalah, 1993, p. 498 
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people, whether those who were party to the discussion or those who needed to 
understand the matter. 
In addition, many examples can be extracted from the traditions of the prophet and his 
companions to assert the freedom of speech in Islam. I will refer below to some events 
that occurred at the time of the Prophet and his companions that strongly suggest that 
this particular kind of freedom is actually an inseparable part of Muslims' culture. 
It is reported by Alkurtubi that in the battle of Badr, when the Prophet, peace be upon 
him, camped with the Muslim army at a well among the wells of Badr and they were 
about to settle down, Alhabbab bin Almundhir, one of the comPanions asked: "0 
Messenger ofA llah, this place ive settled in, is it a place Allah commanded us to camp 
in whereby we cannot leave it? Or is it your idea of war strategy and tactics? " The 
Messenger replied, "It is my own idea of war strategy and tactics. " He replied, "0 
Messenger of Allah, this is not a suitable place. Let us move to the well nearest to our 
enemy and settle down there while we cover ip all the wells behind its with sand and 
palm trunks. We then should build on it a trough andfill it with our drinking water and 
they will not have any to drink. " The Messenger liked the idea; he moved to the lower 
side with the city of Madinah, according to the suggestion of the companion. 454 
The interesting point we can make from this event is that the companion expressed his 
opinion or, even, his objection to the decision taken by the Prophet without even being 
asked or consulted. This indicates that Muslims can indeed raise their voices against a 
decision of the government if they think it is inappropriate, especially in a matter that is 
not of a religious nature. If freedom of speech was not guaranteed in Islam, this 
454 Alkurtubi, op. cit., Part, 7, pp. 374-375 
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companion would not have had the courage to question publicly the Prophet's decision 
and suggest a contradictory one. Consistent with this, Abu Bakr said on his installation 
as the first Caliph, 
"... Now, it is beyond doubt that 1 have been elected your Amir, although I am no 
better than you. Help me ifI am in the right; set me right if I an? in the wrong. Truth 
is a trust; falsehood is a treason. The weak among you shall be strong with me till 
God willing his rights have been vindicated, and the strong among you shall be weak 
with me till, if the Lord will, I have taken what is duefroin him. Obey me as long as I 
obey Allah and His Proph et. When I disobey Him and His Prophet, then obey me 
not. 055 
This was a clear declaration of the Islamic values of justice and fairness that were 
revealed to mankind through the prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, centuries 
ago. Abu Bakr was the man closest to the Prophet and the best able to implement the 
rules of Islam after the prophet. Therefore, in this declaration, he asserted the Islamic 
recognition of the significant role of public opinion in correcting the misconduct of 
government, urging people to raise their voice against wrongdoing. Umar also 
confirmed this point when he took over the responsibility and suggested, in the course 
of addressing the Muslims that "If Ifolloiv the right path, folloiv me. If I deviate fron? 
the right path, correct ine so that ive are not led astray. " Thereupon a man rose up and 
said, " When you wil? /ully deviate ftom the truth, ive will withdraw our allegiance to you 
and Ifor one wouldJeel it my ditty to correct you with my sivord 11456 
455 Cited in Ibn Hesham, A., Asseerah Annabtnviyyah le Ibn Hesham, Part 6, (in Arabic), Beirut: Dar Al- 
Jeel, 1411 (Islamic calendar), p. 82. See AI-Halabi, A., Asseerah Alhalabiyyahfi Seeral, 41-Anieen Al- 
Ma'Moon, Part 3, (in Arabic), Beirut: Dar Alm'arefah, 1400 (Islamic calendar), p. 483, See Attabary, M., 
Tareekh Ahimain iva Ainnilok, Part 2, (in Arabic), Beirut: Dar Alkutob Al'almiyyah, 1407 (Islamic 
calendar), p. 238, See Ibn Katheer, A., Albedayah iva Annehayah, Part 5, (in Arabic), Beirut: Maktabat 
Alm'aaref, p. 248 
456 Al-Qaradawi, Y., op. cit., 1983, p. 62 
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111.5.2.2. Judicial Accountability 
While the discussion above may demonstrate the accountability of the Islamic 
govenunent before the people, this section will be devoted to showing the 
accountability of the Islamic government before the court and hence the subjection of 
the Islamic state's authorities to the rule of law. According to the Islamic judicial 
practices in the early age of the Islamic state, Islam seems to recognize no judicial 
tribunals, no assembly of judges and no juries. 457 A single judge, chosen by the Caliph, 
usually sits to resolve the dispute. 458 However, the judge in Islam was accorded a 
powerful authority to the extent he was able to question the Caliph himself. In the 
following paragraphs, some events that occurred at the time of the companions' 
governance will be cited to demonstrate the accountability of the leader before the 
judiciary. 
In a striking event, Ali bin Abitalib, after he had been installed as the third Caliph of the 
Islamic state, found in the market his lost war shield in the possession of a Jew who was 
trying to sell it. Ali said to the Jew, "This is iny shield'. The Jew denied Ali's claim and 
as a result the issue was referred to the justice Shuraih, one of the well known judges in 
Islamic history, who requested Ali to prove his claim. Ali brought his son Hassan and 
457 Zubaida, S., Lmv and Power in the Islandc World, London: I. B. Tauris, 2003, p. 44 
458AI-Mawardi reported that some jurists even reject the jurisdiction of two judges in the same places over 
same matters. See Al-Mawardi, op. cit., p. 90 According to Al-Mawardi book (Alahkarn Assultanyyah) 
there are different types of court have been recognized in the Islamic history. The Islamic judicial 
authority can be subcategorized into six types according to the subject of the case and the place in which 
the case was brought. The first type of court is a court that has unlimited jurisdiction over all kinds of 
subject, like all types of criminal cases and of commercial cases, but limited in certain place or region in 
the Islamic state. Second, a court that is not limited in place but limited in the type of subject it is able to 
examine. This court have the jurisdiction over the whole regions and places of Islamic state that is 
governed by the Caliph but limited to some cases that may be related to the application of hudud or 
contract law or inheritance or family law... etc. Third, a court that has unlimited jurisdiction over the 
whole places and regions in the Islamic state and has also unlimited jurisdiction over all types of matters. 
Fourth, a court that is limited to certain matters and also limited to certain place or region of the Islamic 
state. Fifth, a court that is related to a certain dispute and this court finish ones the dispute is settled, and a 
court which can be fori-ned for a certain time in response to certain circumstances. See AI-Mawardi, 
op. cit., pp. 81-93. See for details of these categories Al Sheik, A., Lainahat Hoid Alqadaa'fi Abnandakah 
Alarabyyah Assaudiyyah, (in Arabic), Second Edition, 1421 (Islamic calendar)., pp. 54-59 
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his servant Qambar because they were the only witnesses who knew about Ali's 
belongings. However, Justice Shuraih rejected Ali's claim because in Islam, the son 
cannot be relied on as a proper witness for his father and he judged accordingly in 
favour of the Jew's claim. 459 
One might suggest that Ali, in acting in this manner, was not acting on behalf of the 
government and the subject of dispute was not of public concern, rather was of 
interpersonal relationship, which is irrelevant to the subject under discussion. However, 
it must be borne in mind that the government at that time was not as sophisticated as it 
is in the present, and therefore it might be true to say that the acceptance of the idea that 
the head of the Islamic state was sued before the court and judged guilty is itself an 
indication of the Islamic inclination to recognise the modem principle of the 
government judicial accountability, even if the matter examined in the court was not of 
a public or administrative nature. The system of government judicial accountability may 
have not been created to monitor the leader's personal conduct, but rather to monitor the 
authority of the state institutions, since the state is now structured by institutions and not 
individuals. However, as the concept of the state itself was under development at that 
time and the state of institutions was not properly recognised, then bringing suit against 
the leader, the most powerful individual (the sovereign institution in the current term), is 
a powerful sign of the independence of the judiciary and the implementation of the 
principle of the rule of law. If that was recognised in Islamic jurisprudence at that time, 
then, if the same concept is applied in the present Islamic political system, the 
government of the day, which is the institution, will undoubtedly be accountable to the 
court. 
459 Aliodi, S., Madanzeen Alqadaa'Albadaivi Qabl Al'ahd Assaudi, (in Arabic), Attaif. Dar Alharithy Le- 
itteba'ah wa. Annashr, 199 1, p. 213 
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There are, however, events that can be cited here, not to assert the scope of the 
governors' interpersonal relationship but the scope of their political authority and their 
subjection to the rule of law. It might suffice to take just one event for the purpose of 
illustration. 
It is reported that an Egyptian man had been beaten and imprisoned without trial under 
the authority of 'Amr bin Al-'Aas, the govemor of Egypt. The Egyptian man came to 
the Caliph Umar to raise his complaint and enquire whether a Governor could, on his 
own account, beat a Muslim. Umar called upon the governor 'Amr to inquire into the 
truth behind this. 'Amr said that he had beaten the man to enforce discipline. Umar 
replied with anger that unless the man had been judicially tried and found guilty, no 
punishment could be inflicted on him. Umar told the complainant that as 'Amr had 
beaten him without authority, he could strike him with a similar number of lashes, to 
vindicate himself. 460 
Although this does seem to indicate the subjection of the Islamic state authorities to the 
rule of law, it can be argued that this also indicates the concentration of the powers in 
the hand of the Caliph. Islam does not seem to recognise divisions between the state's 
authorities. The Caliph is the head of the government as well as the head of the judicial 
system and hence he possesses final judicial and legislative powers in addition to his 
executive authority. According to the Islamic concentration of powers, Judges in Islam 
do not seem to be occupying a normal public office but rather they seem to be sharing 
with the Caliph the state powers. Judges possess their position, according to the Islamic 
fiqh, through delegation not through appointment and hence Judges are practising their 
job as a deputy of the Caliph . 
46 1 However, the death or removal of the Caliph (the 
governor), as mentioned earlier, does not affect the position of the judges. That is 
460 Ibid., p. 213 
461 See Al-Mawardi, op. cit., pp. 81-93 
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because; the removal of judges as a result of the removal or death of the Caliph would 
disturb the people's interests in the disputes that were brought before the judges under 
462 the governance of the previous Caliph . In addition, although the judges are chosen by 
the Caliph, the powers they both share, the Caliph and the judges, originally come, as 
mentioned earlier, from the people; the actual continuing source of powers. 463 
However, this Islamic recognition of concentration of powers would give the Caliph 
unrestrained power and in such an authoritarian regime, it has been argued, no human 
rights can be implemented. 464 It is indeed a valid argument and there is, indeed, no clear 
recognition of the principle of separation of powers in the traditional Islamic 
jurisprudence. However, the majority of modem scholars seem to be inclined to take the 
principle of separation of powers as the basis for the modem Islamic state . 
465 Their 
assertion is that although the traditional fiqh did not recognise the principle, it did not 
seem to reject it. 466 The companions' genuine piety and sincerity enabled them to 
manage their people justly, but the injustice of the present time seems to press the need 
for division between the state authorities. 
We must realize, however, that Umar and Ali were not merely political leaders, but they 
have been widely recognised as the founders of Islamic jurisprudence. Their role at that 
time was not only to declare the law, but also to establish principles of inference and 
construction. They formulated rules accordingly, explaining to Muslims how the 
principles of Islam must be implemented. Hence, it might be true to say that Umar and 
462 see Al Sheik, A., op. cit, pp. 33-34 
463 AlKhayyad, A., op. cit., p., 73, See also An-Nadi, F., op. cit., pp. 285-286 
464 An-Na'im, A. A., "A Modem Approach to Human Rights in Islam: Foundations and Implications for 
Africa", In: Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Ronald 1. Meltzer, op. cit., p. 81 
465 See Ashawi, T., op. ciL, pp. 620-622, See Mutwalli, A., op. cit., p. 238, See Al-Qadi, A., op. cit., pp. 
636-640, See Alghamdi, N., Aliqlesas Alqadaýfi AUiqh Al-Island, (in Arabic), Riyadh: Maktabat Ar- 
Rushd, 2000, pp. 79-101, 
466 Mutwalli, A., op. cit., p. 238 
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Ali were teaching Muslims how the public body in Islain is politically and judicially 
responsible for their conduct. They were not showing their righteous personality; rather, 
they were laying down Islamic rules that bind all Islamic leaders, no matter what their 
personality might be, righteous or unrighteous. Consistent with this view, Umar 
reportedly said to a man, in examining the judicial decision made by some judges in his 
case, "If I ivas the judge, I would make a different judgment. " The man wondered why 
Umar did not apply his opinion, since he was the one who was in charge as a ruler. 
Umar replied that this was only his own opinion and he was not able to refer it to the 
Quran and Sunna, implying that the ruler cannot interfere with the freedom of the 
judge's reasoning without a clear basis in the Islamic divine sources, the Quran and 
Sunna . 
467 Moreover, Umar's letter to his judge Abu Musa Al-Ash'aary, the judge of 41- 
Basra, has been considered by Muslim jurists as establishing the main principles of the 
judicial system in Islamicfiqh, which all judges must bear in mind in the judicial 
exercise. 468 Thus, Umar and also Ali were considered by Muslim jurists not only as 
leaders but also as founders of the Islamic Fiqh and hence the concentration of powers 
in the hand of the companions should not be taken as a principle that must be followed 
by the leaders of a later age, as the leaders of the later age are not considered in the 
position of the companions. 
111.5.3. The Extent of the Islamic Respect for the Individual Rights 
It might be right to say that in demonstrating the Islamic system's recognition of the 
principle of representativeness and government accountability to the public and to the 
court, we might indicate, at the same time, the Islamic recognition of the political 
individual rights. It might represent the Islamic recognition of the right to vote, the right 
467 Ibn Al-Qayyem, A-'alani Alminvaqqideen, (in Arabic), Part 1, p. 65 
468 Ibid., p. 85, for the English summary of the content of the Uniar's letter See Al-Marzouqi, 1. A., op cit., 
p. 358 
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to participate in public affairs, the right to form a political party, freedom of speech, the 
right to free association, and above all, the subjection of the state authorities to the rule 
of law. However, a question arises, to what extent are human rights respected in Islam if 
they were put before religion? It has been argued that Islam is in clear violation of the 
international right of equality and non-discrimination, and may even be in conflict with 
the freedom of beliCE469 In the following paragraphs, therefore, we will deal with these 
issues separately in more details. 
111.5.3.1. Islam and the Right to Equality and Non-Discrimination 
The rights to equality and non-discrimination are heavily emphasized in the 
international human rights discourse and have been regarded by some authors as the 
starting point of all other liberties. 470 The ICCPR has clearly stressed this point in 
Article 2 (1) which prohibits any discrimination on ground of race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status. In effect, the wording of this Article is read into each of the ICCPR 
Articles, in the sense that the state must not discriminate in the implementation of the 
covenant rights on grounds prohibited in the Article 2 (1). 47 1 Article 26 has also 
confinned that all persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination on a ground prohibited by Article 2(l) to the equal protection of the law. 
The principle of equality and non-discrimination has also been emphasised in Article 2 
(2) of the ICESCR, which guarantees the enjoyment of the rights recognized in the 
469 Mayer, A. E., op. cit., 1999, pp. 85,149 
470 Cited in Baderin, M., op. cit., p. 58 
47 'Harris, D., "The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the United Kingdom Law: An 
Introduction' ', In: Harris, D., Joseph, S., (eds. ), The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and United Kingdom Laiv, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 4 
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covenant without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
The core element of human rights discourse is that human rights inhere in every human 
being by virtue of their humanity and hence they must be enjoyed by every individual to 
an equal extent. 472 As a result, many other important legal instruments have evolved to 
eliminate certain types of discrimination, such as the UN Convention on the Elimination 
of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and the UN Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). 
Islam is seen in conflict with such a substantial principle of Non-Discrimination since it 
differentiates on the ground of religion between Muslims and non-Muslims. It also 
distinguishes between men and women in the enjoyment of some of the international 
rights. It has been said that a person's rights and obligations, in Islamic law, depend on 
his or her status and, as a result, women do not have the same rights as men, nor do non- 
Muslims have the same rights as Muslims. 473 The Islamic rules of inheritance are also 
seen as incompatible with the international principle of equality and non-discrimination. 
Muslim doctrine does not allow a non-Muslim to inherit from a Muslim and even 
between Muslims themselves, the rules are different, since a woman inherits half as 
much as a man. 
474 
472 Craven, M. C. R., The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: A 
Perspective on Its Development, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 153 
473 Brems, E., op. cit., p. 213 
474 Mayer, A. E., op. cit., 1999, p. III 
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111.5.3.1.1. Islam and Non-Muslims' Rights 
It has been argued that Muslims in the Islamic state are the only full citizens, enjoying 
the full rights guaranteed by the Islamic Shariah, subject to some limitations to some 
degree in respect of Muslim women. For non-Muslims, although they are inhabitants of 
the Islamic state, their rights are confined to the practice of their religion and conducting 
their private affairs according to their own custom. 475 In exchange for providing security 
of persons and property, non-Muslims must pay jizyah (tax) and submit to Muslim 
sovereignty in public affairs. 476 Moreover, it has been argued that marriage between a 
Muslim man and a non-Muslim woman, in particular "people of the Book" (Christians 
and Jews) is permitted, while marriage between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim 
man is prohibited, even if he is a Christian or Jew. 
Muslim jurists, however, argue that the claim that Islamic rules are contrary to the 
principle of equality and non-discrimination is, for the most part, based on confusion 
between the concept of the nation state and the concept of the Islamic state. Al- 
Qaradawi observes, in respect of the burden on non-Muslims to payjizyah, that the state 
in Islam is a state of belief, in the sense that it is established to preserve the belief and 
principles of Islam, and therefore it cannot be assumed that non-Muslim people will 
defend principles to which they do not subscribe. 477 As a result, those non-Muslims are 
given the chance to participate in the defence of the state they live in through financial 
support, which is calledjizyah, instead of with their blood. However, if any of the non- 
Muslims is willing to participate physically in a war to defend the Islamic state and its 
475 An-Naim's view cited in Steiner, H., and Alston, P., op. cit., 2000, p. 392 
476 Ibid., p. 392 
477 Al-Qaradawi, Y., Ghair Almuslimeen fi Almz4fani'a AI-Islami, (in Arabic), Beirut: Mua'ssasat 
Arresalah, 1983, p. 33 
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principles, he will not be liable to pay the jizyah . 
478 Al-Qaradawi also asserts that the 
enforcement ofjizyah on non-Muslims is in itself adherence to the principle of equality, 
in that it gives to non-Muslims the chance to participate in founding the public service 
and state facilities side by side with Muslims who have been required to do so through 
zakat (Islamic tax). 479 
Umarah has also observed that in the permission of marriage between a Muslim man 
and a non-Muslim woman, there is a clear Islamic recognition of the other's faith. That 
is to say, instead of being reluctant to accept the existence of the other's faith and 
values, Islam preserves the right for others to differ and obliges Muslims to respect that, 
to the extent that it even allows those of the other belief to be mothers and grandmothers 
of Muslims. 480 The Islamic rule that a Muslim woman is not permitted to marry a non- 
Muslim, such as a Christian or Jew, while a Muslim man, by contrast, can marry a non- 
Muslim, is not because she is a woman and he is a man, but it is believed to be another 
way of preserving the religion, which is the main objective of the Islamic state ideology. 
That is to say, Islam does not only prevent women from marrying non-Muslim men but 
also prevents men from marrying pagan women, and if this was discrimination as to 
sex, then it would make no difference whether a man marries a woman who believes in 
God or one who does not. 481 Moreover, It has been argued that the woman is the weaker 
person in the marriage relationship and because of her sentimental character that always 
admires her husband and his attitude, her religion and belief might be affected, which 
479 See Umarah, M., Al-Islain iva A1-Aqa11iyyat: Aln=6ýý Alhader iva Al-Mustaqbal, (in Arabic), Cairo: 
Maktabat Ashuroq Addawliyyah, 2003, p. 15 
479This connection between jizyah and zakat has long been recognised by the Islamic fiqh, especially 
Maliky school in their method of teaching that teaches the rules offizyah (tax on non-Muslim) in the 
book that teaches the rules of zakat (tax on Muslims). See Al-Qaradawi, Y, op. cit., 1983, p. 34 480 Umarah, M., op. cit., p. 18 
481 Mawlana Jamal Al-Lail, T., Hziqoq Alensan ft At-Islani, (in Arabic), the Thirteenýh session of the 
Islamic Organization Conference, p. 53 
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would ultimately affect their children too. 482 This would likely increases division rather 
than unity in the Islamic society that is governed by Islamic rules. 
It may not also be a discrimination against non-Muslims as to religion because if there 
was discrimination on the basis of religion, a Muslim man would not be able to marry a 
non-Muslim woman (Christian or Jewish). 
This differentiation in the treatment between Muslims and non-Muslims seems to be 
due to the Islamic concept of state, which is based on the preservation of the religion of 
Islam and not on ethnological or linguistic grounds. The principles and rules of Islamic 
law are entirely based on a religious criterion and, as a result, are designed to govem 
relations between Muslims and non-Muslims, regardless of all other criteria which are 
taken into account by the relevant principles of the international doctrine of human 
rights. In other words, whereas the international conception of human rights is based 
upon the concept that human rights inhere in the human being by virtue of being human 
and hence he or she must not be discriminated against on the grounds of religion, race, 
sex, or colour, the Islamic conception of human rights is entirely based on the belief that 
God and God alone is a law giver and the source of human rights, conferring them on 
all mankind through the religion of Islam. Therefore, Islamic law divides people into 
Muslims and non-Muslims, treating the former differently than the latter. The different 
treatment does not necessarily mean that Islam treats non-Muslims in a degrading 
way. 483 The relationship in Islamic states between Muslims and non-Muslim inhabitants 
is similar to the relationship in secular states between nationals and foreigners who live 
in Islamic territories. So, the distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims is merely 
one of political administration, and not of human rights. Muslims and non-Muslims are 
482 Ibid., pp. 52-53 
483 See Al-Qaradawi, Y., op. cit., 1983, pp. 43-54 
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equal before the law. Indeed, a number of Quranic verses 484 and Surma wam Muslims 
against any high handedness towards Dhinunis (non-Muslims). The Prophet is reported 
to have said, among other Hadiths conveying the same message: "Whoever hurts a 
Dhimmi, I shall be his complainant and whosoever I am a complainant, I shall askfor 
his right on the Day ofResurrection". 485 
Thus, the non-Muslims were permitted in the traditional Islamic fzqh to join public 
office and participate in managing political polity of the Islamic state. The majority of 
Islamic fiqh have permitted non-Muslims to hold political responsibility, to the extent 
that non-Muslims at the time of the Caliph Haroon Arrasheed were even allowed to be 
Ministers in the executive affairs. 486 The restriction on non-Muslims in respect of their 
participation in the public life of the Islamic community may be confined in that they 
cannot take the presidency. That is because, first they are in the minority in the Islamic 
societies and second, as the Islamic state is based on the Islamic belief, it is 
inappropriate for Muslims to give the presidency of the Islamic state to people who may 
believe that Islam is wrong. It might be inappropriate for the non-Muslims themselves 
to be put in a position where they must defend a principle they may believe is wrong. 
The same applies to whether non-Muslims can be judges in affairs exclusive to 
Muslims. How can Islamic rules in Islamic disputes be applied by a non-Muslim Judge 
who does not believe in them, especially where qualified Muslims are available? 487 
484 Q60: 8-9 and Q29: 46. 
415 Cited in Al-Qaradawi's opinion in his response to the question of the treatment of non-Muslims, 
Available online at liUI2: Hislamonline. net/servlet/Satellite? paý,, ename=lslamOnline-Arabic- 
Ask Scholar/FatwaA/FatwaA&cid=l 122528601326 
416 Mut%valli, A., Ashareeah 414slamyyah ka Masdar 4sasi Leddustoor, (in Arabic), Third Edition, 
Alexandria: Alm'aaref , 1990, pp. 92-93 487 See Al-Qaradawi, Y., op. cit., 1983, p. 23 
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In fact, these matters are not conceived by most Islamic scholars, especially Sunni 
scholars, to be matters of belief and worship, Ibadat, but mainly concerned with the 
management of life, which is called 'Adat. Hence, they fall in the realm of human logic 
and are governed by the necessities of the realities that change from time to time. 488 
Therefore, the application of these rules seems to fall in the realm of the doctrine of 
Siyasah Shariyyah, which is based, as discussed above, on the criterion of preserving 
Islam and which forms a legitimate way to change. Although the Islamic military, for 
example, could not be led by non-Muslims at the time when the main principle 
governing international relations was power and war, it might be acceptable in the 
present day, when openness and solidarity between cultures is the dominant theme. 
111.5.3.1.2. Islam and Women's Rights 
Women's status has been heavily emphasised in the human rights discourse and given 
special attention by states, to the extent of adoption of a separate and independent 
convention on the rights of women. The adoption of The Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in 1979 clearly indicates the state's 
recognition of the necessity to set up an agenda for national action to end any kind of 
discrimination against woman. 489 Traditional Islamic approach to human rights has been 
accused by some authors, like Meyer for example, of being one of the main obstacles to 
the full realization of the international rights of women. 490 
However, Islam, by close examination, has many values that liberate women from men's 
repression and has given them clear social and economic independence. In fact, at the 
time when the world was debating whether or not women are human beings, the 
488Abdulkhaliq, F., op. cit., p. 162 
489 See the website of the division for the advancement of women in 
http: //%v%v%v. un. org/Nvomenwatch/daNv/ceda%v/ 
490 See Mayer, A. E., op. cit., 1999, pp. 97-130 
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traditional Muslim jurists in the Muslim world were discussing who are better, humans 
(both men and women) or the angels of God. 491 Ibn Katheer even reported that Adam, 
the father of mankind, was created from clay, before entering paradise, while Eve, the 
mother of mankind, was created from a living thing, from Adam, and inside paradise, in 
order to house Adam and to bring ease to him. 492 If this does not indicate a preferable 
position of woman to man, it would, surely, not indicate the reverse. Muslim jurists 
suggest that man and woman were created from a single SOU1493 to enjoy the pleasures of 
life on an equal footing, and have been described in the Holy Quran as God's deputies 
who are given power over all kinds of God's creatures, to build life on earth . 
494 All of 
this seems to have been put aside by many human rights authors. Mayer, for example, 
sees in the traditional Islamic approach an absence of any willingness to recognize 
women as fully equal human beings who deserve the same rights and freedoms as 
men. 495 Many parts of Mayer's writings seem to have shifted the attention to work on 
some narrow domain that is more connected with anthropological, cultural and social 
issues, like polygamy, divorce, and the way women should look, and which does not 
seem to be relevant to curbing government power, a point that she refers to in 
discrediting some Islamic rights. 496 Mayer refuses to recognize women's right to 
chastity as a human right and asserts that human rights are concerned with curbing 
491 See the debate of the medieval Muslim jurists over this subject in Alkurtubi, op. cit., Part, 1, p. 289. 
See Ibn Taymiyah, A., op. cit., 1403 (Islamic calendar), p. 350 
492 Ibn Katheer, op. cit., Part 1, p. 80 
493 "He if is Who created youfrom a single being, and of the same (kind) did He make his mate, that he 
might incline to her; so when he covers her she bears a light burden, then moves about with it, bill when 
it grows heavy, they both call upon Allah, their Lord. If Thou givest its a good one, we shall certainly be 
ofthe grateful ones. " Al-Araf 7: 189 
494 "And when your Lord said to the angels, I am going to place in the earth a khalif, they said: What! will 
Thou place in it such as shall make mischief in it and shed blood, and ive celebrate Thy praise and extol 
Thy holiness? He said: Surely I know what you do not know. " Al-Baqara 2: 30 and in another verse God 
says "And when We said to the angels: Make obeisance to A dain they did obeisance, but Iblis (did it not). 
He refused and he was proud, and he was one ofthe unbelievers. " Al-Baqara 2: 34 
493 Mayer, A. E., op. cit., 1999, p. 123 
496 Mayer asserts that "The Islamic "right" does not appear to be directed against state policy, only 
against the criminal. " See Ibid., p. 61 
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government authority, not womeWs chastity, 497 while she seems to be inclined to 
recognize nude pictures, emotionally erotic dances, and the use of contraceptives as 
human rights. 
498 
However, there are some serious issues that are of clear relevance to human rights that 
need to be tackled and the Islamic stance on them made clear, such as the inheritance 
right and the right of woman to participate in political affairs. 
111.5.3.1.2.1. The Inheritance Right 
The HRC general comment No. 18 on non-discrimination has defined the term 
discrimination as to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is 
based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 499 However, the 
committee has observed in paragraph 13 that not all differentiation of treatment will 
constitute discrimination, and affirmed that if the differentiation is reasonable and 
objective, it might not be considered illegitimate under the Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights. 500 The question that will be tackled here is whether Islamic rules of 
inheritance are justified as reasonably objective or they are based on discriminatory 
element that requires the abhorrent distinction in treatment according to sex. 
The principles of Islamic teachings show that the double share of the male does not 
seem to apply to all cases. Sometimes a woman's share in the inheritance is equal to that 
of a man. For example, when two parents inherit from their children, the Islamic rules 
497 Ibid., p. 61 499 Ibid., p. 104 
499 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18: Non-discrimination 10/11/89, Paragraph 7, 
Available Online at 
http: //www. unhchr. ch/tbs/doc. nsf/(Symbol)/3888bO54 I f*8501c9cl 2563ed004b8dOeMpendocument 
500 Ibid., paragraph 13 
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assign a sixth share of inheritance to each, if the deceased left children. 501 The reason in 
this case is that the parents' needs are often similar. 502 Another example can be found in 
the case of siblings. The Quran establishes clearly that " If the man or woman whose 
inheritance is in question, has left neither ascendants nor descendants, but has left a 
hrother or a sister, each one of the two gets a sixth; but if more than two, they share in 
a third; after payment of legacies and debts, so that no loss is caused (to anyone)". 503 
Thus, the sister gets a sixth, which is the same as the brother by the same mother. If 
there are more than two siblings, they inherit a third, to be distributed equally among 
them. 
504 
Moreover, Sheikh Al-Qaradawi asserts that there are cases in which the female gets a 
bigger share than the male. For example, if a woman dies leaving a husband, mother 
and two brothers and one sister by her mother, the sister alone gets a sixth; whereas only 
one sixth is given to the two brothers. He also gives another example by saying that 'if a 
woman dies leaving a husband, a full sister and a brother by her father, the husband gets 
half the inheritance and the sister the other half, whereas the half-brother gets nothing, 
being merely an agnate. But if the half sibling is a sister and not a brother, she gets a 
505 
sixth, as sustenance'. 
This clearly indicates that the Islamic differentiation in inheritance is not based on sex. 
501AIlah says that "For parents, a sixth share of the inheritance to each if the deceased left children... " 
An-Nessa 4: 11 
502 See Al-Qaradawi, The Status Of Women In Islam, Available Online at http: //wývw. witness- 
pioneer. orgLvil/Books/-0 WI/misconception. htm4lnheritance 503 An-Nessa 4: 12 
504 Al-Qaradawi, Y., 0P. Cit., http: //www. witness- 
pi, oneer. org/viVBooks/Q_Wl/misconception. htmglnheritance 
0 Ibid., Available Online at http: //www. witness- 
pioneer. org g/vil/BooksLQ Wi/misconcet)tion. htmfllnheritance. See also Al-Hassan, y., "Alhewar Alwatani 
houl Huqoq Alensan fi Dawlat Al-Emarat: tumooh mashroo'a fi waqe'a wa'aed, In: AI-Emaraf 
Alarabjyah Alnumahedah iva Huqoq Alensan, (in Arabic), First Edition, Sharjah: Markaz Al-Emarat Le- 
Albehooth Al-Enmai'yyah wa Al-Estrateejyyah, 1999, p. 164 
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If it was so, the male would always be the superior and the female would never have an 
equal or bigger share. The criteria on which the Islamic differentiation is based seem to 
be divided into three reasons. The first is the level of relationship between the heir and 
the legator. The rule governing the distribution of the inheritance is that the closer 
relative to the deceased has priority over the more distant. This is illustrated by the fact 
that if a grandfather died, his children are the only inheritors and the deceased's 
grandchildren are excluded, because the former are deemed to be first degree relatives 
to the deceased, while the latter are believed to be second degree relatives. 506 Second, 
age seems to be another important element, that is to say, aging people take smaller 
shares than younger ones. That is illustrated by the fact that a daughter's share in her 
father's inheritance is more than that of her grandfather, although both are deemed to be 
relatives of same degree. Third, the differentiation of Islamic inheritance rules seems to 
take the overall structure of the family into consideration, in that the male in Islam is 
always the bearer of the financial responsibility and hence he is awarded the bigger 
share in certain cases. The claim that the family structure has now changed and women 
have now become breadwinners of the new type of nuclear family 507 does not change 
the Islamic rules that the husband is the one who must always bear the family's expenses 
and, hence, within this context, the male is deemed to have bigger share in the 
inheritance than that awarded to a female. 508 Accordingly, the Islamic differentiation 
between men and women in inheritance does not seem to be based on discriminatory 
element but rather seems to be reasonably objective and hence not in inconsistence with 
the international rights of non-discrimination against women. In fact, the Prophet 
himself, peace be upon him, warned parents, regarding spending on their children, 
506 Al-Qaradawi, Y., Fatmva Mitaaserah, (in Arabic), First Part, Available Online at 
http: //iv%v%v. qaradaNvi. nettsite/topics/ýrticle. asp? cu-no=2&item-no=358&version=l&template_id=8&par 
ent id=12 
507 Cited in Baderin, M., op. cit., p. 147 
50'Masseekah, F., Httqoq Almarah bayn Ashard AI-Islami wa Ashir'ah Al-Aalanzyyah le Huqoq 
Alensan, (in Arabic), Beirut: Mua'ssasat Alm'aaref, 1992, pp. 144-150 
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against differentiating between them according to sex and said, "Equalize betiveen your 
children in your spending. If I was to prefer between male andjemale I would prefer 
female. "509 
111.5.3.1.2.2. Women's Participation in Public Affairs 
Women's rights to participate in political affairs, particularly the right to vote, and to 
hold public. office, have long been debated in the Islamic fiqh and two arguments have 
resulted. While a number of medieval scholars, and some modem ones, seem to deny 
any such rights for women, most modem Muslim jurists seem to uphold almost all 
women's political rights recognized in the international instnunents. These two 
arguments will be discussed in more details in the following paragraphs. 
111.5.3.1.2.2.1. The Opponents of Women's Political Rights 
The opponents of women's political rights cite, to support their argument, verses of the 
Holy Quran and the Prophet's traditions. They cite verse 34 of chapter 4 of the Holy 
Quran which says, "Men are the protectors and maintainers of ivomen... " and also 
chapter 2 verse 228 which suggests that men have a degree (of advantage) over them. 510 
They claim that if God differentiated between men and women in many private issues 
that relate to family affairs, like divorce for example, which seems to be exclusive to 
men, why is it not the case in respect of public affairs? They further argue that it might 
be more pressing to prevent women from participation in matters of a public nature 
since they are not recognized to be as qualified as men, even in managing issues of a 
509AI-Asgalani, A., op. cit., Part 5, p. 214, See also Assan'aani, M., Sztbzd, 4ssalam Sharh Bithigh Almaram 
min Adellat Alahkam, (in Arabic), Part 3, Fourth Edition, Beirut: Dar Ihya Atturath Al-Arabi, 1379 
(Islamic calendar), p. 89 
510 Allah says "And women shall have rights similar to the rights against them, according to what is 
equitable; but men have a degree (ofadvantage) over them. " Chapter 2: 228 
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family nature . 
51 1 They also cite verse 33 of chapter 33, which was targeting the 
Prophefs wives, and states, "And stays quietly in your houses, and make not a dazzling 
display... " They suggest that if the wives of the Prophet were ordered to stay at home, 
then ordinary women should have no better position. 512 They further suggest that the 
Prophet himself reportedly said that there is "No good in a nation that is governed by a 
ivoinan"513 , which clearly denies any right of women to hold a public office, particularly 
the presidency. 
111.5.3.1.2.2.2. The Proponents of Women's Political Rights 
Nevertheless, modem jurists oppose such a reading of the holy text of the Quran and the 
sayings of the Prophet and suggest that there is no evidence as clear as that which 
underlines the equality between men and women. 514 They argue that Allah states in the 
verse 71 of chapter 9 that "The Believers, men and women, are protectors, one of 
another: they enjoin what is just, and forbid what is evil... " In this verse, Allah has 
clearly called upon both men and women to enjoin what is just and forbid what is evil, 
which is mainly a political task, mostly concerned with the legislative process. 515 The 
differentiation between men and women is an exception from the general rule of 
equality and that exception, they suggest, is solely designed for family affairs. The 
general rule in Islam is that in the case of exception, the process of analogy does not 
work, in the sense that the exceptional case does not extend to any other case that differs 
in nature. 516 Verse 34 of chapter 4 and verse 228 of chapter 2 which seem to give 
51' Cited in Mutwalli, A., op. cit., 1978, pp. 418-419 
. 512Cited in Ibid., p. 419 
513 Al-Bukhary, M., op. cit., Part 4,1987, p. 16 10 
514 Mutwalli, A., op. cit., 1978, pp. 422-463, See Al-Qaradawi, Y., op. cit., 1997, pp. 161-176, See Al- 
Qaradawi, Y., op. cit., 1983, pp. 4749, See At-Abdulkhaliq, F., op. cit., 1998, pp. 213-237, See 
Almansoor, M. A. S., op. cit., p. 121, See Assaleh, S., Annuzom Al-Islamyyah Nasha'leha lva 
Taddivoreha, (in Arabic), Beirut: Dar Al'alm Limalayeen, 1982, pp. 441462 
313AI-Qarada%vi, Y., op. cit., 1983,49 
516 Mutwalli, A., op. cit., 1978, p. 427 
147 
Chapter Three: Islam, Human Rights, and Democracy 
preference to men over women are actually related only to the management of family 
affairs and this rule cannot extend to other issues, especially if there is no other evidence 
to support it. The advantage of men over women with regard to family affairs is only 
because the husband under the Islamic rules is obliged to spend on his wife and 
children, even if his wife is much wealthier, and as a result, the husband is accorded 
some control in return for this responsibility. 517 In other words, apart from the family 
realm, there is no evidence that prohibits women from having control over men. 518 In 
Islamicfiqh, women can be financial trustees of underage and disabled people, and can 
also be procurators in the financial management of any group of people. 519 Therefore, as 
the political rights are mainly concerned with either entrusting somebody or being a 
trustee to represent somebody, then there does not seem to be any valid objection to 
women's right to vote and to nominate themselves for public office, since women are 
eligible to enter into any kind of contract. 520 
In respect of verse 33 of chapter 33, this verse was talking about the wives of the 
Prophet and it is well known to the Muslim jurists that the rules that governed the wives 
of the Prophet are of a special nature and hence cannot be taken to govem ordinary 
women without the support of other evidence. 52 1 Allah clearly says, "0 Consorts of the 
Prophet! ye are not like any ofthe (other) ivonien... , 522 
The question of whether a woman can be a judge has, in particular, been a matter of 
strong debate between Muslim jurists. Although the majority of traditional Muslim 
scholars seem to consider women ineligible to take such a position, there have always 
5: 7 Ibid., p. 424 
5a Al-Qaradawi, Y., op. cit., 1997,165 
519 Mutwalli, A., op. cit., 1978, p. 425 
320 ]bid., p. 425 
52'AI-Qaradawi, Y., op. cit., 1997,163 
522 Al-Ahzab, 33: 32 
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been views to the contrary, suggesting the ability of women to be judges, especially in 
matters on which they are entitled to give testimony. 523 However, the proponents of 
womerfs political rights seem in dispute over whether or not woman can be a president 
of the whole Islamic state. 
IH. 5.3.2. Islam and the Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion 
The freedom of thought, conscience, and religion has been stated in Article 18 of the 
UDHR which says that "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includesfteedom to change his religion or belief, andfreedoin, either 
alone or in community... " The wording of this article has not been without dispute, 
especially by Muslim countries, and although the matter was resolved during the 
drafting of the article in favour of the western views, it was raised again by almost the 
same Muslim countries in the drafting of Article 18 of ICCPR. 524 
The issue under debate was the freedom to change one's religion or belief, as this is 
believed to be in contrary to the Islamic principle that a Muslim cannot change his 
religion. As a result of the Islamic objection to the wording of the freedom to change 
one's religion or belief, a compromise was achieved and the states agreed on the change 
of the language to "This right shall includefteedoin to have or to adopt a religion or 
belief of his choice" without mentioning the freedom to change one's religion. 525 
However, the UN General Comment No. 22 has observed that the freedom to "have or 
to adopt" a religion or belief necessarily entails the fi-eedonz to choose a religion or 
belief, inchiding the right to replace one's current religion or belief with another or to 
523 Alkurtubl, op. cit., Part, 1, p. 270, some of the modem Muslim jurists seem to be more inclined to 
accept women as judges without restriction. See Al-Qaradawi, Y., op. cit., 1997,176, see Mutwalli, A., 
ý. cit., 1978, p. 427 oo 
2 Baderin, M., op. cit., p. 118-119 
525 Ibid., p. 119, Sce also Article 18 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
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adopt atheistic vieivs. 526 This clearly indicates that although Article 18 (1) of lCCPR 
differs in language, it must be read within the context of Article 18 of UDHR which 
suggests that the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion include the freedom to 
change one's religion or belief. 
There seems to be a consensus in Islamic jurisprudence that Islam recognized the 
freedom of belief long before Article 18 of the UDHR was drawn. Almost all Islamic 
scholars have considered the verse 256 of chapter 2 527 of the Holy Quran one of the 
most fundamental principles of Islam and the basis of other freedoms. 528 Muslimjurists 
believe that God has created mankind with wisdom that enables human beings to 
differentiate between right and wrong and hence they have free will whether to follow 
the right path and be grateful to Allah or to deny the religion of Allah altogether and 
follow their own desires. God clearly suggests so in chapter 76 verse 2 which says, 
" Verily We created Man ftom a drop of mingled sperm, in order to try him: so We gave 
him (the gifts), of Hearing and Sight. "529 And in the following verse He says, "We 
shoived him the Way: ivhether he be grateful or ungrateful (rests on his Vill).,, 530 In 
another verse Allah says, "If it had been thy Lord's Will, they would all have believed, 
all who are on earth! Wilt thou then compel mankind, against their will, to believe! "53 I 
Therefore, the Islamic authors unanimously believe that the concept of belief in Islam is 
based on the individual's choice and not on compulsion, however, they differ in the 
extent of that choice, if the individual concerned was a Muslim. It is the question of 
apostasy; can a Muslim individual change his religion? 
526 UN General Comment No. 22, The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Art. 18), 
30/07/93, CCPR/C/21/Rev. I/Add. 4, Paragraph 5. Available Online at http: //w%v%v. unhchr. ch/tbs/doc. nsf 
527 God says in the verse "Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clearfrom Error" See 
Q2: 256 
528 Al-Mutawakkel, M., "Al-Islam wa Huqoq Alensan", In: Ghalyon, B., and others, Huqoq Alensan Al- 
Arab!, (in Arabic), Beirut: Markaz Derasat Alwehdah Alarabyyah, 1999, p. 99 529 Q76: 2 
530 Q76: 3 
"I Q10: 99 
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Most medieval scholars took the view that a Muslim individual cannot change his 
religion. If he did change his religion, however, the state authority concerned must hold 
a debate with him in an attempt to convince him through reasons. This could be 
repeated three times. However, if he insisted in his denial, then he must be killed . 
532 The 
Prophet's saying seems to be the basis for the death penalty for the apostate. The 
Prophet reportedly said, "Whoever changes his religion, kill him 033 and this was 
applied during the governorship of the first Caliph, Abu Baker, who insisted on 
initiating a war to kill those who decided not to pay zakat (Islamic tax) and also applied 
during the rule of the fourth Caliph, Ali bin Abitalib, who reportedly burnt apostates 
alive. 
534 
However, the modem Muslim jurists seem to be more inclined to reinterpret the saying 
of the Prophet and the practice of his companions in light of the Quranic texts. It has 
been argued that there is no indication in the Holy Quran of any worldly punishment for 
the apostate, although apostasy has been mentioned many times in different verses. 535 
Allah says, ", 4nd if any ofyou turn backftom theirfaith and die in unbelief, their works 
will bear no ftuit in this life and in the Hereafter; they ivill be Companions of the Fire 
and will abide therein. 036 And in another verse, Allah says, "0 ye who believe! if any 
from among you turn backfrom his Faith, soon will Allah produce a people whom He 
will love as they will love Him, lowly with the Believers, mighty against the 
037 Rejecters... Allah also says in verse 86 chapter 3, " How shall, 411ah guide those who 
reject Faith after they accepted it and bore witness that the Messenger was true and 
532 See Alkurtubi, op. cit., Part, 6, p. 150 and Attabary, op. cit., Part 5, p. 328 
533 Al-Bukhary, M., op. cit., Pan 6,1987, p. 2537 
534 Ibid., p. 2537 see also Ibn Hanbal, A., Misnad Nemanz bin Hanbal, (in Arabic), Part 1, Egypt: 
Mua'ssasat Qurtobah, p. 282 
535AI-Mutawakkel, M., "Al-Islam wa Huqoq Alensan", In: Ghalyon, B., and others, op. cit., pp. 101-102, 
See also AI-Jabry, M., "Mafaheem Alhuqoq wa AI-Adl fi Annusos Alarabyyah wa Al-Islamyyah, in: Al- 
Jusi, S., op. cit., p. 63 536 Q2: 217 
537 Q5: 54 
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that Clear Signs had come unto, them? But Allah guides not a people unjust. , 538 All - 
these Quranic verses only stress the punishment in the hereafter, which is enough for 
Muslims to hate and dislike the act, but not enough to deduce from it the worldly 
punishment of the death penalty. 
Even if the sayings of the Prophet and the practice of the companions indicated the 
worldly punishment of the crime of apostasy, it does not necessarily mean it is a hadd, a 
sacred punishment revealed by God, which men cannot repeal or change. That is 
because, if it was a hadd, Allah would have mentioned it in the Holy Quran as He did 
with regard to all kinds of hadd punishments. Therefore, the punishment, rather than 
being against the belief, might be against the political crime of treason, since the basis 
of Muslim polity is religious and not ethnological or linguistic 539 and since treason does 
not only mean an act of working for the enemies of the State but also means betrayal of 
trust and disloyalty. 540 It might be a political rather than a religious punishment, which 
is necessary to avoid upheaval and political disorder. 54 1 Abu Bakr's war against those 
who refused to pay zakat might have been a response to the tribal rebellion against 
Islamic rules, which is more in the nature of politics than belief. 
There is an undeniable difference between a person who entered Islam because, say, he 
wanted to marry a Muslim woman, then after divorce he returns back to his original 
religion, and one who entered Islam to destroy the Islamic state. 542 The punishment for 
apostasy may not apply to the former, while. in the case of the latter it is definitely 
538 Q3: 86 
539 Baderin, M., op. cit., p. 124 
5'0 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, available online at httl?: /Imv%v. m-w. com/c2i- 
bin/dictiona[y? book=DictionaDL&-va=treason&x=20&y=14 
541 Ali, H., . 41tayyarat 41-1s1amyyah wa Qadiyyat Addenzoqradyyah, (in Arabic), Beirut: Markaz Derasat 
Alwehdah Alarabyyah, 1999, p. 181 
542 Al-Mutawakkel, M., "Al-Islam wa Huqoq Alensan", In: Ghalyon, B., and others, op. cit., p. 102 
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applicable. The Prophet himself ordered that apostate women and children should not be 
punished, which clearly indicates that the punishment was only intended for warriors. 
Also, no one has reported that the Prophet killed any apostate, although he was 
surrounded by betrayers who became apostate. Hence, it might be true to say that the 
PropheVs saying that instructs the killing of whoever changes his religion is meant to 
point at the one who betrays the Islamic state, and not to be a restriction on the freedom 
of belief. Accordingly, if the crime of apostasy is conceived to be a matter of a political 
nature, then it falls in the realm of the doctrine of legitimate governmental policy and 
therefore its implementation is subject to change according to circumstances and the 
necessities of the current reality. 
III. 5.4. Concluding Points 
The discussion above has attempted to clarify the position of Islam in respect of the 
individual rights recognized in the international instruments, focusing mainly on areas 
in which Islam has frequently been criticized. Although these areas are of significance, 
they seem not to have been clearly defined by the international instruments, especially 
with regard to what might constitute unlawful discrimination. It is not clear on what 
basis, for example, one can suggest a type of discrimination was reasonable and 
objective. 543 
From the Islamic perspective, discrimination between Muslims and non-Muslims in an 
Islamic state is seen to be as justifiable as discrimination between nationals and 
foreigners in the nation state. Moreover, there does not seem to be any kind of 
543 in paragraph 13 of the General Comment No. 18, the Human Rights Committee states that "the 
Committee observes that not every differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination, if the 
criteriafor such differentiation are reasonable and objective and ifthe afin is to achieve a purpose which 
is legitimate tinder the Covenant. " Available Online at 
http: //%vNv%v. unhchr. chftbs/doc. nsf/(SMbol)/3888bO54lf850lc9cl2563ed004b8dOe? Opendocument 
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discrimination between male and female on an arbitrary and unjustified basis that is 
prohibited by the international instruments. The differentiation in inheritance between 
male and female is, as discussed above, clearly not discriminatory. Rather, it was 
designed for the benefit of the heirs, in that it prefers needier people like youngsters 
who face an uncertain future, over aging people who are leaving life. 
Therefore, we may conclude that the three components of democracy, representativness, 
accountability, and the respect of individual rights, are recognized in Islamic 
jurisprudence. Hence, there may be room for dialogue between the international 
instruments of human rights and the Islamic jurisprudence of human rights values, in an 
attempt to reach a better understanding that could facilitate coexistence. 
111.6. Observation on Islamic States Practices 
An important question arises here that if the discussion above demonstrates a possibility 
for dialogue between the international conception of human rights and the Islamic one, 
then, why are violations of human rights so prevalent? 544 Many Islamic states, 
particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia, have been accused of gross violations of 
fundamental human rights, in particular, those concerned with religious intolerance and 
minorities' rights. 545 Although Islam may not be the only reason for the violations of 
other Islamic states or predominantly Muslims societies because some of them have 
secular political systems, as in the case of Tunisia, and others are suffering disorder and 
instability with poor economic development, as in Sudan and Pakistan, the violations of 
the two states that are most Islamic, Iran and Saudi Arabia, may not be justifled by any 
544 1 See the two UN Arab Human Development Reports, 2002,2003 
545 See Tý'e Commission on Human Rights Report on Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question 
of Religious Intolerance, Sixtieth session, E/CN. 4/2004/NG0/72 
26 February 2004 
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other factors except Islam because they are economically wealthy and politically stable 
states. Although this may be a valid argument, it is not necessarily the case that Islam is 
the cause. Close examination of the political systems of these two Islamic states may 
reveal that their practice is irrelevant to the universal principles of Islam discussed 
above and hence Islam should not be judged by such state practice. 
In the case of Iran, the current political regime seems to represent only one vision of the 
Shiite sect, which is the Tivelver Jayarl, and not the cult itself Similarly, the vision that 
is predominant in the Saudi political system seems also to be a vision of one Sunni 
school, which is the Wahabist vision of the Hanbal school, and not all Sunni schools or 
even the school of Imani Hanbal itself. The problem here might not be Islam and its 
way of governance, but the politicization of one particular school or vision of Islam. 
That is to say, politicizing a particular vision of Islam necessarily leads to the values of 
that vision or school being forced on people who belong to other schools that may have 
different values. This will be discussed below in more details. 
However, before embarking on the discussion of the state practices of Iran and Saudi 
Arabia, it is worth noting that this study is not intended to discredit any Islamic school's 
values, nor is it trying to promote another image of Islam to which the researcher may 
subscribe. Rather, this part of the study is intended to elaborate and explore how Islamic 
political principles can work in practice with the general international principles of 
human rights that are based on democracy and the rule of law. Indeed, the relativistic 
approach to human rights, just as it seeks a margin for Islamic states to accommodate 
their fundamental prificiples in their implementation of human rights, should also give a 
margin to each recognized group of Muslims that belong to different sects and schools 
within the Muslim world, to exercise their values, which may differ from one Islamic 
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sect or school to another in the Islamic state political system. However, the subject of 
discussion, here, is not the legal values of different Islamic sects and schools that 
emerge from different interpretations of the holy sources of Islam, but the ideology 
behind this; the idea of values that determine how the legal system operates. The 
different Islamic sects and schools might not be able to have the right to exercise their 
own values without a political system that is willing to give such a right in the first 
place and this political system is determined by the political values, the subject of this 
discussion. We should not confuse the political values that constitute the political 
ideology and which are supposed to be underpinned by the general common values of 
the Islamic community, with the legal values of different Islamic sects and schools that 
may differ form one sect or school to another. Iran and Saudi Arabia, as will be seen 
below, seem to define their political ideology in accordance with their own views of 
their schools, whereas the political ideology should consist of more general principles 
with the capacity to accommodate the different Islamic sects and schools in determining 
the legal or even the political system of the state. That is, if the state ideology was 
established on the general political principles of Islam, which recognize, as seen 
throughout this chapter, the three component elements of democracy, 
representativeness, accountability, and the respect of human life and dignity, then the 
legal and political values that would govern the legal and political system of the Islamic 
state would most likely be chosen by Muslims themselves, through elected institutions 
that are accountable to the public. However, if the state political ideology was based on 
a certain conception of a certain school by making its values the state ideology and 
constitutional principles, then the state ideology may be to impose the officially 
recognized school on the Muslim people, especially those who belong to different 
schools and this may not give margin for the other schools to exercise their own values. 
Thus, as it is important to develop an international approach to human rights 
156 
Chapter Three: Islam, Human Rights, and Democracy 
implementation that takes into account the differences among all nations that form our 
relativistic world in order to make human rights more universal in their applicability, it 
is equally important to discuss and evaluate the current practices of Islamic states in 
order to ensure the right of all Muslims of different sects and schools, including Twelvey- 
Jayari sect and Wahhabi school, to participate in determining the values that will affect 
their lives. The relativistic approach to human rights should encourage not only cross- 
cultural dialogue between different cultures of different nations but also within one 
culture of the same nation, such as the Islamic one, to reach common values applicable 
to all the different groups of that nation. However, it is worth bearing in mined that the 
relativistic approach to human rights is also limited by the international principles of 
human rights protection and hence the variation in human rights implementation should 
fall within the boundaries of the universally accepted human rights standards. 
Therefore, the common Islamic principles that are supposed to be applicable to all 
Muslims may be permissible to decide how international rights can be implemented 
only if they are prescribed by law, necessary in a democratic society 546 and do not 
impair the essence of international rights. 547 Accordingly, our discussion in this part of 
the study is not intended to discredit any sect's or school's values, but rather it is 
intended to open the political door for all groups of Muslims to get involved in 
assessing how Islamic political and legal system should operate under the general 
principles of human rights which are underpinned by democracy and the rule of law. 
546 Limitation clauses that must be necessary in a democratic society see Article 14, Article 21 and Article 
22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Articles 4 and 8 of International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
547 See UN General Comment No. 27, Freedom of movement (Art. 12) 2 November1999, 
CCPR/C/21/Rev. I/Add. 9. Paragraph 13. In Chapter Five we will discuss these human rights standards in 
more details 
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111.6.1. The Islamic Republic of Iran 
In looking into the Iranian constitution, we find Article 12 gives clear indication that the 
political ideology of the state is not Islamic in the universal sense but the ideology of 
the Tivelvei- Jayarl school; a particular vision of Islam that has many principles, 
contrary to the principles recognized in the Sunna, followed by the majority of Muslims. 
It might even contradict some Shiite schools such as Zaydi. The Article states, "The 
official religion of Iran is Islam and the Tivelver dayari school [in usual al-Din and 
fiqhj, and this principle will remain elernally immulable 048 Indeed, the article does 
give some official recognition of certain Islamic schools. 549 However, this recognition is 
only concerned with certain matters, namely, religious education, affairs of personal 
status (marriage, divorce, inheritance, and wills) and related litigation in courts of law, 
which means that the political domain is exclusively dominated by the Tivelver Jayairl 
school. Hence the political principles of that school will be forced on those who do not 
subscribe to this version of Islam, especially in matters not specified in the Article. Iran 
in this sense is far from democratic. It is, rather, a theocratic state, as this particular 
scbool, as will be seen below, seems to suggest. 
The Shiite school of Tivelver Jayaýi believes that linanzah, the leadership, is a matter of 
550 belief, and that only God chooses the Imam (the leader). Moreover, this Imamah is 
only confined to the Prophet and his offspring. 551 Therefore, the governor, from their 
543 Article 12 of the Iran's Constitution 
549 After mentioning the official religion of the state, Article 12 of Iran's Constitution states in resPect of 
other schools that "Other Islamic schools, including the Hanarfl, ShafYi, Maliki, Hanball, and Zaydi, are 
to he accordedfull respect, and 1heirfollowers arefree to act in accordance with their ownfitrisprudence 
in performing their religious rites. These schools enjoy oJJ1'c1al status in matters pertaining to religious 
education, affairs ofpersonal status (marriage, divorce, inheritance, and wills) and related litigation in 
coUrls oflinv" 
550 Saeed, S., op. cit., p. 43 
551 Mutwalli, A., op. cit., 1990, p. 37, See also Alhulu, M. R., op. cit., p. 165 footnote 
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perspective, is infallible and perpetual. 552 However, this infallibility applied only to the 
12 imams of the Prophet's offspring, who are believed to have disappeared 12 centuries 
ago. For the current time and until the last Imam, called 41-Mahdi, comes, the religious 
scholar (Faqih) is the one who must take the responsibility, not as a representative of 
the people but as a deputy of the absent Imam (Al-enzani Alqaeb). 553 Therefore, we find 
the main cornerstone of the Iranian political system is the doctrine of Walayat Alfaqeeh 
(the rule of religious scholar). Consistent with this, Article 2 paragraph 5 refers to: 
"continuous leadership (Imamah) and perpetual guidance, and its fitndaniental role in 
ensuring the uninterripted process of the revolution of Islain". It must be noted, 
however, that although the political reality of Iran might not indicate such a doctrine of 
the imam's infallibility, since the Iranian president seems to be a representative of the 
people and might even be responsible before them; the overall constitutional structures 
of Iran seem to indicate that the political ideology is heavily influenced by this belief. 
For example, the real leader in Iran does not seem to be the president, but the religious 
scholar (Faqih) who is appointed by the expert in the light of Article 5 which says, 
"During the Occultation of the Mali al-'Asr (may God hasten his reappearance), the 
wilayah and leadership of the Unimah devolve upon thejust radl] andpious [muttaqij 
faqih". The authority of the Faqih in accordance with Article 57 seems to be absolute. It 
says that "The poivers of governinent in the Islainic Republic are vested in the 
legislature, the judiciary, and the executive powers, fitnctioning under the supervision 
of the absolute ivilayat al-'amr and the leadership of the Unimah". On the other hand, 
the president's role is confined to the executive branch and even in this narrow role, the 
552 Al-Qaradawi, op. cit., 1997, p., 71 See also Tablyyah, A., Ahvaseedfi Annuzom Al-lslamyyah: AI-Islam 
iva Addmvlah, (in Arabic), Dar Alittehad Al-Arabi, 1982, p. 208 
553 Al-Qaradawi, op. cit., p., 71 See also Saeed, S., op. cit., p. 44 
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president is not free, but is limited by the interpretation of the Guardian Council. 554 So 
the Shiite's belief in the infallibility and the perpetuity of the Imam is present in the 
constitutional framework of Iran, since no institution, it seems, is able to scrutinise the 
Imam's decision and there is no limitation on the period of the Imam's power. However, 
the situation in Iran does not represent the view of the majority of Muslims and it may 
not even represent many schools of the Shiite cult. 
111.6.2. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
In respect of the Saudi political system, the overall result appears to be the same, 
although the belief is different. The Saudi political system belongs to the Sunni 
Madhab, which represents the vast majority of Muslims and which contains different 
political principles than those recognised in the Shiite school of Tivelver Jayari. The 
Sunni schools do not regard the leadership as a subject of belief (Pateqad) but as a 
worldly issue, resolved by the people. 555 In other words, the Shiite Tivelver Jayari base 
the leadership on the sacred text, while the Sunni doctrine base it on the people's 
choice. 556 The leader in the Tivelver Jayari doctrine is infallible and perpetual, while the 
leader in the Sunni doctrine is a human being who does right and wrong and hence he is 
accountable to the people and can be removed if he is found to be no longer fit for the 
557 task. However, the Saudi political system seems to have diverted from these general 
principles and started to engage in specifities that are more concerned with the 
individual's daily life. It does not seem to differentiate between the general political 
principles that define the ideology of the state, which is a core matter of the state 
identity, and the legal rules and regulations. The latter are very contestable in Islam and 
554 Karveh, M., An Independent Constitutional Court: Essential Prerequisitefor peaceful Resolution of 
Vast Majority ofCurrent Crises in Iran, First World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies (WOCMES), 
Mainz, Germany, 8-14 September 2002, p., 7 
555 Tablyyah, A., op. cit., p. 211 
556 Al-Qaradawi, op. cit., 1997, p. 70 
557 See the discussion above of government accountability in Islam. 
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are viewed by different Islamic schools from different perspectives, depending on the 
standards of each school. They may therefore be more appropriately left to a specified 
elected institution that is more capable of accommodating the variety of principles for 
the good of the community. 558 Instead of implementing the universal principles of 
Islam, the Saudi political and religious system has implemented, as will be seen below, 
its own vision of Islam and enforced it on other Muslims who belong to different 
schools, let alone non-Muslims. 
This Saudi system of governance can be traced to the doctrine of ivahhabisin that the 
Saudis have for long promoted and advocated. This kind of Islamic doctrine does not 
seem to recognize political Islam. 559 Islamic rules, according to this doctrine, are very 
much confined to the private sphere. The government, in this doctrine, is reduced to the 
person of the leader, who seems to have been assigned unrestrained power. In this 
doctrine, the term Ijtihad, as Vogel defined it, means 'vertical lmv-making'. in the sense 
that it deals with individual action for every fresh act, with no general applicability. 560 
Horizontal law-making, which is concerned with designing general rules applicable to 
the community as a whole, by contrast, is confined to a worldly institution or 
collectivity such as the state. In principle, this is exactly what the Sunni doctrine would 
558The Saudi government interferes fundamentailly-in matters that are mainly concerned with the 
individual's personal life in the name of the Islamic principle of ordering good and forbidding evil. In the 
name of this principle, they forbid different media forms and arts and impose restriction on women's 
work, especially in places where men work. The Saudi system sees that the woman's sphere of activity in 
the home, and they are restricted in going out except with their Mithrem, such as father or brother. See Al- 
Jeraisy, K., (ed. ), Fataiva UlaniaAlbalad, 41haram, (in Arabic), Riyadh: Mua'ssasat Al- Jeraisy, 1999, p. 
4551-lowever, from the perspectives of the vast majority of Muslim schools, since these Islamic values that 
are connected with the individual's daily life are for the most part disputable, it is not for the state to 
forbid them under the name of forbidding evil. The matters that the state is obliged to forbid are those 
which are universally recognized by all Muslim schools as evil. See Al-Qaradawi, op. cit., 1997, p. 122 
559 A clear example of the Saudi rejection of political Islam is the denouncement by the Saudi Minister of 
Interior, Amir Naief, of the politicization of Islam and the Islamic movement of Islamic brotherhood, See 
analysis of the Saudi stance on the political Islam and the movement of Islamic brotherhood in Fuller, G., 
, 4ndr Naief and the Movement of Islamic Brotherhood, (in Arabic: Amir Naief wa Alekhwan Al- 
Muslimeen), Aljazeera news network, special files, 2002, Available Online at 
http: //Nvww. aliazeera. net/NR/exeres/4939E393-4F674 I C8-9112-46CDCI B04BFA. htm 
560 Vogel, F., "The Rule of Law in Saudi Arabia: exploring contradictions and traditions", In: Cotran, E., 
and Yamani, M., (eds. ), op. ciL, p, 132 
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agree with in general; however, the Wahhabists emphasize the principle to empower the 
ruler alone, with no participation of the public, to decide what is good for the 
community. Wahhabists argue that Islam gives no right to the governed to publicly 
oppose the governor. 561 In this doctrine, unless the governor becomes an apostate, the 
governed has a religious obligation to follow his orders. The crucial point here is that 
the governor cannot be considered an apostate, even if he breaks the very basic rules of 
Islam, if it is felt that he did not intend by his actions to deny Islamic principles. 562 
Wahhabi scholars assert this by saying that faith cannot be destroyed by mere action and 
conclude that a Muslim can only be considered apostate only if he intends by his action 
to legitimize the illegitimate. 563 As a result, if a ruler governs his people according to his 
own arbitrary rules that fundamentally contradict the teaching of Islam, but without 
giving sign that he believes in them as legitimate, this would not be enough to confer 
any right on individuals to oppose the ruler, since mere action is not enough to consider 
the ruler apostate. Faksh's insightful comment on the Saudi political system is worth 
quoting here 
Orthodox Wahhabi Islam has become the raison d'etre of the Saudi state, serving as 
a unifyingforce in the social andpolitical cohesion of tribal Arabia andproviding the 
basis of the royalfamily's legitimacy. As the official ideology, it has been utilized to 
support the monarchy's authority. Thus, Wahhabism has always been kip- t, inform at 
least, in the service of the status quo and has been undergirded by the power and 
561 if anyone has an issue with the government he must privately discuss it with the leader, See the 
opinion of Sheik Ibn Baz in: At-Jeraisy, K., and Al-Buraik, S., (eds. ), op. cit., p. 316 
562 See AI-Jeraisy, K., (ed. ), op. cit., pp. 66-67 
563 This principle, however, seems to be only applicable to the ruler, because Saudi scholars regard the 
ordinary individual who makes ajoke about the main values of Islam as an apostate without looking at his 
intention, i. e. whether he intends from this joke to deny those values or not. See the opinion of the well 
known Saudi scholar, Ibn Othaimeen, about the one who makes a joke about the values of Islam in Al- 
Jeraisy, K., (ed. ), op. cit., pp. 248-249. They also seem to regard the one who does not pray at all as an 
apostate without looking into his intention, while the ruler is not, even if he disables the application of the 
public Islamic rules altogether. See the opinion of the same scholar Ibn Othaimeen in AI-Jeraisy, K., 
(ed. ), op. cit., p. 146 
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wealth of the state. The symbiosis between Wahhabi ideology and Saudi power 
remains the basis ofstate identity and national unity. '564 
This vision of Islam, as Daniel E. Price suggests, was actually a result of an old 
agreement between the regime and the Ulanza (the Islamic scholars) that was conducted 
at the early stage of the establishment of the Saudi Arabia. The agreement implies that 
the L17ama would take the authority of social govenunent agencies and religious police, 
to ensure that proper Islamic conduct is followed. Meanwhile, the Saudi regime would 
hold authority over important political matters, such as foreign policy, modernization, 
the economy, and most areas of public administration. 565 Any interference from the 
Ulama in these matters would be ignored. 566 
Thus, although the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is not a secular state in its legal system, it 
does not seem to be guided by the universal political principles of Islamic Shari'ah in its 
political system and hence Islam should not be judged by its political practice. The 
political culture of Saudi Arabia, as well as many other Arab states, is dominated by 
tribal values that regard the ruler as the traditional father and the people as his children 
who have no choice but to obey their ruler without questioning what is being decided 
for them. 567 The government is seen in the person of the ruler, who is assigned great 
authority over all state powers, the legislative, the executive and the judiciary. The 
Saudi Islamic scholars seem also to be affected by this tribal culture, since they always 
cite the person of the leader in resolving any matter of a political nature. This is clear in 
564 Faksh, M., The Future of Islain in the Middle East. Fundamentalism in Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi 
Arabia, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997, p., 90. 
565 Price, D., op. cit., pp. 90-91 
566 It is not surprising, therefore, that the well known Saudi Islamic scholar, Sheik Safar Alhawali, after he 
finished his Master's study on the subject of secularism, the separation between the religion and the state, 
focused in his PhD study on the separation between faith and action as if he to imply that such separation 
is just another kind of secularism. See Alhawali, S., Al-llinanlyyah, (in Arabic) Hawalli: Dar Alsalafla, 
1987. See also Alhawali, S., Zaherat At-Erjaa'fi AYthr ANsland, (in: Arabic), PhD Study, Jame'aat 
Umm Alqura, Rosmalen: Dar Alkalemab, 1999 
567 Muhammad, T., Sadik and William P., Snavely, Bahrain, Qatar, and UnitedArab Endrates; colonial 
past, present problems andfuture prospects, London: D. C. Heath and Company, 1972, p., 143. 
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their discourse that considers the objection to the leader's political vision as a sin. 
Anyone who expresses such objection is considered as Khawary and may deserve the 
death penalty. As one commentator noted, the Saudis 'fiorge an ideological bond 
betiveen Islamic ideology and hereditary monopoly, suggesting to citizens that 
obedience to the Saudi King is not simply a legal duty,, it is rather an act offaith under 
Shari a. , 568 This vision of governance is an expression of primitive tribal values of 
governance. The constitutional modem values of governance do not confine the 
government in a certain man, whoever this man might be, political leader or religious 
leader, but rather the government is considered as the machinery that processes the 
people's demands and brings about the outputs that meet popular expectations. 
Objection to the government's decision does not necessarily mean an objection to the 
rule of the leader, but may be to the way that the officials in the government perform 
their work. So, the popular objection in this sense does not mean revolution and hence 
does not require having an apostate leader in order for his work to meet with objection. 
Accordingly, the practices of Iran and Saudi Arabia may indicate that the politicization 
of a certain school of Islam, by making its values the state ideology and constitutional 
principles, is an important reason for Muslims' failure to establish a state that meets the 
universal Islamic standards, let alone the international principles of human rights based 
on democracy and the rule of law. An important factor for state compliance with human 
rights is embracing political values of democracy that let all groups of people, which 
form the state's society, irrespective of their differences, participate in determining their 
political destiny. This is not achievable in an Islamic state without taking Islam on the 
basis of general principles that are universally accepted by all Islamic schools and sects. 
That is to say, if all Muslims agree on the validity of the variety of different Islamic 
568 Khan, A., A Theory of Universal Democracy: beyond the end oftistory, The Hague ; London: Kluwer 
Law International, 2003, p. 63 
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schools and sects that represent different interpretations of Islam, then, on what basis, if 
it is not democratically chosen, should one particular school govern and oblige the 
others to obey its principles? The relativistic approach to human rights should not give 
the right for a certain unelected group to decide what interpretation must be upheld, 
since enforcing one interpretation may well lead to marginalization of other opinions. 
The differences should, rather, be resolved by all Muslims in a free discussion where 
the argument that is supported by the most convincing reasons prevails. 
111.7. Conclusion 
This politicization of a certain understanding about Islam is the reason, I believe, behind 
the so called non-compliance of the values of Islam with the international standards of 
democracy and human rights. The political principles of Islam do not seem to be, as 
discussed above, in fundamental conflict with the international conception of 
democracy and human rights. It has been demonstrated in this chapter that Islam, in 
accordance with the Islamicftqh, does not seem to perceive the concept of human rights 
as a mere duty, nor does it view human rights as mere privileges. Rather, human rights 
in Islam seems to have been taken as a comprehensive term that includes the concept of 
duty as well as the concept of privilege, to end up with legal right that has the force of 
the law of Shari'ah. The Islamic technique of Siyasah Shariyyah has demonstrated the 
flexible and timeless nature of Islam which seems to be capable of accommodating 
different circumstances in different realties, so long as the universal and fixed principles 
of Islam are preserved. Even the hadd punishments, like amputation of the hand and 
stoning can be temporarily repealed, if sometimes they form a cause of injustice. This 
was clearly demonstrated by Umar, the second Caliph, who repealed the hadd of theft in 
the year of poverty, when all the people were starving. 
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Democracy and the doctrine of limited government are recognized in the Islamic fiqh 
and are considered as of fundamental importance. As was discussed above, the three 
fundamentals of democracy; representativeness, accountability and the respect of human 
rights were the dominant theme in the political culture of Islamic society at the time of 
the prophet and his companions. However, there was a lack in the political machineries 
of implementation that left a gap to be filled, in the later stage of Islamic history, with 
tribal values. This forms a main cause of the current situation of Islamic states. Some 
Islamic scholars are influenced by this tribal culture and still advocate such values, 
sometimes in the name of religion and sometimes in the name of Darora (necessity). 
Such scholars focus on the particularities of their school within the Islamicji'qh and tend 
to politicize their own vision of Islam regardless of the other schools' values. It might be 
fair to say that if Muslim scholars avoid focusing on the differences between Islamic 
schools and unite themselves under the general principles of Islam; this would pave the 
way for compliance with international standards of democracy and human rights. 
It is, indeed, necessary for Muslims to reach common political principles of an Islamic 
state that is able to accommodate Muslims' differences. Muslim's failure to establish a 
state that meets Islamic standards, let alone the international ones, is due to the fact that 
Muslims' efforts have been focused, as seen above, either on upholding certain views 
about Islam, as in the case of Iran and Saudi Arabia, or, as in the case of Saudi Arabia, 
on establishing the Shari'ah law, which is the subject of Islamic schools, irrespective of 
political ideology. Therefore, there seems to be a need for broadening the discussion in 
this field to include states that are politically and economically stable and do not 
politicize any particular vision of Islam. Thus, in the next chapter we will examine the 
United Arab Emirates as a case study that does not politicize a certain vision of Islam 
and where secular and religious cultural values seem to co-exist. 
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Chapter Four 
IV. The UAE Islamic Constitution and the International Requirements 
of Human Rights Protection 
IVA. Introduction 
Generally speaking, some western authors seem to view the rise of Islam in the political 
and consfitutional life of the Islamic states as undermining the principle of the rule of 
law and the independence of judiciary. 569 The general impression is that Islamization 
did much to eliminate due process and modem independent state institutions, to place 
legal proceedings and important decisions under the control of clerics and religious 
leaders. 570 This might be true, to some extent, in states which engaged in the process of 
Islamization through revolution, like Iran. However, it is not necessarily the case in 
Islamic states where Islamization was not a reaction but part of progressive 
modernization that adopted modem values in line with the main fundamental principles 
of Islam. The United Arab Emirates is one of these states that possess modem 
constitutional structures, away from the domination of clerics and religious leaders. The 
nature of the United Arab Emirates as a federal state has been established on 
constitutional institutions like the Federal Supreme Council, of which the main job is to 
elect the ruler of the federal state from the members of the Council. Although it is not a 
democratic state, since the election is limited to those members of the Council, it is not 
a one family state where the ruling position of the federal state is obtained through 
heredity. 
569 Mayer, A. E., op. cit., 1999, p. 28 
570 Ibid., p. 28 
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Therefore, in examining the issue of human rights in the United Arab Emirates, I will 
examine the question of whether the United Arab Emirates has in fact a constitutional 
foundation for protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms in line with 
international law. In considering this question, I will discuss first the historical 
formation of the UAE Federation, with an analysis of the main features of its 
constitution. Such a historical background will help in assessing the role of the 
constitution in tenns of the overall structure of the state. 
Having discussed the historical foundation and main features of the UAE constitution, I 
will move to examine the constitutional system of the United Arab Emirates and 
whether there is any constitutional machinery, guaranteeing the implementation of 
human rights. I will give an analysis of the constitutional recognition of the principle of 
separation of powers in the UAE. I will also examine Islarn as the principal source of 
legislation in the UAE Constitution and how it can affect the implementation of the 
international human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
IV. 2. The UAE Constitution: Its Historical Foundation and Main 
Features 
Since this study considers the way the Islamic government was established as an 
important factor in determining the relationship of Islamic values to international 
norms, this historical background of the UAE formation will help to give a clear picture 
of how, in a region that is mostly based on tribal values, such a Federation of the UAE 
came into existence. The tracing of the UAE's formation will show that although each 
of the Emirates was founded on certain family rulers, the Federation, on the other hand, 
is founded on constitutional and political institutions based on a modem constitution 
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which was designed not by clerics but by recognised law professors, on the basis of 
long discussion with the state politicians. 
IV. 2.1. The Historical Formation of the UAE Federation and its Constitution 
The idea of unity is not a new phenomenon to the tribes in the eastern Gulf region. The 
Trucial States 571 had witnessed very distinct tribal groupings since 1624.572 Two major 
alliances appeared in the Trucial States after many years of serious tribal conflicts; the 
Baniyas tribe on the one hand and Al-Qmvashn on the other. Baniyas consisted of a 
group of around fourteen families, among whom were Albufalah and Albufalasa. 573 it 
was governed by 41-Nahayan, part of the Albufalah family, for about two hundred 
years, gaining control over the whole of the southern region. The Al-Qaivasim alliance, 
on the other hand, consisted of about seven main families and was centred in Ras Al- 
Khaimah in the northern area of the Trucial States under the governance of the 41- 
Qmvasim family. 574 Later, these two alliances formed a tribal Confederation, conferring 
on them the power to control what are now known as the northern emirates and the 
emirate of Abu Dhabi. 
575 One of the most important reasons behind such tribal 
groupings was to protect the region from any external dangers represented by the 
competition between European states, namely, the UK, France and Holland. 576 
571 In 1971 it became the Federation of the United Arab Emirates. 
572 The time when the Portuguese dominance over the eastern Gulf region ended 
573 Al'aidaroos, M.,, 4ttataivorat. 4ssiyasýyahfiDaivlat, 41-Eniarat, 41arabyyah, 41niziltahedah, (in Arabic), 
Kuwait: Manshorate That-Assalasel, 1983, p. IS 
574 Ibid., p. 18 
575 Peck, M., "Formation and Evolution of the Federation and its Institutions", In : Ghareeb, E. & AL 
Abed, I., Perspective on the VnitedArab Emirates, London: Trident Press Ltd.., 1997, p. 123 
576 In addition to this reason, there are other factors facilitating such groupings. First, the unity of religion 
and origin; the tribes all believe in one religion, which is Islam, and come from one origin (Arab). 
Second, the unity of traditions; the tribes all share the same traditions and values, which govern their 
relationships. Third, the political structures of these tribes are the same, since they all share the same 
system of governance, the governance of the tribe. For more information regarding these factors see 
Group of Professors of the United Arab Emirates University, Derasat fi Miytatnaa Al-Emarat, (in 
Arabic), Al Ain: Jame'aat Al-Emarat Alarabyyah Almuttahedah , 1999, pp. 8-9 Moreover, close examination of the system of tribe leads to suggest that the idea of unity is actually in its 
very nature since the tribe itself initially consists of a group of families. For more information about the 
169 
Chapter Four: The UAE Islamic Constitution and the International Requirements of Human Rights Protection 
However, these tribal groupings did not last very long as they became involved in 
territorial disputes. 
The area was of great strategic importance to European states. It was the only way by 
which they could control international commercial approaches to India and South 
Africa. In 1820 the UK occupied the region through various treaties intended to give 
recognition to the British existence in the region. The UK also meant by these treaties to 
disassemble the alliances mentioned above, in order to maintain its control over the 
Trucial States. For example, the UK included the Albufalasa family in the treaty of 
1835, indicating British recognition for the family, separate from the alliance with the 
Baniyas. 577 Besides this, the UK exceeded its authority to question infringements of 
these treaties, to intervening in the internal conflicts between the families themselves, 
which raised serious disagreements between the tribes. 
One of the most important treaties was the Exclusive Agreements of 1892, which 
represented the direct occupation of the UK in the region. 578 This agreement gave the 
UK the right to take responsibility over foreign affairs and made the region a 
protectorate of the UK. This was mainly meant to prevent any involvement of other 
European states such as France and Holland in the lower Gulf. From that time, the 
Trucial States were separated from the world, confined by the British policy that served 
the interest of the UK in keeping its control over the area. 579 The British attitude 
towards the Trucial States was described as 'benign neglect' for the long period of 
governance of the tribe see Asbamsi, R., Alhayat Assiyasah iva, 41-Amniyyahf1 Miýtanta'a Al-Emarat, (in 
Arabic), Dubai: Albayan. 2000, pp. 17-69 
577 See Group of Professors of the United Arab Emirates University, op. cit. p. 45 
57' Al'aidaroos, M., op. cit., p. 80 
579 It is worthwhile to point out, however, that the Trucial States' sovereignty over their national affairs 
was not altered by the Exclusive Agreements of 1892, in the sense that the states maintained their 
sovereignty over their internal matters. So, the states had special status in international law. They were 
not recognized by Britain as Protectorates but Independent Pelly States as it was mentioned in the British 
documentation. See Al'aidaroos, M., op. cit., p. 80 
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British protection. 580 However, after the discovery of oil, a new British policy towards 
the Trucial States was initiated. This involved providing financial support for some 
rulers to develop their own states. 581 Another remarkable aspect of the new British 
policy towards the region was the creation of the Trucial States Council in 1952.582 The 
Trucial States Council was composed of seven rulers of the Trucial States and chaired 
by the British Political Agent, resident in Dubai. 583 The council was designed as an 
inforinal consultative institution, with no charter. 584 It was intended to establish closer 
political and economic relationships between the states in the future. 585 
In 1968, the UK declared its intention to withdraw from the region by 1971. The 
announcement of the British withdrawal was made in a very critical situation. The rulers 
at that time were in deep disputes over their territorial borders. A precise territorial 
definition of authorities was very much needed, especially after the discovery of oil. 586 
There was a significant disagreement between Abu Dhabi and Dubai over their 
boundary lines, which led to warfare in 1948. Qatar and Bahrain were also engaged in 
another disagreement over their boundaries. Sharjah and its neighbours were also in 
conflicts over their borders. For this reason, the region was not prepared for the British 
withdrawal. In addition to these internal disputes, there were some external dangers 
threatening the rulers after the British announcement. Iran renewed its claim over the 
island of Bahrain. Iran also claimed the islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs. Moreover, 
580 Peck, M., "Fon-nation and Evolution of the Federation and its Institutions", In : Ghareeb, E. & Al 
Abed, I., op. cit., p. 124 
581 Al-Ghufli, S., op. ciL, p. 6 
582 Peck, M., "Formation and Evolution of the Federation and its Institutions", In : Ghareeb, E. & Al 
Abed, I., op. cit., p. 124 
583 Al Abed, I., "The Historical Background and Constitutional Basis to the Federation", In: Ghareeb, E. 
& Al Abed, I., op. cit., p. 104 
584 Ibid., p. 104 
585 AI-Ghufli, S., op. cit., p. 6 
586 Before the discovery of oil, the people in the Trucial States, including the rulers, were not concerned 
about where the boundary line lay. There were no clear definitions of their borders. People could live 
wherever they wished without any worry. Thus, the concept of exact territorial borders was alien to a 
tribal society. See Peck, M., "Formation and Evolution of the Federation and its Institutions", In: 
Ghareeb, E. & Al Abed, I., op. cit., p. 124 
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Saudi Arabia saw the British withdrawal as an opportunity to reassert its claim over 
large part of Abu Dhabi territory. 587 Furthermore, radical revolutionary movements such 
as the Marxist leadership established in Yemen formed another threat to the rulers of 
lower Gulf, 588 In this situation, action by the rulers was indeed needed. 
The first attempt to settle these issues was in 1968. The two rulers of Abu Dhabi and 
Dubai met at Assameeh to resolve their border dispute, as well as discussing the 
possibility of reaching an agreement on prospects for the region if the British 
withdrawal took place. The meeting was very positive and the rulers overcame all the 
obstacles. The meeting resulted in a very significant event. On 18 February, 1968 the 
ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Zayid bin Sultan Al-Nahayan and the ruler of Dubai, Sheikh 
Rashid bin Said Al-Maktum, declared the first Federation between the two states, and 
invited the rulers of other Trucial States, as well as Qatar and Bahrain, to join the 
Union. 589 Seven days later, the rest of the Trucial states as well as Qatar and Bahrain 
indicated their willingness to join the Union. 590 They met in Dubai on 25 February. The 
meeting resulted in the Dubai Agreement of 1968, declaring Federation between nine 
emirates, namely Qatar, Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm. al-Qwain, 
Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah . 
591 The Union was called the 'Federation of Arab 
Emirates'. 
The Agreement established, in Chapter two, Article 4, the Supreme Council of the 
Federation. It specifies its authorities as to set a permanent and comprehensive Charter 
for the Federation and to issue the necessary federal laws. The Council was also 
5" Ibid., p. 125 
5" Ibid., p. 125 
589 Al Rayyes, R., lVathaeq Alkhaleej Al Arabi [1968-1971] Tumohat Ahvehdah iva Humom 
Almuslaqbal, (in Arabic), Third Edition, Beirut: Riad El Rayyes Books S. A. R. L, 2002, p. 21 
590 Al-Ghufli, S., op. cit., p. 7 
591 Al Rayyes, R., op. cit., p. 21 
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described by Article 4 as the supreme reference of all authority of states' institutions. It 
was provided that decisions must be taken by unanimous vote and the Chairmanship of 
592 the Council must be rotated annually among its members. Moreover, the agreement 
established in Article 8a Federal Council to assist the Supreme Council, mentioned 
above, in exercising its authorities. Furthermore, Chapter three Article 13 (A) of the 
agreement called for the establishment of a Supreme Court of the Federation, the 
fon-nation and function of which were to be defined by law. 
Article 17 of the Agreement suggested that the Agreement should come into application 
on 30 March 1968. It was to be applied only until the Permanent and Comprehensive 
Chat-ter for the Federation was set. 
These articles of the Dubai Agreement 1968 were subject to very serious debates among 
the rulers. Article 17, for example, was the subject of disagreement in the subsequent 
meeting conducted in Abu Dhabi on 25 May 1968. While Abu Dhabi saw the meeting 
as a preparatory meeting to study steps required to establish the Permanent and 
Comprehensive Charter for the Federation stated in Article 17, Qatar considered the 
meeting the first summit to give the Federation its actual meaning. 593 This disagreement 
was due to the differences between the rulers in their understanding and interpretation 
of the Dubai Agreement. Qatar and Dubai understood the Agreement of 1968 as a 
temporary charter for the Federation and therefore considered that its provisions must be 
implemented immediately, whereas Abu Dhabi and Bahrain preferred to postpone any 
decision on any fundamental issue until the Perinanent and Coniprehensive Charter was 
592 Ibid., p. 33 
59' Qatar provided a detailed programme in respect of the election of the President of the Federation, the 
permanent location of the Federation, the formation of the Federal Council with the specification of its 
authorities and some other issues concerned with giving the Federation real effect on the ground. See Al 
Rayyes, R., op. cit., p. 22 
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brought about. 594 This disagreement on the agenda of the first meeting in fact 
undermined the meeting as a whole and revealed how divergent the rulers were, even on 
procedural matters. However, Kuwait played an important role in reducing the degree of 
divergence, leading the nine rulers to conduct their second session in Abu Dhabi on 6 
595 July 1986. 
Despite the disagreement among the rulers, the meeting resulted in significant 
resolutions in its second session. Resolution no. I committed the preparation of the 
Permanent Comprehensive Charter for the Federation to an Egyptian expert, Dr. 
Abdulrazzaq Assanhoori, who was required to complete and submit the Charter within 6 
months. Resolution no. 2 established a Communication committee to conduct 
communications between the states and the expert. Resolution no. 3 suggested that the 
chairmanship of the Supreme Council was to rotate every session. Resolution no. 4 
indicated that the location of the Federal Council and the Supreme Council was to be 
chosen periodically. Resolution no. 5 established a Temporary Federal Council 
composed of the rulers' deputies. 596 
On 10 May 1969 the third session was conducted in Qatar, chaired by the President of 
Qatar, Sheikh Ahmed bin Ali Al-Thani. In this session, the rulers agreed on the main 
constitutional principles of the union. They also formed a committee consisting of 
lawyers and advisers to set a provisional constitution for the union. Clause 4 of the 
constitutional principles announced by the Supreme Council in 1969 suggested that the 
committee should finish the proposal in two months and refer its work to the Egyptian 
594 Ibid., p. 23 
595 Ibid., p. 27 
596 See resolutions 1,2,3,4,5 of 1968 of the Supreme Council of the Federation in: Ibid., p. 28 
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expert (Dr. Abdulrazzaq Assanhoori). The expert would review the proposal in one 
597 
month and submit his recommendations to the Supreme Council. 
One of the most important issues that really concerned the rulers, even in the first 
session, was to reach an agreement on the main principles of the federation, the 
infrastructure of the proposed state. During the meeting of the first and even second 
session there were two views on the Union. One attempted to preserve the sovereignty 
of each state and suggested a Confederation type of Union; the other was more 
federalist and keen on establishing a federal goverment . 
598 However, the use of the 
word Constitution instead of the Permanent and Comprehensive Charter in the third 
session clearly indicated the intention of the rulers to establish a new state under one 
federal govemment. 
599 
On 21 June 1969, the draft constitution, after it had been prepared by the expert and 
studied by the rulers, was submitted to the expert again by the chairman of the third 
session of the Supreme Council . 
600 Except for Dubai and Qatar, the draft was not 
reviewed by the states. Dubai sent its adviser to discuss the draft with the expert, while 
Qatar prepared another full proposal of a provisional constitution for the union. 601 The 
Egyptian expert reconsidered the draft constitution in accordance with Dubai's remarks 
597 The Supreme Council's announcement of 1969, in: Al Rayyes, R., op. cit., pp. 512-513. However, Dr. 
Abdulrazzaq Assanhoori was replaced by another Egyptian expert Dr. Wahid RaaTat after the fon-ner fell 
ill. See Al-Ghufli, S., op. cit., p. 9 
5's Abulmajd, A., "Annizarn Addustoori li Dawlat Al-Emarat Alarabyyah Almuttahedah", in: DinvIat Al- 
Emarat Alarabyyah Ahnuttahedah: Derasah Mashiyyah Shamelah, (in Arabic), Ma'ahad Albuhoth wa 
Adderasat Alarabyyah, 1978, p. 14 
599 Ibid., p. 14. See also the Supreme Council's announcement of 1969 in: Al Rayyes, R., op. cit., p. 512, 
513 
600 Abulmajd, A., "Annizarn Addustoori li Dawlat Al-Emarat Alarabyyah AlmuttahedaW', in: Dmvlal Al- 
Emarat Alarabyyah Almultahedah: Derasah Mashiyyah Shamelah, op. cit., p. 14 
601 Ibid., p, 14 
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602 
and Qatar's proposal and submitted it to the Supreme Council in its fourth session. 
However, the fourth session resulted in a failure of the Federation of Arab Emirates. 
The failure of the union was due to several reasons: First, the process of decision 
making in the Supreme Council was to be on the basis of unanimity. This made serious 
difficulty in reaching an agreement; because a single ruler could, and often did, prevent 
the required unanimity being reached. 603 Second, the level of representation in the 
proposed National Council (Parliament) was a subject of disagreement. While some 
states, such as Bahrain, insisted that the method of determining the composition of the 
Council should be a ratio based on the population of each state, others such as Qatar 
refused, and put more emphasis on equal representation. 604 Third, the contribution of 
each state to the federal budget was also another matter of disagreement. Some states 
suggested that the proportion of contribution to the federal budget should be 10 % of 
each state's revenue. Others suggested that the contribution must take account of the 
level of each state's income and the size of each state's population. 605 Besides this, some 
other external reasons played an important role in defeating the union of nine states. For 
example, the territorial conflict between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi made the former 
unwilling to recognise any federation between the nine states until its boundary dispute 
with Abu Dhabi was resolved. The Iranian claim on Bahrain was another barrier. Some 
rulers were hesitant in accepting Bahrain because of the fear of Iran. It is said that one 
state explicitly tried to exclude Bahrain from the union. 606 In addition, the UK favoured 
602 Ibid., p. 41 
603 Al Abed, L, "The Historical Background and Constitutional Basis to the Federation", In: Ghareeb, E. 
& Al Abed, I., op. cit., p. 108 
604 Ibid., p. 109 
603 Alshaheen, A., Nezain Al Hzikni iva AI-Edarah fi Dinvial Al-Emarat Alarabyyah Almutlahedah, (in 
Arabic), Ras al Khaimah: Jelfar, 1997, p. 56 
606 Abulmajd, A., "Annizarn Addustoori 1i Dawlat AI-Emarat Alarabyyah Almuttahedah", in: DaivldtAl- 
Emaral Alarabyyah. 41mittlahedah: Derasah Mashlyyah Shantelah, op. cit., p. 15 
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a union between the seven Trucial States, rather than the union of the nine emirates. 607 
Accordingly, Qatar started to distance itself from the union and finally chose to follow 
an independent course in I September 1971. Bahrain also declared its independence in 
31 August 1971, just before the Qatar declaration, after having been assured that Iran 
was no longer interested in its traditional claim, as a consequence of the UN Security 
Council resolution on 12 May 1970.608 
Once Qatar and Bahrain made it clear that they were no longer interested in the union, 
the union process went in another direction. The Trucial States were left alone to decide 
their destiny, realizing that while time had been wasted in the negotiation process, they 
were approaching the deadline for the British withdrawal. The rulers of the Trucial 
States found themselves obliged to proceed to union without relying on Qatar and 
Bahrain, especially after the UK made it clear that it would not give the Trucial States 
their independence unless they formed a kind of federation. 609 They continued the 
process of unification and adopted the provisional constitution prepared by the Egyptian 
expert with some minor amendments. 61 0 Ras al-Khaimah rejected the proposed 
constitution on the basis that it favoured both Abu Dhabi and Dubai . 
61 1 However, the 
rulers of six states, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al Qwain, and Fujairah 
declared on 18 July 1971 a federation between the six Emirates, with an open door for 
Ras al-Khaimah if she decided to join the union in the future. As a consequence of the 
Iranian occupation of the Tunbs islands belonging to Ras al-Khaimah, the latter asked to 
join the Federation on 10 February 1972 without preconditions. 612 The Federation of the 
607 Alshaheen, A., op. cit., p. 56 
608 Abulmajd, A., "Annizarn Addustoori li Dawlat Al-Emarat Alarabyyah Almuttahedah", in: Dawlat Al- 
Emarat Alarabyyah Ahnuflahedah: Derasah Mashiyyah Shamelah, op. cit., p. 15 
609 Ibid., p. 16 
610 AI-Ghufli, S., op. cit., p. 11 
611 Ibid., p. 11 
612 Al Abed, I., "The Historical Background and Constitutional Basis to the Federation", In: Ghareeb, E. 
& Al Abed, I., op. cit., p. 1 II 
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seven Emirates, under the name of the United Arab Emirates, came into existence on 2' 
December 1971. 
IV. 2.2. The Features of the UAE Constitution 
IV. 2.2.1. The UAE Constitution is a Grant 
It was well understood by the rulers of the lower Gulf that to establish the new state an 
agreement on the constitutional basis, like the form of the state and the extent of powers 
that its national institutions would enjoy, must first be reached. However, such an 
agreement was not an easy task. The Trucial States themselves may have not been 
convinced by the union either, but because of the compelling circumstances they were 
confronting, they agreed on a provisional constitution. One of the reasons for such 
failure, in addition to the above mentioned, may have been the absence of popular 
participation in decision making for the proposed state. The rulers had no restraints 
whatsoever upon their choice. They were free to decide on whether to join the union or 
to sit aside. If the federation had been a reflection of popular will, then there would have 
been some accountability, in the sense that the rulers would have had to satisfy either 
such popular demands or to give convincing reasons for not doing so. 
Indeed, discussing the reasons for the failure of the Federation of Arab Emirates is 
beyond this chapter. However, it might be useful to provide an answer to the question 
on whether the constitution was granted by the rulers so they could suspend it or even 
nullify it whenever they wished, or as a contract between the rulers on the one hand and 
the people on the other. 
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It is traditionally believed that a written constitution can either be made by a democratic 
process, such as by an elected council or being approved by a referendum, or made by 
bureaucratic means, such as being granted by the ruler or taking the form of a contract 
between the ruler and the people. 613 There is no doubt that the people of the Trucial 
States were not involved in the process of making the original constitution. So, our 
focus will be on the bureaucratic means; whether the constitution is a grant or contract. 
Some scholars have suggested that the UAE constitution is a grant. 614 They argued that 
the preamble of the constitution clearly indicates such a nature when it states that 
"We the Rulers of the Emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ajman, Umm Al Qwain and 
Fiýairah ... whereas it is our desire... We proclaim before the Supreme and 
Omnipotent Creator, and before all the people, our agreement to this constitution. t6I5 
So, since the constitution was agreed by the rulers alone, with no popular participation, 
then the constitution is a grant and hence as it was granted by the rulers to the people, 
they can take it away whenever they wish or change any of its principles without 
popular participation. 616 
613 Alshrqawi, S. & Nasif, A., 41qanon Addustoori iva Annizant Assiyasy Ahnasry. - tahreer a1eqt1sad iva 
dsloor sanat 1971, (in Arabic), Cairo: Jame'aat Al-Qaherah, 1994, p. 91 see also Attabtaba'i, A., Annizam 
Addustoorifi Al-Kinvait, (in Arabic), 1998, p. 96 
614 For more about this view, see Ibrahim, M., Usos Altanzeem Assiyasy 1va Addustoorl le DcAvIal Al- 
Enzarat Alarabyyah 41nizinahedah, (in Arabic), Abu Dhabi: Markaz Al Watha'eq wa Adderasat, 1975, 
p. 154. See also Attabtaba'i, A,, Annizam Al-Illihadifi DmvIatAl-EmaratAlarabyyah, (in Arabic), Ph. D. 
Thesis, Al-Qaherah: Jame'aat Ain Shams, 1978, pp. 82-83. Moreover, see Alhulu, M., Anzimat Al Hilkni 
iva Dstoor Dmvlal Al-Emarat, (in Arabic), Al Ain: Maktabat Al Ain Alwataniyyah, pp. 158-159 61 5 Note that Ras al-Khaimah joined the union on the I I"' of February 1972. 
616 Alshrqawi, S. & Nasif, A., op. cit., p., 92 This is evidenced by the fact that Article 144(2) (a) gives the 
ultimate say on the constitutional amendment, as we will see below, to the Federal Supreme Council, 
which consists of the rulers of the states, in that the definition of the topmost interest of the federation that 
requires constitutional amendment has been left to the members of the Federal Supreme Council to 
decide. 
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Other scholars reject this view, suggesting that the constitution is not a grant. They 
assert their view on the ground that the grant constitution requires a ruler to act 
according to his own free will in establishing the constitution of a given state. They 
believe that in the case of the constitution of the UAE, the rulers did not act according 
to their own free will; rather, they were under pressure of certain international and 
domestic circumstances which inevitably rendered this the only option open to them. 617 
Those authors do not believe, either, that the constitution is a contract between the 
rulers and the people. Their view is that the constitution is neither a grant nor a contract 
between the rulers and the people, but a special type of contract conducted among the 
rulers themselves. 61 8 They argue that the federation, which was desperately needed for 
the sake of security and complete independence, could not have been established 
without the constitution. So, the constitution was merely a step in the process of 
federation, rather than a permanent charter and the rulers agreed on a provisional 
constitution to assure that the basis of the federation was settled. Thus, they conclude 
that the UAE constitution is, in fact, an agreement among the rulers themselves and 
nothing else. 
Although this argument seems to be more convincing, it does not provide a proper 
answer to the main question. It focuses solely on the relationship among the rulers 
themselves, whereas the question is about the relationship between the rulers of the 
Emirates and their people. 
617 AI-Ghufli, S., op. cit., p. 13 
618 Supporters of this view are Abulmajd, A., "Annizam Addustoori li Dawlat Al-Emarat Alarabyyah 
Almuttahedah", in: Denviat Al-Emarat Alarabyyah Almultahedah: Derasalt Mashiyyah Shamelah, op. cit., 
p. 23, and Khaleel, M., kinizam Addusloori U Al-Emarat Alarab", ah Almultahedah, (in Arabic), Al-Ain: 
Jame'aat AI-Emarat Alarabyyah Almuttahedah, 1999, pp. 130-133, At-Ghufli, S., op. cit., p. 13 
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It is true that the circumstances surrounding the formation of the UAE federation were 
compelling and the rulers were under pressure to establish some kind of cooperation, 
but this does not mean that the rulers were obliged to form this particular type of 
federation. The rulers actually had a choice among several types of cooperation to 
defend themselves against any external dangers. However they chose to establish this 
particular type of federation. 
Moreover, the UK did not seem to have compelled the rulers to establish one federal 
government with one constitution, so long as they were agreed on a reasonable type of 
cooperation that would assure their security. Furthermore, Qatar and Bahrain were 
originally in the union and they finally decided to withdraw, which indicates that the 
main motivator was their own free will, and the same is also true in the case of Ras al- 
Khaimah. So, it might be true to say, as a result, that the rulers in the formation of the 
UAE constitution were acting according to their own free will and hence the 
constitution that resulted from this process is a grant, since there was no popular 
participation. The argument that suggests that the constitution is a special type seems to 
be an escape from the real question of the legal justification of the relationship between 
the rulers of the Emirates and their people. Even if we submit that the constitution is a 
special type of contract, this does not change that fact that the rulers alone, in both 
cases, can change its main principles without popular participation. Again, the question 
is not about the relationship among the rulers themselves but actually about the 
relationship between the rulers of the Emirates and their people. 
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IV. 2.2.2. The UAE Constitution is a Written and Inflexible Constitution 
Constitutions in general can be classified into written and unwritten constitutions and 
can also be classified into flexible and inflexible constitutions. 619 The written 
constitution provides clear indications of what should happen and what is required to 
put its provisions into action. It is far from any ambiguity in respect of its 
implementation, in contrast with the unwritten type which is rather ambiguous in this 
regard. Flexible constitutions can be defined as those which can be amended or altered 
with comparative ease, while inflexible constitutions are those where amendment is 
more difficult. 
620 
There is no doubt that the UAE constitution is a written constitution. The circumstances 
surrounding the formation of the UAE and its constitution required a written 
constitution to establish the union on strong constitutional grounds. 
Moreover, since the amendment of the provisions of the UAE constitution requires 
going through different procedures from those recognized for the issue or amendment of 
ordinary laws, it might be considered as having a rigid or inflexible character. The 
Articles 110,2, (a) and 144,2, (a) of the UAE Constitution have expressed that the 
amendment of the constitution's provisions must first be proposed by the Federal 
Supreme Council to be submitted to the Federal National Council, whereas, in making 
federal laws, a Bill must first be prepared by the Council of Ministries to be forwarded 
to the Federal National Council (parliament). 621 In addition, the majority vote required 
619Amheim, M., The Handbook offfinnan Rights Lmv. An Accessible Approachfor the Workplace, 
London: Kogan Page, 2004, p. 65. See also Abulmajd, A., "Annizarn Addustoori li Dawlat Al-Emarat 
Alarabyyah Almuttahedah", in: Dmvlat AI-Emarat Alarabyyah Allnuttahedah: Derasall Mashiyyah 
Shamelah, op. cit., p. 19 
620 Parp%vorth, N., op. cit., p. 7 
621 See articles I 10,2, (a) and 144,2, (a) of the UAE Constitution. 
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in the Federal National Council to approve an amendment to the constitution is higher 
than the majority required to approve federal laws. 622 
It has been argued that the inflexible character of the constitution demonstrates the 
sanctity of its provisions, in the sense that no one can ever touch such provisions, even 
the Federal Supreme Council, the highest body in the land, except in the event of the 
623 
utmost danger to the interest of the Federation. Article 144 (2) (a) of the constitution 
suggests that the Supreme Council cannot amend the constitution unless there is a 
compelling interest of the federation requiring such an amendment, which may confirm 
the supremacy of the constitution. 624 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the preservation of the supremacy of the 
constitutional provisions requires more than different amendment procedures from those 
designed to amend the ordinary laws. The amendment must go through more difficult, 
not only different, constitutional procedures. 
Close examination of the constitutional provisions in respect of the amendment of the 
constitution does not provide a clear answer to the question of whether these 
amendment procedures constitute any difficulty in any way. Although Article 144(2) (a) 
allows the Supreme Council to amend the constitution under the condition of its being 
required by the topmost interests of the Federation, it has not provided any definition of 
such topmost interests. So, any interest decided by the Supreme Council to be a topmost 
622 Article 144,2, (c) states that "the approval ofthe Federal National Councilfor a draft constitutional 
amendment shall require the agreement of nvo thirds of the votes of members present", while article 89 
does not specify any majority for the Federal National Council approval of federal laws. A simple 
ma'ority of "haLrofthe members phis one" of members present seem to be adequate. 
623 Alshaheen, A., op. cit., p. 78 
624 Article 144 (2) (a) states that "If the Supreme Council considers that the topmost interests require the 
amendment of this Constitution, it shall submit a draft constitutional amendment to Federal National 
Council. " 
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interest, would indeed be treated as such, since it seems no other institution can review 
any of the Supreme Council's resolutions, especially in this regard. It is rightly said, 
therefore, that the condition of the "topmost interests" of the Federation is not a 
restriction upon the Council; rather it is a directive principle confirming the special 
status of the constitution. 625 
Moreover, - there are, indeed, differences between the amendment of the ordinary laws 
and the amendment of the constitution, but these differences do not necessarily suggest 
any difficulty in the process. That is, in accordance with the Articles 47,54,60, the 
legislative and the executive powers seem to be centred in the president of the 
Federation and the Federal Supreme Council. The Federal Council of Ministers seems 
to be an institution branched from the Supreme Council to help the latter in its 
legislative and executive power by proposing laws and implementing them on the 
ground. There does not seem to be a constitutional recognition of the principle of strict 
separation of powers, in the sense that legislative and executive powers in the UAE 
constitution are not assigned to different institutions. Therefore, it might be true to say 
that assigning the preparation for issuing or amending federal laws to the Council of 
Ministers and the preparation of the constitutional laws to the Supreme Council does not 
seem to indicate a substantive difference, since the latter has the last word on the overall 
legislative matters. Furthermore, Article 110 (3) (a) seems to indicate that the Federal 
National Council is merely a consultative committee issuing recommendations on the 
law-making process to help the Federal Supreme Council in exercising its legislative 
authority. It states that 
623 Abulmajd, A., "Annizarn Addustoori li Dawlat Al-Emarat Alarabyyah Almuttahedah", in: Dmvlat, 41- 
Eniaral. 4larabyyah, 41mititahedah: Derasah Mashiyyah Shamelah, op. cit., p. 21 
184 
Chapter Four. The UAE Islamic Constitution and the International Requirements of Human Rights Protection 
'Ifthe Federal National Council inserts any amendment to the bill and this amendment 
is not acceptable to the President of the Federation or the Supreme Council, or if the 
Federal National Council rejects the hill, the President of the Federation or the 
Supreme Council may refer it back to the National Council. If the Federal National 
Council introduces any amendment on that occasion which is not acceptable to the 
President of the Federation or the Supreme Council, or if the Federal National Council 
decides to reject the bill, the President of the Federation may promulgate the lMv after 
ratification by the Supreme Council. , 626 
Although this Article is concerned with the issue of ordinary laws, it is also applicable 
to the process of the constitutional amendment, since Article 144 (2) (b) states that "The 
procedure for providing the constitutional anzendinent shall be the saine as the 
procedure for approving lenVS.,, 627 Thus, the special majority vote required in the 
Federal National Council for amending the constitution does not make any substantive 
difference at all, since the Council's opinion is not binding. Thus, the rigidity of the 
UAE constitution is in fact uncertain in this respect. 
It is worthwhile to be mentioned, however, that the constitution established by Article 
95 the Federal Supreme Court to examine the constitutionality of legislation, being the 
ultimate source of the interpretation of the constitutional provisions. 628 This is, indeed, 
626 Article 110 (3) (a) of the UAE Constitution. 
627 The only valid interpretation for this clause is that the processes of discussion and the stages that must 
be fulfilled for the amendment of the constitution are to be the same as those required for approving 
federal laws. This means that the procedures contained in Article 110 (3) (a) concerning the amendment 
of federal laws will also be the procedures for amending the constitution. Otherwise, Article 144 would 
be in contradiction. That is, while Article 144 (2) (a) and (c) underline different procedures for 
constitutional amendment from those recognized for issuing and amending ordinary laws, paragraph (b) 
suggests that the procedures for approving the constitutional amendment shall be the same as the 
procedures for approving laws. See the footnote in Abulmajd, A., "Annizam Addustoori li Dawlat Al- 
Emarat Alarabyyah Almuttahedah", in: DinvIal AI-Emarat Alarabyyah Almultahedah: Derasah 
Mashiyyah Shamelah, op. cit., p. 21 
628 See Article 99 of the UAE Constitution 
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another dimension that secures the supremacy of the constitution in that it has been put 
under the Federal Supreme Court protection. The Federal Supreme Court clearly 
underlined the superiority of the constitution in its interpretation no. I of 14 April 1974, 
suggesting that legislation in general cannot contradict any provision of the 
constitution. 629 
IV. 3. The Distribution of the Jurisdictions and Powers between Federal 
and Local Institutions in the UAE Constitution 
Some Western authors, as seen in Chapter Two, claim that the application of Islam in 
the state political sphere is to eliminate due process and modem independent state 
institutions, to place legal proceedings and important decisions under the control of 
clerics and religious leaders. 630 In this section we will challenge this view by 
demonstrating the various constitutional institutions the UAE recognises with an 
analysis of their effect in the UAE constitutional system. As discussed in Chapter Two 
the federal system of governance could play an important role in limiting the state's 
political power in its scope of authority. Some authors describe this type of limitation as 
vertical separation of powers. 631 The UAE, as a federal state, embraces a clear political 
identity with clear distribution of powers between its federal and local authorities, 
which could help in forming a foundation for limited and responsible government. We 
will discuss this further below by examining the articles of the UAE constitution. 
Articles 120 and 121 of the UAE constitution stipulate the matters which exclusively 
fall within the jurisdiction of the federal government, being silent on what falls within 
the jurisdiction of the local institutions. In stipulating the powers and jurisdictions of 
629 See Application for Constitutional Interpretation no. 1 of the year no. 3,14 April 1974 
630 Mayer, A. E., op. cit., 1999, p. 28. See also Bernard Lewis's opinion cited in Monshipouri, M., op. cit., 
F;, 216 
Baun, M. J., and Franklin, D. P., op. cit., p. 43 
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the Federation, leaving the local institutions with unspecified general powers and 
jurisdictions, the UAE constitution gives the local institutions a stronger presence in the 
state public life, with all powers that are outside the lists of the federal jurisdiction. This 
readiness of the UAE constitution to give preference to the local govermnents of the 
Emirates may have been due to the rulers' concern about losing their authority to the 
Federal government. The excePtions stated in Articles 123,124, and 149 of the 
constitution to the jurisdiction of the federal government in favour of the individual 
emirates indicate that point. It is said that the rulers of the Emirates seek, by the 
insertion of these articles, to preserve as much as possible of their power. 632 However, 
Abulmajd has remarked that the two lists in Article 120 and 121 are virtually 
comprehensive and contain the essential matters, leaving little within the jurisdiction of 
Emirates. 633 Moreover, these exceptions, particularly those which concern paragraph 1 
of Article 120, according to Article 123 are limited to the approval of the Federal 
Supreme Council, whose decision on the matter is of immediate effect. Below we will 
discuss the federal institutions recognised by the UAE constitution to have a clear 
picture of the UAE constitutional structures. 
IV. 3.1. The Federal Institutions in the UAE Constitution 
The UAE is an Islamic state and yet the main formal structures of the modem state, as 
will be shown in this section, are also recognised. In fact, Muslims recognised the 
concept of constitution a long time ago when establishing the first Islamic state in 
Madinah. The Madinah Char-ter is considered the basis of Islamic constitutionalism in 
632 Taryarn, A., The Trucial States, London: Allen and Unwin, 1970, p. 234 
633 Abulmajd, A., "Annizarn Addustoori li Dawlat Al-Emarat Alarabyyah Almuttahedah", in: DmvIat Al- 
Emaral Alarabyyah Ahnuttahedah: Derasah Mashiyyah Shamelah, op. cit., p. 46. 
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Islamic history, serving as the source of political power and law for state authorities. 634 
The Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, could have established the first Islamic 
state by his religious power as revealed by Allah and this would have been enough to 
serve as a basis for the new community, with this revelation forced upon Muslims and 
non-Muslims alike. However, he did not rely on his religious legitimacy but chose to 
draw up a specific constitution based on the consent of all who would be affected by its 
implementation. This clearly demonstrates the constitutional character of the Islamic 
state, where the political leader ruled on the basis of the explicit written consent of all 
citizens of the state. 635 Thus, being an Islamic state is not an obstacle to the endorsement 
of the modem values of a constitutional state. The UAE Islamic constitution 
demonstrates this point by recognising the main formal structures of the modem state. 
We will examine below various constitutional institutions recognised by the UAE 
constitution, with an assessment of their roles in the UAE constitutional system, 
showing that the Islamic character of the UAE constitution did not raise any difficulty 
in the exercise of the constitutional functions of the UAE institutions. 
Article 45 specifies the federal authorities of the UAE which consist of. 
1. The Federal Supreme Council. 
2. The President of the Federation and his Deputy. 
3. The Federal Council of Ministers. 
4. The Federal National Council. 
5. The Judiciary of the Federation. 636 
Each of these authorities will be discussed as follows: 
634 Benveen, M., Al-Wathiqa: The First Islamic Constitution, 23 Journal of Muslim Minority, 4ffairs, No. 
1,2003, p. 105 
635 Ibid., p. 115 
636 See Part Four, Article 45 of the UAE constitution 
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IV. 3.1.1. The Federal Supreme Council 
Article 46 states that the Federal Supreme Council is the highest authority in the 
Federation consisting of the rulers of the Emirates. Each of the seven Emirates has a 
single vote in the deliberations of the Federal Supreme Council. Although Article 46 
seems to indicate that the Constitution has adopted the equal votes rule in the Supreme 
Council in decision making, Article 49 shows that the voting requirements vary 
according to whether substantive or procedural matters are being decided upon. On 
substantive matters, Article 49 seem to favour Abu Dhabi and Dubai in requiring for the 
validity of a decision a majority of five of the Supreme Council members, provided that 
this majority includes the votes of the Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. On the other 
hand, decisions of the Supreme Council on procedural matters shall be by a majority 
vote of the Council members, without mentioning that such majority should include any 
of the Emirates composing the Federation. 
The constitution, however, does not define what may constitute a 'substantive matter'. 
Although the Supreme Council bye-law of 17 July 1972 laid down procedural matters, 
this does not mean that other matters which do not fall under the Council bye-law are 
necessarily substantive, because defining what is substantive and procedural is itself a 
substantive matter, which the Supreme Council has to define. 637 The Emirates of Abu 
Dhabi and Dubai, therefore, seem to have a veto in any decision that the Federal 
Supreme Council has to make. Thus, the ultimate players of the UAE Federation seem 
to be these two biggest Emirates, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, which play a key role in 
deciding all essential matters that require a majority vote. The only case in which the 
constitution requires the unanimous agreement of the Supreme Council is when they are 
637 Obaid, M., NumniAlln(kni iva DstoorAl-Emarat, (in Arabic), First Edition, Dubai: Albayan, 1994, p. 415 
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deciding whether any other independent Arab country may join the Federation of the 
UAE. 638 
IV. 3.1.2. The President of the Federation and his Deputy 
Article 51 states that" The Federal Supreme Cotmed shall elect front among its 
members a President, and a Vice-President of the Federation .... ... This article of the 
constitution clearly states that the President of the Union and the Vice-President are 
both members of the Federal Supreme Council in which they both would hold two 
offices: as ruler of an Emirate, and as President or Vice-President of the Federation. 
The combination of ruling an Emirate and holding at the same time the federal office 
may lead to a conflict of interest between the local government and the federal 
institution and this is worrying, particularly in the UAE, which has only limited 
experience of the federation system. 639 Article 51 states that a President and Vice 
President of the Federation shall be elected by the Federal Supreme Council from 
among its members. Article 52 states that the term of office of the President and the 
Vice-President shall be five Gregorian years and indicates that they are eligible to be re- 
elected to the same office. It is important to note that the constitution does not limit the 
number of times that the President and Vice-President can be re-elected. 640 
Article 51 of the UAE Constitution makes it clear that no one can hold the presidency 
or vice presidency of the UAE unless he was elected by the Supreme Council of the 
Federation. Although the election is confined in the members of the council, it is still a 
step toward more comprehensive democratic government, particularly when we 
compare the situation in the UAE with other neighbouring states, where the presidency 
638 See Article I of the UAE Constitution 
639 Khaled, M., op. cit., p. 206. 
640 See Articles 51 and 52 of the UAE Constitution 
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is occupied only through heredity. 641 It is worthwhile to mention, however, that 
although the presidency and vice presidency are open to all members of the Council, 
these two positions seem to be more likely to go to Abu Dhabi and Dubai, because of 
their importance in the Federation and their right of veto in the Supreme Council. 642 
Sheikh Zayid, the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, for example was elected President of the UAE 
in 1971 and has been re-elected a further five times. Sheikh Rashid Al Maktom, the 
Ruler of Dubai, was also elected Vice-President in 1971, and was re-elected three 
subsequent times before his death in 1991. After his death his son Sheikh Maktorn 
became ruler of Dubai, and was elected Vice-President of the Federation in 1991, and 
then re-clected in 1996. After the death of Sheikh Zayid, his son Sheikh Khalifah was 
recently elected to the presidency in 2004. 
IV. 3.1.3. The Federal Council of Ministers 
The Federal Council of Minister consists of the Prime Minister, his Deputy and a 
number of Ministers chosen from among the citizens of the Federation. 643 The Prime 
Minister and his Deputy are both appointed by the president of the Federation. The 
Council of Ministers is only empowered to carry out general policy as formulated by 
641 See Article 8 of Qatar constitution, for example, which sates "The Ride of the State shall he hereditary 
ivithin the . 41 Thani family and by the male successors of Hamad bin Khalifia bin Hamad bin Abdullah bin Jassim. The inheritance of the Ride shall go to the son to be named by the Emir as I*IrApparent. If there is no 
male offspring, the Ride shall be transferred to the onefrom thefamily whom the Endr names as Heir Apparent 
and, in this case, the Rule irould then be inherited by his male successors. A special Imp shall organise all 
provisions related to the ruling of the State and its inheritance, to be issued within one year of the date of this 
Constitudon coming inloforce, and should have a Constitutional validity. " Moreover, In the Saudi Arabia, the 
Saudi basic law of government adopted in 1992 declared that Saudi Arabia is a monarchy ruled by the sons and 
grandsons of the first king, Abd Al Aziz Al Saud. The current head of the Al-Saud and ruler of Saudi Arabia, 
King Abdullah bin Abdul- Aziz, announced, on 20 October 2006, the creation of a committee of princes to vote 
on the viability of kings and the candidature of nominated crown princes, which in effect, clarifying and 
further defining the Al-Saud's line of succession process. The committee, to be known as the Bay'ah Council, 
would include all the sons and some grandsons of the late King Abdul-Aziz who would vote for one of three 
princes nominated by the king as Heir Apparents. See the king's announcement of the Bay'ah Council in 
Alriydh newspaper wcbsite, (in Arabic), Available Online at 
http: //%v%v%v. airiyadh. com/2006/10/2 I /article 195 873. htmI 
642AI-Owais, H., The Role of the Supreme Court in the Constitutional System of the United Arab Emirales A 
Comparative Study, Ph. D. Thesis, University of Durham, U. K, 1989, p. 188 
643 See Article 55 and Article 56 of the UAE constitution. 
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the Supreme Council and is politically responsible collectively before the President of - 
the Federation and the Federal Supreme Council for execution of the general policy of 
the federation, in both domestic and foreign affairs. 644 Article 64 also states that each 
minister is personally responsible to the President of the Federation and the Supreme 
Council for the activities of his ministry or office. The Federal Supreme Court in its 
constitutional interpretation no. 3,1976 confirmed such responsibility and asserted that 
the Prime Minister and the Ministers are politically accountable before the President of 
the federation and the Supreme Council, and are legally accountable before the 
Supreme Court for any criminal activity. 645 
To guarantee the impartiality of Ministers, Article 62 prevents the Prime Minister, his 
Deputy, or any federal Ministers, while in officp, from exercising any profession, 
commercial or financial occupation or from entering into any commercial transactions 
with the Government of the federation or the Government of the Emirates; or 
combining with their office the membership of the board of directors of any financial or 
commercial company. 
IV. 3.1.4. The Federal National Council 
The Federal National Council is composed of forty members divided as follows 
between the different Emirates: Abu Dhabi and Dubai 8 seats each, Sharjah and Ras al 
646 Khaimah 6 seats each, Ajman, Umm Al Qwain and Fu airah 4 seats each. The term i 
of membership in the Federal National Council is two Gregorian years commencing 
from the date of its first meeting. 647 The members have parliamentary immunity from 
644 See Article 64 of the UAE constitution. See also Obaid, M., op. cit, 1994, p. 440 
645 The Supreme Court judgement no. 3, for the fourth year, issued on 18-11-1976, "interpretation judgment" 
brought to the court by the Minister ofjustice to interpret Article 99(5) of the constitution. 
'546 See Article 68 of the UAE Constitution 
647 See Article 72 of the UAE Constitution 
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penal proceedings and cannot be censured for any opinions or views expressed in the 
course of carrying out their duties within the council or its committees. 648 
Although the UAE constitution was designed for "preparing the people of the 
ftderation ... for a noble andftee constitutional life, progressing by steps towards a 
comprehensive, i-epresentative, democratic regime", the current method of selecting the 
member of the Federal National Council is that each Ruler of the Emirate chooses and 
appoints the member he considers best to represent the state he governs. It is worth 
noting, however, that the members of the Federal National Council represent all the 
people of the federation and not merely the Emirate which selected them. 649 
Although the Federal National Council is supposed to serve as the Parliament of the 
Federation, its legislative function has been considered by many commentators weak 
and the council does not go beyond being a consultative institution, established to assist 
the Supreme Council to exercise legislative power in the federation. 650 The constitution 
clearly states in Article 110 (3) that amendment or rejection by the Federal National 
Council is not binding on the Federal Supreme Council. That is to say, if the Federal 
National Council inserts any amendment to the bill and this amendment is not 
acceptable to the President of the Federation or to the Federal Supreme Council, or if 
the Federal National Council rejects the bill, the President of the Federation or the 
Federal Supreme Council may refer the bill back to the Federal National Council. If the 
Federal National Council introduces any amendment on this occasion which is not 
acceptable to the President of the Federation or the Federal Supreme Council, or if the 
648 Articles 82, and 81 of the UAE Constitution 
649 See Article 77 of the UAE constitution 
650 Abulmajd, A., "Annizarn Addustoori li Dawlat Al-Emarat Alarabyyah Almuttahedah", in: Dcnvlat Al- 
Emarat Alarabyyah Almuttahedah: Derasah Mashiyyah Shanielah, op. cit., p. 72. See also, Heard-Bey, F., 
From Trucial States to UnitedArab Endrates: A society in transition, London: Longman Group, 1982, p. 377 
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Federal National Council decides to reject the bill, the President of the Federation may 
promulgate the law after ratification by the Supreme Council. This clearly shows that 
the Federal National Council is no more than a consultative council for the Supreme 
Council and its legislative power consists only of making consultative 
recommendations to the President of the Federation and to the Federal Supreme 
Council. 651 
However, in practice the Federal National Council has used its power in full extent and 
managed to amend many bills and even did not hesitate to reject some bills proposed by 
the government. Alrokn has demonstrated in his study that the Council in the period 
between 12 February 1972 and 12 July 1989 succeeded in amending one hundreds and 
five bills which amounted to over half of the bills proposed by the government. There 
were also five Bills rejected by the members of the Council and this small number of 
rejected Bills was to avoid clashes with the government at an early stage. 652 The Federal 
National Council also managed to stand against the issue of the UAE penal law which 
took the government thirteen months to reach compromise with the Council. 653 The 
main obstacle, as indicated in the Alrokn study, was the crime against state security 
which according to the Federal National Council was not clearly defined and the 
punishments were very harsh which could lead to the violation of citizens' rights. 654 
The Council succeeded in omitting Articles 149,169,183,184,202 and 203 which took 
a hard line against those expressing views or spreading information about the state. 655 
651 See Article I 10 (3) of the UAE constitution 
652 See Alrokn, M., A Study of the United, 4rab Endrates Legislature under the 1971 Constitution with 
XS ecial Reference to the Federal National Council, PhD Thesis, University of Wanvick, 199 1, p. 257 3 Ibid., p. 260 654 Ibid., p. 261 655 Ibid., p. 262 
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IV. 3.1.5. The Judiciary of the Federation 
According to Article 95, the Federation recognises two types of court, the Federal 
Supreme Court and the Federal Primary Courts (courts of first instance). The Federal 
Supreme Court is the highest court in the judicial system in the UAE and sits in the 
federal capital and it may, exceptionally, assemble when necessary in the capital of one 
I of the Emirates. 656 The Federal Primary Courts, however, could sit in the permanent 
capital of the federation or in the capitals of some of the Emirates. 657 
The constitution provides for each Emirate to have its own judicial system. Article 104 
states that the local judicial authorities in each Emirate shall have jurisdiction in all 
judicial matters not assigned to the federal judicature by the constitution. However, 
Article 105 allows an Emirate to transfer all or part of its local judicial authority to the 
Federal Primary Courts. This article seems to have been designed to facilitate the 
creation of a federal judicial system. The Federal law no. 6,1978 which transferred 
local judicial. authority in Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, Ajman, and Fujairah to the Federal 
Primary Courts in each Emirate, was the first step towards this federal judiciary. Umm 
al, Qwain subsequently joined the federal judicial system in 1991. Dubai and Ras al 
Khaimah are the only two emirates which still retain their own local judicial system. 
Generally speaking, there are three types of Federal Primary Courts: the Shari'ah Court, 
which applies Islamic law in matters related to family affairs such as proof of marriage, 
divorce and inheritance for Muslims; second, the Criminal Courts which have 
jurisdiction in criminal laws and which, in various degrees, as will be seen below, apply 
Islamic law for major crimes; third the Civil Courts, which have a general jurisdiction 
656 See Article 100 of the UAE constitution 
657 See Article 102 of the UAE constitution 
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on civil and commercial transactions, administrative, banking, insurance and traffic 
matters. 
The UAE constitution did not establish federal courts of appeal; however, it suggests in 
Articlel. 05 that any circumstances in which appeals against judgments by local judicial 
authorities shall be defined by a Federal law. Article I of the Federal law no. 6,1978 
established the federal courts of appeal, which, in practice only converted the existing 
local courts of appeal into Federal Appeal Courts; one in Sharjah hearing appeals from 
Shaýah and the Northern Emirates, the other in Abu Dhabi hearing appeals from Abu 
Dhabi courts. 658 
Thus, according to the discussion above, the constitutional institutions which are 
supposed to regulate the political authorities are fonnally established in the UAE and 
the state's political powers are clearly distributed among these institutions, as well as 
between the local and federal governments. This is clearly an important factor for the 
establishment of limited and responsible government, which in its turn would enhance 
and promote human rights in the UAE. Islam has not been an obstacle to the 
endorsement of the modem values of a constitutional state. Whether or not these 
constitutional structures are effective is a matter that is more dependent on the political 
will of the state than on the principles of Islam. 
IVA The Constitutional System of Government and the Separation of 
Powers 
In embarking on the discussion of the kind of government the UAE constitution 
recognizes, it is important to tackle first the question as to whether the UAE constitution 
recognizes the principle of separation of powers. This principle is believed to be one of 
653 M-Ghuffi, op. cit., p. 33 
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the important mechanisms that prevent arbitrary use of powers through distributing the 
state's powers among the three state authorities, namely, the legislature, executive and 
the judiciary, requiring each authority to act independently. 659 The UAE constitution 
has, however, distributed the state's powers among five organs, as discussed above, 
without indicating which organ has the legislative and which has the executive power. 
The Federal Supreme Council has been accorded, according to the Article 47, the 
legislative authority to sanction the federal laws and state decrees 660 and according to 
Article I 10 no law can be recognized as such unless was signed by the President and 
sanctioned by the Federal Supreme Council . 
66 1 Further, Article I 10 (3) (a) seems to 
indicate that the Federal National Council is merely a consultative committee and the 
essence of its work seems to be confined to issuing non-binding recommendations to the 
Federal Supreme Council and the President to help them in the exercise of their 
legislative authority. 662 However, Article 94 of the constitution has granted the judiciary 
independence, suggesting that 'judges ... shall not be subject to any authority but the law 
and their own conscience. , 663 
Some commentators believe that the UAE constitution has not recognized the principle 
of separation of powers, since both the legislative and the executive powers are centred 
in the hands of the Supreme Council, which consists of the rulers of the Emirates with 
659 Barendt, E., op. cit., p. 14-16. See also Khaleel. M., op. cit., pp. 188-189 
660 See paragraph 2,3, and 4 of Article 47 of the UAE Constitution. 
661 See Paragraph 2 (c ) of the Article 110 of the UAE Constitution. 
662 See Paragraph 3 (a ) of the Article 110 of the UAE Constitution which clearly suggests that if the 
Federal National Council insists on the insertion of an amendment to the proposed bill and this 
amendment is not acceptable to the President or the Supreme Council, the latter may promulgate the law 
with disregard of the Federal National Council's suggestion. 
663 See Article 94 of the UAE Constitution which states that "Justice is on the basis ofrule. In performing 
their ditties, judges shall be independent and shall not be subject to any authority but the laiv and their 
own conscience. " 
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the union president. 664 Because of such non-recognition of the constitutional principle 
of separation of powers, they argue, the UAE goveniment cannot be classified under the 
parliamentary system of government, nor can it be described as presidential 
government. They believe that the main distinction between those two systems of 
government lies in the principle of separation of powers, which is not recognized by the 
UAE constitution. 665 Accordingly, they conclude that the system of government is a 
special type of government consistent with the tribal circumstances within which the 
Federation was established. 666 
Although this argument seems to be convincing at first glance, close examination may 
reveal a different conclusion. The above view seems to be more concerned with the 
separation of persons, rather than the separation of powers, in the sense that it focuses 
on the form rather than the substance. To put it simply, strict separation of persons does 
not necessarily mean strict separation of powers. Although, for example, The USA 
system is traditionally believed as having strict separation of powers, close examination 
indicates that it recognises strict separation of persons; but with some degree of power 
overlap to secure the functionality of check and balance. 667 The president, although he is 
an executive, can veto a Bill put by the Congress, the legislature. The latter, on the other 
hand, can override the veto of the president by a two-thirds majority of both Houses of 
Congress. 668 The court also can override legislation enacted by the legislature or acts of 
664 Khaleel, M., op. cit., p. 188, see also Alhulu, M., Anziniat, 41 Hitkni iva Dstoor Dmvlat, 41-Emarat, op. 
cit., p. 171. Moreover, see Abulmajd, A., "Annizarn Addustoori li Dawlat Al-Emarat Alarabyyah 
Almuttahedah", op. cit., p. 8 1. Furthermore, see Obaid, M., op. cit. 1994, p. 4 10 665 Khaleel. M., op. cit., p. 188 
666 See Alhulu, M., Anziniat Al Hitkni iva Dstoor DaWat AI-Emarat, op. cit., p. 171. Moreover, see 
Abulmajd, A., "Annizarn Addustoori li Dawlat At-Emarat Alarabyyah Almuttahedah", op. cit., p. 81, 
Obaid, M., op. cit., 1994, p. 41O. However, some commentators believe that such a tribal constitutional 
system does not weaken the constitution at all, because the main reason for the principle of separation of 
powers is to protect the rights of people and these rights and freedoms are already recognized within the 
text of the constitution. See Khaleel, M., op. cit., p. 189 
667 Barendt, E., op. cit., p. 15 
669 See Article I section 7 of the US Constitution 
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an executive, inconsistent with the constitution. 669 Accordingly, it is unsatisfactory to 
say that the constitution of the USA, which adopts the presidential system of 
government, recognizes pure separation of powers, even though their institutions are 
strictly separated. It follows that prevention of the arbitrary use of powers does not 
necessarily need pure separation of powers. Good government can be assured even if 
there is overlap between state powers, as long as this overlap of powers was intended to 
conduct a review by one branch of government over the use of power of the other. This 
principle is known as a check and balance principle, which requires each branch of 
goverment to check exercise of power by the others. 
In the UK constitutional system, the parliamentary system of government, there seems 
to be no separation of persons or even powers in tenns of the legislature and the 
executive. The executive in this system consists of members of the legislature, to which 
it is responsible. The government ministers, although they are members of the 
executive, exercise a legislative function, not only because they sit in Parliament but 
also by making delegated legislation . 
670 So, in the UK, the legislative and the executive 
powers may be centred in the hands of government. However, the judicial ftinction has 
been allocated to an independent branch of goverrunent, which is the judiciary. 671 In 
other words, although the legislative and executive functions are exercised by 
Parliament, more specifically the House of Commons, the judiciary in the UK is 
independent. That is because, first, full-time judges cannot sit in the House of 
Commons. 672 Second, the rules of the House of Commons limit the freedom of MPs to 
criticize the judiciary or to discuss cases pending before the courts. 673 Moreover, senior 
669 See Marbury v. Madison 5 U. S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803) 
670 Parpworth, N., op. cit., p. 22 
67'Barendt, E., op. cit., p. 129 
672 See House of Common Disqualification Act 1975 
673 Barendt, E., op. cit., p. 130 
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judges cannot be removed except by the Crown on an address represented by both 
Houses of Parliament, which in its turn makes the removal of the judge more 
difficult. 674 The British courts have played a very important role in checking the use of 
power by the government, especially the executive branch. The court is able to examine 
cases of a political nature, to an extent that enables the court to intervene in the 
executive affairs by virtue of judicial review. 675 For example, if a minister has acted 
beyond his power delegated by Parliament, the courts may examine such a case and 
may grant remedies to the claimant. 676 Therefore, it is rightly said that the separation of 
powers is recognized by the UK constitution in the context of judicial powers. As 
Barendt comments, "the United Kingdom constitution observes the separation of 
powers principle in the context ofjudicial powers more carefully than it does to the 
executive and legislative branches. , 677 
With regard to the UAE, Article 95 of the UAE constitution establishes the Federal 
Supreme Court, as the highest court in the land. It is authorized by Article 99 to check 
on the legislative power conferred on the President and the Federal Supreme Council. 
Paragraph 2 confers on the court power to examine the constitutionality of Federal laws, 
if they are challenged by one or more Emirates alleging that they violate the 
constitution, or by the Federal authority if one or more Emirates is found to be violating 
the constitution or Federal laws. Paragraph 3 also allows the Supreme Court to examine 
the constitutionality of laws, legislations and regulations if such a request is referred to 
it by any Court in the country. Article 101 states that the 'Yildginent of the Federal 
Supreme Court shall be final and binding upon all'ý It has also been provided with the 
674 See the UK Supreme Court Act 198 1, s. 11 
675 British doctrine recognises judicial review as deciding on the lawfulness of the exercise of executive 
discretionary power. It has no authority to examine the constitutionality of legislation enacted by 
Parliament. For more details see Barendt, E., op. cit., p. 132 and Parpworth, N., op. cit. p. 254 676 Parpworth, N., op. cit., p. 252. See 31(4) of the UK Supreme Court Act 1981 
677 Barendt, E., op. cit., p. 129 
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authority to interpret the constitution provisions and such interpretation is binding on 
all. So, any legislation that is incompatible with the constitution may be regarded as 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, even though such legislation was issued by the 
President or the Supreme Council. Thus, there seem to be two independent powers 
recognized in the UAE Constitution; the Supreme Council with the President on the one 
hand, exercising both the executive and legislative powers, and the Judiciary on the 
other, which exercises judicial authority. Although the principle of separation of powers 
is not recognized in respect of the legislative and executive powers, it is clearly 
recognized in terms of the relationship between the legislature and the executive on the 
one hand and the judiciary on the other. However, it does not seem to embrace the 
principle as a pure one, but as the principle of cheek and balance. 
It might be true to say, accordingly, that the separation of powers might be recognized 
in the UAE constitution in a similar way to the British version of check and balance, 
although the Supreme Court in the UAE has been granted a greater power than the 
British courts since it was given the power of judicial review of constitutionality of 
federal legislations. 
It is worthwhile noting, though, that the principle of separation of powers is not 
necessarily the criterion on which a given government can be classified, as the previous 
argument seems to suggest. That is, although the principle plays a significant role in 
preventing the abuse of executive power, it does so in a formal way through separating 
the state's institutions, without reflecting the people's wishes. The legislature, for 
example, may enact arbitrary legislation, although it acts independently of the executive 
organ. So, although the principle of separation of powers gives some sense of 
accountability, it should not be regarded as the main element of the good constitutional 
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system. Human rights and fundamental freedoms seem to be more concerned with the 
substantive principles of justice and fairness, irrespective whether that system has 
recognized any formal principle, in so far as the respect of human dignity is the most 
fundamental element of the constitution. In the UK, the separation of powers was 
sacrificed by the Parliament Act of 1911-49 to the interest of democracy, which reduced 
the legislative power of the House of Lords, which is composed of unelected members, 
and strengthened the elected members of the House of Commons. According to the 
British, democracy might be the core principle of any legitimate government, whether it 
is parliamentary or presidential. 678 Therefore, the pressing question, here, is does the 
UAE constitution recognize democratic government? 
In accordance with paragraph 4 of the preamble of the UAE Constitution, it can be said 
that the form of government for which the constitution was set is a comprehensive, 
representative, democratic regime. 679 However, since at the time of preparation of the 
constitution, it was recognized that the people were not yet prepared for a democratic 
regime, because they were living according to tribal principles and since they were not 
in a position of awareness that would enable them to implement the principle of 
democracy correctly, the constitution has recognized the principle of democracy on a 
progressive basis. In other words, until the environment for democracy is properly 
established, the government is undemocratic. 680 This is evidenced by the fact that the 
Federal National Council is seen in reality as a modem form of tribal Majles (council), 
678 However democracy, as discussed in Chapter Two, may itself conflict with human rights, especially 
the rights of minorities. It also may reject the idea of legal protection of human rights since the judge, an 
unaccountable person, is responsible for their implementation. We will see more about this in the next 
chapter 
679 The purposes of the constitution are stated in its preamble and one of these purposes is "... preparing 
the people of the Federation ... for a dignViled and free constitutional life, and progressing by steps 
towards a comprehensive, representative, democratic regime in an Islamic and Arab society free from 
fear and anxiety. " 
680 Peck, M., Fon-nation and Evolution of the Federation and its Institutions, In: Al-Abed, I., and Hellyer, 
P., (eds. ), UnitedArab Endrates: a new perspective, London: Trident Press, 200 1, pp. 151-152 
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which is usually composed of the old and more influential people in the tribe, acting as 
consultative body that provides the ruler with advice on tribal affairs. 681 It is unclear 
when exactly will be considered the right time for democracy in the UAE. It has been 
more than 34 years since the federation was established, and the country still does not 
hold elections for any public office, and political participation is limited to the ruling 
family in each emirate. 682 However, considering developments in the region, which is 
now witnessing transformation and reforms, the President of the UAE Sheikh Khalifa 
took a significant step when he announced on the UAE's 34 th National Day in 2005 that 
for the first time, half the members of the Federal National Council would be elected by 
the people. 683 The decision stipulates that the Ruler of each of the seven UAE emirates 
will form a local council containing at least 100 times as many members as the number 
of the emirate's representatives in the FNC. The local council will then conduct a poll to 
elect half of the representatives of that emirate to the FNC, while the Ruler will appoint 
the other half. 684 Although the decision was considered as a ground-breaking step 
toward democracy, many academics have emphasised that this decision should be a step 
towards having the members of the FNC selected wholly by election. Alrokn, a law 
professor, noted that "giving the privilege to certain groups to be members of the 
council would not be the ideal way to have representation of the UAE nationals. , 685 Dr 
Al Mutawa, Chairman of the Social Guidance Association, stressed that the move 
should be accompanied by amendments to the provisions of the UAE constitution to 
ensure that the FNC is given the power "to practise a legislative role and not just, as 
68 1 Al-Ghufli, S., op. cit., p. 123-24 
682 See Human Rights Watch Report 2005, available Online at 
http: //hr%v. orgLenizlish/docs/2006/01/18/uae]2233. htni 
683 Samir Salama, A landmark move, Gulf News, Available Online at 
hup: //archive.. szulfnews. com/articles/05/12/27/10007783. htmi 
684 See Gulf News at http: //archive. p ., ulfnews. coni/articles/05/12/27/10007783. 
htmI 
685 Eman Al Baik and Mohsen Rashid, Legislative powers for FNC advocated, Khaleej Times, 3 
December 2005, Available Online at 
http: //www. khaleeitimes. com/Displayarticle. asp? section--theuae&xfile=data/thetiae/2005/december/theua 
e december63. xmI 
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now, having inerely a consultative role. o, 686 The announcement has, in fact, indicated a- 
readiness for constitutional amendments, as the President Sheikh Khalifa, himself, said 
the decision is a step towards more constitutional amendments aimed at "enhancing the 
role of the FNC and increasing its powers to comply with the requirements of the next 
stage . "687 It is indeed a realization of the political leader in the UAE for a constitutional 
reform towards a comprehensive, representative, democratic regime. 
IV. 5. The Islamic Nature of the UAE Constitution 
IV. 5.1. A Moderate Constitution in an Islamic Domain 
Although the United Arab Emirates is an Islamic state, it has constitutional provisions 
similar to those recognised in liberal states, especially with regard to the recognition of 
the judicial review of constitutionality. It might even be true to say that the Islamic 
nature of the United Arab Emirates accords to the UAE constitutional settings a degree 
of moderation, especially with respect to the relationship between the individual and the 
community. The articles of the constitution, in particular those which are concerned 
with the specification of the rights and freedoms, do not seem to embrace the socialist 
position, nor do they follow the individualist pattern. Article 39, for example, is clearly 
against the philosophy of communism, in that it prohibits general confiscation; it states 
that "General confiscation of property shall be prohibited... " Moreover, Article 21 
protects private property, opposing the socialist theory that believes in collective 
ownership. It states " Private property shall be protected ... No one shall be deprived of 
his private property... " However, the restraint that is imposed on private property 
686 Ibid., Dr Al Mutawa Comments 
687 Samir Salama, A landmark move, Gulf News Available Online at 
http: //archive. guifnews. com/articles/05/12/27/10007783. litmi 
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suggests that the constitution also does not put more emphasis on individualism. 688 The 
same article refers to "circumstances dictated by the public benefit in accordance with 
the provisions of the law and on payment of a just compensation"; such a constraint 
does not seem to be, generally speaking, of an individualist nature. The constitution also 
contains some articles which may be considered as having more aspects of socialism 
than of individualism. For example, in Article 17, the right to education, and in Article 
19 the right to medical care, shall be secured by the community; in Article 20 the right 
to work also shall be secured by the society, and it is emphasised in Article 24 that the 
basis of the national economy shall be social justice, founded on sincere cooperation 
between public and private activities. These articles are conceived by one commentator 
as of a socialist nature. 
689 
It might be true to say, therefore, that some aspects of both ideologies, communal and 
individualist, are recognized by the UAE Islamic Constitution; however, jurists differ in 
asserting its position towards the society. Some suggest that the constitution has taken a 
moderate individualist stance that recognizes the role of society. 690 Others claim that the 
constitution is a moderate socialist one that recognizes the importance of the 
individual. 691 
This moderate position of the UAE Islamic Constitution seems to affirm the moderate 
stance of Islam towards the individual and the community. Islam, as discussed in 
chapter three, seems to recognize the two sets of rights, individual and societal, equally 
as fundamental principles and as cornerstones of any constitutional system. According 
688Abulmajd, A., "Annizarn Addustoori li DaNvlat Al-Emarat Alarabyyah Almuttahedah", in: Dmvlat, 41- 
Enzaral, 41arabyyah. 41nititiahedah: Derasah Mashiyyah Shamelah, op. cit., p. 28 
689 Khaleel. M., op. cit., pp. 163-164 
69OAbulmajd, A., "Annizarn Addustoori li DaNvIat Al-Emarat Alarabyyah Almuttahedah", in: Dmvlat 41- 
Emarat, 41arabyyah, 41niziltahedah: Derasah Mashiyyah Shantelah, op. cit., p. 27 
691 Khaleel. M., op. cit., p. 159 
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to the well known Muslim scholar Al Mawdudi, Islamic teaching prevents the state 
from intervening if the issue is concerned with the freedom of speech, while it imposes 
a positive obligation upon the state to intervene if the issue is concerned with basic 
needs of individuals. 692 Further, protecting the soul (individual's life) is one of the five 
most fundamental principles in Islamic law. 693 In the language of human rights, this 
fundamental principle means the right to life. It includes social security and social 
responsibility to ensure health care and means of prevention and treatment of 
diseases. 694 Islam, in protecting the life of the individual, it is actually attempting to 
prevent the circumstances that could lead to death. 
IV. 5.2. Islam is the Supreme Source of Legislation. 
The Islamic nature of the UAE Constitution has been clearly stated in the UAE 
Constitution. Article 7 of the UAE Constitution states that "Islam is the official religion 
of the Federation... " which means that the UAE is an Islamic state as opposed to those 
that are of a secular nature. 695 It is important to draw attention to the language used in 
the article. It states that "Islain is the official religion" which means that the religious 
values of the state are the Islamic values and there seem to be no room for other values 
of a religious nature to be applicable in the state public domain. 696 Accordingly, the 
UAE as an Islamic state cannot make rules that contradict the Islamic rules; otherwise 
692 Al Mawdudi, A., Tadiveen Addustoor At-Island, (in Arabic), Mua'ssasat Arresalah, 1975, pp. 61-62 
693 Five elements are believed to be the most fundamental in Islam; Religion, Soul, Mind, Procreation, 
Property. For more details see Al Marzouqi, I., op. cit., p. 142 
694 Ja'aid, K., . 41-Islam iva Hziqoq Alensanfi Dozia'Alnuilaghayyerat Al'ahniyyah, (in Arabic), Jeddah: 
Mujamma'a Alfiqh Al-Islami, Third Session of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, p. 9 
695 It must be born in mind that 'Islamic state' in this context is not to assert the theocratic nature of the 
state of the United Arab Emirates, because Islam, as we discussed in chapter three, does not believe in the 
theocratic theory of the concept of state, but Islamic state is used here to show that the principle embraced 
by the UAE Constitution is that Islam is the core of the UAE state's constitutional structures and hence 
religion is not separated from the state authorities. 
696Annadi, F., Mabadea'Nezani Al Hitkni fi 41-Islam, (in Arabic), First Edition, Dubai: Albayan, 1999, 
pp. 85-86. 
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they would not be Islamic and may, hence, be unconstitutional. 697 Consistent with this, - 
Article 7 has reaffirmed such an Islamic character of the state by stating that "... The 
Islamic Shariah shall be a main source of legislation in the Federation... " 
Some authors, however, have cited the Egyptian argument that was conducted within 
the Egyptian constitutional system on whether Islam is the source of legislation or a 
source of legislation, in the belief that the overall constitutional structure of the UAE is 
similar to the Egyptian one. Therefore, they argued, that as the UAE Constitution 
indicates in Article 7 that Islam is a source, it may imply that there are also other equal 
sources with Islam that the legislation can be derived from . 
698 But, the Federal Supreme 
Court in the application for constitutional interpretation no. 4 of the year no. 9,25 
December 1983 has interpreted Article 7 of the UAE Constitution as Islam is the 
principal source of legislation having primacy over other sources of law. The court 
explained its judgment by saying that Article 75 of Federal Law (10) 1973 obliges the 
UAE Courts to apply the Islamic Shari'ah as the dominant law and to abstain from 
applying any law that is inconsistent with the rules of Islam. The court further argued 
that the Egyptian argument over the source of legislation is not applicable to the UAE 
constitutional system because the UAE legislature has clearly revealed its intention in 
the Federal law No. 80 of the year 1973, which is concerned with the specification of 
the authority and the jurisdiction of the highest court in the land, the Federal Supreme 
697 See Mutwalli, A., op. cit., 1990, p. 16. 
693 Khaleel. M., op. cit., see Abulmajd, A., "Annizam Addustoori li Dawlat Al-Emarat Alarabyyah 
Almuttahedah", in: DinvIal AI-Enzaral Alarabyyah Almultahedah: Derasah Mashiyyah Shamelah, op. cit., 
pp. 26-27. More details about the Egyptian disputes in this regard were also cited in AI-Muhari, B. S. B. A., 
Conflicl and continuity Islamization and modernization ivithin the UAE penal 1mv, Ph. D., Kent, 1994. 
pp. 133-235. See also Annadi, F., op. cit., p. 85. See Mutwalli, A., op. cit., 1990, pp. 15-17 
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Court, which obliges the court to apply Islam as the principal supreme source of , 
legislation. 699 The main principle established by the Supreme Court in this case was 
"That, although it may appearfrom Article 7 of the constitution that Shariah is to be 
on an equal terms with other sources of law because it is referred to as "a main 
source " instead of "Lhe main source " of law, the doubt has been removed by Article 
75 in which the legislation has explained the intention from Article 7 of the 
constitution that Shariah is the principal source having supremacy over other 
sources ofl(nV.,, 700 
Further, the UAE Constitutional court has asserted that since the constitution reflects the 
desire of the rulers of the Emirates to implement its rules and the goals of the 
Federation, including progressing by steps towards a comprehensive representative, 
democratic regime in an Islamic society, this indicates that the cornerstone of the 
Federation is to have the Islamic Shari'ah as the supreme source of the state's 
authority. 
701 
Moreover, The Federal Supreme Court has already emphasized in its opinion of the case 
no. 22 of the year no. 6,10 December 1985 that public morality in the UAE is defined 
by the religious values embraced by the society which is Islam, the source of the 
societal values as well as the source of the legislative and state authorities. 702 
The Islamic nature of the UAE Constitution has further been emphasised in many other 
cases, leaving no doubt that the Islamic Shari'ah in the UAE is the supreme source of 
699 UAE Federal Supreme Court's Opinion in case no. 4 of the year no. 9,25 December 1983, In: Aham 
AI-Ahkam wa Almabadia' Aljaza'iyyah allaty Qarraratha Almahkamah Al-Ittihadiyyah Al'aulya, (in 
Arabic), Sharjah: Jam'aiyyat Alhuqoqiyyeen, 1980, p. 12 
7001bid., p., 16 See AI-Muhari, B. S. B. A., op. cit., p. 167. See also Al-Owais, H. R., op. cit., pp. 350-351. 
701 The UAE Supreme Court Decision in the Case no. 4, of the year no. 9 
702 See the UAE Federal Supreme Court's opinion in the case no. 22 of the year no. 6,10 December 1985, 
See also the case no. 43 of the year no. 7,24 February 1986 
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legislation. 703 As AI-Muhari observed, the Supreme Court decisions place beyond doubt 
the supremacy of the Shariah in the hierarchy of sources of lmv in the UAE by which 
the hudud punishments had to be enforced by the courts in the UAE legal system. 704 It is 
worth noting that according to Article 99 (4) of the constitution, the Federal Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the UAE constitutional provisions is binding on all. 705 
Thus, the UAE constitution is of an Islamic nature and, hence, every provision in this 
constitution, including the rights and freedoms, must be interpreted in the context of the 
teaching of Islam. For example, the double portion granted to men in inheritance may 
not be seen as an infringement of Article 25 of the UAE constitution, which suggests 
"All persons are equal before the Imv... " That is, this article may well be recognized 
within the context of the teaching of Islam which imposes this rule, suggesting that men 
should inherit more than women. It, rather, would be seen as an infringement of the 
article, if it was interpreted that men and women are to inherit equally. 
A question arises, however; if the UAE constitution has such an Islamic character, with 
its own understanding of people's rights, will that lead to any tension between the UAE 
constitutional provisions and the requirements of the international human rights law? 
703 See the UAE Federal Supreme Court's opinion in the case no. 17 of the year no. 7,27 May 1985. See 
also the UAE Federal Supreme Court's opinion in the case no. 43 of the year no. 7,24 February 1986. 
Moreover, see the UAE Federal Supreme Court's opinion in the case no. 20 of the year no. 6,21 May 
1986. 
704 Al-Muhari, B. S. B. A., op. cit., p. 168 
70-5Article 99 (4) states that "Interpretation ofthe provisions ofthe constitution, when so requested by any 
Federal authority or by the government of any Emirate. Any such interpretation shall be considered 
binding on all. " 
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IV. 5.3. The Flexibility of the UAE Judicial Application of the Sharilah Law 
Although the UAE Federal Supreme Court has stressed the exclusive Islamic character 
of the UAE constitution in its interpretation of Article 7 in several cases mentioned 
above, it does not seem to politicize a certain rigid vision of Islam in tackling the state 
political and constitutional functioning. It seems to be, as will be seen below, more 
inclined to recognise Islam in this respect in its universal sense and seems to avoid 
employing the understanding of one particular school. In several cases, as will be 
examined below, the UAE Federal Supreme Court has asserted that Islam is 
comprehensive enough to accommodate secular laws within its rules and hence Islamic 
law and secular law are not necessarily incompatible. For example, in the application 
for constitutional interpretation no. 4 of the year no. 9,25 December 1983, the Federal 
Supreme Court asserted that a state punishment that was not derived from the Islamic 
Shari'ah in hadd crime does not necessarilY mean a contradiction with the constitutional 
principle that Islam is the supreme source of legislation. This particular point is of 
significance and needs further explanation. 
The application for constitutional interpretation no. 4 of the year no. 9,25 December 
1983 was submitted by the Court of Appeal, which was in doubt as to the validity of the 
local law of Abu Dhabi no. 8 of the year 1976 concerning the crime of drinking alcohol, 
which provides in Article 17 a punishment different from the Islamic hadd. The Court 
of Appeal noted that Article 7 of the constitution stated that Islam is a main source of 
legislation and the Federal law no. 10 of the year 1973 affirmed this principle and 
compelled the Federal Supreme Court and all Federal Courts to apply Islamic Shari'ah 
as the supreme source of legislation. It feared that the Abu Dhabi law no. 8 of the year 
1976, which states in its Article 17 that the punishment of a person found drunk in a 
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public place is imprisonment for a period not less than two months and not exceeding 
one year or a fine not less than 500 Dirhams and not exceeding 2000 might be 
unconstitutional, since the punishment is different from the Islamic hudud of 40 to 80 
lashes. However, the Federal Supreme Court asserted that different punishment does not 
mean contradiction and according to the IslamicfIqh the political leader is permitted to 
establish laws and punishments alongside the Islamic Shari'ah, even if they contain 
different rules and punishments. 706 This is called ta'zir and it is part of the application 
of Islamic Shari'ah. In respect of the crime of drinking alcohol, the court argued, the 
Islamic punishment of hadd alkhanir will undoubtedly be applied if it is proven that the 
offender has drunk alcohol and this act of drinking is enough to invoke the punishment 
of hadd. That is because the mere act of drinking is the one which is forbidden, without 
looking at the result of the act. However, to reach this conclusion it must be proven that 
the offender was aware of the nature of the material he was drinking, in the sense that he 
intended to drink alcohol. If it was proven that a person has drunk alcohol with 
knowledge and intention, then the court could not apply any other punishment than the 
Islamic hadd. It went further to argue that this does not mean that the political leader 
cannot legislate another law tackling the same issues. If the leader has proven that there 
is a proper interest for the Muslim community in legislating another law to be applied in 
the same domain as the Islamic Shari'ah and that this would prevent clear harm, it 
would be islarnically permissible. 707 On that basis the court suggested that the Abu 
Dhabi local law no. 8 of the year 1976 concerning the drinking of alcohol is not 
contrary to the constitution and must be applied alongside the Islamic hadd. The court 
further explained that the main concern of the Abu Dhabi law is not the mere act of 
drinking alcohol, as Islamic law requires, but for the law to be applied, the act must be 
706 See the UAE Federal Supreme Court's opinion in the case no. 4 of the year no. 9,25 December 1983 
707 This a clear application of the doctrine of Siyasah shariyyah or legitimate governmental policy, 
discussed in chapter three of the study. 
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committed in public places. 708 The crime mentioned in Article 17 of the Abu Dhabi , 
local law under question is more than just consumption of alcohol, and includes acts 
committed hy non-Muslims as ivell as Muslims. 709 Hence, the secular law in this sense 
seems to be complementing the Islamic Shari'ah law rather than contradicting it. 
Moreover, in other striking cases demonstrating the flexibility of the UAE judicial 
application of the Shari'ah law, the Dubai Supreme Court suggests that clerics and 
religious leaders have no authority in the legal proceedings and that judges, in the 
application of law based on Shari'ah, must not use their own understanding of Islamic 
law. In the cassations no. 43 of the year 1997, no. 53 of the year 1997, no. 56 of the year 
1997, and no. 57 of the year 1997, the Dubai Supreme Court contends that Judges do 
not apply the Islamic Shari'ah, but law that is issued by the legislature. The court has 
suggested that Article 7 of the UAE constitution obliges the legislature, not the courts, 
to use the Islamic Shari'ah as the supreme source of legislation and the authority of the 
courts is to apply the Shari'ah based law as specified by the legislature, not as envisaged 
byjudges. 710 
It might be true to say that this decision was intended to be applicable to cases where 
relevant laws exist but in matters where there is no relevant law, the judges might be in 
a position to use their understanding of the Islamic Shariah to give a verdict. This is 
evidenced by Article 75 of Federal Law (10) 1973 obliging the UAE Courts to apply the 
Islamic Shari'ah as the dominant law in the UAE legal system. However, the judges are 
not left without rules controlling the scope of the Islamic rules to which the judges are 
limited in tackling these matters. Article I of the UAE Civil Transaction Code makes it 
708 See the Federal Supreme CourVs opinion in the case no. 4 of the year no. 9,25 December 1983. 
709AI-Muhari, B. S. B. A., op. cit., pp. 167-168. See also Al-Owais, H. R., op. ciL, pp. 350-351. 
710 See Dubai Supreme Court decision in the cassations no. 43 of the year 1997, no. 53 of the year 1997, 
56 of the year 1997, and no. 57 of the year 1997. 
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clear that there would be no judicial #tihad, mental effort, where there is a clear 
provision of law. If a judge finds no provision of law, tackling the issue, he has to pass 
judgement according the Shari'ah law. However, the article obliges judges to choose 
among certain of the most widely-recognised Islamic schools in an effort to make the 
judgement more predictable. The article states 
', 'There shall be no innovative reasoning Ijtihad in the case of provisions of 
definitive import. If the judge finds no provision in this law, he has to pass 
judgement according to the Islamic Shariah but he must choose the most 
appropriate solutions ftom the schools of Imam Malik or Imam Ahmed bn Hanbal, 
and if none is found there then from the schools of Imain Alshafi and Imam Abu 
Hanefah as most benefits. If thejudge does notfind the solution there, then he must 
render judgement in accordance with custom, provided that the custom is not in 
conflict with public order or morals. jj711 
This UAE legal principle challenges the argument, which suggests that the application 
of Islamic Shari'ah will place legal proceedings and important judicial decisions under 
the control of clerics and religious leaders, which, since the Shari'ah was shaped by 
very diverse opinions, would make the judicial judgements uncertain. 712 
In another step away from the domination of certain religious understandings over some 
important fields, like civil transactions and contract law, the Federal Supreme Court has 
711 See Article I of the UAE Civil Transaction Code 1985. For more information about this article see 
Ashamsi, J. A., op. cit., p. 18. It must be pointed out that legalizing certain Islamic schools to make the 
application of the Shari'ah law more predictable as stated in the Article I of the UAE Civil Transaction 
Code does not amount to politicizing certain Islamic schools with a certain understanding of Islam as a 
basis of the state's constitutional ideology, as happens in Iran. The article here is organizing a pure legal 
issue not a constitutional or ideological matter, in the sense that the law, here, is obliging the court to 
follow these schools, not the legislature. The legislature in the UAE can, if it wishes, change these schools 
or remove the article itself at any time. 
712 See Mayer, A. E., op. cit., 1999, pp. 28,66-67 
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observed in cases no. 363 and no. 380 of the year 20,30 April 2000 that civil 
transactions and contract law in the UAE legal system are not exclusively reserved to a 
certain type of court; neither the civil court nor the Islamic court. Rather, both types of 
court have been given the right to examine cases of such a nature and it is up to the 
contract parties to decide to which court they will bring their case. 713 This recognition of 
both types of judicial jurisdictions, civil court jurisdiction and Islamic court jurisdiction, 
on an equal footing, in relation to contract law and civil transactions, is a clear judicial 
effort to affirm the coexistence of both laws, whether that which is enacted by humans 
or that which is revealed by God. There does not seem to be, as the UAE judicial 
practices might suggest, an Islamic obstacle to accommodate laws that are derived from 
human logic and reasoning, so long as this law is not enacted to replace the Islamic 
fixed rules. 
Moreover, the UAE judicial application of the Shari'ah law has even gone beyond the 
mere acceptance of law that does not traditionally fall within the Shari'ah law, although 
not conflicting with it, but extends to include, albeit temporarily, elements that are 
traditionally perceived to be in clear contradiction with the Islamic Shari'ah, like riba 
(interest on loans). Although the Federal Supreme Court has recognized the Islamic 
prohibition of loan interest in any bank transactions, in its opinion in the case no. 245 of 
the year 20,7 May 2000 it permitted necessary interest in bank transactions, so long as 
there is no other way in which people's basic needs can be satisfied. 714 The court in 
these opinions seems to be employing the Islamic doctrine of Siyasah Shariyyah, which 
was discussed in chapter three, which is based on the exigencies of realties that 
sometimes even permit suspension of some Islamic rules. 
713 See the UAE Federal Supreme Court's opinion in cases no. 363 and no. 380 of the year 20,30 April 
2000 
714 See the UAE Federal Supreme Court's opinion in the case no. 245 of the year 20,7 May 2000. 
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Accordingly, despite the UAE's strong constitutional endorsement of the Islamic 
Shari'ah as the supreme source of law, nothing, as it seems from the practice, prevents 
the legislature in the UAE from enacting law derived from human logic and reasoning, 
in so long as this law does not conflict with the main fixed principles of Islamic 
Shari'ah . 
71 5 However, if the laxv is in clear contradiction with the Islamic rules the court 
must abstain from applying the inconsistent law7 16 and instead the court should refer it 
to the Federal Supreme court to examine its constitutionality. 717 Even contradictory law 
can be allowed if there is no other way, at all, in which people's basic needs can be 
satisfied. Thus, the UAE's main principle of the supremacy of the Shari'ah law does not 
seem to indicate an application of the Shari'ah in its strict sense. This judicial approach 
by the UAE in the application of the Islamic Shari'ah seems to follow the school of Ibn 
Al-Qayyem, one of the most respected Muslim scholars discussed in chapter three. It 
implies that the application of the Shariah law does not necessarily require that a 
particular action should be in conformity with the Islamic Shari'ah in its strict sense, but 
718 
rather, is concerned with its consistency with the main fixed objectives of Islam. In 
other words, it is an application of the Siyasah shariyyah, discussed in chapter three, 
which balances competing Islamic interests and prioritises the most useful interests by 
sacrificing a less useful one, or avoids the most evil action by accepting a less evil 
one. 719 
Consistent with this moderate approach taken by the Federal Supreme Court in the 
application of the Islamic Shari'ah, the Court of Appeal in Abu Dhabi has in several 
715 See the UAE Federal Supreme Court's opinion in the case no. 4 of the year no. 9,25 December 1983 
discussed above 
716 See Article 75 of the UAE Federal Law (10) 1973 
717 See Paragraph 3 of Article 99 of the UAE constitution which allows the Supreme Court to examine the 
constitutionality of laws, legislations and regulations if such a request is referred to it by any Court in the 
country. 
718 Ibn Al-Qayyem, op. cit., 199 1, p. 22. see our discussion of the doctrine of Siyasah shariyyah in chapter 
three 
719 Ibn Taymiyah, op. cit., 1993, p. 67 
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cases prioritized the moderate opinions of the Islamicfiqh in the application of 1slamic 
principles. 720 One of these cases is case No. 8533/2003. 
Case No. 8533/2003 was an adultery case in which each of the accused persons was 
already married. According to Islamic law, the punishment of a married person who 
commits the crime of adultery is stoning to death, provided the conditions of the 
application of this hadd, like being free from any doubt, and the availability of four 
witnesses, are satisfied. In this case, the illegal act of adultery had resulted in a 
pregnancy and both of the accused had confessed before the first court that they had 
entered into illegal sexual intercourse and the pregnancy was the result. However, in the 
Court of Appeal, both of the accused reverted and denied the crime. Although the Court 
of Appeal recognized that the punishment that must be applied to this case was the hadd 
of adultery, which is stoning to death, it decided that the denial of the crime that was 
made before it was enough to constitute the doubt that would invalidate the hadd, 
especially in the absence of four witnesses. It went on to argue that the denial of a 
confession is valid even if it was not explicitly conveyed, for example by escaping from 
the punislunent after the confession has been made. 72 1 The court went on to argue that 
pregnancy, according to some Islamic scholars, is not powerful enough evidence to 
indicate the commission of adultery. Although the pregnancy may form evidence of the 
crime of adultery, it is also possible that it may have resulted from legitimate sexual 
intercourse, since the woman accused was already married. As a result, the court 
concluded, the hadd of stoning was not applicable to this case, since the evidence was 
not powerful enough to apply the hadd, although the court was convinced that the crime 
720 See the Abu Dhabi Court of Appeal decision of 6/1/2003 on the case No. 9808/2002. See also the Abu 
Dhabi Court of Appeal decision of 30/11/2004 on the case No. 8533/2003. In these two recent cases the 
court has laid down a principle, indicating that the denial of confession is enough to constitute doubt that 
invalidates the hadd. 
721 See the Abu Dhabi court of appeal decision, p. 4 
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of adultery had been committed. 722 
A similarly moderate reading of the Islamic Shari'ah was also demonstrated in the 
Dubai SuPreme Court in the cassation no 70 of the judicial year 2000,18/2/2001. The 
cassation was brought against the Dubai Court of Appeal's ruling on inheritance issues, 
in which it upheld the Dubai court's decision that the inheritance of the deceased must 
go to the children of the deceased's sister and the children of the son of the deceased's 
brother, as they were the only relatives of the deceased. However, the claimant alleged 
that the deceased person had been a slave of the claimant's father and hence the 
deceased's inheritance must be transferred to her master instead of her natural 
inheritants. That is because, the claimant argued, in Islam a slave person and all of his 
belongings are owned by his or her master, and therefore as the claimant's father was 
the deceased's master, the belongings of the deceased must be transferred to the master's 
heirs and not those of the deceased. 723 
The Dubai Supreme Court, however, rejected this claim and asserted that at the present 
time, the condition of slavery has disappeared and has been internationally prohibited. 
The court went on to justify its opinion that Islam has never permitted such an act; 
rather Islam was mainly revealed to eliminate any kind of slavery or servitude to 
mankind and heavily stressed within its rules that this practice, which was very common 
in former times, should be abandoned. The court cited many evidences that urged to 
abandonment of this practice according to the Islamicftqh and also extracted evidences 
722 The court found both of the accused persons guilty of committing adultery and punished them with 90 
lashes and imprisonment for a period of one year, not as a hadd but as a tazir punishment. Ibid., p. 5 
723 See the claimant argument in Dubai Supreme Court, cassation no 70 of the judicial year 2000, 
18/2/2001. 
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from the Holy Quran and the sayings and practices of the prophet, peace be upon 
him. 724 
Nevertheless, although there seems to be a judicial willingness to soften the application 
of the Islamic rules and punishments through the moderate Islamicji'qh for the benefit 
of human life and dignity, the UAE courts in their efforts have not made any reference 
to the international instruments of human rights or international customary norms. The 
Dubai Supreme Court, for example, stressed in the cassation. no 70 of the judicial year 
2000,18/2/2001, mentioned above, the Islamic stance on slavery, but without giving a 
proper reference to the international effort in the abolition of slavery, which is the core 
element of the international human rights movement. The judiciary in the UAE might 
have feared that such reference to the international norms of human rights would 
undermine the basis of the Shari'ah law. 
IVA The UAE Constitution and the International Human Rights 
This section will discuss the position of human rights in the UAE constitution. It will 
first discuss what rights and freedoms the UAE constitution recognises. Then, the 
human rights treaties that the UAE has signed will be presented. A question of whether 
the other rights recognised in the international community, and which are not stated in 
the UAE constitution and not embodied in the human rights treaties to which the UAE 
is party, are also applicable in the UAE jurisdiction will be analysed. The International 
reports of international human rights organizations concerning The UAE and some 
other Islamic states will also be examined. 
724 Ibid., the court decision 
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IV. 6.1. Constitutional Specification of the Rights and Freedoms in the 
United Arab Emirates 
It is believed that a substantive feature of the UAE constitutional system is the 
entrenchment of the rights and freedoms within the text of the constitution, giving the 
rights entrenched constitutional superiority in the hierarchy of the UAE legal system. 725 
As a result, the constitutional legislature in the UAE has avoided the uncertainty on the 
status of these rights that might arise otherwise. 726 Although these rights are clearly 
specified in the constitution, there are no clear, specific, judicial decisions nor other 
guidance concerning the matter that could help in identifying the UAE approach to right 
implementation. The lack of judicial decision on human rights could be due to the 
recognized social values of Arab tribes, which encourage people to solve their problems 
peacefully through tribal Majles by wise and more influential people. In the Arab tribal 
system, people can even gain access to the ruler and complain to him directly without 
any need to go to court. 727 Moreover, the extreme wealth that resulted from the oil 
industry seems to have triggered popular satisfaction, even if some constitutional rights 
had been at stake. Thus, as a result of the lack of judicial decisions on human rights, it 
was difficult to identify the UAE approach of rights implementation within the context 
of Islamic law. Therefore, I will specify the rights and freedoms embodied in the UAE 
constitution by indicating briefly each right and its constitutional sources, derived from 
different parts of the constitution in order to give a general understanding of the 
constitutional rights within the overall structure of the UAE constitution. I will give 
725 For more about the different approaches taken by the states to secure human rights in the constitutional 
settings see our discussion in Chapter Two. See also Darrow, M. and Alston, P., "Bills of Rights in 
Comparative Respective", In. Alston, P., op. ciL, 1999, p. 466 
726 An example of the uncertainty that might have risen if the rights of people were not entrenched in the 
body of the constitution is France. France's constitution included the rights of people in the preamble 
which raised then a question of whether the inclusion of the rights of people in the preamble of the 
constitution, and not in the main body, is enough for them to be regarded as constitutionally binding 
rights. There was a strong debate over this issue until they were given constitutional value by the French 
Constitutional Council in 197 1. See our discussion in Chapter Two. See also Sroor, A., op. cit., p. 67 
727 Al-Ghufli, S., op. cit., p., 254 
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explanations of these rights in the light of the international supervision of the 
international human rights body. 
IV. 6.1.1. Traditional Rights and Freedoms 
What is meant by traditional rights and freedoms, here, is those which are stipulated in 
the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. Although the UAE is not party to this 
Covenant, the discussion will be in the light of the general comments of the Human 
Rights Committee, on the Covenant provisions, since they are the most recognisable 
explanation of the rights of a civil and political nature which are contained in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
IV. 6.1.1.1. Non-Discrimination 
Equality before the law, without discrimination, has been recognised in Article 7 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Covenant of Civil and Political Rights has 
laid down further details on the meaning and bans any discrimination or distinction of 
any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status . 
728 However, Article 25 of the 
UAE constitution guarantees freedom from discrimination only in regard to race, 
nationality, religious belief or social status. It does not, for example, prohibit distinction 
as to sex in the sense that men may well under the UAE constitution be accorded 
different treatment from that provided for women. In light of this, Article 14 of the UAE 
constitution, which talks about equality and social justice for all citizens, does not seem 
to include equality in every aspect between men and women. This is evidenced by the 
UAE rules of inheritance and the UAE personal law, which do not seem to give the 
728 General Comment No. 18: Non-discrimination: 10/11/89. CCPR General Comment No. 18. Paragraph 
I 
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equality of treatment that may be envisaged by the international body. 729 This stance of 
the UAE Constitution is in line with its Islamic nature, which provides rules that, as 
discussed in chapter three, do not necessarily discriminate but differ in treatment 
between men and women in certain aspects. 730 
IV. 6.1.1.2. The Right to Life and the Freedom from Torture or Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
The right to life enshrined in Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is 
recognised by the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights as the supreme right, from 
which no derogation is permitted. 731 Similarly, the freedom from torture and inhuman 
treatment or punishment is also as important as the right to life, since it lies at the heart 
of the integrity and dignity of human being. Therefore, the Human Rights Committee 
has reminded the states parties to the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights that this 
right, along with the right to life, even in situations of public emergency, are non- 
derogable. 732 The UAE Constitution guarantees in Article 26 freedom from torture or 
degrading treatment. However, the Committee's understanding of torture extends 
beyond torture as normally understood, to include corporal punishment, including 
729 See Paragraph 6 of the General Comment No. 18 It states that ""discritnination against women "shall 
inean any distinction, exchision or restriction inade an the basis ofsex which has the effect or purpose of 
impairing or nullijying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by ivomen, irrespective of their marital 
status, on a basis of equality of inen and women, of human rights andfindamentalfreedoms in the 
political, economic, social, cultilral, civil or any otherfield. " In chapter 5 we will see more analysis about 
the compatibility of Islamic law with the international standards in particular with regard to the freedom 
from discrimination. 
73" Kuwait is the only Gulf state that has ratified the civil and political rights Covenant and indicated 
clearly, when it made its declaration with regard to the application of Article 23 of the Covenant that the 
Article conflicts with Islamic law on which the Kuwait personal law is based and hence it reserved the 
right, where the provisions of that article conflict with Kuwaiti law, to apply its national law. See 
Declaration and Reservation, available online at 
http: //www. ohchr. org/english/countries/ýatification/4_1. htm 
731 General Comment No. 14: Nuclear weapons and the right to life (Art. 6):. 09111/84. 
CCPR General Comment No. 14. Pargraph 1 
732 General Comment No. 07: Torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Art. 7) 
30105/82., Paragraph 1. For more infon-nation about the right to life see General Comment No. 06: The 
right to life (art. 6): 30/04/82. CCPR General Comment No. 6. 
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excessive chastisement as an educational or disciplinary measure. 733 According to the 
UAE Federal penal law which applies the Shari'ah law as the basic criminal law, it is 
clear that the UAE understanding of this right is very different. 734 It applies the Islamic 
hadd of lashing as an acceptable legal punishment. It is worth noting that the right to 
life is not guaranteed under the UAE constitution and hence stoning to death has also 
been recognised by the UAE legal system as an acceptable punishment . 
735 This might 
be seen as a point of conflict with the international understanding of right to life and 
freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In 
addition, Article 26 of the UAE constitution also guarantees another important right 
which is the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest, search, detention or imprisonment 
except in accordance with provisions of law. 
IV. 6.1.1.3. The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion 
The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion is perceived by the 
international human rights body as far reaching and profound; it includes freedom of 
thought on all matters, personal conviction and the commitment to religion or belief, 
whether manifested individually or in community with others. 736 The international body 
distinguishes the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief from the freedom to 
manifest religion or belief and does not allow any restriction or limitations whatsoever 
on the freedom of thought and conscience or on the freedom to have or adopt a religion 
or belief of one's choice, including the right to replace one's current religion or belief 
733 Ibid., Paragraph 2 
734 See our discussion above about the UAE judicial application of the Islamic Shari'ah 
7351t must be remembered that the UAE court in the case no. 8533/2003, cited above, did not apply the 
hadd punishment of stoning to death to the married man and women, who entered illegal sexual 
intercourse, not because the Islamic punishment is not applicable in the UAE legal system, but because 
the conditions of the application of punishment of the hadd for that particular case, as explained in the 
case, were not satisfied. 
736 General Comment No. 22: The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion ( Art. 18) 
: 30/07/93., Paragraph I 
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with another. 737 However, under the UAE constitution the freedom of thought and 
conscience, religion or belief as envisaged by the international body does not seem to be 
protected at all. Article 32 of the UAE constitution only guarantees freedom to exercise 
religious worship and that is restricted ivith established customs, provided that it does 
not conflict with public policy or violate public morals. As the UAE constitution is 
Islamic in nature, as will be seen below, the right to replace one's current religion or 
belief with another is prohibited. 
IV. 6.1.1.4. Freedom of Expression 
The international human rights instruments differentiate between freedom of opinion 
and freedom of expression. Freedom of opinion in international instruments means the 
"right to hold opinions without interference" and this kind of right permits no exception 
or restriction. Freedom of expression is recognised as freedom to "impart information 
and ideas of all kinds", and to "seek" and "receive" them "regardless of frontiers" and in 
whatever medium, "either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any 
other media of his choice". 738 Unlike freedom of opinion, freedom of expression is 
subject to restrictions and limitations. 739 However, Article 30 of the UAE constitution 
does not differentiate between freedom of opinion and freedom of expression and hence 
the limit stated in the Article appears to apply to both of them. The Article states, 
"Freedom of opinion and expressing it verbally, in writing or by other means of 
expression shall be guaranteed within the limits of law. " It is not clear how freedom to 
hold an opinion can be limited in the UAE legal system, since there is no law imposing 
any limit on freedom of opinion. However, freedom of expression, in particular, is 
737 Ibid., Paragraph 3 and Paragraph 5 
738 General Comment No. 10: Freedom of expression (Art. 19): . 29/06/83. CCPR General Comment No. 10. Paragraph 2 
739 Ibid., paragraph 4 
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limited by the UAE Federal Law No. 15 of 1980 concerning publication and publishing. 
The law provides a chapter of 15 articles specifying the banned matters which the 
publisher must not touch. Examples of these matters are: publishing any insult to Islam, 
making direct criticism of the person of the state president or the governors of the 
emirates, publishing anything that damages the reputation of any Arab or Islamic state 
or any other friendly state, publishing opinions violating public decency, material that 
incite hate crimes, confidential communications or military affairs. Article 89 states that 
any person who makes direct criticism of the person of the state president or the 
governors of the Emirates will face either or both of imprisonment for a minimum of six 
months and a maximum of two years and a fine varying between five thousand Dirhams 
and ten thousand Dirharns. 740 
IV. 6.1.1.5. Political Rights and Freedoms 
Political rights and freedoms, such as the right of every citizen to take part in the 
conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access 
to public service are recognised by the international body as lying at the core of 
democratic government, which is based on the consent of the people. 74 1 However, the 
740 Article (98) of the same law reiterates the banned areas and states: "The press is free within the limits 
of the law. Serving, suspending or cancelling ajoumal administratively is forbidden unless its circulation 
offends the Islamic doctrine, incites against the regime, harms the higher interest of the state or publishes 
articles that abuse their constitutional principles, especially the concept of unity, union and threatening 
the public order or serves foreign interests that are inconsistent with the national interest, or if it appears 
that the journal has received from any foreign state aid, help or profit of any kind, for any reason or under 
any pretext or name or has published the thought of any adversary state or revealed the military secrets or 
published what may touch the main basis of the society and news or information articles leading to 
trouble the public opinion that contradicts the necessities of the national interest. The government may - 
upon the proposition of the Minister of Information and Culture - promulgate a decision in the previous 
cases to suspend the journal for a maximum of one year or cancel the journal's permit. The government 
may also decide to suspend the journal for a maximum of one year if it publishes banned matters 
mentioned in Articles 70,71,72,75 et 80. The decision to suspend or cancel the permit does not deny the 
right to criminally sue the perpetrators and impose the civil indemnities. The journal may be stopped for a 
maximum of two weeks by virtue of a decision from the minister notified to the government in case of 
urgent need and in the cases mentioned in the previous paragraph. " 
741 General Comment No. 25: The right to participate in public affairs, voting rights and the right of equal 
access to public service (Art. 25) : 12/07/96., paragraph I 
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UAE constitution does not guarantee this group of political rights. The UAE 
constitutional system is not yet democratic and hence recognises a different kind of 
political rights that are more concerned not with the formation of the political decision 
but with what might result from the undernocratically taken decision. Article 41 of the 
UAE constitution guarantees the right to submit complaints to the competent 
authorities, concerning the abuse or infringement of the rights and freedoms stated in 
the constitution. 742 This absence of the democratic rights makes it unclear whether all 
the constraints imposed to limit the rights guaranteed under the UAE constitution are 
permissible from perspective of the international instruments. That is because, it is 
universally recognised that limitations are permissible only if prescribed by law and 
necessary in a "democratic" society. 743 
Most of the other civil and political rights entrenched in the UAE constitution, like 
freedom of assembly 744, the right of fair trial745, the right of communication '746 the right 
747 
of privacy , generally speaking, do not raise clear conflict with the international 
human rights instruments. However, freedom of movement and residence secured under 
742 Alrokn. M, "Huqoq Alensan fi Addustoor Almua'qqat le Dawlat Al-Emarat: damanat wa qoud", In: Al 
Alrokn. M, HuqoqAlensan Bayn. 411anzeent ivaXestibahah, (in Arabic), Dubai: Albayan, 1999, p. 98 
743 The International Covenants refer to democracy as a precondition to permit limitations on the 
covenants' rights in 5 Articles; Article 14, Article 21 and Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and Articles 4 and 8 of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. The European Convention of Human Rights also refers to democracy in almost all limitation 
clauses. The limitation clauses will be further discussed in chapter 5 
744 Article 33 of the UAE constitution states that "Freedom of assembly and establishing association shall 
be guaranteed within the limits of law. " 
74's Article 28 of the UAE constitution states that "The penalty is personal. An accused shall be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty in a legal and fair trial. The accused shall have the right to appoint the person 
who is capable to conduct his defence during the trial. The law shall prescribe the cases in which the 
presence of a counsel for defence shall be assigned. Physical and moral abuse of an accused person is 
prohibited. " 
746 Article 31 of the UAE constitution states that "Freedom of communication by post, telegraph or other 
means of communication and the secrecy thereof shall be guaranteed in accordance with law. " 
747 Article 31 states the secrecy of the right to communication shall be guaranteed in accordance with law. 
Article 36 of the UAE constitution also states that "habitations shall be inviolable. They may not be 
entered without the permission of their inhabitants except in accordance with the provisions of the law 
and in circumstances laid down therein. " 
225 
Chapter Four: The UAE Islamic Constitution and the International Requirements of Human Rights Protection 
Article 29 and freedom from deportation secured under Article 37 are limited to the . 
UAE citizens. 
748 
IV. 6.1.2. Social and Economic Rights and Freedoms 
IV. 6.1.2.1. Right to Work 
Since the right to work contributes to the survival of the individual and his or her 
family, it is a very fundamental right, and recognised in several important international 
legal instruments. 749 The right to work includes the individual's right to choose or 
accept work freely, and the right not to be- deprived of work unfairly. 750 The UAE 
constitution guarantees the right to work under Article 20, suggesting that employment 
shall be secured for all citizens. The significance of this article is that it requires national 
legislation concerning the relationship between employees and employers to be 
compatible with the developing international labour law. The final sentence of the 
article requires the state to provide legislation protecting the rights of employees and the 
7481n this sense aliens in the UAE have no constitutional standards governing their expulsion. It is worth 
-noting that Article 13 of the covenant of civil and political rights specifies standards governing the 
expulsion of an alien lawfully entered a state territory, which states: 
"An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant may be expelled therefrom 
only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except where compelling 
reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion and 
to have his case reviewed by, and be represented for the purpose before, the competent authority or a 
person or persons especially designated by the competent authority. " 749 Committee in Economic and Social Council, The Right to Work, Article 6 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 18, Adopted on 24 November 
2005, paragraph 1. Examples of International Instruments on the Right to Work are: Article 23 of 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, Articles 6,7, and 8 of International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Articles 8 and 22 of International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Article 32 of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article Ilof the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Article 5 of 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. See also the ILO 
Conventions, including Forced Labour Convention, Equal Remuneration Convention, Abolition of 
Forced Labour Convention, Employment Policy Convention, Occupational Safety and Health 
Convention, Employment Promotion and Protection against Unemployment Convention Work 
750 Committee in Economic and Social Council, The Right to Work, Article 6 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 18, Adopted on 24 November 
2005, paragraph 4 
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interests of employers "in the light of the developing international labour law. " It is 
worth noting that the constitutional provision of the right to work in the UAE 
guarantees the right to work to all citizens without differentiation according to sex 
between men and women. Women in the UAE have been promoted to take part in the 
development of all areas of their society and to take up high-ranking positions. In the 
recent cabinet two women ministers have been appointed to serve two ministries; the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Econorny. 
751 The UAE Constitution 
affirms the right to work that is fully guaranteed under the Islamic Shari'ah for all, men 
and women, 752 in legal terms which are applied throughout the country. 
Article 34 also guarantees the freedom to choose an occupation, trade or profession 
within the Ifinit of 1mv. Moreover, Article 34 prohibits forced labour except in 
exceptional circumstances providedfor by the law and in return for compensation. It 
also prohibits slavery, unconditionally. 
IV. 6.1.2.2. Right to Education 
The right to education is internationally recognised as a human right in itself and as an 
indispensable means of realizing other human rights. 753 Education empowers women to 
participate in their communities, and safeguards children from exploitative and 
hazardous labour and sexual exploitation. 754 The UAE constitution realizes the 
importance of the right to education and guarantees in Article 17 the right to education 
as compulsory in its primary stage and free of charge at all stages. Article 18 also urges 
75 1 New UAE Cabinet hailed, Khaleej Times Online, 11 February 2006, Available Online at 
http: //www. khaleeitimes. com/Disnlayarticle. asp? section=theuae&xfile=data/thcuae/2006/februaiy/thcuac 
februa! y313. xmI 
752 See more information about the right to work under the Islamic Shari'ah in Baderin, M., op. cit., pp. 
176-181 
753 Committee in Economic and Social Council, The right to education (Art. 13) : 08/12/99. 
E/C. 12/1999/10. (General Comments), paragraph 1 
754 Ibid. paragraph I 
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the society to provide education for its people but subject to the provision of the 
competent public authorities and to their directive. 
IV. 6.1.2.3. Right to Private Property 
Article 21 guarantees the right of private property and provides that no one shall be 
deprived ofhis private property except in circumstances dictated by the public benefit in 
accordance with the provisions of the law and on payment of a just compensation. 
Moreover, Article 39 prohibits confiscation of an individual's possession as a penalty 
except by a court judgment in circumstances specified by law. Furthermore, in an 
attempt to prevent any kind of class differences, the constitution states in Article 22 that 
public property shall be inviolable and in Article 23 states that the natural resources 
and wealth in each Emirate shall be considered to be public property ofthat Emirate. 
IV. 6.1.2.4. Right to Social Security 
The right of everyone to social security has been recognised in Article 9 of ICESCR. 
The Islamic Shari'ah, as practised in the early Islamic state, also imposes the concept of 
social security as the state's duty to ensure the basic well-being of every member of the 
Islamic SoCiety. 755 Article 16 of the UAE constitution translated this Islamic principle 
into a legally binding constitutional provision. The article states that "society shall be 
responsible for protecting childhood and motherhood and shall protect minors and 
others unable to look after themselves for any reason, such as illness or incapacity or 
old age orforced unemployment. It shall be responsible for assisting them and enabling 
thein to help themselves for their own benefit and that of the community. Such matters 
shall be regulatedhy welfare andsocialsecurity legislation". 
735 Baderin, M., op. cit., p., 189 
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Nevertheless, there are many important rights that are mentioned in the international 
instruments of human rights are not included in the UAE constitution, like the right to 
life, the right to vote, the right of minority to enjoy their own culture, to profess and 
practise their own religion and to use their own language, the right to peaceftil assembly 
and others. A question arises, therefore, whether the international rights and freedoms 
recognised in the international human rights instruments have legal force in the UAE 
domestic legal system. 
IV. 6.2. The UAE Constitutional stance towards International Principles of 
Human Rights 
The United Arab Emirates has not, in fact, ratified the most important treaties in the 
realm of human rights; the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. However, it has ratified some other conventions 
concerning labour rights, such as the Convention Concerning Forced Labour 1930, the 
Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration 195 1, the Convention Concerning the 
Abolition of Forced Labour 1957, and the Convention Concerning Minimum Age 1973. 
It has also ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination 1966, and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child 1989.756 It has very recently ratified Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women 1979.757 The main reason for not ratifying the two 
Covenants, which may be regarded as a comprehensive international bill of rights, and 
preferring, instead, to select specific rights to be implemented, might not be the 
unwillingness of the UAE to implement human rights and fundamental freedoms, but 
756 See Zayid Centre for Coordination & Follow-up, Httqoq Alensan 1va Waqiahafi Dcnvlat Al-Emarat 
Alarabyyah Ahnuffahedah, (in Arabic), Abu Dhabi: Zayid Centre for Coordination& Follow-up, 2001, 
vp. 67-68 77 It entered into force 05/10/2004. see the UN High Commission of Human Rights website, Available 
Online at 
http: //www. unhehr. ch/tbs/doe. nsf/newlivstatusbycount[y? OpenView&Start=I&Count--250&Expand=183 
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could be traced to the realization of the state that such ratification of the two Covenants 
would include some rights and freedoms that may conflict with the fundamental 
principle of the constitution, which is Islamic Shari'ah. 758 
However, the mentioned treaties to which the UAE is party, especially those which 
concern the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination, the elimination of all forms 
of discrimination against women, and the rights of the child, have made in their 
preambles a clear reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two 
UN Covenants, which may indicate the state's acknowledgment of the rights contained 
in such important international documents of human rights. Reference is also made to 
the United Nations' Charter, which recognizes the inherent dignity and the inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family. This raises a question as to whether the 
United Arab Emirates is bound to implement, in addition to the rights contained in the 
mentioned treaties, the rights and freedoms recognized in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the two UN Covenants on human rights. 
It has been discussed in Chapter Two of this study how important the human rights 
principle has become on the international level, to the extent it has even been one of the 
most essential standards on which a state's behaviour is judged. There is a developing 
notion supported by a number of scholars, that in spite of the fact that the two covenants 
on human rights are recognized as treaties which are supposed to be applicable to the 
state parties, because of the nature of their contents which relate to all human beings, 
they may be regarded as codifying pre-existing customary rules and, hence, their 
758 See Al-Hassan, Y., "Alhewar Alwatani houl Huqoq Alensan fi Dawlat Al-Emarat: turnooh mashroo'a 
fi waqe'a wa'acd, In: Al-Emarat Alarabyyah Almultahedah iva Huqoq Alensan, op. cit., p. 164 
230 
Four: The UAE Islamic Constitution and the International Requirements of Human Rights Protection 
provisions might be seen as binding on states not parties to the covenants. 759 Given the 
fact that the rights contained in the constitution are not exclusively specified, a question 
arises, whether the international rights recognised in the most important international 
rights instruments, which are internationally considered as the International Bill of 
RightS760have the same force of law in the UAE constitution by virtue of international 
customary law and the state's membership of the UN. This question is of a significant 
importance to this study and therefore to tackle such an important issue we should first 
understand the constitutional standards of the UAE system in dealing with international 
law in general. Does the UAE constitution recognize the international principles as an 
integral part of its legal system or as alien values that need to be incorporated before 
being judicially applied? 
IV. 6.2.1. The UAE Constitutional Approach towards the International 
Principles 
In general, states tend to differ in dealing with international treaty law through their 
national courts. Some take the doctrine of dualism which regards the international legal 
system as a separate entity established alongside the national legal system. 761 Under this 
doctrine, there are some transformation procedures that must be satisfied for the signed 
treaty to be given judicial recognition and applicability in the domestic legal system of 
the state. British law, for example, requires parliamentary assent to a treaty, which has 
759 For more discussion about extending the obligation of a treaty beyond the contracting states see 
Meron, T., op. cit., pp. 89-93. For more information on the binding nature of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights as part of customary law see Humphrey, J., P., "The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights: its history, impact and juridical character", In: Ramcharan, B., G., op. cit., 1979. 
7'0 The International Bill of Rights consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and its two Optional Protocols. For more details see Fact Sheet No. 2 (Rev. 1), The 
International Bill of Human Rights, Available online at 
http: //www. ohclir. orgLený, ylishfabotit/publications/docs/fs2. htm 
161 Starke has reported that the two legal systems have two fundamental differences: "a. the subjects ofthe 
state law are individuals, while the subjects of international 1mv are states solely and exclusively. b. the 
source of the state lmv is the will of the state itsetr, while the source of the international law is the 
connnon will (Genteinivill) ofstates. " See Starke QC, op. cit., p. 72. 
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been signed by the government, if such a treaty inflicts a major change in the British 
legal system. This parliamentary assent to the treaty is recognized as an Enabling Act 
that enables the treaty to be applied within the municipal law. 762 In Belgium, also, the 
consent of Chambers or Councils is the factor that determines the legal effect of a treaty 
conducted by the Crown. 763 
Other states take the doctrine of monism, which considers international treaty law as an 
important part of the national legal system in that the treaty that is signed by the 
government is judicially applicable without the need for any transformation steps. 
Under this doctrine, states differ on the status of the international principles in their 
legal system. Some regard the international principles of the treaty signed by the 
government as the highest law in the land. 764 Others recognize the supremacy of 
international treaty principles over ordinary law, but stop short of granting them 
constitutional status. 765 Treaties in those latter states are usually subject to 
constitutionality, in the sense that they must be in accordance with the provisions of the 
state's constitution; otherwise, at least in states which recognize the review of 
constitutionality, they might be invalidated by the constitutional court. 766 
One justification of the dualistic approach undertaken by states in dealing with 
international treaty principles can be found in the principle of separation of powers. If 
the executive power, for example, signed a treaty that made a significant change in the 
762 Tillotson, J., Foster, N., Text, Cases and Materials on European Union Lmv, Fourth edition, London: 
Routledge Cavendish, 2003, p. 60. See also Ali, A., Alivajeezft Alqanon Addinvii, 41aam, (in Arabic), 
Dubai: Albayan, 1989, p. I 11 
763 Robert, J., op. cit.,, p. 13 
76' Article 6 of the US Constitution states that " ... all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
, 4uthority of the United States, shall be the supreme Lmv of the Land... " It is worth mentioning that the 
US supreme court also held that rights and freedoms stated in treaties signed by the United States are non- 
self-executing and hence not the source of enforceable rights. See Lillich, R. B., op. cit., p. 855 
765 Robert, J., op. cit., p. 14 
766 Even states which recognize the review of constitutionality are hesitant on whether the court is capable 
of reviewing the constitutionality of international norms for the protection of human rights. See Ibid., p. 15 
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legal system of the state or modified some existing legislation, then the executive power 
in this sense would take over the position of the legislature. Therefore, in such 
circumstances, the constitution prevents the legal effect of such a treaty until it is 
approved by the legislature, either in the forin of legislation or in the fonn of a 
decree. 767 
As regards the UAE constitution, it is commonly believed that it has taken the dualistic 
approach, since Article 125 of the constitution requires the Federal Supreme Council's 
assent in any international treaty signed by the state, in order for it to be valid in the 
UAE legal system. It can be argued, however, that since the legislative and executive 
powers are confined to the Federal Supreme Council, which is also the institution that is 
given the right to ratify international treaties, the requirement of another procedure to 
validate treaties, which is also assigned to the same institution, seems to be artificial and 
meaningless. That is, the institution that is concerned with ratifying international treaties 
(the Federal Supreme Council) is actually the institution which is constitutionally 
recognized as the legislature. 768 So , the Federal Supreme Council, in ratifying 
international treaties by virtue of its executive authority, is in fact legislating new 
national law on the ground of its legislative function. 
Although this constitutional provision, when put in practice, may indicate aspects of a 
monistic approach in the constitution, Article 47 (4) has clarified such doubt by stating 
that "such ratification shall be accomplished by decree", indicating that the provisions 
of international treaties are not self executing. A transformation step is needed to 
accommodate any treaty in the national law, and this step, according to the article, 
767 British law requires parliamentary assent to a treaty if such a treaty inflicts a major change in the 
British legal system, which indicates the British will to preserve the parliamentary monopoly over 
legislative matters in the UK. See Ali, A., op. cit., p. I 11 
769 See Article 47 (2), (4) of the UAE Constitution. 
233 
Chapter Four: The UAE Islamic Constitution and the International Requirements of Human Rights Protection 
should take the form of a decree. This clearly suggests the dualistic approach of the 
constitution. Once a treaty has been ratified, its provisions will be incorporated into the 
municipal law with the status of federal law, taking precedence over the local law of 
each Emirate. Article 125 asserts that 
"The Government of the Endrates shall undertake the appropriate measures to 
implement the lems promulgated by the Federation and the treaties and international 
agreements conchided by the Federation, including the promulgation of the local 
laws, regulations, decisions and orders necessaryfor such implementation. " 
Thus, according to Article 47 (4) of the UAE constitution, the UAE judiciary does not 
recognise the principles of an international treaty, even if signed by the federal 
government, if it was not incorporated in the form of national law. It is unclear, 
however, whether the international customary principles have the same status as treaty 
law, as there is no indication of the position of international customary principles in the 
UAE domestic domain. Some states, like the UK, differentiate in their judicial practice 
between the status of international treaty law and international customary principles in 
the domestic legal system. 769 Although the British legal system seems dualistic in 
principle, requiring Parliament's assent to apply treaty principles in the UK domestic 
system, there has been extensive case law, as will be seen in the next chapter, asserting 
that international customary principles are part of British domestic law as long as they 
are consistent with the British statutes. 770 There have been no judicial cases of the 
British kind in the UAE. However, in case no. 316 of 1992, Dubai Supreme Court 
suggested that in marine commercial matters where there is no relevant law, the national 
courts may apply the relevant principles of the international customary law, on 
769 In chapter five we will see a detailed case analysis of the receptive approach that the British judiciary 
hastaken. 
770 See the British case of Chung Chi Cheung v. Rex. [ 1939] AC 160 
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condition that these principles are not inconsistent with the Islamic Shari'ah. However, 
this decision by Dubai Supreme Court was only an application of the Federal marine 
commercial law no. 26 of 1981, which states in Article 8 that in matters of a marine 
commercial nature, if there is no relevant law covering them, the court shall apply the 
principles of international customary law recognised in this regard. 771 So, a question 
arises as to whether the UAE judiciary, by itself, can make reference to international 
customary principles in cases where there is no relevant national law, provided that 
these international principles are not inconsistent with the Islamic Shari'ah. There is no 
clear judicial practice in this regard, but in looking at the case cited above, it might be 
reasonable to deduce that the UAE judiciary would not have regard to international 
customary law if there were no reference to it in the national law, since the court in the 
case, just mentioned, stressed that its decision was an application of the Federal marine 
commercial law no. 26 of 198 1. Accordingly, international human rights principles that 
are not embodied in the treaties to which the UAE is party, or that are embodied in a 
signed treaty but not incorporated in the form of national law, do not seem to have, in 
the eyes of the UAE judiciary, any effect in the UAE domestic system, since the 
position of the UAE judiciary, as it seems, is hampered by the UAE dualistic approach 
towards international law in general. 
IV. 6.3. The Practices of the International Human Rights Organizations 
Although the UAE does not seem to be lacking the formal constitutional foundations for 
protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, the Amnesty International regards 
some of its Islamic principles, particularly, flogging and the discrimination in marriage 
between Muslim and non-Muslim, in tension with the international rights. Amnesty 
771 Dubai Supreme Court decision no. 26 of the year 1981 
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International has expressed its view that the death penalty carried out in the UAE was, 
in all cases, the ultimate violation of the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading punishment. 772 Flogging, also, in the eyes of Amnesty International, has to 
stop as it is believed to be in violation of international human rights standards. 773 Many 
of the practices that Amnesty International perceives as violations of human rights 
standards in the UAE, are associated with basic rules of Islam, and it is this that raises 
real difficulty in human rights implementation in the UAE domestic sphere. 774 For 
example, the Shari'ah law enforced in the UAE is that a Muslim woman is not allowed 
to marry a non-Muslim man unless he converts to Islam. Such a marriage under the 
Shari'ah law is considered null and void, and the parties may be subject to punishment 
772Amnesty Report, UA 99/02 Death penalty 3 April 2002, Available Online at 
httr): //Nveb. amnesiy. org/libra! ý/index/ENGMDE250012002 
773 Amnesty Report, UA 268/00 Flogging 6 September 2000, Available Online at 
http: //%veb. amnesty. org/libra[y/index/ENGMDE250042000. In response to the flogging carried out in 
Saudi Arabia, Amnesty International clearly considers the punishment of flogging to be cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment amounting to torture, in contravention of Article 5 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, which states that "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment". See Amnesty Report, UA 116/00 Fear of flogging 12 May 2000, 
Saudi Arabia: Fear of flogging: Nine Saudi Arabian Nationals, Available online at 
http: //Nveb. amnes! y. org/libra! ]L/index/ENGMDE230382000 
774 There are some reports concerning other issues which are not of an Islamic nature but connected with 
tribal values, like the use of boys as camel jockeys, which has resulted in some serious injuries and deaths 
of young boys during races. See United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, 30th 
Session, Geneva 6-10 June 2005, Available online at 
http: //www. antislavery. ore/archive/submission/submission2005 -camel i ockeys. htm. There are also issues 
related to some other factors of a political nature, like the case of five Libyan nationals, some of whom 
were forcibly expelled, and factors of a family nature, like the case of Sabrina Imtiaz Syed, a Pakistani 
national who was jailed at the request of her family. There is also a concern about the situation following 
the II September 2001 attacks in the USA as hundreds of UAE nationals have been arrested and held in 
detention without charge. See Amnesty International report 2003 concerning the UAE, Available Online 
at http: //web. amncsty. ori! Vreport2O03/are-stimmary-en. g. However, since these issues are not of an 
Islamic nature, they are not sacred in the sense that the government could, if it wished, change the 
situation by a simple decision. For example, in the case of human trafficking to the UAE, the President 
Sheikh Khalifia resolved the problem with a federal decree in July 2005 requiring that all camel jockeys 
must be eighteen years of age or older. According to the new law, violators will be jailed for up to three 
years and/or fined a minimum of Dh50, OOO (U. S. $13,600). See Human Rights Watch Report 2005, 
Available Online at http: //hr-, v. orgLenglish/docs/2006/01/18/uae]2233. htm Moreover, the Human Rights 
Watch report of 2005 has found abuses of migrant workers' rights include non-payment of wages, 
extended working hours without overtime compensation, unsafe working environments resulting in death 
and injury ... etc. However, resolving these problems did not raise 
difficulty. The Minister of Labour and 
Social Welfare delivered a decision requiring the company concerned to pay all overdue wages within 
twenty-four hours, and prohibited it from hiring migrant workers for the next six months. This decision 
and others introduced by the ministry have been praised by Human Rights Watch and considered as 
"promising reforms that have met stiff resistance from the business community. " See Human Rights 
Watch Report 2005, Available Online at http: //hnv. orWenglish/docs/2006/01/18/uael2233. htm. Thus, 
matters that are not of Islamic nature are dependent solely on the political will and can easily be resolved. 
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111.5.3.1.1. Islam and Non-Muslims' Rights 
It has been argued that Muslims in the Islamic state are the only full citizens, enjoying 
the full rights guaranteed by the Islamic Shari'ah, subject to some limitations to some 
degree in respect of Muslim women. For non-Muslims, although they are inhabitants of 
the Islamic state, their rights are confined to the practice of their religion and conducting 
their private affairs according to their own custom. 475 In exchange for providing security 
of persons and property, non-Muslims must pay jizyah (tax) and submit to Muslim 
sovereignty in public affairs. 476 Moreover, it has been argued that marriage between a 
Muslim man and a non-Muslim woman, in particular "people of the Book" (Christians 
and Jews) is pennitted, while marriage between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim 
man is prohibited, even if he is a Christian or Jew. 
Muslim jurists, however, argue that the claim that Islamic rules are contrary to the 
principle of equality and non-discrimination is, for the most part, based on confusion 
between the concept of the nation state and the concept of the Islamic state. Al- 
Qaradawi observes, in respect of the burden on non-Muslims to payjizyah, that the state 
in Islam is a state of belief, in the sense that it is established to preserve the belief and 
principles of Islam, and therefore it cannot be assumed that non-Muslim people will 
defend principles to which they do not subscribe. 477 As a result, those non-Muslims are 
given the chance to participate in the defence of the state they live in through financial 
support, which is calledjizyah, instead of with their blood. However, if any of the non- 
Muslims is willing to participate physically in a war to defend the Islamic state and its 
475 An-Naim's view cited in Steiner, H., and Alston, P., op. cit., 2000, p. 392 
476 Ibid., p. 392 
477 Al-Qaradawi, Y., Ghair Almuslimeen fi Almujtama AI-Islami, (in Arabic), Beirut: Mua'ssasat 
Arresalah, 1983, p. 33 
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key role in arousing the fear of most Islamic states, including the UAE, that any further 
involvement in the international instruments of human rights would undermine 
fundamental rules of the Islamic Shari'ah . 
778 Taking into consideration the universal 
fundamental principles of Islam may, on the other hand, serve to promote human rights 
in the Islamic states and could encourage Islamic states to engage in more human rights 
instruments. 
There are indeed, desperate situations in some of the Islamic states that need urgent 
action for reform; 779 however, there is also a clear lack of understanding on the part of 
the members of the international organisations of human rights about the rules of Islam. 
For example, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, in 
its examination of the report on the situation of woman in Gambia, noted that the 
prevalence of discrimination against women in all areas of their lives is based, apart 
from customary practices, on religious Islamic family law including Islamic law of 
inheritance, which governs 90 per cent of the Gambian population. However, by close 
examination, the differentiation between men and women in Islamic inheritance law, as 
seen in Chapter Three, is more in the nature of justified and objective differentiation 
778The extensive criticisms of the international organizations of the human rights situations in the Arab 
states, without mentioning the grave situation of Palestinian rights, which are grossly infringed by the 
Israeli occupation, creates a public impression in many Arab and Islamic states that these international 
organizations are set to serve Western imperialism. See Ghalyon, B., "Huqoq Alensan fi Alfikr Assiyasy 
Alaraby Almu'aaser", In: Al-Jeosi, S., op. cit., p., 395 
779 In some of the Amnesty reports concerning the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia the organization reports that 
there is no upper limit on the number of lashes judges can impose. It can reach in some events up to 4,000 
lashes. In the same report the organization also indicates that Saudi Arabia's criminal justice system 
facilitates arbitrary arrest and detention, denies of prompt access to relatives and a doctor, and does not 
facilitates access to lawyers and other legal assistance. The report indicates that grossly unfair trials could 
result in a hand cut off or a foot and hand cut off. See Amnesty International report, Saudi Arabia Culture 
of brutality, Available on line at httP: Hweb. amnesty. org/library/index/ENGMDE230102000. Amnesty 
International also reports about the state of Sudan that the Sudanese judicial system applies the death 
penalty to young offenders under 18 years old in the name of hudzid. Although the Sudanese constitution 
states "The death penalty shall not be imposed on a person under the age of eighteen... ", the exemption of 
the hudzid crimes from the reach of this article makes the article almost worthless, since hudud crimes 
include murder and burglary over a certain amount. See Amnesty International Worldwide Appeal, 
Sudan: Young offender at risk of execution, Available online at 
http: //%veb. amnesty. org/appeals/index/sdn-01 1005-wwa-eng 
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which may be permissible under the international instruments, rather than abhorrent - 
discrimination on the basis of sex, since males are not always given the bigger share and 
sometimes even get less than what is preserved for females. 780 Moreover, in the 
Summary record of the 795th meeting, a member of the committee on the rights of the 
child expressed his fear that a defendant might have no right to legal assistance in the 
UAE Shari'ah court. 78 1 The UAE report might not have been made with enough clarity 
in this regard; however, the member was not as much seeking information about the 
Shari'ah court procedures as he was making an assumption that Islamic Shari'ah 
recognizes no right to legal assistance. This gives the impression that this member lacks 
the knowledge that Islam has no rule, whatsoever, preventing an individual from having 
the right to legal assistance that could help judges in reaching a just verdict. The 
Shari'ah courts in the UAE are governed by the same law that governs federal courts, so 
that an individual has the same right to a lawyer and other legal assistance. 782 Hence, 
while Muslim officials and scholars need to take a sensitive approach towards human 
rights and participate in human rights activities, the members of international human 
780 See our discussion about inheritance rights in Chapter Three 
781 See Mr. Citarella's opinion in the Summary Record of the 795th meeting: United Arab Emirates, 
Convention Abbreviation: CRC, 10/06/2002. CRC/C/SR. 795. In reply to the committee's assumption 
that there is difference in the procedures of the two courts, the Shari'ah courts and the civil courts, with 
regard to a juvenile trial, the UAE delegate underlined that "the procedures were in fact the same: the 
same obligations and rights arose from the law and the juvenile had the same right to a lawyer. Conditions 
for legal assistance were the same for religious and civil courts" See the Summary Record of the 795th 
meeting: United Arab Emirates, Convention Abbreviation: CRC, 10/06/2002. CRC/C/SR. 795. 
782 See Mr. Al-Suwaidi's reply in the Summary Record of the 795th meeting. However, not all Islamic 
states apply to the Shari'ah courts the same procedures that are applied to the civil courts. The Saudi 
Islamic judicial system, for example, tends to uphold secrecy over publicity in which trials are often held 
behind closed doors. Amnesty International has claimed that "the proceedings invariablyfall to ineel the 
most elementary standards offairness. " See the Amnesty report, Saudi Arabia: Further Information on 
Fear of Torture and ill-treatment, PUBLIC Al Index: MDE 23/009/2004,02 July 2004, available online at 
bttp: //,. veb. amnesiy. orp-/Iibra! y/index/ENGMDE230092004. Hytham Mnna'a, the spokesman of the Arab 
Commission for Human Rights, stated in commenting on the imprisonment of three Saudi activists who 
sought political reforms in Saudi Arabia, in an interview on the A1jazeera news channel, that the Saudi 
judicial system is based on a certain unpopular Islamic view that supports secrecy in managing public 
affairs and which has been discarded by all recognized Islamic sects and groups. This extreme medieval 
Islamic view was the reason, he said, behind the court's unjustified decision of the imprisonment of the 
three Saudi activists and the court's refusal to respond to all powerful legal challenges submitted by their 
lawyers. He affirmed that the decision was not judicial at all but a fulfillment of the Saudi political 
leaders' desires. See Aijazeera interview, Adda'awat Al-Eslahiyyah fi Assaudiyyah, In Arabic, Available 
online at http: //www. aliazeera. net/NR/exeres/03826CF6-5BE2-4787-BEBA-2DD4FE3A7CB2. htm 
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rights bodies need to study Islam in depth, especially with regard to its relation to the 
public domain. To put the problem right, both sides should work cooperatively to reach 
a common understanding of human rights in order to lay down standards of 
implementation. 
IV. 7. Conclusion 
Although the United Arab Emirates is an Islamic state, it does not seem to be lacking 
the formal constitutional foundations for protecting human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. The rule of law seems to be recognized through the rigidity of the 
constitution that, to some extent, could help to secure the supremacy of its provisions. 
The constitutional Article 151 clearly states that the law of the constitution prevails 
over the states members' constitutions, Federal laws and the legislations, regulations 
and decisions issued by the authorities of Emirates. Institutional arrangements for 
putting the provisions of the constitution in action, and which could fonn another 
safeguard of the supremacy of the UAE constitutional law, seem also to be recognized 
through the Federal Supreme Court, which has been assigned the power to examine the 
constitutionality of legislation, being regarded as the ultimate source of the 
interpretation of the constitutional provisions. Although there seems to be no separation 
of powers between the executive and the legislature, it may well be present in the 
independence of the judiciary. 
Moreover, the political institution that is supposed to regulate the political authorities 
and put them in conformity with the popular demands is formally established through 
the Federal National Council. Furthermore, the UAE is a federal state whereby the state 
powers (legislative, executive judicial) are distributed between local and federal 
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governments, which could form another foundation for limited and responsible 
govenunent. 
Although the UAE system of governance is undemocratic, the constitutional recognition 
of the significant power of the Federal Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of 
legislations could balance the scale in the interest of the people. The established 
undemocratic regime in the UAE is not a result of the constitutionally embraced Islamic 
principles. Rather, it is a result of the tribal values which for long have been an obstacle 
to progreýssing towards a comprehensive, representative, democratic regime. That is to 
say, the UAE's Islamic constitution has clearly expressed the desire for a dignified and 
free constitutional life in its introduction under Islamic rules and principles. If there was 
a contradiction between democracy and Islam, then democracy would not have been set 
as the ultimate objective of the UAE Islamic constitution. 783 
To say that the UAE constitution have, to some extent, the formal foundation for human 
rights implementation is not to say it is fully compatible with the current international 
human rights standards. There are certain issues that seem not to be compatible. Those 
include, in addition to the undemocratic regime, flogging and the discrimination in 
marriage between Muslim and non-Muslim. It is necessary to pay attention to the areas 
of conflict and make the necessary effort to comply. 
In the next chapter we will examine a much more advanced Western state that has 
constitutional traditions that happen to be in conflict with the international human rights 
standards. The UK is a state that has made good efforts to balance its international 
783 See the introduction of the UAE constitution which states "Desiring... to lay thefoundationforfederal 
rule.... Andpreparing thepeople of1he Federation at the same 11inefor a dignified andfree constitutional 
life, andprogressing by steps towards a comprehensive, representative, democratic regime in an Islamic 
andArab societyfreefronifear and anxiety. " 
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obligation of human rights and its great constitutional traditions based on specific social 
and cultural beliefs, which makes it a good example to learn from in order to assess the 
ongoing process of the implementation of international human rights in the Islamic 
states. As the UK has greatly contributed to the formation of the current instruments of 
human rights, it seems also to have laid down standards of balance in the area of 
conflicts. f 
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Chapter Five 
V. Implementing International Human Rights Standards in our 
Relativistic World 
V. I. Introduction 
The previous chapter shows that although the United Arab Emirates recognise the 
Islamic Shari'ah law as the supreme source of legislation, there is a judicial willingness 
to accommodate secular law through making use of the moderate reading of Islam. 
Yet, the judiciary in the UAE seems to have been avoiding employing the recognised 
international principles particularly those concerned with human rights. The Dubai 
Supreme Court, for example, stressed in the cassation no 70 of the judicial year 2000, 
18/2/2001, as mentioned in chapter four, the Islamic stance on slavery, but without 
giving a proper reference to the international effort in the abolition of slavery, which is 
the core element of the international human rights movement. There seems to be a 
common understanding among Islamic states that the Islamic Shari'ah is the only 
784 
reference for human rights. This may be evidenced by the Islamic adoption of the 
'Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam' (CDHRI), adopted in August 1990 by 
the 19th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers of the OIC countries, meeting in 
Teheran. 785 The representative of Iran had already expressed the Iranian Government's 
position at the 36th session of the UN General Assembly in 1981 that "The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which represented a secular understanding of the 
Judeo-Christian traditions, could not be implemented by Muslims and did not accord 
with the system of values recognized by the Islamic Republic of Iran. 11786 
794 Ghalyon, B., "Huqoq Alensan fi Alfikr Assiyasy Alaraby Almu'aaser", In: At-Jeosi, S., (ed. ), Huqoq 
Alensan FiX-Fikr. 41-Arabi, (in Arabic), Beirut: Markaz Derasat Alwehdah Alarabyyah, 2002, p. 402 
723 Articles twenty-four and twenty-five of the Cairo Declaration clearly state that the rights and freedoms 
embodied in the declaration are subject to the Islamic Shari'ab, which appears to be the only source of 
reference for the explanation of any of the articles of this document. See Ali, S., op. cit., p., 29 
796 Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-ninth session, E/CNA/2003/NGOt225,17 March 2003, 
Paragraph 4 
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Many Muslim lawyers and politicians seem to avoid dealing with international law in 
general and tend to consider many of its principles, in particular those concerning 
human rights, as a means that can be used by the most influential states to interfere in 
their local matters. 787 Some argue that the strong reaction in the West to human rights 
abuses under Islamic states, without a corresponding reaction to the grave situation of 
Palestinians' basic rights, which are grossly infringed by the Israeli occupation, creates 
a general impression in many Arab and Islamic states that the international human rights 
instruments are a Western conspiracy against Islam and set to serve the Western 
imperialism. 788 Some of the human rights organizations' practices seem to affirm this 
stance in their insistence that some of the Islamic values run contrary to international 
human rights standards, without having regard to the fundamental nature of these 
789 values, like those concerning the Islamic marriage rules , and without considering 
whether they are necessary for maintaining law and order in the Islamic states, like the 
application of Islamic hudud . 
790 The International Commission of Jurists even advised 
against the adoption of the Islamic Draft Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, which 
was presented for approval at the Summit Meeting of OIC Heads of State and 
787 See Hanafi, H. "Almauqif Al-Islarni Almu'aaser wa Huqoq Alensan", In: Al-Jeosi, S., (ed. ), op. cit., 
584 See also Ali, S., op. cit., p., I 
Ghalyon, B., "Huqoq Alensan fi Alfikr Assiyasy Alaraby Almu'aasee', In: Al-Jeosi, S., (ed. ), op. cit., 
? P. 394-395 99 In the case of a Christian Lebanese national who married a Muslim woman in the UAE and was 
sentenced subsequently to 39 lashes and imprisonment of one year, the UAE was found by Amnesty 
International to be in violation of the right to express beliefs and the freedom from discrimination by 
reason of religion. See Amnesty International Report, Imprisonment and Flogging for Marriage Across 
Faiths: The Case of Elie Dib Ghaleb, MDE 25/003/1997, Available Online at 
http: //web. amnesty. org/library/index/ENGMDE250031997 
790 In response to the flogging carried out in Saudi Arabia, Amnesty International clearly considers the 
punishment of flogging to be cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment amounting to torture, in 
contravention of Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that "No one shall 
be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment". See UA 116/00 Fear 
of flogging 12 May 2000, Saudi Arabia: Fear of flogging: Nine Saudi Arabian Nationals, Available online 
at http: //%veb. amnes! y. orýVlibraLiL/index/ENGMDE230382000. See also UA 268/00 Flogging 6 September 
2000, Available Online at http: //%veb. amnes! y. or. v ., 
/Iibra! ]L/index/ENGMDE250042000. We will see below 
that in the application of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Court of 
Human Rights opens the possibility that if judicial corporal punishment were considered not only local 
conditions, but necessary as a deterrent and to maintain law and order in the state concerned, it could be 
considered that, in spite of its degrading character, it does not entail a breach of Article 3. See Tyrer v. 
The UnitedKingdom, 25/04/1978, Application Number 5856/72 
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Government held in Dakar on 9 December 1991. It called the attention of the Muslim 
conununities and world public opinion to the negative implications which might follow 
the Summit's adoption of the Islamic Draft Declaration on Human Rights in Islam. Its 
reasoning was that such adoption would threaten the inter-cultural consensus on which 
the international human rights instruments are based, in that the declaration would 
introduce, in the name of the defence of human rights, an intolerable discrimination 
against both non-Muslims and women. 791 
However, having certain internal religious or cultural elements that may in one way or 
another raise tension with the current understandings of human rights values is not an 
excuse for not recognising the legal instruments of these rights and participating in the 
process of their development. As Islain itself is a universal religion that came to all 
mankind and is not exclusively related to a certain culture or society, the Islamic states 
are encouraged to act within the international arrangements and to engage in a dialogue 
with the rest of the world to clarify the Islamic position, as well as their positions 
towards human rights. The UAE judicial practice, as demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, has shown the flexibility of Shari'ah law to accommodate values that are not 
only foreign to its rules but even contradictory. 792 Hence, through making use of the 
Islamic technique of Siyasah Shariyyah, there is room for the Islamic states to engage 
79'Sce the statement of former Secretary-General of the International Commission of Jurists, Adma Dieng 
cited in Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-ninth session, E/CN. 4/2003/NGO/225,17 March 2003, 
Paragraph 7. We saw in Chapter Three that such a claim against Islam, by reflection, is mistaken. The 
distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims is merely one of political administration, and not of 
human tights. Moreover the differentiation between men and women in inheritance, for example, is, as 
discussed in Chapter Three, not based on discriminatory issue. Rather, it was designed for the benefit of 
the heirs, in that it prefers needier people like youngsters who face an uncertain future, over aging people 
who are leaving life. 
... As discussed in the previous chapter, Islamic Shari'ah strongly prohibits any kind of loan interest in 
any bank transactions, and yet the UAE Federal Supreme Court in its opinion in the case no. 245 of the 
year 20,7 May 2000 permitted necessary interest in bank transactions, so long as there is no other way in 
which people's basic needs can be satisfied. In this judgement, the court used the Islamic technique of the 
Siyasah Shar'iyyah, which is based on the exigencies of reality that sometimes even permit suspension of 
some Islamic rules. 
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in a constructive debate at the internal level, as well as in the international forum, to 
contribute positively to the current developing notion of human rights. 
Islamic principles are not the only principles that may raise tension with the, current 
conception of human rights but also some Western traditional understandings of 
democracy and human rights create complexity to the international human rights 
discourse. The UK political and constitutional tradition, as seen in Chapter Two, has 
been an obstacle to the full realization of the European convention rights; however, this 
did not hold the UK back from joining and strongly participating in the formation of 
most parts of European convention rights as well as international human rights 
instruments. 
The UK is a good example of a state that overcomes its traditional obstacle and acts in a 
receptive way to the international law in general and to an acceptable degree to the 
internationally recogniscd principles of human rights. The British did not reject all the 
criticism made against their constitutional system, especially from the European organs, 
but responded with another argument through constructive dialogue that contributed 
positively to the development of the British constitutional system, as well as the 
European human rights practice. Unlike the international human rights instruments, 
which mostly rely on international public opinion and political pressure to enforce their 
principles, the European Convention's principles of human rights, as we will see below, 
are enforced by legally binding judgements of an independent court. The UK, instead of 
avoiding joining this powerful convention, contributed substantially to the fonnation of 
most of its principles. The British participation in the formation of the most powerftil 
regional arrangement on human rights in the world may demonstrate that the domestic 
barrier should not be seen as a reason not to participate in the formation of the 
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international human rights principles. The European Court of Human Rights has 
responded positively to the changes made by the British government to overcome its 
internal obstacle, although the British reform was not carried out at the expense of the 
local values of the state. The European Court has developed a notion of margin of 
appreciation to accommodate differences in the implementation of rights in Europe. 
Through the use of the technique of margin of appreciation, the European Court has 
confirmed that human rights are so contestable that unification on one model of 
implementation is difficult to achieve, even on the regional level, where societies are 
supposed to have shared conunon values. 
This chapter, therefore, will examine the UK experience in European human rights 
implementation and the development of this important doctrine of margin of 
appreciation, and will assess whether the doctrine of margin of appreciation is 
applicable to the international instruments. The chapter will also raise another important 
question, which is the extent that the margin of appreciation can be used to 
accommodate differences in human rights implementation that result from the 
application of the Shari'ah law. As I mentioned elsewhere in this study, the British 
traditional principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty has been held sacred in much the 
same way that Islamic Shari'ah is in the Islamic states, in that in each case, rules derived 
from them are supreme, even if they are contrary to human rights. However, the 
reference, here, is mainly to the ideological and constitutional aspects of the UK 
principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty, with all this may imply of legal rules 
inconsistent with human rights, which Parliament itself cannot change to assist in 
tackling the constitutional principle of Islamic Shari'ah that God is the supreme law 
giver, with all this may imply of rules inconsistent with human rights, which the Islamic 
legislature cannot change. The British experience in balancing between the two 
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important principles, the protection of human rights as specified in the European 
Convention and elaborated by the European Court of Human Rights and its fundamental 
principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty, could provide the Islamic states with guidance 
on how to overcome internal obstacle and act in a way that is acceptable to international 
law without affecting the main Islamic constitutional principle of the supremacy of 
Islamic Shari'ah which implies that God is the supreme lawgiver. 
V. 2. British Experience in the Implementation of Human Rights 
The European Convention on Human Rights of 1953 is believed to be the most 
important regional instrument on human rights, which over a period of 50 years has 
become the most sophisticated and effective human rights treaty in the world. 793 It is a 
striking example of a human rights treaty that has a special legal status in the domestic 
law of the contracting parties. The most powerful feature of the convention is that it 
imposes upon the contracting states a certain body of legally binding principles 
enforced by an independent and impartial tribunal, which is the European Court of 
Human Rights. Individuals have been given free access to submit to the court 
complaints against the public authorities of their own states. Therefore, the convention 
does not merely represent common standards of achievement enforced by public 
opinion, as in the case of the international instruments, but it was intended to establish 
standardsforming part of the public laiv in Europe. 794 
793 Loucaides, L., G., "The Protection of the Right to Property in Occupied Territories", 53.3, 
International and Comparative Lenv Quarterly, July 2004, p. 681 
794 The commission observed in the application of Helgal and Wilhelm Gericke v. Federal Republic of 
Germany that " ... the human rights andfundamentalfreedoms guaranteed by the Convention extend beyond the individual interests of the parties concerned ... they have led the member parties to the Convention to establish standards forming part of the public 1mv in Europe. " For more details see 
Drzemczewski, A., European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Lmv, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1983, p., 24 
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Accordingly, the convention seems to have created a new type of European law, 
transcending domestic legal structures of European States. There seems to be no 
privilege or immunity for the state authorities to exercise against 'supra-national 
795 European judicial scrutin5ý. Although the judgments of the European Gourt of 
Human Rights are legally binding in international law upon contracting states and 
ignoring the court's decisions would lead to expulsion from the Council of Europe, 796 
the UK has accepted the jurisdiction of the court, despite its strong endorsement of its 
traditional fundamental principle of parliamentary sovereignty. Therefore, this 
acceptance was seen as permission for a foreign court -European Court of Human 
Rights- to question an Act of Sovereign Parliament of Westminster, 797 which, 
accordingly, could make Acts of Parliament at risk of judicial review of compatibility, 
which is traditionally prohibited in the British constitutional system. 
This British recognition of the jurisdiction of the European Court is in itself a 
significant lesson for the Islamic states to learn from, in that the domestic Islamic and 
constitutional principles that could raise tension with human rights are not an acceptable 
justification for not joining the international human rights conventions. Joining the 
human rights instruments is a clear sign that Islamic states have no local values, whether 
religious or traditional, that necessarily violates human fundamental rights and 
freedoms. In much the same way, the avoidance of these international procedures and 
arrangements is a powerful sign that these states are hiding local principles which are 
incompatible with the modem world of today, which is based on the respect of human 
rights and dignity. There is no doubt that in the case of Islamic states, there are Islamic 
795 This phrase is taken from Lord Lester in Lord Lester, "Human Rights and the British Constitution", 
In: Jowell. J and Oliver. D., op. cit., p. 93 
796 Ibid., p., 95 
797 See Kentridge, S., "Parliamentary Supremacy and the Judiciary Under a Bill of Rights: Some Lessons 
from the Commonwealth", Public Lcnv, 1997, p. 99 
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values that represent fundamental constitutional principles and which cause complexity 
and serious tension in the domain of rights implementation. However, the legal 
recognition of human rights and the implementation of human rights are two different 
issues and hence the complexity that arises in human rights implementation shwld not 
be a reason not to recognise the legal force of the relevant international instruments. 
Human rights, as we have seen in Chapter Two and as we will be seeing below, are in 
practice subject to some variations in exercise according to different ideological, moral 
and religious values. The British participation in the European Convention on Human 
Rights and its recognition of the -jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights 
did not, as we will see below, cause Britain to abandon its traditional fundamental 
principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty. Rather, the following discussion will show that 
the British recognition of the European Convention makes the UK's judges, lawyers and 
politicians, in various degrees, engage in a constructive effort to develop and modernise 
its constitutional system, which is not at the expense of its great political and 
constitutional traditions. 
The discussion of the British experience in human rights implementatiofi will be divided 
into two sections. I will, in the first section, examine the British judicial effort to 
reconcile the British domestic principles with international law. In the second section I 
will examine the legislative measure that the British government had to take to bring its 
legal system into line with the requirements of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 
V. 2.1. British Judicial Practices and Human Rights 
The British practice of the principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty, especially with 
respect to international law seems to make the principle less radical than it seems in 
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theory. The British courts have made a great effort to reconcile the supremacy of 
Parliament and the principles of international law, particularly the international 
customary principles. This section of the chapter will tackle the judicial role, in which I 
will examine various cases that have contributed to a greater reception of international 
principles. The following detailed examination of the British court practice will raise 
some judicial techniques taken by the British judges to strike the balance between 
British tradition of Parliamentary Sovereignty and international norms in an attempt to 
help Muslim judges to widen their approach in managing the area of tension between 
international principles and the supremacy of Islamic Shari'ah. 
In considering this subject I will go back to 1888, the case of Colquhoun v. Brooks, to 
give a better clarification of the matter. The case concerned the imposition of tax. The 
difficulty was raised by 16 & 17 Vict. c. 34, s. 2, sched. D, dealing with the imposition of tax 
upon the profit of a firm situated not in the United Kingdom and which was owned by an 
owner residing in the UK, without mentioning whether a subject of Her Majesty or not. 798 
Lord Esher in his judgment asserted that if the words of the Act were taken in a broad 
sense, the rules would apply to foreigners who were resident in the UK for a while, whose 
company was located outside the UK, and who had no incomes coming into the UK . 
799 If 
the Act was interpreted in this sense, then the Act would be intended by Parliament to 
793 The question arose under 16 & 17 Vict. c. 34, s. 2, sched, D, by which duties are imposed 'fior and in 
respect of the annual profits or gains arising or accruing to any person residing in the United Kingdom 
from any kind ofproperty whatever, whether situate in the United Kingdom or elseivhere, andfor and in 
respect of the annual profits or gains arising or accruing to any person residing in the United Kingdom 
from any profession, trade, employin ent, or vo cation, i Yheth er th e sain e shall be resp eclively carried on in 
the United Kingdom or elsewhere .... Andfor and in respect of the annual profits or gains arising or 
accruing to any person whatever, whether a subject of Her Majesty or not, although not resident within 
the United Kingdom, from any property whatever in the United Kingdom, or any profession, trade, 
employment, or vocation exercised within the United Kingdom . ..... See the case of Colquhoun v. Brooks, 
the Court of Appeal, [ 1888] 21QBD 52. 
799 For more information about income taxation as a factor of transcending national boundaries and the 
state exclusive jurisdiction see McCahery, J., Picciotto, S., and Scott, C., (eds. ), Corporate Control and 
Accountability: changing structures and the dynamics ofregulation, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1994, pp. 
381-382 
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function contrary to the law of nations, which Parliament, according to Lord Esher, 
cannot do. As he put it, "It is that the English parliament cannot be supposed merely by 
reason of its having used general words to be intending to do that which is against the 
comity of nations"800 In this case the judges expressed their views that an enactment of 
Parliament with general words cannot be construed as intended to apply beyond the limit 
of international norms. 801 However, Fry, L. J., in deciding the same case, took a different 
view, suggesting that it is not for the court to decide the question of sovereignty 
limitation; rather, it should take the words of the Act as they are expressed. The question 
of expediency should be left to the law giver, the legislature, to detennine; not to the 
court, which is supposedly concerned with the mere question of enactment. 802 
It is worthwhile to mention, here, that although Lord Esher in that case seemed very 
monist in his approach in accepting international law as a superior law over the Act of 
Parliament, he did not claim the power to invalidate the Act on the basis of its 
inconsistency. He, rather, looked at the intention of Parliament and supposed that 
Parliament did not mean to infringe the norms of international law and therefore 
interpreted the Act in accordance with international law requirements. This position of 
the effect of international law, as will be seen below, does not seem to negate the 
importance of the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty. 
In a similar case, Lord Atkin, in Chung Chi Cheung v. The King, 1939, although he 
expressed clearly his dualist view in asserting that the unincorporated international law, 
treaty principles, has no validity in the British legal system, acknowledged the existence 
of the international rules recognized by the international community, international 
800COlqtihozin v. Brooks, the Court of Appeal, [ 18 88] 21 QBD 52, Lord Esher's Judgement 
so' Marshall, G., Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Commowealth, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957, p. 
71 
802 See Fry, L. J. Judgment in Colquhozinv. Brooks, the Court of Appeal, [1888]21 QBD52 
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customary principles, and treated them as incorporated into the domestic legal system if 
relevant. As he put it: 
"It must be always remembered that so far at any rate as the Courts of this country 
are concerned, international Imv has no validity save in so far as its principles are 
accepted and adopted by our own domestic law... The Courts acknowledge the 
existence of a body of rules which nations accept amongst themselves. On any 
judicial issue they seek to ascertain what the relevant rule is, and havingfound it they 
will treat it as incorporated into the domestic law, sofar as it is not inconsistent with 
rules enacted by statutes orfinally declared by their tribunals. , 803 
It seems from Lord Atkin's opinion that not all international norms need to be adopted by 
domestic law to be given effect in the British legal system, nor do all of them form part of 
the British national law. Lord Atkin was clear in giving international customary law legal 
effect in the British law, in so far as it is not inconsistent with Parliamentary statutes. 804 
However, for Lord Atkin, international principles contained in treaties seem to have a 
different status in terms of their legal effect in domestic legal system. Case law suggests 
that judicial treatment of international rules differ according to their status in the 
international legal system in that international customary law is given the status of 
national law by British court, as long as it is consistent with the British statutes, without 
the need for incorporation, while unincorporated international treaties have not been 
803 Chung Chi Cheung v. The King, Privy Council, [ 1939], AC 160 
$04 However, the English courts' application of the international law has been criticized as they impose 
their rules about the force of precedents to questions of international law in the same manner as they 
apply them to questions of domestic law. As one commentator put it "English courts sometimes seent to 
the Impyers of other countries to be applying purely English law when they themselves profess to be 
applying international lmv. " See Brierly, J. L., and Waldock, H., (eds. ), The Lmv of Nations: an 
introduction to the international Imp ofpeace, London: Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 92 
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given so much judicial attention. 805 In the following sections we will discuss the British 
judicial approach towards both unincorporated international treaty law and international 
customary law. 
0 
V. 2.1.1. British Judicial Approach towards Unincorporated International Treaty 
Law 
The British courts are, in fact, very cautious in dealing with unincorporated treaties, not 
only because of their dualistic approach to the reception of international law, but also 
because of the legislative monopoly of Parliament. It might be true to say that the 
dualistic approach itself is a product of the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty. The 
courts' monistic stance with regard to international customary law and the dualistic 
approach in respect of international treaties, may explain why. If a treaty signed by the 
executive automatically entered into the British legal system as enforceable law, this 
would undennine the legislative monopoly of Parliament, whereas the recognition of 
international customary law would not, as it always would give way, like the common 
law itself, to the Act of Parliament in case of contradiction. 806 So, in reserving the 
ultimate legislative power of Parliament, for the treaty to have legal effect in the British 
domestic law, the court would require incorporation by an Act of Parliament. In the caýe 
of Ellernian Lines v. Murray, the court even denied the use of the international treaty as 
an aid to interpret domestic legislation. 807 
" See Trendtex Trading Corp Ltd V. Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] 1 All ER 881 at 890, [19771 QB 
529, see also R v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate and others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty 
International and others intervening), House of Lords, [2000] 1 AC 61, [1998] 4 All ER 897, [1998] 3 
WLR 1456, See Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd v. Department of Trade and Industry and related appeals; 
Maclaine Watson & Co Lid v. International Tin Council, House of Lords, [1989] 3 All ER 523, [1990] 2 
AC 418, See Brindv. Secretary ofStatefor the Home Dept, House of Lords, [199 1] 1 All ER 720, [199 1] 
I AC 696, See also R v. Lyons, House of Lords,, [2002] UKHL 44, [200214 All ER 1028, [2003] 1 AC 
976. 
806 Hunt, M., op. cit., p., 13 
807 Ellerman Lines v. Murray, [ 193 1] AC 126 
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However, British courts did not stop there. The courts have indeed exerted great effort to 
reconcile the most fundamental principle of British constitution, Parliamentary 
Sovereignty, with unincorporated international law. The main vehicle open to the courts, 
for such a compromise, was the court's authority to interpret Parliament's legislation. 
When Parliament enacted legislation in the same field as that tackled by an 
unincorporated international treaty, the court would assume that Parliament intended by 
such legislation to fulfil its obligation under the unincorporated treaty concerned. In the 
Salomon case Lord Diplock L. J. argued that where the legislation was passed after a 
convention, tackling the same topic that the convention dealt with, the court presumes, if 
there are no express words to the contrary, that Parliament did not intend to enact in 
breach of the convention. 808 He rejected the view, supported by the Ellerman Lines etc. v. 
Murray case, that the terms of an international convention cannot be used to resolve 
ambiguity in a statute if there is no express reference to the international convention, and 
suggested, 
"I can see no reason in comity or common sense for imposing such a limitation upon 
the right and duty of the court to consult an international convention to resolve 
ambiguities and obscurities in a statutory enactment. Iffrom extrinsic evidence it is 
plain that the enactment was intended to JuYil Her Majesty's Government's 
obligations under a particular convention, it matters not that there is no express 
reference to the convention in the statute. 11809 
808 Salomon v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1967] 2 QB 116. See also the case of Re 
Westinghouse [1978] AC 547 where all of their Lordships suggested that the Act 1975 was passed to give 
effect to the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters 1970, 
although the Act concerned has no reference at all to the convention. For more information about the 
method of incorporation see Higgins, R., "Treaty-Making Power in the United Kingdom", In: Jacobs, F., 
and Roberts, S., (eds. ) The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Lmv. United Kingdom National Committee of 
Comparative Lmv, vol. 7, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1987, pp. 126-128 
809 Salomon v. Commissioners of Customs andExcise., [1967] 2 QB 116 
I 
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Lord Diplock L. J., however, added "... the court must not inerely guess that the statute . 
was intended to give effect to a particular international convention. The extrinsic 
evidence ofthe connection must be cogent. "810 
.I 
Thus, in the Salomon case, the resort to an unincorporated treaty as an aid to interpret a 
statute was permitted under two conditions: first, the terms of the legislation were not 
clear but 'ambiguous', in that they are reasonably capable of more than one meaning; 
second, there was cogent extrinsic evidence that the legislation was intended to give 
effect to a particular international convention. 811 
However, in the case of Garland v. British Rail Engineering Ltd. 812 Lord Diplock L. J. 
developed his view further in that he, so to speak, dropped the ambiguity requirement and 
extended the presumption to non-implementing legislation as long as the legislation is 
. 
concerned with the same subject matter. 8 13 The principle adopted in the case was that the 
words of a statute were to be construed consistently with any relevant international treaty 
obligation of the United Kingdom if they were 'reasonably capable of bearing such a 
814 
meaning'. Diplock L. J. argued in this case that the words of a statute maY not bear 
more than one meaning if it were read in isolation from the treaty tackling the same issue. 
He called the court to give regard to Article 119 of the E. E. C. Treaty in interpreting the 
Section 6 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 without mentioning the ambiguity 
requirement. It might be true to say that Diplock L. J. in this case shifted from the 
orthodox theory of statute interpretation, which suggests that words of statutes are 
"'0 Ibid., [1967] 2 QB 116 
8" For more discussion on the Salomon case see Hunt, M., op. cit., pp. 14-15. 
812 Garland v. British Rail Engineering Ltd. [1983] 2 AC 751 
913 See Hunt, M., op. cit., pp. 18-21 
814 Allan, T. R. S., op. cit., p. 275 
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considered on their own, in isolation from any wider context, and called for looking at the 
meaning of the statute words within the context of international obligation. 815 As he put it 
"... [it is] now too well established to callfor citation of authority, that the words of a 
statute passed after the Treaty has been signed and dealing with the subject matter of 
the international obligation of the United Kingdom, are to be construed, if they are 
reasonably capable of bearing such a meaning, as intended to carry out the 
obligation, and not to be inconsistent with it.,, 
816 
In fact Lord Diplock L. J., in this case, did not bring about any new principle of the legal 
position of international law in British constitution. Rather, he reiterated an old one that 
i 
can be traced to the Dicean theory of parliamentary sovereignty itself. Dicey, when he 
asserted his view about Parliamentary Sovereignty, was well aware of the importance of 
international law and was very dedicated to their preservation. At the same time, 
however, Dicey was also aware that "There is no legal basisfor the theory thatjudges, as 
exponents of morality, may overrule Acts of Parliament. " 817 Therefore, Dicey explained 
the limitation advanced at that time, that Parliament cannot go beyond the norms of 
international law, as amounting to a presumption of intended conformity with 
intemational law. As he put it: 
"... judges when attempting to ascertain what is the meaning to be affixed to an Act of 
Parliament, will presume that Parliament did not intend to violate the ordinary rules 
of morality, or the principles of international lcnv, and ivill therefore, whenever 
815 Hunt, M., op. cit., pp. 19-20 
816 Garlandv. British Rail Engineering Ltd. [1983] 2 AC 751 
817 Dicey, op. cit, p. 60 
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possible, give such an interpretation to a statutory enactment as may be consistent 
with the doctrines hoth ofprivate and international morality. , 818 
This principle of presumption of intended conformity with international law was already 
cited in the case of Colqzthozm v. Brooks, mentioned above, where Lord Esher asserted 
that an Act of Parliament cannot reach beyond the law of nations by merely general 
words. Although the principle of the presumption of intended conformity was rooted in 
British history, it can be said that Lord Diplock L. J. may have attempted to close the way 
before sovereigntist judges who may rest on the Parliament's clear intention that it would 
avoid the implementation of unincorporated international law. Those judges can always 
preserve the opportunity to disregard the provisions of unincorporated law at all by 
finding that the legislation is clear or unambiguous. So Lord Diplock L. J. in the Garland 
case maintained the receptive judicial approach to unincorporated international law by 
asserting that in deciding the ambiguity of the meaning of a statute, the statute should be 
read within the context of the provisions of international law. 
V. 2.1.2. British Judicial Approach towards International Customary Law 
According to Chung Chi Cheung v. King, international customary law was clearly 
recognized as part of British law but in so far as it is consistent with either statute or 
precedent. However, in the Trendtex case, Lord Denning adopted an advanced view 
towards greater receptiveness to international customary principles. 819 A question tackled 
by Lord Denning in that case was whether the change of the rules of international law 
causes change in the British common law too. This question is, actually, vital, especially 
when the change of international customary law is contrary to the domestic precedents. 
Ibid., p., 60 
9 Trendlex Trading Corporation Ltdv. Central Bank offigeria, Court of Appeal, Civil Division, [19771 
QB 529, [1977] 1 All ER 881, [1977] 2 WLR 356, [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep 581, [1977] 2 CMLR 465, (47 
MLR 600) 
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Does British common law change as international customary law changes or it is bound 
by precedents and those international customary rules which have been accepted and 
adopted in the past? Lord Denning, in this case, took the view that international 
customary law forms part of British common law and, as a result, the British -domestic 
law is affected by any changes in international law. 820 According to Lord Denning, the 
English law incorporating a rule of international customary law should develop as 
international law itself develops. 82 1 Lord Denning answered the question as follows: 
"International 1mv does change: and the courts have applied the changes without the 
aid of any Act ofParliament. Thus, when the rules of international lMv were changed 
(by the force ofpublic opinion) so as to condemn slavery, the English courts were 
justified in applying the modern rules of international law. J22 
So, Lord Denning in this case dropped the condition of the compatibility of international 
customary law with the domestic precedents, and urged the judges to take international 
customary principles recognized by state practice seriously and apply them in domestic 
matters, notwithstanding the existence of domestic precedents to the contrary. However, 
there has been a debate over whether this judicial principle overriding all inconsistent 
precedents, or only those which are originally stemmed from international customary 
law and now are no longer in practice. One author argued for a "modified narrow view" 
of the decision in Trendtex, suggesting that this judicial principle is only applicable to 
$20 Haenggi, S., "The Right to Privacy is Coming to the United Kingdom: balancing the individual's right 
to privacy from the press and the media's right to freedom of expression", 21 Houston Journal of 
International Lenv, 1999, pp. 551-552 
$21 See Elias, T. 0., "The Doctrine of International La%V', 74 Anterican Journal of International Linv, 
1980, p. 294 See Rv Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate and others, ex parle Pinochet Ogarte (Amnesty 
International and others intervening), House of Lords, [2000] 1 AC 61, [1998] 4 All ER 897, [1998] 3 
WLR 1456 
$22 See Lord Denning's opinion in Trendtex v. Central'Bank offigeria [1977] QB 529 
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the precedents based on obsolete international IaW. 823 Such a reading, it is said, an 
attempt to have the advantage of recognising the contemporary changes in international 
customary law consistently with the doctrine of precedent. 824 
V. 2.1.3. Observations on the British Judicial Approach towards International 
Law 
Although the Dicean theory of Parliamentary Sovereignty seems to be very radical 
dualist in receiving international law in the British legal system, judicial practice of the 
theory seems to indicate the flexibility of the British constitution and the ability to 
reconcile this fundamental constitutional principle with the norms of international law, 
especially in its customary part. British judges have tackled the question of the 
relationship between domestic and international law with wisdom and flexibility. The 
court does not abandon the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty, in that Parliamentary 
enactment is always the supreme law in the land. The court also does not ignore the 
importance of international law, in that it applies customary international principles as 
part of domestic law, applicable to domestic matters even if there exist precedents to the 
contrary. Moreover, the Parliament's statute itself, the court concluded, should be read 
within the context of international law to be given the proper meaning of the words. 825 
As a result, irreconcilable conflict between the statute and international law would 
become highly unlikely. 
This raises a question, however, as to whether such judicial efforts to comply with 
international law satisfy the basic requirements of human rights protection. It is true that 
judicial practice has made a great effort to reconcile domestic common law with 
823 Cited in Hunt, M., op. cit., p. 17 
924 Ibid., p. 17 
825 See judgement of Lord Diplock L. J. in Garlandv. British Rail Engineering Ltd. [198312 AC 751 
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international law, but no judge has ever made any attempt to set aside an Act of 
Parliament. Although Lord Bingham in A and others v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department case expressed his discomfort with the suggestion of the Court of Appeal 
that an international obligation solemnly and explicitly undertaken can be overridden by 
a statute of Parliament, he could not suggest any revolutionary idea except the principle 
of presumption of intended conformity with the international human rights and 
freedoms discussed above. 826 No judge in the above mentioned cases has accepted 
international norms contrary to the Act of Parliament. International law has no 
validation in the British domestic legal system if there is a parliamentary statute to the 
contrary. The main condition for judicial recognition of international principles is that 
the principle concerned, to be given legal effect in the British common law, must be in 
compliance with the will of Parliament. In the case of R. v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, ex parte Simms, the House of Lords clearly expressed its view that 
"Parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament can, if it chooses, legislate contrary 
tofundamental principles offtman rights". 827 Lord Lester asserts that the English court 
has attempted a great effort to put the convention rights in effect, but Parliamentary 
Sovereignty was the obstacle that drew the courts back from complete judicial 
incorporation. 828 He states, 
"The landmarkjudgments of the European Court of Human Rights against the UK 
had a profound impact upon senior Britishjudges. The Strasbourgjurisprudence has 
826 See Lord Bingham's opinion in A and others v Secretary ofStatefor the Home Department (No 
2), House of Lords, [20051 UKHL 71, [2006] 1 All ER 575 
927 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department_ ex parte. Shnnis and Another, House of Lords, 
[2000] 2 AC 115, [1999] 3 All ER 400, [1999] 3 WLR 328, [1999] EMLR 68 
828Lord Lester, "Human Rights and the British Constitution", In: Jowell. J and Oliver. D., op. cit., p. 97 
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made them more sensitive to thefault-line in the British legal system that has resulted 
in repeatedfailures to give sufficient legal protection to individual rights. , 829 
The failures of English courts in incorporating the convention rights urged some lawyers 
to call for the introduction of a bill of rights based on the Convention, giving the 
Convention the force of law within the United Kingdom. 
V. 2.1.4. The British Argument against the Introduction of a Bill of Rights 
The argument that has always been advanced by the opponents of adopting a bill of 
rights is that the positivisation of rights, as mentioned above, would transfer the 
legislative power, which is supposed to be in the hands of elected people, to the judges, 
appointed officials. 830 It would be an undemocratic way of resolving the matter if the 
judge were to have the last say on such a comprehensive subject. On what basis can a 
judge invalidate a legislation issued by the representatives of the people of the country? 
Would the protection of human rights justify the judicial invalidation of popular 
legislation? If yes, then the bill of rights would undermine the three fundamental 
attributes of democracy; first, participation, in the sense that the decision making would 
only be, in the hands of elite of lawyers with no involvement of the rest of the 
community; second, representativeness, in that judges do not represent the whole 
community; third, accountability, meaning that judges are unaccountable to the 
public. 831 
8'91bid., p. 96 
830 Fredman, S., " Judging Democracy: The Rule of the Judiciary under the HRA 1998", 53 Current Legal 
Problems, 2000,99 
831 Zander, M., A Bill qfRights?, Fourth Edition, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997, p. 78 
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This argument does not seem to differ very much from some of the Arab and Islamic 
objections to accommodate the international principles of human rights. Some Islamic 
and Arabic authors also make the point that it is undemocratic and another kind of 
imperialism to leave such an important issue that has a direct effect -on the 
understanding and belief of the Islamic society to be decided by a handful of appointed 
international lawyers. 832 The rights of Islamic people must be decided by Islamic people 
themselves, not by a certain group with a certain view of human rights that is mostly 
irrelevant to the fundamental values of the Islamic nation. Although the actors here are 
different, the substance of both arguments seems to be the same, since they all rely on 
the popular will and lead to the same conclusion, which is that international rights 
should be implemented, not as required by the international instruments, but according 
to the popular will. This argument has in fact a legitimate point which must be taken 
seriously by the international human rights lawyers and advocates. There is no sensible 
reason to exclude people, wherever they are, from participating in deciding what rights 
they have. 833 The British government has taken into consideration this difficulty and 
hence drawn, as will be seen below, legislative measures that ensure respect for human 
rights and at the same time uphold the supremacy of the popular will of the British 
people. 
932 Ghalyon has reported that in the Arab and Islamic thinking, international human rights movements t) have always been considered as an agent for advertising Western liberalism of bourgeois system and the 
Arab advocates of human rights have been accused of advertising, through human rights organizations, 
such unpopular western values in the Arab states. See Ghalyon, B., "Huqoq Alensan fi Alfikr Assiyasy 
Alaraby Almu'aaser", In: Al-Jeosi, S., (ed. ), op. cit., pp. 394-395 
833 Fredman, S., op. cit., p., 101 
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V. 2.1.5. Observations on the British Argument against the Introduction of a 
Bill of Rights 
Since human rights are a very contestable matter on which agreement cannot be 
guaranteed, 834 it has become a common understanding in the UK that, judicial 
invalidation of popular legislation concerning human rights matters is not necessarily 
the solution for a proper human rights implementation. Human rights, in the UK, are 
conceived to be a matter of politics, not law and hence it is for the politicians to resolve, 
not for the lawyers. The question that touches the heart of the matter, accordingly, is 
whether in the judicial interpretation of human rights provisions, the judge is really 
interpreting law or making a political judgment. 835 Goldsworthy raised the question that 
if judges rejected legislation passed by elected people on the ground of each judge's 
own political morality, they would make law less predictable than judgments about the 
proper meaning and interpretation of the legislation. 836 Although Goldsworthy's 
argument seems to be convincing, the predictability matter is very sensitive in common 
law and needs to be examined from different perspectives, since it was also raised, by 
837 
some commentator, against the Islamic Shariah. 
It is uncontroversial that common law was made by judges case by case through a 
sufficient number of successive precedents that circumscribe a distinct path. 838 These 
precedents are essential for all subsequent cases. If a judge, however, is confronted with 
a case that has no relevant precedent, the judge will have to apply his own experience, 
common sense, and his own understanding of justice and fairness. 839 This powerful 
834 Campbell. T., "Democratizing Human Rights", In: Leiser. B& Campbell, (eds. ), op. cit., p. 183 
835 McCrudden, C., A Common Law of Human Rights?: transnational judicial conversations on 
constitutional rights, 20 Oxford Journal ofLegal Studies, 2000, p. 502 
836 Goldsworthy, J., "Legislative Sovereignty and the Rule of Law", In: Campbell, T., Ewing, K., and 
Tomkins, A., (eds. ), op. cit., p., 74 
837 Mayer, A., op. cit., 1999, pp. 66-67 
838 Rosenfeld, M., op. cit., p. 1337 839 Ibid., p. 1337 
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authority of judges to make laws is generally recognized where no parliamentary statute 
exists tackling the issue in question. Where there is a statute of Parliament, however, 
judges usually have no right to exercise such authority. Instead, they should interpret the 
statute in a way that does not conflict with the intention of Parliament when the statute 
was issued. As a result, one may suggest that the codification of a bill of rights could 
make the application of the bill more predictable, than if there was no law at all 
concerning the matters. 840 Subsequently, by the nature of common law, one could say 
the legalization of human rights may be required, if the law is to be more predictable. 
However, there is a clear tension in the British constitutional system in the relationship 
between the courts and the government, especially in the matter of human rights 
implementation. While the court claims the jurisdiction over the matter as an exercise of 
its genuine authority to uphold the rule of law, the govenunent claims its exclusive 
sovereignty and authority over this contestable matter on the ground that it represents 
the people's attitude in defining what constitutes rights. It is not surprising to see this 
tension in a state where the two important institutions, the judiciary and the government, 
have been regarded as ultimate sources of two important spheres of law, defined by the 
courts, and politics, determined by the government. These two sources, I believe, were 
shaped by the nature of common law itself and the British political traditions. Common 
law allows judges to use their own experience, common sense and understanding of 
justice and fairness in tackling matters that have no judicial precedents, whereas British 
democracy accords the elected government an exclusive authority in determining what 
is right and wrong for the community. The powerful authority of the judges, accorded 
by the nature of common law, could lead to a tension between the court and parliament 
on matters where the two authorities are not agreed completely on the way they should 
840 Fredman, S., "Scepticism under Scrutiny: Labour Law and Human Rights", in: Campbell, T., Ewing, 
K., and Tomkins, A., (eds. ), op. cit., p. 208 
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be implemented, which ultimately could create a state of unpredictability, in the sense 
that one cannot predict the legal consequence of his act. For example, if a law is issued 
by Parliament to regulate a matter in certain areas and applied by the judges in a certain 
way, any change in the way that this law is operated could result in an innocent person 
being held legally responsible for an act that was not regarded as a crime at the time he 
committed the act. In the R v. R case, the judge was able to use his power to interpret 
the law in a manner contrary to the parliamentary intention of the Act, leading him to 
regard a husband as a criminal for embarking on an act that was regarded as permissible 
before this judgement. 841 Moreover, in the Spectrum case, Lord Nicholls suggests that 
judges have, in respect of statute law, an evolutive role to interpret the statute according 
to the changing social conditions and circumstances and this judicial interpretive power 
is preserved even if the interpretation runs against the original intention of Parliament 
when enacted the statute. As he puts it "From time to time cases arise where changed 
social conditions dictate that a statutory provision should have a different and wider 
meaning than when enacted. , 842 It is unclear, however, whether judges with such a 
power that could even enable them to give a new meaning for a statute, different from 
that which Parliament had in mind when it enacted it, are really interpreting the law, or 
making new law. 
Interestingly, some human rights authors raise the same predictability argument against 
the involvement of the Islamic rules in resolving human rights issues, as it will likely 
enable judges to use their own understanding of the general rules of Islam to take away 
84 1Rv. R, House of Lords, I [1992] AC 599. Although Parliament's intention in the Act seems not to 
regard a husband who has sexual intercourse with his wife against her will as committing a crime of rape, 
the court, which is accorded great authority in the application of law, did charge him with raping his wife, 
which subsequently resulted in uncertainty in the application. If the husband had known that committing 
such conduct was legally prohibited, he might not have had this sexual intercourse with his wife. See 
Barber, N. W., "Sovereignty Re-examined: The Courts, Parliament, and Statutes", 20 (1), OxfordJournal 
ofLegal Studies, 2000, pp. 146-147. 
842 See Lord Nicholls's opinion in In re Spectrum Phis Ltd (in liquidation), House of Lords, [2005] 
UKHL 41, [2005] 2 AC 680. 
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some individual rights, instead of giving rights to individuals. 843 Mayer, for example, has 
reported that although in Pakistan judges were able to deduce from Islamic rules to assert 
that a woman can serve as a judge, the Iranian Muslim cleric, after the Islamic 
Revolution, enforced a law, excluding women not only from the judiciary but also from 
studying law itself. 844 We will give below more discussion on how the European Court of 
Human Rights dealt with the generality of the common law and whether the court 
decision can be used to justify Islamic law limitation on human rights. 
V. 2.2. The United Kingdom's Human Rights Act 1998 
As mentioned earlier, the objection to the entrenchment of a bill of rights in the UK is 
based on democratic theory, in the sense that the right people to assert the rights of people 
are the people themselves not unelected, unaccountable judges. 845 While it has been 
argued that a handful of unelected, unaccountable officials should not be given the final 
say on issues of fundamental disagreement, account has been taken of the danger of an 
unrestrained legislature, which could result in a majoritarian tyranny. 846 So some sort of 
843 Mayer, A., op. cit., 1999, pp. 28-29 see also pp. 66-67 
844 See Mayer, A., Islam and Human Rights: tradition andpolifics, Second Edition, London: Pinter, 1995, 
pp. 105-106 and the footnote of chapter 5 number 23. However, in the third edition of Mayer's book, 
cited above, she recognises that the Iranian regime allowed few women in 1997 to serve as judges. 
However, she cites, in her third edition, a court case in Pakistan suggesting that while the petitioner did 
manage to cite views of medieval jurists to support his view that women could not be judges, the attorney 
general of Pakistan in turn found a medieval jurist who held the contrary view and suggested that the 
other jurists had drawn an overly broad conclusion from the statement by the Prophet on women's 
capacity to rule. The court found the petitioner had been mistaken in his interpretations of many 
requirements of Islamic law as they would affect the ability of women to serve as judges. Although she 
cited the case to show the great disparity between the English and the Arabic versions of Article 3 of the 
Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, the case still conforms her view that is demonstrated in 
her both editions that Islamic law is ambiguous to the extent that would enable judges to use their own 
understanding of the general rules of Islam, which in turn could open the way to nullification of rights and 
hence Islamic law cannot be relied on to limit or dilute human rights. Although the court in this case ruled 
out in favour of women to serve as judges, no one can guarantee that another judge would not rule in 
favour of the petitioner opinion in another case. See the discussion of the case in Mayer, A., op. cit., 1999, 
p. 93 and the discussion of the ambiguity of Islamic law in Mayer, A., op. cit., 1999, pp. 28-29 and also in 
pp. 66-67 
4.5 Darrow, M., and Alston, P., "Bill of Rights in Comparative Perspective", In: Alston, P., op. ciL, 1999, 
p., 498 
ý" It has been argued that the distinctive feature of the HRA is that it is based upon a mature theory of the 
nature of parliamentary democracy and the role of the judiciary in the sense that while it does not create a 
government of unelected judges, it recognises the notion of Sovereignty as a flexible notion rooted in the 
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technique was needed to gain an agreement on the incorporation of human rights. The 
first principle in the mind of the drafter of the Human Rights Act 1998 was to ensure a 
proper Parliamentary control of judicial decision making. This clearly meant that the 
court would not have the authority to invalidate an Act of Parliament. The drafters were 
also aware of the need of some control on the legislative power of Parliament., but the 
question was whether it was going to be of a legal or a political nature. The big job of the 
drafters of the HRA was to reconcile between the traditional principle of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty and the establishment of newjusticiable human rights. 847 A democratic bill 
of rights, which was the goal of the drafters, was commonly recognized as to bring the 
court to a democratic discussion and debate over such a controversial matter, rather than 
to give it the authority to judge what is right and wrong. Hence, the Human Rights Act 
1998 was articulated to balance the protection of human rights through incorporation and 
the democratic principle of popular participation in decision-making. 848 
There are several points that can be deduced from the 1998 Act. First, human rights 
matters have been codified and it is left for the court to read any legislation, whether 
primary or secondary, as far as possible in conjunction with the convention rights. The 
Act states in section 3 (1) that, "So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and 
subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with 
the Convention rights". Accordingly, the ambiguity condition for use of the European 
Convention in the domestic law is dropped. 849 
political reality of the sharing of power. See Lester, A., "The Human Rights Act 1998- Five Years On", 3, 
European Human Rights Law Review, 2004, p. 261 
947 Gearty, C. A., "Reconciling Parliamentary Democracy and Human Rights", 118 L. Q. R., 2002, p. 248 
848 Lester. A., "The Human Rights Act 1998- Five Years On", op. cit., pp. 258-271 
849 Fredman, S., "Judging Democracy: The Rule of the Judiciary under the HRA 1998", op. cit., p. 118 
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Second, although the Act makes human rights justiciable, it does not give the court any - 
authority to set aside an Act of Parliament. The final say on the matter has been reserved 
for parliament, and the authority of the court, in case of inconsistent legislation, does not 
go beyond a declaration of incompatibility. 850 Section 4 (6) states that 0 
"A declaration under this section Ca declaration of incompatibility)- 
(a) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the provision 
in respect of which it is given; and 
(b) is not binding on the parties to the proceedings in which it is made. "851 
Third, the Act set up a pre-legislated scrutiny to guarantee compliance with the 
Convention rights. When a bill is introduced in either House, the minister responsible for 
the bill will be required to declare that the bill is in compliance with the Convention 
rights, unless the government wishes to proceed with the legislation notwithstanding its 
inconsistence. 852 However, the government, in approving the inconsistent legislation, 
would have to engage in detailed debate and justification for the decision. If Parliament 
were convinced, then no one could stop Parliament from issuing such incompatible 
legislation. 853 Parliament can still legislate in a manner contrary to the Convention rights, 
if the legislature expressly wishes to do so. This was clearly confirmed in A and others v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, where Lord Bingham suggested that the 
Human Rights Act 1998 would not take away or reduce the power of Parliament even if 
850 Clapham, A., "The European Convention on Human Rights in the British Courts: problem associated 
with the incorporation of international human rights", In: Alston, P., (ed. ), op. cit, 1999, p. 150. See also 
Clayton, R., "Judicial Deference and "Democratic Dialogue": the legitimacy ofjudicial intervention under 
the Human Rights Act 1998", SPR, Public Lcnv, 2004, pp. 33-47 
851 Section 4(6) of the UK Human Rights Act 1998 
852 Section 19, Human Rights Act 1998. See also Fredman, S., "Judging Democracy: The Rule of the 
Judiciary under the HRA 1998", op. cit., p., 119 
853 Fredman, S., "Scepticism under Scrutiny: Labour Law and Human Rights", in: Campbell, T., Ewing, 
K., and Tomkins, A., (cds. ), op. cit., p. 209 
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854 
that power was used to contradict fundamental principles of human rights. This was 
also underlined by the case of R (on the application ofHooper and others) v Secretary of 
State for Work and Pensions. In this case it was impossible for the Secretary of State to 
read and give effect, so far as it is possible to do so, to the relevant provisions of the 1992 
and 1999 Acts in a way that was compatible with Convention rights. 855 The Secretary of 
State, as a result, refused to pay widowers sums equivalent to the benefits to which they 
would have been entitled had they been widows and hence acted incompatibly, as the 
claimants suggest, with their Convention right and in breach of section 6(l) of the Human 
856 Rights Act 1998. However, the case has underlined that although the act of the 
Secretary of State in authorizing payment of the section 36, section 37 and section 38 
statutory benefits to widows and in reftising to authorise payment of those benefits to 
widowers is discriminatory, the court asserts it is not unlawful. Lord Hope suggests that 
the Department of State has no alternative but to do what the legislation tells it, as a 
public authority, to do, even if the legislation requires it to act in a way which is 
incompatible with a Convention right. As he puts it "The authority has no discretion to do 
otherwise. As it is a duty which has been imposed on the authority by or as a result of 
primary legislation, Parliamentary sovereignty prevails over the Convention right. iiM 
854 See the case of A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2), House of 
Lords, [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 1 All ER 575. Lord Bingham in this case cited Lord Hoffmann's opinion 
in case R. v. Secretaty ofStatefor the Home Department,, ex parle. Sinims and Another, House of Lords, 
1999, cited above, which suggests that "Parliament can, if it chooses, legislate contrary to fimdainental 
principles of Intman rights. The Human Rights Act 1998 will not detract from this power. " See also 
Regina (Roberts) v Parole Board and another, House of Lords, [20051 UKHL 45, [2005] 2 AC 738. 
However, in Regina (Jackson and others) v Attorney General case Lord Hope suggests that the 
interpretative obligation resulted from Human Rights Act 1998 section 3 (1) enables the courts to give 
a meaning to legislation which is compatible even if this appears to differ from what Parliament had in 
mind when enacting it. See Lord Hope opinion in Regina (Jackson and others) v Attorney General, House 
of Lords, [2005] UKHL 56, [2006] 1 AC 262 
'-A requirement of Section 3(l) of Human Rights Act 1998 
56 Section 6(l) of the Human Rights Act 1998 states it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way 
which is incompatible with a Convention right. 
857 See the case of R (on the application of Hooper and others) v. Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions, House of Lords, [2005] UKHL 29, [2005] All ER (D) 60 (May), (Approved judgment) 
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This raises a question as to what is the effect of the Human Rights Act 1998 if 
Parliament's unrestrained power is intact in which it can if it chooses legislate contrary 
to fundamental principles of human rights. What the judicial declaration of 
incompatibility can do to preserve human rights from parliamentary breach by apbitrary 
legislation. Lord Lester suggests that the importance of the judicial declaration is 'in 
bringing the problem to attention of the executive and the legislature' and urging them 
to amend the inconsistent legislation. 858 It would create immense political pressure on 
Parliament to amend offending primary legislation. 859 It is the democratic nature of the 
Act which invites the court to make a distinctive contribution to the human rights 
debate. It could be argued, however, that if the declaration fails to induce the legislature 
to amend the incompatible legislation, the complaint may well be brought before the 
European Court of Human Rights, which would in all likelihood uphold the 
incompatibility. 860 As the Home Secretary stated in the House of Commons, "One of the 
questions that will always be before Government, in practice, will be, 'is it sensible to 
wait for a firther challenge to Strasbourg, when the British courts have declared the 
provision to be outivith the Convention? ". 861 
V. 3. The UK and the European Court of Human Rights 
British experience of human rights implementation has shown that the application of 
human rights on the ground is much more complex than it may seem in theory. The UK 
seems to put more emphasis on the political legitimacy of human rights implementation 
than the process of legalization that is commonly conceived in Europe. 862 The British 
experience demonstrates that the political traditions of parliamentary democracies of 
858 Lord Lester, "Human Right and the British Constitution", In: Jowell. J and Oliver. D., op. cit., p. 105 
859 Elliott, M., The Demise of Parliamentary Sovereignty? The Implications for Justifying Judicial 
Review, 115 Hunian Rights Lmv Review, 1999, p. 127 
860 Lord Lester, "Human Right and the British Constitution", In: Jowell. J and Oliver. D., op. cit., P. 105 
86 1 Bradley, A., "The Sovereignty of Parliament -Form or Substance", In: Jowell. J and Oliver. D., 
o cit., P, 55 
8T2 See the work of Goldsworthy, J., op. cit., pp. 61-78 
271 
Chapter Five: Implementing International Human Rights Standards in our Relativistic World 
Western Europe are not unified in one model of human rights implementation and hence, 
each tradition seems to have its own approach to human rights implementation. 863 While 
Western civil IaNv systems stress the codification of human rights, giving the judges the 
wider role in the implementation, the Western common law systems stress the political 
legitimacy of the authority concerned with right implementation and accord the elected 
officials the ultimate say on the issue. The image of one homogenous "Western righf' is 
often a simplified or distorted one. 864 Democracy has been conceived differently and 
Western authors, as we saw above, are still debating on the complex relationship between 
right and democracy. 865 As one commentator suggests, "Everyonefavotirs democracy, Init 
ive cannot find agreement on what it is.,, 866 The question of the differences in 
approaching human rights accordingly is not confined to whether that state is of a 
Western or Eastern culture or a secular or religious nature. This chapter demonstrates that 
the Western states themselves have different approaches to the implementation and also 
have traditions that even prevent full realization of international rights and fundamental 
freedoms. The European Court of Human Rights seems to be aware of such inevitable 
diversities and hence has developed an interesting legal technique that leaves room for the 
exercise of national sovereignty. 867 It has been commonly conceived that the provisions 
of the European Convention do not replace the national laws, nor would the Commission 
replace itself in the position of the government. 868 Under the supervision of the European 
Court of Human Rights, a state is permitted a certain measure of discretion when it takes 
963 However, some still treat Parliamentary democracies of Western Europe as one, presenting it as a 
model of human rights implementation. See Robertson, A., and Merrills, J., op. cit., p. 8 
864 Brems, E., op. cit., p. 357 
965 See the work of Loughlin, M., "Rights, Democracy, and Law", In: Campbell, T., Ewing, K., and 
Tomkins, A., op. cit., pp. 41-60 
$66 Campbell, P., and Mahoney-Norris, K., Democratization and the Protection of Human Rights: 
Challenges and Contradictions, Westport: Praeger, 1998, p. 4 
867 Brems, E., op. cit., p. 360. The Europeans have treated the HRA as a significant event in that the UK 
has made the ECHR part of its domestic law, although the HRA has not added any new substantive rights 
to the UK common law system. See McGoldrick, D., "The United Kingdom's Human Rights Act 1998 in 
Theory and Practice", 50 International and Comparative Lmv Quarterly, 200 1, p. 908 
86s Hutchinson, M., "The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the European Court of Human Rights", 48 
International and Comparative Lmv Quarterly, 1999, p. 640 
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legislative or administrative action in the area of a guaranteed right . 
869 This legal - 
technique is known as the doctrine of margin of appreciation; a term that is solely a 
product of Strasbourg organs. 870 
V. 3.1. The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine 
The emergence of the doctrine of margin of appreciation is commonly dated from the 
Handyside case of 1976 . 
871 The case was brought by Mr. Handyside against the United 
Kingdom before the European Court of Human Rights, to which the case was initially 
referred by the European Commission of Human Rights. The case was about a British 
citizen, Mr. Handyside, who had published a book, targeting school-children of the age 
of twelve and upwards, called the Little Red Schoolbook. The book was a subject of 
controversy in Britain and of extensive press comments. The book contains a section 
concerning "Sex" which includes sub-sections on Masturbation, Orgasm, Intercourse, 
Pornography, and Homosexuality. The British court found the book "subversive to the 
influence of the trust between children and teachers" and that "tends to deprave and 
corrupt a significant nuinber, significant proportion, of the children likely to read it". 
As a result, the British judicial authority ceased the distribution of the book and initiated 
a warrant to seize the available copies. The judicial decision was based on section 3 of 
the British Obscene Publications Acts 1959/196. 
Mr. Handyside complained that the action taken by the British authorities against his 
publishing of the book was in breach of his right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
belief under Article 9 of the Convention, his right to freedom of expression under 
869 Harris, D., "The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the United Kingdom Law: 
An Introductioif ', In Harris, D., and Joseph, S., The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and United Kingdom Lmv, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 13 
870 Hutchinson, M., op. cit., p. 639 
871 Ibid., p. 639 
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Article 10 of the Convention and his right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions 
under Article 1 of Protocol No. I (P 1- 1). 
The European Court of Human Rights decided that the measures taken by tho. British 
authority were beyond doubt "interferences by public authority" in the exercise of the 
applicant's freedom of expression which is guaranteed under paragraph I (art. 10-1). 
However, the court pointed out that the freedom of expression is not without limitation 
and if the interference was "prescribed by laiv" and was "necessary in a democratic 
sociejy', it would not be regarded as a violation of the Conventional provision of 
freedom of expression. The court found that the interference fell within one of the 
exceptions provided for in paragraph 2 (art. 10-2), in that it was first "prescribed by 
lcnv" and second it was "necessary in a democratic society", 'fior the protection of... 
morals". 872 
According to Article 26 of the Convention, the Convention institutions are only of 
873 
relevance to the proceedings once all domestic remedies have been exhausted. The 
Court, therefore, pointed out that the Convention is a subsidiary machinery of 
protection to the national systems safeguarding human rights. As a result, the 
Convention leaves to each Contracting State, the initial task of safeguarding the rights it 
enshrines. The court noted that the requirements of morals vary from time to time and 
from place to place and since it is not possible to find a uniform European conception of 
morals, "... State authorities are in principle in a better position than the international 
872 Handyside v. The UnitedKingdom, Application Number 5493/72, Date of Judgment 07/12/1976. 
Available Online at 
http: //cmiskp. echr. coe. int/tkpl 97/view. asp? action=html&key=31213&, portal=hbkm&source=extemal&ta 
ble=285953B33D3AF94893DC49EF6600CEBD49 
873 See Article 26 of the European Convention on Human Rights which states, "The Commission may only 
deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally 
recognized rules of international leny, and within a period ofshc monthsfroin the date on which thefinal 
decision was taken. " 
274 
Chapter Five: Implcmenting Intemational Human Rights Standards in our Relativistic World 
judge " to decide the requirement for the protection of morals and the "necessity" of a 
,, 874 "restriction " intended to meet them. The court stated that 
"... it isfor the national authorities to make the initial assessment of the reality of the 
pressing social need implied by the notion of "necessity" in this context. 
Consequently, Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2) leaves to the Contracting States a margin 
of appreciation. This margin is given both to the domestic legislator ('ýPrescribed by 
laWq and to the bodies, judicial amongst others, that are called upon to interpret and 
apply the laws inforce , 875 
The European Court, in articulating the doctrine of margin of appreciation in the 
Handyside case, was well aware of the sensitivity of its decision to the sovereignty of 
the state parties. The Court realised that the functioning of the Convention is ultimately 
dependent on the state's willingness to be governed by its provisions and hence the 
Court feared that any unfavourable result might cause the states to refuse to accept any 
longer the Court's jurisdiction. 876 However, the Court emphasised that the enjoyment 
of the power of appreciation must go hand in hand with a European supervision 
concerning both the aim of the measure challenged and its "necessity". 877 This was 
confinned by the Sunday Times case, where it was reemphasised that it is for the 
European Court to make a final detennination of whether the state's interference with a 
convention right corresponds to the European notion of necessity. The court stressed 
that the state's interference in order to fall within the margin of appreciation must 
correspond to a "pressing social need', be "proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued' 
and the reasons given by the national authorities to justify it has to be "relevant and 
874 Handyside v. The United Kingdom, Application Number 5493/72,07/12/1976, Paragraph, 48 
975 Ibid. Paragraph, 48 
976 Jacobs, F., (ed. ), Yearbook ofEttropean Laiv, Vol. 6, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982, p. 7 
877 See Handyside case, op. cit., paragraph 49 
275 
Chapter Five: Implementing International Human Rights Standards in our Relativistic World 
sufficient" . 
878 These three requirements are the tests set to assess what is "necessary in a 
democratic society', 879 
The application of the doctrine of margin of appreciation varies from case to case. One 
of the factors that generally seems to deten-nine the width of the margin depends on 
whether or not there is a uniform European standard regarding the application of the 
right under. question. 880 The margin is narrow and the court monitoring is strict if there 
is consensus on the application of the right and becomes wide with flexible judicial 
monitoring if there is not. 881 A clear example of European lack of uniformity is the 
protection of morals, in which the state is accorded a wide margin of appreciation to 
limit the convention rightS. 882 In the Cossey case, the court realised that there is great 
diversity between member states in matters of a moral nature and, hence, despite the 
European Parliaments' encouragement 883 to harmonise laws and practices in this field, 
the court contended that the contracting states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation. 884 it 
has also been asserted in the case of Open Door and Dublin Ivell Woman v. Ireland that 
"national authorities enjoy a 1vide margin of appreciation in matters of morals, 
particularly in an area such as the present which touches on matters of belief 
concerning the nature of human life. "885 
8713 See The SundayTimesv. The UnitedKingdom, Application no. 6538/74,26/04/1979, paragraph 62. 
See also the case of Barlholdv. Germany, Application no. 8734/79,25/03/1985, paragraph 55. 
879 Davidov, G., Judicial Deference and the Constitutional Protection of Human Rights, LLM Thesis, 
University of Toronto, 1998, p. 47 
880 Neuman, G., "Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and Dissonance', 55 Stanford Lmv 
Review, 2003 
881 Davidov, G., op. cit., p. 48 
982 See Handyside case cited above. See also the case of Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 
A plication no. 14234/88; 14235/88,29/10/1992. 
88F See the reports accompanying the resolution adopted by the European Parliament on 12 September 
1989 (OJ No C 256,9.10.1989, p. 33) and Recommendation 1117 (1989) adopted by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe on 29 September 1989 
" Cossey v. the United Kingdont, Application no. 10843/84,27/09/1990, Paragraph, 40 
85 Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, op. cit., paragraph, 68. However the European Court 
held by fifteen votes to eight that Ireland in this case was in violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
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The variation of the margin accorded to the states seems also to be determined by the 
effect of the threat. If the threat to the general interest is more urgent than the individual 
right, the state discretion will be a wide one. 886 In the Leander case, although the court 
recognised that the protection of national security must be balanced against the 
seriousness of the interference with the applicant's right to respect his private life, the 
court suggested that the margin of appreciation available to the state in determining the 
appropriate means to protect national security is a wide one. 887 Hence, the Court 
concluded that the release of the applicant's private infonnation secretly by the police 
register to the military to assess the applicant's suitability for the job was not a violation 
of the applicant's right of privacy guaranteed under Article 8 of the Convention . 
888 Also 
in the case of Klass, the Court asserted that the state has a certain discretion to assess 
how surveillance measures can best be operated and this discretion, the court concluded, 
extends to cover the state's right to have recourse to surveillance measures without 
obliging the authorities in every case to notify the persons concerned after the event, 
and the exclusion of any remedy before the courts against the ordering and execution of 
such measures. 889 Nevertheless, the court contended in the Rees case that although the 
exercise of the convention rights shall be subject to the national laws of the contracting 
states, "the limitations thereby introduced must not restrict or reduce the right in such a 
way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired. "890 This test of 
gessence' or 'substance' has been applied in many cases; 891 however, there has been no 
886 Brems, E., op. cit, p. 366 
887 Leander v. Siveden, Application no. 9248/81,26/03/1987, Paragraph, 59 
$88 Ibid., Paragraph, 68 
8g9 Klass and others v. Germany, Application no. 5029/71,06/09/1978 
890 Rees v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 9532/81,17/10/1986 
891 Cossey v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 10843/84,27/09/1990 See the case of Campbell and 
Cosans v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 7511/76; 7743/76,25/02/1982. it has been asserted that 
" The right to education guaranteed by the first sentence of A rticle 2 (P 1-2) by its very nature calls for 
regulation by the State, but such regulation must never injure the substance of the right nor conflict with 
other rights enshrined in the Convention or its Protocols" paragraph 41. See Fayed v. the United 
Kingdom, Application no. 17101/90,21/09/1994. See also Stubbings and others v. the United Kingdom, 
Application no. 22083/93; 22095/93,22/10/1996 
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European uniformity on standards, determining whether or not a certain limitation 
touches the essence of right. 892 Below we will examine cases from the European Court 
providing further detail on how the test of essence of right is exercised. 
0 
In the Johnston case the European Court contended that the Irish constitutional 
prohibition of dissolution of marriage, which the applicant was seeking to enable him to 
marry a second woman, did not impair the essence of the right to marry guaranteed in 
Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The court took the words 
'right to marry' in their ordinary meaning, in the sense that they cover the formation of 
the marital relationship but not their dissolution. Although the court admitted that such a 
prohibition could form a restriction on the capacity to marry, the court did not consider 
it touching the essence of the right to marry in a society that adheres to the principle of 
monogamy. 893 The court agreed that the Convention must be interpreted in the light of 
present-day conditions, but it could not by means of an evolutive interpretation derive a 
right not included in the convention, such as the right to divorce. 894 In the Rees case, the 
court also suggested that the right to marry refers to the traditional marriage between 
persons of opposite biological sex and hence, the court concluded, the British legal 
prohibition on the marriage of persons who are not of the opposite biological sex does 
not injure the essence of the right to marry. 895 
The ordinary meaning approach used by the court to assess whether the national law 
injure the essence of the right under question was not followed in the Goodivin case. 896 
Although the court in this case recognised that the first sentence of Article 12 refers in 
express tenns to the right of a man and woman to marry, it was not persuaded that at the 
892 Brems, E., op. cit., p. 369 
893 Johnston and others v. Ireland, 18/12/1986, Application no. 9697/82, paragraph 52 
894 See Ibid., paragraph 53,54 
'95 Rees v. the United Kingdom, 17/10/1986, Application no. 9532/8 1, paragraph 49 and 50. 
'96 Christine Goodivin v. the United Kingdom, II July 2002, Application no. 28957/95 
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dale of this case it can still be assumed that these terms must refer to a determination of 
gender by purely biological criteria. 897 The court argued that there have been major 
social changes in the institution of marriage since the adoption of the Convention as 
well as dramatic changes brought about by developments in medicine and science in the 
field of transsexuality. 898 The court asserted that in the tiventyfirst century there is a 
continuing international trend in favour not only of increased social acceptance of 
transsexuals but of legal recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative 
transsexuals . 
899 Hence the Court found no justification for barring the transsexual from 
enjoying the right to marry under any circumstances and suggested that the allocation of 
sex in national law to that registered at birth is a limitation impairing the very essence of 
the right to marry. 900 Moreover, in the Matthews case9ol the court found the United 
Kingdom responsible to secure the rights guaranteed in by Article 3 of Protocol No. I in 
Gibraltar. 902 In the interpretation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the court rejected the 
opinion of the majority of the Commission, that Article 3 is not applicable to 
supranational representative organs but relates to local legislative assembly and hence 
the United Kingdom could not be held responsible to secure election in Gibraltar to the 
European Parliament. The court contended that the Convention must be read in the light 
of present-day conditions and hence the word legislature must be interpreted in the light 
of the current changes of constitutional or Parliamentary structures of the European 
Community. 903 The court argued that the European Parliament was now transformed 
from a mere advisory and supervisory organ to a body which had assumed the powers 
897 Ibid., Paragraph, 100 
898 Ibid., Paragraph, 100 
899 Ibid., Paragraph, 85 
900 The applicant complained that although she currently enjoyed a full physical relationship with a man, 
she and her partner could not marry because the law treated her as a man. See Ibid., Paragraph, 95- 101 
901 Matthews v. The United Kingdoin, Application no. 24833/94,18 February 1999. 
902 Article 3 of Protocol I states "The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at 
reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the 
09 imon of the people in the choice of the legislature. " 
9 Matthews v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 24833/94,18 February 1999, Paragraph 39 
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and functions of a legislative body. 904 Although the court recognised that the EU 
Parliament has no formal right to legislate, the court emphasised that the EU Parliament 
has to be seen as part of the EU Community structure which best reflects concerns as to 
effective political democracy and which is accordingly involved in the- general 
democratic supervision of the activities of the EU Community. 905 Thus, the court 
concluded that the absence of elections to the EU Parliament in Gibraltar injured the 
very essence of the applicant's right to vote guaranteed in the Article 3 of Protocol 
No. 1.906 
Accordingly, there seems to be no consistent judicial approach followed by the 
European Court to assess whether a certain limitation on right actually injures the 
essence of the right concerned. From this point it has been argued that the determination 
of which will be given the relative weight, the preservation of the public interest or the 
preservation of the very core of the right concerned, is entirely subjective and 
unpredictable, changing from judge to judge and case to case. 907 
The British judiciary generally pays a degree of deference to The British Parliament's 
view of what may constitute the interest of the public when upholding the right 
908 
enshrined in the European Convention. This raises a question of whether the British 
court uses the doctrine of margin of appreciation recognised under ECHR jurisprudence 
904 Ibid., paragraph 46 
905 Ibid., paragraph 54 
906 Ibid., paragraph 65 
907 Davidov, G., op. cit., p. 49. See also Hutchinson, M., op. cit., p. 641. This is another demonstration of 
the European lack of clear standards of right implementation that could define clearly when the right 
concerned is violated by the state authorities. Although the European Court of Human Rights was able to 
define what is necessary in a democratic society, it is still unclear when the state limitation would injure 
the essence of rights, especially if the limitation was set to serve grounds that have no uniform European 
conception, like morals. If that is the case in a regional arrangement where states are supposed to share 
common heritage of social and cultural traditions, the differences in the implementation of international 
human rights in the world level, where social and cultural principles clearly vary, should, then, be 
appreciated. 
93 93 Lord Woolf's opinion in Regina v Lambert; Regina v Ali, Regina v JordanCortri ofAppeal (Civil 
Division), [2002) QB 1112 
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as part of the judicial application of HRA 1998. In the Montgomery case, Lord Hope 
suggested that the Scottish variation in method (prosecutor bearing responsibility for the 
protection of the right to a fair trial in the first instance) fell within the margin of 
discretion given to contracting states. However, Lord Hoffman refused to employ the 
margin of appreciation to this case, on the ground that the doctrine only exists to enable 
the concepts in the Convention to be given somewhat different content in the various 
contracting states, according to their respective histories and cultures and this was not 
the question of the present case. For Lord Hoffman, the question of the case was a 
purely United Kingdom question involving simply the construction of United Kingdom 
legislation and hence he refused withoutfirther argument, to accept that the concept of 
a margin of appreciation should be employed to enable the same provision of the 
Convention to be given different meanings according to ivhether it has been 
incorporated into the laiv ofone part ofthe United Kingdom rather than another. 909 
The Divisional Court in R (on the application of Pelling) v Boiv County Court 
maintained that the discretionary judgement in the national court concerning the 
application of Article 6 within the national legal order is sometimes confused with the 
doctrine of margin of appreciation, which is a doctrine available only to the Strasbourg 
court. 910 Lord Hope clearly made the point in Rv Director of Public Prosecutions, ex 
parte Kebeline that the doctrine of margin of appreciation underlines the principle that 
the convention, as a living system, does not need to be applied uniformly by all states 
but may vary in its application according to local needs and conditions. 911 Lord Hope, 
however, also pointed out that this technique is not available to the national court in 
909 Montgomery v. HMAdvocate, Privy Council, 2001 SC(PC) 1 910 R (on the application of Pelting) v. Bow County Court, Queen's Bench Division, [2000] 
CO/4774/1999 
911 Rv Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebeline and others, Rv Director of Public 
Prosecutions, exparte Rechachi, [2000] 2 AC 326, Lord Hope 
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resolving convention matters within their own countries. The judicial deference to the 
view of elected body in areas that are seen as incompatible with the convention, unlike 
the margin of appreciation, which is more concerned with the question of what content 
should be given to the concepts of the convention, involves questions of-balance 
between competing interests and issues of proportionality. 912 
Thus, the international doctrine of margin of appreciation, which leaves a degree of 
discretion to states to differ in the implementation of the convention provisions, cannot 
be used by a national court to justify the state's violation of a convention right. 
However, the judicial deference to the elected body within a country will still be 
developed under the jurisprudence of the European Court. As Lord Hope emphasised, 
the convention should be seen as an expression of fundamental principles rather than as 
a set of mere rules and the national court will always need to bear in mind the 
jurisprudence of the European Court in tackling the convention provisions. 913 
The subject of the right limitation clause and the margin of the discretion available to 
the states in interpreting the intemational rights is a very important matter to this study, 
since it tackles the recognised standards for the pennissible variations of the right 
implementation. Therefore, a further discussion will be made below to assess the 
international application of this doctrine and whether it could be applied to the Islamic 
values. 
912 Ibid.,. Lord Hope's opinion 
913 Ibid. For more information about the judicial deference to the elected body in the UK see McGoldrick, 
D., op. cit., pp. 26-28. See also Clayton, R., op. cit., pp. 33-47 
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V. 4. International Use of Margin of Appreciation to Accommodate the 
Islamic Values 
Although the term, "margin of appreciation" is a product of the European Court of 
Human Rights, the idea that the state is the one which is in charge of the deterjuination 
of how the international nonns should be put into effect is recognised worldwide, 
particularly in the UN human rights instruments. In the UN human rights treaties, many 
rights recOgnised as essential, like the right to a fair and public hearing, freedom of 
expression, the right of peaceful assembly and the right to freedom of association, are 
subject to state interference. It seems that almost all rights in the Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights which require state abstention and would in their exercise be likely to 
require manifestation and demonstration in public are subject to various types of state 
limitation, whereby the state has a margin to determine the means of implementation. 
For example, Article 19, paragraph (1) which guarantees the right to hold opinions 
seems to have been set free from any state limitation, since its exercise clearly does not 
need demonstration in public, while in paragraph (3) the freedom of expression stated in 
paragraph (2) and which requires in its exercise manifestation and demonstration in 
public has been limited for protecting various objectives. Similarly, the right to freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion is stated in Article 18 but when it comes to the 
manifestation and practices of the religion, various limitations have been put to serve 
various goals and objectives. Therefore, the right of peaceful assembly and the right to 
freedom of association have unsurprisingly been limited to protect national security or 
public safety, public order (order public), the protection ofpublic health or morals or 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 914 It is worth noting that these 
limitation clauses, unlike derogations, are permanent and must be provided by law. 915 
914 See Article 21 and 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
915 Kiss, A., "Permissible Limitations on Rights", In: Henkin, L., The International Bill of Rights: the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York : Columbia University Press , 198 1, p. 290 
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However, this international recognition of the state margin to determine how the 
international rights should be implemented is not without standards controlling the 
scope of the grounds on which the state margin of implementation must be based. The 
state's limitation in both International Covenants has to be 'provided by law', 'in 
conformity with law', or 'prescribed by law', and for certain limitation clauses it must 
be 'necessary in a democratic society'. 916 Moreover, state limitations are permitted only 
where they were provided and for the objective specified. For example, if the limitation 
was permitted to protect national security or public safety, other than these objectives 
would not be permissible grounds for the limitation. 917 Although the definition of these 
objectives of the limitation clause seems to fall under the state's discretion, which may 
vary from state to state, this state discretion is also restricted not to impair the essence of 
the right concerned. 9 18 
It seems that the law that is able to qualify human rights and freedoms is that which uses 
precise criteria919, is based on clear legal grounds920 and complies with the provisions, 
aims and objectives of the international instruments. 92 1A question arises, here, as to 
whether the Islamic Shariah law is capable of qualifying human rights. Mayer asserted 
that the vagueness of the Islamic criteria made by too diverse pre-modem jurists would 
make the international rights illusory. 922 Therefore, Mayer concluded that Islamic law 
cannot be a legitimate basis for curtailing rights. 923 As she put it 
"'Limitation clauses that must be necessary in a democratic society see Article 14, Article 21 and Article 
22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Articles 4 and 8 of International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
917 Kiss, A., "Permissible Limitations on Rights", In: Henkin, L., op. cit., p. 296 
9's UN General Comment No. 27, Freedom of movement (Art. 12) 2 November1999, 
CCPR/C/21/Rev. I/Add. 9. paragraph 13 
919 Ibid., paragraph 13 
920 Ibid., paragraph 16 
921 UN General Comment No. 16: The right to respect of privacy, family, home and correspondence, and 
F2rT tection of honour and reputation (Art. 17): . 08/04/88. CCPR General Comment No. 16., Paragraph 3 
923 
Mayer, A., op. cit., 1999, p., 66-67 
Ibid., p. 66 
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"Even on those topics, where there are extensive rules in the Shariah, there is 
enough diversity and nuance in the relevant legal doctrines to give the state 
considerable leeway in deciding what rules should be chosen as embodying the 
official Islamic norms. 
024 
Interestingly, the vagueness of the law as an issue to render the law concerned incapable 
of limiting human rights was in fact raised against British common law in the case 
Sunday Times v United Kingdom before the European Commission of Human Rights 
and the European Court of Human Rights. As mentioned above, the common law 
system leaves the judges with powerful authority to deduce law from judicial precedents 
or even from their own experience, common sense, and their own understanding of 
justice and fairness if there is no relevant precedent for the case in question. As 
Rosenfeld suggests, unless judicial precedents resulted in determinate outcome, the 
common law cannot guarantee predictability, in the sense that one cannot predict the 
legal consequence of his or her act, until further judicial decisions are made in future 
cases, setting up the legal specificities of such conduct. 925 
The Sunday Times brought an application against the United Kingdom before the 
Commission, alleging that the law of contempt of Court was so vague and uncertain that 
the restraint imposed by it could not be regarded as "prescribed by law". The 
Commission referred the case to the European Court which, on the assumption that the 
injunction had been prescribed by law, articulated that there had been a violation. In 
respect of whether the limitation imposed by common law on the convention rights is 
prescribed by law the court stated, "it ivould clearly be contrary to the intention of the 
drafters of the Convention to hold that a restriction imposed by virtue of the common 
924 Ibid., p. 67 
925 Rosenfeld, M., op. cit., pp. 1337-1338 
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law is not 'ýprescribed by law" on the sole ground that it is not enunciated in 
legislation" as this would strike the very root of the common law states' legal system. 926 
The cour-t found the two implied requirements for the norm to be a recognized law, 
which are first it must be adequately accessible and second must be formulated with 
sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct, unattainable. The court 
further argued that "whilst certainty is highly desirable, it may bring in its train 
excessive rigidity and the law must be able to keep pace with changing 
circumstances"927 The court admitted that "many laws are inevitably couched in terms 
which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application 
are questions ofpractice , 928 
With regard to the applicant's contention that the British prejudgment principle was 
novel and that they therefore could not have had an adequate indication of its existence, 
the court responded that the applicant could have known, with legal advice if necessary, 
that a particular principle might be applied by the courts. 929 
Accordingly, if the Shariah law, because it has vague standards made by too diverse 
pre-modem jurists is insufficient to limit the international rights as claimed by Mayer, 
then the common law system, which was also made by too diverse judges, would be 
regarded as such, since it too consists of vague principles, as demonstrated above. 
However, the European court has made it clear that the vagueness itself may be 
necessary to avoid being rigid in the changing circumstances and hence the precision 
required should not mean to be more than the existence of sufficient indications that a 
926 The Sunday Times, op. cit., paragraph 47 
927 Ibid., Paragraph 49 
928 Ibid., Paragraph 49 
92') For more information about the limitations clauses of the European Convention of Human Rights and 
for more comments on the Sunday Times case and others see Brisby, L., and Jacobs, F. G., Yearbook of 
European Lcnv VoL 6, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982, pp. 10-25 
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particular act is prohibited by a particular principle that might be applied by the courts. 
It is worth noting here that the Islamic system does not seem to leave judges to pick 
what they like or dislike from the Islamic teaching. Rather, the judicial #tihad (mental 
effort) and reasoning must be consistent with the principles specified by the legislature. 
In the UAE legal system, judges are obliged to apply the Islamic principles that are 
already underlined by the legislature in the form of law or in the form of legislative 
decree. 930 
Another condition governing the permissible limitation of the international rights is that 
the limitation must be 'necessary in a democratic society'. The phrase is very general 
and could bear different interpretations. What would constitute necessity is problematic 
and the words 'in a democratic society' are not elaborated enough to articulate the basis 
on which the word democracy can be universally defined. An attempt to narrow down 
the generality of the word democracy was that a democracy can be identified by its 
respect for the principles and objectives of the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the international Covenants on Human Rights. 93 1 However, these 
international human rights instruments are themselves problematic in implementation, 
raising enough generality to be interpreted differently according to each state's political 
ideology and legal system. It is rather strange to define a general notion by reference to 
more general and complex principles. Hence, the international instruments seem to 
contribute little to settle an agreement on how a particular limitation on international 
rights might be necessary in a democratic society. 
930 The Article I of the UAE Civil Transaction Code states "The legislative provisions shall apply to all 
matters dealt with by those provisions in the letter and in the spirit. There shall be no innovative reasoning 
1jtihad in the case of provisions of definitive import. If the judge finds no provision in this law, he has to 
passjudgement according to the Islamic Shari'ah. If no provision is found here either, he must choose the 
most appropriate solutions from the schools of Imam Malik or Imam Ahmed bin Hanbal, and if none is 
found there then from the schools of Imam Alshafi and Imam Abu Hanefah as most benefits. If the judge 
does not find the solution there, then he must renderjudgement in accordance with custom, provided that 
the custom is not in conflict with public order or morals ...... 93 1 Kiss, A., op. cit., p. 306 
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One can notice, here, that reference to democracy as a condition for the limitation of 
international rights is only made in five Articles of both International Covenants of 
Human Rights. 932 On the other hand, the European Convention of Human Rights has 
made reference to democracy in almost all limitation clauses and hence the European 
Convention on Human Rights and its machineries like the European Commission and 
the European Court of Human Rights may be the instrument that have made the most 
contribution in the elaboration and exploration of what could constitute what is 
6necessary in a democratic society'. 
The European Court of Human Rights has underlined three requirements to assess what 
is necessary in a democratic society. The court asserted in cases like The Sunday Tinies 
and Barthold that the necessary limitation in a democratic society must correspond to a 
It pressing social need', be "proportionate to the legitimate ahn pursued' and the reasons 
933 
given by the national authorities to justify it must be "relevant and sufficient". 
Moreover, the court has emphasised that limitation must not impair the essence of the 
Convention rights. However, the European Court of Human Rights, as discussed above, 
seems unable to reach a consistent European approach based on clear standards able to 
strike a balance between the limitation that is necessary in a democratic society, and the 
preservation of the very essence of rights, leaving the door open, especially in areas 
where there is less European consensus like morality, to subjective decisions of each 
individual judge. If that is the case in a regional instrument, where states are supposed 
932 Unlike the European Convention of Human Rights that refers to democracy in almost all limitation 
clauses, the International Covenants refer to democracy only in 5 Articles; Article 14, Article 21 and 
Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Articles 4 and 8 of International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
933 See The Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom, op. cit., paragraph 62. Available online at 
http: //cmiskp. echr. coe. int/tkpl 97/view. asl2? action=html&key=31298&nortal=hbkm&source=extemal&ta 
ble=285953B33D3AF94893DC49EF6600CEBD49 
See also the case of Bartholdv. Germany, op. cit., paragraph 55. Available online at 
httn: //cmiskp. echr. coe. int/tkpl97/view. asp? action=html&key=31146&portal=hbkni&source=extemal&ta 
ble=285953B33D3AF94893DC49EF6600CEBD49 
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to share a common heritage and values, then it is unsurprising to see very diverse views 
and understandings of what may constitute necessity in a democratic society on the 
world level. Therefore, as Brems rightly suggests, a broader use of the margin of 
appreciation may be appropriate on the international level, particularly in areas where 
vague and general notions exist. 934 Within this context, a question arises as to whether 
the Islamic hadd, corporal punishment, like flogging, could be regarded as acceptable in 
a democratic society. 
Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights makes it illegal for 
the state to have in its legal system any punishment that subjects a person to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In the general comment no 20, 
the Human Rights Committee emphasised that the text of Article 7 allows of no 
limitation, even in situations of public emergency; no derogation from the provision is 
allowed. 935 It went on to suggest that "nojustification or extenuating circumstances may 
be invoked to excuse a violation of article 7 for any reasons. , 936 However, the 
committee has not provided a precise definition of what punishment might be regarded 
as torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading. In fact, the committee considered an 
engagement to define these concepts unnecessary and contented itself with providing 
some general and perhaps vague guidance to identify whether a punishment is 
prohibited under the Article. The committee refers to the nature, purpose and severity 
of punishment or treatment as standards to identify whether a punishment or treatment 
is torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading. 937 However, these standards do not specify from 
what perspective a punislunent can be seen as involving torture or degrading elements. 
934 Brems, E., op. cit., p. 399 
935 General Comment No. 20: Replaces general comment 7 concerning prohibition of torture and cruel 
treatment or punishment (Art. 7) :. 10/03/92. Paragraph 3 
936 Ibid. paragraph 3 
937 Ibid., paragraph 4. 
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Without clear and precise standards to identify what would constitute torture, cruel, 
inhuman or degrading punishment, difficulty would arise in the implementation of this 
938 
article. On what basis can one say that a punishment is torture or of a degrading 
nature, if the society where this punishment is applied, say, does not consider it ag such? 
In other words, if a society views certain punishments applied to its members as not of a 
degrading nature, can the international organ consisting of a handful of appointed 
officials decide to the contrary? Moreover, some societies may view the effectiveness of 
punishment on the basis of how much pain or degradation it involves and without such 
elements a punislunent may not be an effective deterrent. 
The European Court of Human Rights tackled this question in length in the Tyrer case 
and provided answers to all these propositions. The facts of this case constituted a 
breach of Article 3 of the Convention which provides that "No one shall be subjected to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. "939 The applicant had 
been punished by the authority of Isle of Man, a dependency of the United Kingdom, 
with three strokes of the birch in accordance with the relevant legislation. As mentioned 
in the facts of the case, the birching raised, but did not cut, the applicant's skin and he 
938 In Ireland v. UK, the European Court of Human Rights has differentiated according to the intensity of 
the suffering inflicted between the concept of torture and the concept of "inhuman or degrading treatment 
and punishment". According to this distinction the court concluded that the five techniques including, 
wall-standing forcing the detainees to remain for periods of some hours in a "stress position", hooding, 
subjection to noise, deprivation of sleep, deprivation of food and drink, used by RUC security forces to 
obtain intelligence information, although they amounted to a practice of inhuman and degrading 
treatment, did not occasion suffering of the particular intensity and cruelty implied by the word torture as 
so understood. The court contended that for a treatment to be regarded as torture, it has to contain a 
special stigma of deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering. It refers to UN 
General Assembly resolution adopted on 9 December 1975 which declares: "Torture constitutes an 
aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment". See Ireland v. 
UK, Application no. 5310/71,18 January 1978, paragraph 167. It is unclear, however, how the court 
considers inhuman and degrading treatment as an element to assess the intensity of suffering that 
constitutes torture and at the same time asserted the distinction between the two concepts. It is rather 
vague how the scale of aggravation in suffering can be assessed in a way that easily leads to the 
conclusion that it commences with degradation, mounts to inhumanity and eventually reaches the level of 
torture. 
939 Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
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was sore for about a week and a half afterwards . 
940 The applicant alleged that the 
judicial corporal punishment he was subjected to consisted of elements of torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and hence was in a breach of Article 3 
of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the court considered the level 
of suffering according the facts of the case did not reach such a level that the 
punishment could be classified as 'inhuman punishment' and as a result it limited the 
question which would be tackled by the court to whether the punishment was 
degrading. 941 
In considering the question of whether the punishment of three strokes of the birch was 
of a degrading nature, the court noted that the assessment of whether there is a 
humiliation element in the punishment is relative and "depends on all the circianstances 
of the case and on the nature and context of the punishment itsetf and the manner and 
,, 942 method of its execution. The court took into account that the local public opinion can 
have a bearing on the interpretation of the concept of "degrading punishment" and may 
view the punishment as effective on the basis of the element of degradation which it 
involves. 943 However, the court also noted that "a punishment does not lose its 
degrading character just because it is believed to be, or actually is, an effective 
deterrent or aid to crime controL 
044 For the application of Article 63 (3), 
945 
there 
would have to be positive and conclusive proof of a requirement that without recourse 
to that punishment law and order could not be maintained. 
940 Tyrer v. The UnifedKingdonz, 25/04/1978, Application Number 5856/72, Paragraph 10 
94 'Ibid., Paragraph 65 
942 Ibid., paragraph 30 943 Ibid, paragraph 31 
944 Ibid, paragraph 31 
945 Article 63 (3) of the European Convention states that "The provisions of this Convention shall be 
applied in such territories with due regard, however, to local requirements. " 
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A striking point, in the case, was that the court opened the possibility that if it was 
provided that judicial corporal punishment was considered not only appropriate to local 
conditions, but necessary as a deterrent and to maintain law and order in the Isle of 
Man, and there was positive and conclusive proof of a requirement, then it might have 
been considered, according to Article 63 (3), that in spite of its degrading character, it 
did not entail a breach of Article 3.946 
Indeed, the court concluded that the judicial corporal punishment of the island was in 
breach of Article 3 of the Convention and no local requirement could be cited to make 
use of a punishment contrary to Article 3. However, the reasoning of the case seems to 
have been based on the European common heritage of political traditions that does not 
use such punishment and of which the Isle of Man has been regarded an inseparable 
part. 947 In this connection, the court emphasized that "in the great majority of the 
member States ofthe Council ofEurope, judicial corporal punishment is not, it appears, 
, 948 used and, indeed, in some of them, has never existed in modern times... , This, 
according to the court, is enough to cast doubt on whether the availability of this penalty 
is a requirement for the maintenance of law and order in a European country- 949 Thus, 
the common understanding of the European states with respect to judicial corporal 
946 Tyrer v. The United Kingdom., op. cit., paragraph 38. The court says ....... for the application of Article 
63 (3) (art. 63-3), more would be needed: there would have to be positive and conclusive proof of a 
requirement and the Court could not regard beliefs and local public opinion on their own as constituting 
such proof Moreover, even assuming that judicial corporal punishment did possess those advantages 
which are attributed to it by local public opinion, there is no evidence before the Court to show that law 
and order in the Isle qfMan could not be maintained without recourse to that punishment. " See also the 
case of Matthews v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 24833/94,18 February 1999, Paragraph 59 
947 The court states in paragraph 38 "The Isle of Man not only enjoys long-established and highly- 
developed political, social and cultural traditions but is an up-to-date society. Historically, 
geographically and culturally, the Island has always been included in the Europeanfamily of nations and 
must be regarded as sharingfully that "common heritage ofpolitical traditions, ideals, fteedom and the 
rule oflaw" to which the Preamble to the Convention refers. The Court notes, in this connection, that tile 
system established by Article 63 (art. 63) was primarily designed to meet the fact that, when the 
Convention was drafted, there were still certain colonial territories whose state of civilisation did not, it 
was thought, permit thefill application ofthe Convention. " 
948 ]bid., paragraph 38 
9'9 Ibid., paragraph 38 
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punishment seems to have been the main factor in not giving regard to the local values 
of the island, in the sense that if there was great European variation in this regard, the 
resort to Article 63 (3) might have been of relevance. 
Consistent with this, if it was proven that there is Islamic common heritage of social, 
cultural and political traditions, considering the punishment of Islamic hadd as a 
deterrent and to maintain law and order and there is, not only belief but positive and 
conclusive proof of a requirement that without recourse to that punishment law and 
order could not be maintained in Islamic states, would they be acceptable in a 
democratic society? If, however, the international organ decided 'No', would this 
decision of a handful of appointed international lawyers, itself, be acceptable in a 
democratic society? It does not seem to be democratic to leave such an important issue 
that has a direct effect on the understanding and belief of the Islamic societies to be 
decided by a handful of appointed international lawyers. Local Islamic views supported 
by the vast majority of Islamic societies, therefore, should have a bearing on the 
interpretation of the concept of torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment stated in Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. More tolerance is needed to accommodate the variations of values on the world 
level, especially those that are not only fundamental for the maintenance of the law and 
order, but form a main factor of legitimacy of the state authorities like the Islamic 
ones. 950 The employment of a wider margin of appreciation might be helpful in this 
regard. 
950 The Islamic Shari'ah is, as Fuller observed, the most powerful ideological force across the Muslim 
world, operating in parallel to other globalizing forces. See Fuller, G. E., op. cit., p. 67. When the former 
president of Iran, the Shah, endeavoured to westernize the political life of Iran in a very radical way that 
rejected the very basics of Islamic Shari'ah, the result was the collapse of the regime through a Shiite 
revolution that brought about the current theocratic state. See Price, D. E., op. cit, pp. 113-114. Algeria 
has suffered from political disorder that was caused by its crucial decision to ban the Islamic Party that 
won the election in 1991. For more information about democracy in Algeria see Volpi, F., Islam and 
Democracy., The Failure ofDialogue in Algeria, London: Pluto, 2003. 
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It is worth to note, here, that Islamic states should not take advantage of the 
international use of the doctrine of margin of appreciation to disguise their violation of 
human rights under the cloak of cultural differences. 951 States can only claim a margin 
of appreciation to interfere in human rights if there is clear proof that the limitation on 
the rights concerned is "necessary in a democratic socieV'. 952 The states' exercise of 
the doctrine will be supervised by international human rights instruments in which the 
states will be required to demonstrate that the interference in human rights corresponds 
to a "pressing social need, is "proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued' is justified 
by the national authorities with "relevant and sufficient" reasons. 953 As mentioned 
earlier, these requirements are the tests set by the European Court on Human Rights to 
assess what is necessary in a democratic society and can be applied internationally to 
assess the state implementation of human rights. Moreover, national Islamic courts 
cannot use the doctrine of margin of appreciation to justify the government's violation 
of international human rights. The doctrine of margin of appreciation was not designed 
for domestic use, to leave the government unrestrained. The Islamic governments 
should be ruled by law and the judiciary are under obligation to protect the supremacy 
of law. The doctrine of margin of appreciation is an international technique which 
tackles the relationship of the international supervisory system to the national system 
951 Schmidt expressed the fear that the international admission of the margin of appreciation "might 
prompt some states parties to rely on arguments of 'cultural relativism, however ill-defined or 
inappropriate in the circumstances of a given case, or to seek tojustify serious human-rights abuses. " See 
Schmidt, M., "The Complementarity of the Covenant and the European Convention on Human Rights- 
Recent Developments", In: Harris, D., and Joseph, S., op. cit., p. 657 
952 Davidov, G., op. cit., p. 47 
953 See The Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom, op. cit., paragraph 62. Available online at 
hUp: //cmiskp. echr. coe. int/tkp197/view. asp? action=html&key=31298&portal=hbkm&source=extemal&ta 
ble=285953B33D3AF94893DC49EF6600CEBD49 
See also the case of Bartholdv. Germany, op. cit., paragraph 55. Available online at 
http: //cmiskp. echr. coe. int/tkp197/view. asp? action=html&key=31146&portal=hbkm&source=extemal&ta 
ble=285953B33D3AF94893DC49EF6600CEBD49 
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and not a constitutional norm that can be cited for more governmental or administrative 
discretion. 954 
As the proposal, here, is to encourage the international human rights body to gwe more 
attention to the doctrine of margin of appreciation to accommodate differences among 
states in cultural, moral and religious values, the Islamic states, along with the Islamic 
scholars, s"hould also embrace a complementary approach for the promotion of human 
rights through making use of the Islamic doctrine of Siyasah Shar'iyyah, the legitimate 
govenu-nental policy. The dilemma that may be raised from the conflicting Islamic 
views on democracy and human rights can be resolved through the unification of 
Islamic states on clear standards of human rights implementation through regional effort 
based on the European model. The use of the Islamic doctrine of Siyasah Shar'iyyah 
and the Islamic unification on clear standards of human rights implementation through 
Islamic regional arrangement would ultimately enhance human rights in the Islamic 
states. These two elements will be further discussed below. 
V. 5. Islamic Use of the Islamic Doctrine of Siyasah Shar'iyyah to 
Accommodate the International Human Rights Values 
In this modem time of openness and solidarity between cultures, the hardliners' vision 
of Islam based on a static interpretation that is rooted in the history of the Crusade wars 
should now be reconsidered. The international principles of human rights are not 
necessarily a Western conspiracy against Islam, nor are the international movements to 
promote respect for human rights over the world another form of imperialism. Although 
the West might be the greatest contributors to the development of the notion of human 
rights, human rights are not an exclusively Western idea. They are a result of 
954 For more discussion of the use of the doctrine of margin of appreciation in the domestic legal system 
see McGoldrick, D., op. cit., p. 27 
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international realization that human beings, whatever their religion and whatever their 
culture or tradition, deserve a better life, free from fear and want. It might not be 
appropriate to see Muslim scholars justifying the rule of dictators through a medieval 
interpretation on the basis of defending the Islamic state, at a time when the 
international community has reached the point of regarding all human beings of the 
world as members of one human family in an attempt to lay down foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world. 955 It might also be inappropriate to see in the 
current Islamic discourse the notion of government reduced in the person of the ruler 
and used as a means to satisfy his own desire, while in the world of today the 
government is understood as a machinery that processes the people's demands and 
brings about the outputs that meet popular expectations. It is important, therefore, that 
Islamic judges and scholars be careful in reading their reality, taking the international 
efforts with regard to human rights in good faith and sincerity. Since the Islamic judges 
are the ultimate resort of the victim of human rights and since justice is to a degree 
relative to the judge's understanding and values, the judges should have a proper human 
956 
rights education with a receptive approach to international norms in general. If it was 
legitimate for Muawia, the ruler of the Islamic state after the fourth wise Caliph, to 
borrow the internationally recognised rule of hereditary system of governance, the 
predominant international principle at that time, advocated by Rome and others, why 
should it not be legitimate for the current Islamic states to borrow the international 
values of representativeness, accountability and the respect of human rights, promoted, 
generally speaking, by the same nations, on the basis that they are the values of 
disbelievers? Therefore, tolerance is also needed on the part of Islamic jurists to 
accommodate international norms of freedom, justice, and peace. 
955 See the introduction of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
956 Baderin, M., op. cit., p. 224 
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Within this context of tolerance with a proper understanding of current reality, the 
Islamic doctrine of Siyasah Shariyyah can be of remarkable benefit for the 
enhancement of human rights in the Islamic states. It is undisputable in the Islamicji'qh 
that the matters that fall in the realm of the 'Adat, particularly those related to the 
relationship between the governor and the governed, are mostly governed by very 
general Islamic principles that bear different interpretations. These different Islamic 
interpretations of the Islamic general rules are themselves governed by the Islamic 
methodology, of which the main concern is the protection of the interest of human 
beings. 957 What may constitute human interest (Maslahah) is, too, a matter that itself 
bears different interpretations according to each scholar's understanding, shaped by the 
scholar's awareness of the conditions and circumstances of his reality. In this sense the 
Siyasah Sharijyah will serve as a technique that balances competing Islamic interests 
and prioritises the most useful interests by sacrificing a less useful one, or avoids the 
most evil action by accepting a less evil one . 
958 This will give a margin for the Islamic 
jurists to resolve the issue of conflict with human rights norms, particularly in respect of 
women's rights, minority rights and the application of the Islamic punishments. In so far 
as the core principles of the Shariah are preserved, the other principles that are seen 
sometimes as prohibited can now be permissible if it were proven to be, under the 
current circumstances, in the interest of Islam. For example, the distinction that was 
made between the residents of Islam (dar al-Islam) and the residents of war or 
disbelievers (dar Al-harb) and the rules that resulted from this distinction, although they 
might have been acceptable at a time when war was the main principle governing 
international relations, might not be appropriate at this time, when the relationship 
between states is based upon international norms of freedom, justice and peace. Making 
use of the Siyasah Sharijyah in this regard will require looking at the circumstances 
937 Al-Qadi, A., op. cit., p. 135 
9581bn Taymiyah, op. cit., 1993, p. 67 
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under which this distinction was formulated and comparing them with the current 
circumstances to measure what rule could serve more the Islamic interest, Maslahah. 9" 
In this example, if the Islamic interest at that time was on the side of the distinction to 
preserve the Islamic identity and integrity, then it would be at this time against that 
distinction, since international relations are now based on peace between states, and this 
distinction could endanger this international principle of peace. 960 As discussed in 
Chapter Three, even the hadd punishments, like amputation of the hand and stoning, 
can be temporarily repealed, if sometimes they form a cause of injustice. This was 
clearly demonstrated by Umar, the second Caliph, who repealed the hadd of theft in the 
year of poverty, when all the people were starving. 961 The doctrine of Siyasah 
Shar'iyyah teaches not how to follow the traditions, but how to be guided by those who 
made the traditions and how to engage in new thinking that responds to the current 
trends and conditions. Well trained jurists equipped with this doctrine and proper 
knowledge of the international norms would pave the way for better communication 
between the intemational law and Islamic law. 
The moderate reading of the Islamic Shariah through the use of the Siyasah Shai-iyyah 
may even make the Islamic hadd like flogging fall within the margin of appreciation as 
articulated by the European Court of human rights. If the hadd of flogging is set to be 
executed in all hadd crimes with moderate force in a way that does not lacerate the 
convict's skin, provided that the application of the hadd of flogging does not only 
satisfy local conditions, but it is necessary as a deterrent and to maintain law and order, 
it might be, according to Tyrer case, an acceptable punishment. However, the medieval 
959 See Al-Qadi, A., op. cit., particularly the first two parts. 
960 See Addeek, M., Xmoahadalfi Ashareeah Al-Islainyyah ivaNqation Addmvli, (in Arabic), Dubai: 
Albayan, pp. 62-71 
961 For more information about the validity of an act even if it is incompatible with the Islamic Shari'ah if 
it is proven to be taken to implement a competing Islamic interest see Mutwalli, A., op. ciL, 1990, pp. 145- 
180. 
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Islamic views over the execution of the hadd of flogging, although they are similar in 
general, are in specifity different. Many scholars, for example, differentiate between the 
crimes of hadd committed and, as a result, differentiate in the execution of the 
punishment. If the crime was a zina (adultery) the force used to execute the flogging, 
according to this view, would be harder, 962 and the stripes would be applied directly on 
the convict's base skin. 963 One supporter of this view went further and suggested that 
the stripe can even be applied on the convict's head to reach a stronger deterrence. 964 
Using Siyasah Shariyyah based on maslahah in this case would necessarily uphold the 
moderate Islamic view that could facilitate better understanding between the Islamic 
principles and the requirement of the doctrine of margin of appreciation as articulated 
by the European Court of Human Rights. There are respected views in the traditional 
fiqh suggesting that the execution of the hadd has to be applied with moderate force in 
all hadd crimes, zina, alcohol drinking, and the hadd of qadf, and that the level of force 
should not be such as to lacerate the skin of the convict. 965 Muslim scholars specify 
certain procedures that could define moderate force in practice, which include: first, the 
person appointed to apply the flogging must not raise his hand above his head and after 
he has applied the stripe he must raise the whip aloft and not pull in off . 
966 Second, the 
stripes have to be applied without taking off the convict's clothing. 967 Third, the stripes 
must not be concentrated on one part of the body so as not to cause the skin to be cut or 
962 It has been suggested by a number of respected scholars that Muslims have been commanded by Allah 
in the Quran 24: 2 that the woman and the man guilty of adultery have to be flogged a hundred stripes and 
Allah expressly says "let not compassion move you in their case, in a matter prescribed by Allah" which 
means, according to their view, hardening the use of force in the execution of flogging in the hadd of 
adultery. Whereas the hadd of drinking alcohol was not prescribed by Allah in the Holy Quran but it was 
deduced by the companions and therefore its punishment should not have the same pain as the other hadd 
prescribed by Allah. See Assarkasy, S., Ahnabsoot, Part 9, Beirut: Dar Alm'arefah, 1406 (Islamic 
calendar), p. 71 
963 Cited in Alkasani, A., op. cit., p. 60 
964 See the opinion of Abu-Yosuf cited in Ibn Qudama, op. cit, p. 141 
965 Cited in Al-Qurtubi, M., op. ciL, p. 163 
966 Alkasani, A., op. cit., p., 60 
967 Ibn Qudama, op. cit., p., 142 
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damaged, but have to be spread all over the body. 968 Fourth, the stripes must not be 
applied to the head, face, stomach or chest or the delicate parts of the body of the 
convict. 969 Hence, the execution of flogging, as far as the opinion of European Court of 
Human Rights in the case of Tyrer is concerned, does not seem to reach, according to 
the moderate Islamic view, the level of suffering that could constitute torture or 
inhuman treatment. Moreover, it is well known to Muslims that the application of 
Islamic hadd is not only appropriate to local conditions, nor is it only necessary as a 
deterrent and to maintain law and order, but it is widely recognised as forming a factor 
of legitimacy of the legal system of the Islamic states. Although flogging can be applied 
to people whose age is 13 or 14, which is the age of takleef according to the traditional 
Islamic fiqh, through the use of the Siyasah Shariyyah, which leaves a margin for 
change according to current requirements, it can be raised to 18, the internationally 
recognised age of adulthood, since the modification of the age does not seem to bring 
significant change in the application of the punishment, and since most of the Islamic 
970 states, in their legal systems recognise the age of 18 as the age of adulthood. 
Indeed, Islamic opinions over human rights matters are very diverse. However, these 
differences of opinion that exist within Islamic jurisprudence on the general subject of 
Islam and human rights can be resolved through inter-State co-operation as a means for 
officially recognising the Islamic opinions that are most conducive to the enhancement 
of human rights and dignity. Creating an effective regional mechanism for the 
968 Assarkasy, S., op. cit., p., 72 
969 Ibn Qudama, op. cit., p., 141. These procedures, governing the force used in the execution of flogging 
are actually stated in the Pakistani Islamic Criminal Law in the Execution of the Punishment of Whipping 
Ordinance, 1979. See Waqar-Ul-Haq, M., Islamic Criminal Lmvs: hudud lmvs and rules with tip to date 
commentary, Lahore: Nadeem Law Book House, 1994, p. 455458 
9"Amnesty international condemns the Sudanese judicial application of death penalty to young offenders 
under 18 years old in the name of hudud. Although the Sudanese constitution states "The death penalty 
shall not be imposed on a person under the age of eighteen ...... the exemption of the 
hudud crimes from 
the reach of this article makes the article almost worthless, since hudud crimes include murder and 
burglary over a certain amount. See Amnesty International Worldwide Appeal, SUDAN: Young offender 
at risk of execution, Available online at http: //Nveb. amnesty. org/appeals/index/sdn-01 1005-wwa-eng 
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enforcement of human rights in the Muslim world "can provide a community 
frameivork among modern Muslim States within the international order as a regional 
arrangement for the practical realization of international human rights law in the 
Muslim world. 071 In adhering to an Islamic collective supervision based on the doctrine 
of Siyasah Shar7yyah over the application of the hadd of flogging, for example, would 
create a better understanding of the Islamic hadd, which is, as seen above, not 
necessarily of the nature of inhuman punishment. The Organization of Islamic 
Conference could play a key role in performing this task and in establishing proper 
communication between Islamic states and international human rights instruments. 
V. 6. The Use of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) as a 
Regional Arrangement for Human Rights Protection 
The Islamic states engaged in 1969 in a type of regional arrangement to collectively 
tackle some important issues, such as promoting Islamic solidarity among Member 
States, encouraging economic cooperation, and supporting international peace and 
security founded on justice. 972 In the preamble of the OIC Charter, the Member States 
have expressed their commitment to the United Nations Charter and fundamental 
Human Rights freedoms. 973 In a significant step to the promotion of human rights, the 
Member States have endorsed the 1990 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, a 
document that is issued to serve as a general guidance for Member States in the field of 
971 Baderin, M., op. cit., p. 226 
972 See the objectives of the Islamic Organization Conference stated in Article 2 section (A) of the OIC 
Charter. Article 2 section (A) states: 
"The objectives of the Islamic Conference shall be 
to promote Islamic solidarity among Member States, to consolidate cooperation among Member States in 
the economic, social, cultural, scientific and other vitalfields of activities, and to carry out consultations 
among Member States in international organizations, * to endeavour to eliminate racial segregation, 
discrimination and to eradicate colonialism in all its forms; to take necessary measures to support 
international peace and securityfounded onjustice; to coordinate effortsfor the safeguarding of1he Holy 
Places and support of the struggle of the people ofPalestine, to help them regain their rights and liberate 
their land, to hack the struggle ofall Muslim people with a view to preserving their dignity, independence 
and national rights; to create a suitable atmospherefor the promotion of cooperation and understanding 
ainong Member States and other countries. " Available Online at http: //www. oic-oci. orp-/ 
973 The Charter of the OIC has been registered in conformity with Article 102 of the United Nation's 
Charter on February I st, 1974. See Article 14 of the OIC Charter 
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human rights. 974 The OIC has, further, established in 2004 a Covenant on the Rights of 
the Child in Islam. 975 This regional human rights arrangement could play an important 
role in promoting human rights in the Islamic world and in establishing communication 
with international human rights instruments on clear and unified Islamic human rights 
standards. There is a notable willingness from Islamic states to bridge the gap between 
the OIC and UN human rights organs, like the Resolution No. 3/29-LEG, which requests 
the Member States and the Secretary General of the OIC to hold meetings with the UN 
human rights organs and agencies to clarify the Islamic states' positions on important 
human rights issues, like minorities' rights. 976 
Many regional efforts have been elaborated in the light of the international instruments 
to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in the world. The European 
Convention on Human Rights in 1950, the American Convention on Human Rights in 
1967, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights in 198 1, have all 
977 
elaborated regional standards with detailed arrangements of implementation. These 
regional efforts do not seem to present themselves as alternative options to the 
international instruments of human rights. Rather, they seem to be mainly intended to 
lay down standards of implementation for a particular region that might not have been 
achieved on the world level, as a result of the worldwide diversity in the level of 
specificity in the implementation of the concept of human rights. These regional 
engagements in human rights protection would narrow down this wide divergence in the 
world understanding of human rights, which is affected by cultural values and social 
974 See the introduction of Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam 
973 Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam, Available Online at http: //www. oicm 
oci. orgLeng - , 
Iish/conventions/RightsO/o2OoP/o2OtheO/o2OChildO/o2Oln%201slamO/o2OE. 12d 
976 OIC Resolution No. 3/29-LEG on Coordination among Member States in the Field of Human Rights 
977 Chapter 3 of The Major Regional Human Rights: Instruments and the Mechanisnifor their 
Implementation, UN publication, available Online at 
http: //ivww. ohchr. orgLenglishfabout/ptiblications/docs/CHAPTER 3. pd 
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codes and which has always been cited as an excuse for not applying the universal 
rights. 978 The UN General Assembly affirmed this in its resolution 32/127 which 
encourages regional co-operation for the promotion and protection of human rights, 
particularly in areas where no regional efforts of such a nature exist. 979 
Islamic societies do share common values of justice and freedom embodied in Islam, 
which could form a strong unifying factor for the Islamic states to represent themselves 
in one human rights instrument. However, this common heritage shared by all Islamic 
societies seems not to have helped Islamic states to reach an agreement on a certain 
effective machinery of uniformity over human rights protection, as has happened in the 
European community. Although there seem to have been some efforts to reach that level 
of regional cooperation, these efforts seem not to have reached beyond the paper they 
were written on. The OIC Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, the most 
comprehensive human rights document conducted under the OIC, has not yet resulted in 
any machinery of enforcement. This absence of enforcement procedures, leaving 
Islamic states with wide discretion to interpret the Islamic Shariah in a way that fits 
their desires and which ultimately led to severe limitation on even basic rights, rendered 
the Cairo Declaration mostly inoperative. 980 Although the Charter of the OIC affinns 
members' commitment to the UN Charter and the treaties on human rights, Muslim 
states succeeded in escaping their obligation to the UN human rights instrument through 
vague interpretation of Islamic law . 
98 1 Thus, the effectiveness of this Islamic 
organization seems solely dependent on reaching consensus on a universal 
interpretation of the Shari'ah with the regional organ serving as a monitoring body of 
978 Baderin, M., op. cit., p. 225 
979 UN General Assembly Resolution, GA Res. 32/127 (1977), Available Online at 
http: //,. vivw. un. org/documents/p,, i/ýes/32/ýres32rl27. pd 
9'0 Baderin, M., op. cit., pp. 228-229 
981 Verma, V., "Debating Rights in Malaysia: Contradictions and Challenges", Vol. 32, Journal of 
Contemporary Asia, 2002 
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states' application of the international rights recognised in the Cairo Declaration. This 
regional body could also facilitate proper communication with the international human 
rights instruments based on a clear and unified Islamic conception of fundamental rights 
and freedoms. The UN General Assembly clearly expressed the UN readiness to 
cooperate with the OIC for the enhancement of international peace and security, 
disarmament, self-determination, decolonization, fundamental human rights and 
economic and technical development. 982 Moreover, in a recent significant step the UN 
has signed a Memorandum of understanding of human rights on July 2006 with the OIC 
according to which the two organizations will work together in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 983 Hence, in spite of 
the ineffectiveness of the current form of the OIC in respect of human rights, the OIC as 
an internationally recognised regional organization which consists of almost one-third 
of the UN members could, after developing the necessary enforcement procedures, 
serve as a valuable existing regional arrangement for the promotion of human rights in 
the Islamic states and also on the world level. Part of the necessary machinery for the 
implementation of the international rights within the OIC members is the establishment 
of a regional binding convention on human rights on the basis of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Resolution No. 2/29-LEG is one of a significant step for 
human rights promotion in which the Member States have called to start the formulation 
and consideration of Islamic charters on human rights which shall take the form of 
covenants. 984 This would eliminate any difficulty that might arise from the legal status 
of the Cairo Declaration, which has not been recognised as having binding principles. 
Moreover, a regional Islamic court of human rights, based on the European model of 
982 The UN General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/53/16,11 November 1998 
993 See OIC News website Available Online at http: //www. oicm 
oci. orgjpress/en. glish/2006/Julyý/ý202006/un-oic-memo. htm 
984 Resolution No. 2/29-LEG, On the Fellow-up of the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam 
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human rights court, would be of great benefit for the enhancement of human rights, in 
that it would raise the legal culture of human rights through its case law in Islamic 
world. The significance of the establishment of a regional court of human rights is 
evidenced by the success of the two most effective regional arrangements of human 
rights protection, the European Convention on Human Rights and the Inter-American 
Convention on Human Rights, in which the regional courts were the key players. 
However, for the regional Islamic human rights court to be sufficient and effective, it 
would need to adopt a dynamic approach of the Shari'ah law interpretation that 
corresponds to the present-day conditions. It would need to take advantage of the 
doctrine of Siyasah Shariyyah that is based on maslahah, which could enable it to adopt 
the juristic opinions that are most conducive to enhancing human rights and dignity. 985 
The principle of takhayyur (a technique which permits selecting a course of legal action 
from the various juristic opinions) will also not only assist judges to chose the right 
opinion but can also be used with the help of the doctrine of Siyasah Shariyyah to 
develop Islamic law through enlightened interpretation of the Shari'ah. When the 
Caliph Uniar repealed the hadd of theft in the year of poverty, as mentioned earlier, he 
did not change the divine text but what he changed was the interpretation of the divine 
provisions in light of the requirements and conditions of his time. As I said above, the 
doctrine of Siyasah Shariyyah teaches not how to follow the traditions, but how to be 
guided by those who made the traditions and how to engage in new thinking that 
responds to the current trends and conditions. 
V. 7. Conclusion 
As shown in this chapter, Britain as a signatory state of the European Convention on 
Human Rights was legally compelled to engage in a constitutional reform to satisfy the 
985 See Baderin, M., op. cit., p. 230 
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Convention requirements. One of great obstacles that held Britain from full compliance. 
with the convention provisions was the absence of justiciable rights entrenched in the 
British constitution. However, as discussed above, the entrenchment of the convention 
rights was not an easy task, since it conflicts with the very fundamental constitutional 
tradition in the United Kingdom. The sovereign Act of Parliament, under the British 
constitution, cannot be repealed by international law. There is no institution, whether 
internal or international, that can ever legislate inconsistently with ParliamenCs Act. So 
Britain had to find a way to preserve its constitutional essence while implementing its 
international obligation. However, Britain in doing so did not bring about any major 
constitutional change or any revolutionary idea, such as giving the court the authority to 
invalidate the Act of Parliament. Rather, the international obligation has been 
implemented in a way compatible with the British constitution. In other words, the 
question, in the eyes of the British lawyers, was not how to make the British constitution 
consistent with international law, but how to implement the latter in compliance with the 
British constitutional law. Accordingly, as far as the Human Rights Act 1998 is 
concerned, the constitutional principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty has taken 
precedence over international law, in that the final say on the matter has been reserved for 
Parliament, but also, at the same time, the international obligation has been implemented 
in the British domestic sphere by giving human rights the force of national law. 
Thus, it might be right to conclude that one of the distinctive features of the British 
constitution is the obvious reliance on the traditional common values of the British 
people. The UK demonstrates that traditions are of significance in maintaining political 
stability as long as those traditions are consistent with human rights and democracy. 
British use of traditions has created a strong connection between the political elite and 
the rest of the members of the society which has made the UK one of the few states in 
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modem times that enjoy both political stability and substantive features of democracy. 
The UK, as one of the most developed countries in the Western world, which has 
participated strongly in forming most parts of international law, has also shown that the 
reconciliation of the most fundamental constitutional principles with the most 
fundamental of international norms is widely possible. The UK's constitutional 
principle of sovereign Parliament seems to constitute to a large degree the same obstacle 
that the supremacy of Shari'ah is forming in the United Arab Emirates and other Islamic 
states that adhere to the Islamic constitutional principle that God is the supreme 
lawgiver. Both are raising difficulty in the implementation of the international rights, 
although they differ in their justifications of the limitations. 
The European legal technique to accommodate the British differences in the 
implementation of the convention rights can be of benefit for the international 
instruments to set standards for permissible variations, as well as for the other states to 
adjust their differences within the international framework. European Court practice has 
shown flexibility in tackling states' implementation of the convention rights and 
allowed a good margin for the states to determine how rights can best be implemented 
in accordance with each state's legal values and constitutional traditions. Even in the 
case of rights like the right to freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment, the court contends that the local public opinion can have a bearing on 
the interpretation of the concept of "degrading punishment". If that is the case at the 
regional level, where states are supposed share a common heritage, then more tolerance 
is needed to accommodate the wider variations of values, on the world level, which are 
not only fundamental for the maintenance of the law and order, but form the main factor 
of legitimacy of the state authorities like the Islamic ones. 
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VI. Conclusion 
VI. I. Findings of the Research 
The previous chapters clearly demonstrate that there are many aspects of international 
human rights that need to be addressed more carefully in terms of their applicability. As 
seen in Chapter Two and Chapter Five, the image of one homogenous "Western right" 
is misleading and not realistic. They have shown that the Western states themselves, 
although springing from the same ideology of individualism, are not unified in a certain 
model of human rights implementation. British experience demonstrates that 
disagreement over such a contestable matter is difficult to accommodate even on the 
regional level, where societies are supposed to have shared common values. It can even 
exist within one state and hence it is not surprising to see that human rights on the 
international level are such a controversial subject. The UK's endeavour to 
accommodate international rights within its common law system revealed that there are 
many aspects of the notion of right that still need more elaboration and exploration, 
especially when it comes to the realm in which the two important fields, law and 
politics, each claims its own exclusive jurisdiction. British emphasis on the political 
legitimacy of human rights implementation is of significance, calling for more attention 
to the area where a potential conflict between law and politics could occur. The 
advocates of the universality of human rights have generally simplified the matter of 
implementation and seem to be less enthusiastic to take into account the complexity that 
arises from the process of right application in the state constitutional settings. They 
seem to mix the process of recognition, which generally does not go beyond the 
assessment of whether to ratify a certain human rights treaty, with or without 
reservation, with the process of realization, which requires the assessment of whether 
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the right is effectively applied by the state and practised fully in the country, which is 
more difficult to measure. 986 From this perspective, this study appeals for 
reconsideration of the international human rights discourse to avoid being biased to the 
Western culture, trying to suggest that the use of traditions to a certain cregree is 
inevitable to establish real universal human rights with full realization of their essence. 
As Surin Pitsuwan suggested in an expert seminar held by the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with the UN resolution 2001/41, people 
are only convinced by their own rich cultures, and hence they should be encouraged to 
achieve human rights on the wings of their own cultures, inspirations and teachings. 987 
Hence, although some of the Islamic values and principles may seem incompatible with 
the principles and values of the current international trend of human rights, this does not 
necessarily mean these Islamic principles and values must be changed to comply. 
Rather, it may more appropriately be suggested that this developing notion of human 
rights should be reconsidered to make universal rights more universal and not relative to 
a certain regional part of the world. 
It must be noted, here, that the question of disagreement over rights present in this study 
is not whether a right is obligatory in its legal sense but how to apply this obligatory 
right within the social and religious context. There is, as discussed above, no 
international fixed model of right implementation, but only theoretical standards which 
are, in many parts, controversial. Many human rights authors, like Mayer and Donnelly, 
make their claims against Islam without having proper knowledge of what Islam really 
is. They seem to overstate the Islamic recognition of the individual's duty towards God 
986 Arat, Z., "Human Rights and Democracy: expanding or contracting", Vol, 32 Polity, 1999 
937 Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/41, Continuing dialogue on measures to promote and 
consolidate democracy, AIRES12001141 
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and society in claiming that Islam has only recognised the concept of duty rather than , 
the concept of right. Chapter Three of this study has given a detailed examination of the 
concept of right in Islam which according to the most recognised schools in the Islamic 
fiqh appears to be a comprehensive notion, covering both concepts; right as a rlaim as 
well as the concept of duty. Although the Islamic scholars have not defined the notion 
of right in the same context that the Western authors have defined it, the rules 
vindicated by the Islamic scholars on the basis of their understanding of right clearly 
assert that the right in Islam is not a mere duty but also an individual claim with the 
force of the Shari'ah law against whoever violates his right, even if it was the state. 988 
Many of the human rights authors seem also to overstate the Islamic principal belief that 
God is the ultimate legislative power in an attempt to suggest that Islam is 
undemocratic, as it contradicts the democratic main value that people, not God, are the 
ultimate legislature. In so arguing, they seem to have not properly understood the 
differentiation presented in the Islamic fiqh between sovereignty and legitimacy. This 
affirms that although God is the source of legislation of very broad and general political 
and legal structures of the state, the people, in Islam, are still the source of political 
power and legitimacy for governance. This Islamic conception of democracy does not 
seem to differ very much from the Western one since, as seen in Chapter Three, the 
main components of democracy, which are representativeness, accountability, and the 
respect of individual rights and freedoms are generally recognised. It is worth noting, 
here, that this study does not underestimate the Western authors' claim against Islam, 
since there are Islamic scholars who are against democracy and who seem to even 
conceptualize a theocratic nature of the Islamic state. Western criticisms are of 
significance and it may even be necessary to have outsiders' comment on this particular 
988 See our discussion in Chapter Three 
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field in order to review the Islamic discourse and see where the weaknesses are. 
However, the study is calling upon those authors to raise their awareness about Islam, 
particularly in areas which, on the surface, seem to conflict with the international right 
and which by close examination indicate, rather than conflict, a permissible difference. 
The inheritance right, for example, at first glance may seem to be conflicting with the 
international right of non-discrimination, as the Islamic teaching gives males a bigger 
share of inheritance than is given to females. However, on reflection, this 
differentiation, as seen in Chapter Three, seems to be more in the nature of justified and 
objective differentiation which may be permissible under the international instruments, 
rather than abhorrent discrimination, since males are not always given the bigger share 
and sometimes even get less than what is preserved for females . 
989 However, it is 
worthwhile to note that not all Islamic principles can be reconciled with the current 
international right and may even never bear modification, like the Islamic hudud 
punishments. This particularly calls for particular attention to be given by the 
international instruments to reconsider their discourse to be more accommodative to 
others' fixed values, in much the same way they seek the others' discourse to be 
accommodative to their values. The technique of the doctrine of the margin of 
appreciation, discussed in Chapter Five, might be of benefit to strike that balance. 
The study also calls upon the Islamic authors to reconsider their discourse and be more 
receptive to the internationally recognised values of human rights. Human beings do 
share common values and there is no such particularity that justifies the breach of the 
very essence of the basic right of individual and hence Muslims deserve to live in a state 
of justice in much the same way the people in other parts of the world do. Instead of 
hiding behind the cloak of cultural differences, they should work together with the 
9'9 See Chapter Three 
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international rights jurists and advocates and challenge the arguments against them with 
another argument for, not against, the promotion of human rights. Building a proper 
communication between the two sides through the UN human rights bodies and forums 
would pave the way for better understanding, which in its turn would clear the, air and 
correct misconceptions about both approaches to human rights. But this might not be of 
relevance if Muslim jurists have not used the same language between themselves in the 
first place and hence Muslim jurists are encouraged to be unified under universal and 
fixed principles of Islam, with a sensitive approach to human rights promotion in the 
Islamic states. The OIC would be helpful to unify Islamic states under a universal 
Islamic conception of human rights. 
It is worthwhile noting, however, that this divergence of opinions of Islamic scholars 
should not be taken as a sign of ambiguity of the Islamic Shariah to discredit Islam as 
having unqualified rules and hence, as is sometimes claimed, being incapable to qualify 
human rights. 990 The divergence of opinions should not raise any ambiguity or 
confusion; rather, it should be seen as affording greater options to choose from in a 
quest for a solution. Islamists, like secularists, have right wing, moderate and left wing 
but in Islamic terms. Ulania or Islamic scholars are also very much the same as lawyers 
in the secular realm. Why is it good for secularists to differ in their opinions and 
regarded as a healthy process and a support for freedom of speech, but when it comes to 
Islam, the same behaviour raises uncertainty? Therefore, this study is not trying to close 
the door before differences in opinions, but rather calling upon the Islamic authors to 
avoid politicising a particular vision of Islam at the expense of the others, and to give 
others who differ the respect they deserve, as no one can claim the ultimate truth. 
Within this context of tolerance, Islam, in this changing world, should be read in a 
See Mayer, A., op. cit, 1995, pp. 64-65 
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receptive way that can accommodate changes in conditions and circumstances but 
without affecting the main fixed fundamentals. The discouraging situation in the Islamic 
states in the field of human rights may be a result of such politicization of a certain 
vision of Islam, whose main concern is not to change but to uphold the traditions 
through changing circumstances. 
The gross violation of human rights in most Islamic states is a result of the absence of a 
clear Islamic vision of the relationship between the governor and the governed. Chapter 
Three clearly demonstrates the democratic feature of Islam in principle, which is based 
on representativeness, accountability and the respect of human rights, but this is not to 
say that Islam has not recognised other, hereditary forms of government too. The later 
ages of Islamic history have shown an abundance of this substantive feature of Islam 
and this diversion from the principle of democracy has for long been accepted and 
promoted by most Islamic jurists and scholars. If we measure the age of Islamic 
goverrunent based on the respect of individual rights, we will undoubtedly find it, in the 
Islamic history, occupying a very short period of time compared with the authoritarian 
Islamic regime established after the golden era of the Companions' governance. This 
confusing stance of Islamic jurists towards democracy, together with the lack of clear 
political machinery concerning the application of the Islamic political beliefs and 
values, have brought about a state of confusion and vagueness which in its turn has led 
to the current political situations of the current Islamic states. This absence of a clear 
Islamic political form of government may be one reason that encourages some Islamic 
states to uphold a certain vision of Islam at the expense of others. 
However, the gross violation of human rights in Islamic states may not only be due to 
this factor but there is another strong factor that maintains the state of emergency in 
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many Islamic states. It can be concluded from the comparative study conducted by 
Daniel E. Price991 that most Islamic states that have worst human rights records appear 
to be governed by goverrunents that came through military upheaval, like Syria, Iraq, 
Libya, Sudan, etc., while states like the Gulf States, 992 whose governments were 
established without revolution, although tribal, seem to have less violation of human 
rights. This result might be natural, since the nature of a state whose government came 
through revolution is likely, if it does not base itself in democratic principles, to take the 
form of a police state, that is always concerned with its security rather than the respect 
of individual rights, as it is always under fear of another revolution. Although Price, in 
his study, has given a sophisticated analysis of the relationship of Islam to democracy, 
in which he concluded that Islam is not the force that is repressing democracy in 
Muslim nations, referring to other emerging secular values in the Islamic public life that 
could play a more important role of repressing, the fact that these states are governed by 
people who came into power through military upheaval cannot be underestimated. 
Many studies which are concerned with the promotion of human rights in Islamic states 
seem to ignore this important element and many of them seem to put the blame on Islam 
alone as the factor of non-compliance with the international rights. 
The approach taken in this study, therefore, has taken this fact into account and uses the 
United Arab Emirates as a case study, because it is an Islamic state which has no 
particular image about Islam to uphold, and its government was established without 
revolution. What also makes the UAE an interesting case study, here, is the fact that it is 
a federal state of which the power map of the state institutions is clear. We do not 
overstate the situation in the UAE, since it is undemocratic and still established on tribal 
991 Price, D., Islamic Political Culture, Democracy, and Human Rights: a comparative study, Westport, 
Connectiut: Praeger, 1999 
992 Especially those which do not fall into a trap of politicizing a certain vision of Islam 
314 
Chapter Six: Conclusion 
values, which may be evidenced by the fact that the Federal National Council is seen in , 
reality as a modem form of tribal MajIes (council), which is usually composed of the 
old and more influential people in the tribe, acting as a consultative body that provides 
the ruler with advice on tribal affairs. 993 However, these tribal values are not saored and 
nothing stands in the way of any attempt to change them if there is a political will for 
change and development. This is evidenced by the introductory statement of the UAE 
constitution which stresses that a dignified and free constitutional life underpinned by a 
comprehensive, representative, democratic regime is one of the main goals of the UAE 
constitution, although the approach set to achieve that happened to be a gradual one. 994 
The examination of the UAE constitutional settings in Chapter Four clearly 
demonstrates that although the UAE is an Islamic state with strong endorsement of the 
Islamic rules and principles in both its constitution and judicial practices, the main 
formal structure of the modem state is also recognised. Islam does not seem to be an 
obstacle to the endorsement of the modem values of a constitutional state. Whether or 
not these constitutional structures are effective is a matter that is more dependent on the 
political will of the state than on the principles of Islam. However, the examination of 
the UAE also reveals that there is a clear tension between the principles of Islam and the 
international rights, particularly in relation to flogging and the discrimination in 
marriage between Muslim and non-Muslim. Unlike the other tribal values that may exist 
in the UAE constitutional system, these values are so sacred that they cannot be 
changed, since they have been revealed by God through the Islamic Shariah. From this 
point it might be right to say that the tension between Islam and the international rights 
does not seem to go beyond this legal perspective since, as it seems, it does not have a 
real problem with the modem notion of democracy that is underpinned by the rule of 
993 AI-Ghufli, S., op. cit., pp. 123-24 
994 See the introduction of the UAE Constitution. 
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law, civil society and free media. Even if there is an Islamic view opposing these 
modem values of a modem state, although it represents a minority of jurists, there is a 
wide space in the Islamic fzqh to argue and resolve the problem through constructive 
interpretation, since these matters are of an 'Adat nature; they fall in the realm of human 
logic and are governed by the necessities of the realities that change from time to time. 
Within this context, reference to the United Kingdom was made in Chapter Five to learn 
how the tension between local values and international norms can be resolved. Although 
the UK has a great tradition of democracy and has made a great contribution to the 
establishment of the current international instruments of human rights, it has a rigid 
constitutional tradition that holds the UK back from full realization of human rights. 
Like the sacred principles of the Shariah law in the United Arab Emirates, the 
Parliamentary enactment seem to be so sacred that the judiciary cannot override it, even 
if it was contrafy to the international rights. The constitutional principle of supremacy of 
the Islamic Sharl'ah, which implies that God is the supreme lawgiver in the UAE, and 
which cannot be changed by the legislature, seems to be comparable to the supremacy 
of the constitutional principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty in the UK, which even 
Parliament itself cannot change. So, Islamic religion and British tradition seem to come 
to a point of convergence in respect of the foreign values represented by the 
international norms of human rights. The British experience has shown, however, that 
the resolution of this tension is not necessarily to be made at the expense of the local 
values of the state, especially if these values are of such an inviolable nature. The UK, 
in resolving the tension, seems to have put both sides relevant to the matter, itself and 
the European Court of Human Rights, on an equal footing, as both are concerned to 
resolve the incompatibility. Although the UK seems to have upheld its constitutional 
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principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty, such reconciliation seems to have been 
perfon-ned with sincerity and in good faith. 
Islamic judges can make use of the British courts' flexible approach of incorporating 
Customary International law and Treaty law into their interpretation of Islamic law. 
British judges have clearly identified the areas where they can implement international 
principles without affecting the UK fundamental principle of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty. They adopt a flexible method of interpretation of parliamentary statutes, 
whereby the courts assume that such statutes are not intended to violate international 
law. As Islam is, in itself, a universal religion revealed to all human beings by God to 
promote justice on earth, Islamic judges can, then, assume that Islamic law was not 
intended to violate the general principles of international human rights. Where tension 
arises, Islamic judges should make use of the UK courts' experience along with the 
doctrine of Siyasah Shariyyah and adopt a dynamic approach in the interpretation of the 
Shari'ah law that corresponds to the present-day conditions. One of the areas, where the 
British judicial principle of the presumption of intended conformity with international 
human rights law can be of use to the Islamic judges is, for example, women's right to 
participate in political affairs. Islamic judges can assume in their interpretation of 
Islamic rules that the rules of Shari'ah are not intended to deprive women of such a 
right, since there is no clear explicit Quranic text or Prophetic saying or practice to the 
contrary, as discussed in Chapter Three. However, this does not mean they should 
disregard the fixed fundamentals of Islam, such as the application of Islamic hudud, but 
rather they should preserve, as the British judges did when preserving the UK 
fundamental principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty, the supremacy of the Shari'ah and 
apply its irreconcilable rules as required by the Shari'ah law, notwithstanding their 
inconsistency with the current understanding of international human rights. International 
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human rights bodies also bear the responsibility to be more sensitive to others' fixed 
principles, in much the same way as they ask others to be sensitive to theirs. 995 
Thus, the language used by some international advocates of human rights, which 
implies that international law norms must not be compromised, and insists that 
harmonization between international rights and Islamic law depends only on Muslim 
996 scholars exploring alternative interpretations, should now be discarded. Both 
international human rights instruments and Islamic states, along with the Islamic 
scholars, should embrace a complementary approach for the promotion of human rights 
in the Islamic states. Such a complementary approach can be ýchieved internationally 
through making use of the doctrine of margin of appreciation and Islamically through 
making use of the Islamic doctfine of Siyasah Shariyyah. The unification of Islamic 
states under one conception through regional effort would also help to eliminate the 
complexity that may be raised from the conflicting Islamic views on democracy and 
human rights, which ultimately would enhance human rights in the Islamic states. 
995 Indeed, Islamic variations in human rights implementation should fall within the boundaries of 
international standards of human rights protection if they were to be internationally acceptable, and as a 
result Muslim jurists should develop a dynamic approach in the application of Islamic variations that 
correspond to the present-day conditions. The moderate reading of the Islamic Shari'ah through the use of 
the Siyasah Shariyyah, as we saw in Chapter Five, may make such Islamic variations fall within the 
acceptable margin of appreciation. Human rights approach of implementation should, after all, work both 
ways, in the sense that international human rights bodies should recognise variations in social and 
constitutional settings but social and constitutional settings should recognise they cannot self-define how 
individuals are treated and hence the limitations on individual rights have to be based on the universally 
accepted international standards of human rights protection in that they have to be, as seen in Chapter 
Five, prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society. 996 Cited in Baderin, M., op. cit., p. 222 
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'Adat Customs. 
'A dl Justice. 
AI-Ansar Muslim inhabitants of Medina, who welcomed the 
prophet Muhammad and the other Meccan Muslims 
when they migrated to Medina from Mecca. 
AI-Mahdi A male spiritual leader regarded by Shiites as a 
descendant of Muhammad divinely appointed to guide 
humans. 
Al-Mithajreen The early Muslims, companions of Muhammad, who 
emigrated with him from Makkah to Medina in the wake 
of the Hijra. 
Alqadhf Slander. 
Bay'ah Pledge of allegiance. 
DarAl-harb House of war: home of the infidels or unbelievers. 
Dar al-Islam The home of Muslims. 
Darora Necessity. 
Dhimmis Non-Muslims citizens of the Islamic states. 
Diyyah Blood money, compensation for murder or injuries under 
Islamic law. 
Faqih Islamic scholar. 
Fiqh Islamic jurisprudence. 
Hadd alkhanir The punishment of alcohol drinking. 
Hadd and Hudud Fixed Quranic punishment or punishments for certain 
crimes under Islamic law. 
Hadith A 1eJk The narration of the Lie. 
I'ateqad Belief. 
lbadat Acts of worship. 
Ibahah Permission. 
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IN AI-Hal wa Al-'Aqd The electoral college. 
#fihad The intellectual effort of Muslim jurists to reach 
independent religio-legal decisions. 
Shad A Muslim holy war or spiritual struggle against enemies. 
Jizyah Tax imposed on adult males of other faiths under Islamic 
law. 
Khathn. 4n-Nbuivat Final Prophet of God. 
KhaivarU The name of a reactionary Islamic group that emerged 
during the fighting between 'Ali and Umayyad founder 
and tried to establish its own purified caliphate to 
enforce justice and a more orthodox Islam. 
Kodysh Ancient Bedouin tribe that controlled Mecca. 
Madinah A city of Al-Ansar where the Prophet Muhammad 
migrated to from Makkah. It is the second holy city of 
Islam, after Makkah. 
Majles Council. 
Wonah The tax that brings relief to the needy persons in the 
community. 
Maslahah Interest. 
Maslahat al'aebad The interest of Muslims. 
Murtaddeen Apostates. 
Multaqi Righteous. 
Qawaniah Guardianship. 
Qisas Law of retaliation (life for life, injury for injury). 
Riba Prohibited collection of interest under Islamic law. 
Sadaqa Charity. 
Saqeefat bani Saaedah A place where the Muhajreen and Al-Ansar are gathered 
to elect a leader for Islamic state after the death of the 
Prophet Muhammad peace upon him. 
Shubhah Doubt. 
Shura Consultation. 
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Siyasah Shariyyah The legitimate govermnental policy. 
Sultan A ruler of a Muslim country. 
Sunni Madhab The Islamic school of Sunna: a major cult of Islam. 
Ta'zir Unfixed Punishments under Islamic law where judge has 
great flexibility in deciding their application. 
Tahrim Prohibition. 
Takhayyui-. A technique recognised in Islamic jurisprudence which 
permits selecting a course of legal action from the 
variousjuristic opinions. 
Takleef The concept of liability in Islamic legalism. 
Tivelver Jaya'ri A major cult of Shiite. 
Uhud A place in Madinah where the second battle in Islamic 
history has taken place. That battle was called the battle 
of Uhud. 
Ulaina Muslim scholar. 
Ummah Islamic nation. 
Wahhabisni A member of a Muslim sect founded by Abdul Wahhab 
(1703-1792), known for its strict observance of the 
Koran and flourisbing mainly in Arabia. 
Walayat Alfaqeeh The rule of religious scholar. 
Wal! One of the state authorities in the Islamic state. 
Zakat Islamic religious tax, one of the five basic requirements 
of Islam. All adult Muslims of sound mind and body 
with a set level of income and assets are expected to pay 
zakat. 
Zina Adultery and fornication. 
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